## The Project Gutenberg eBook of New York Times Current History: The European War, Vol 2, No. 1, April, 1915

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Title: New York Times Current History: The European War, Vol 2, No. 1, April, 1915

Author: Various

Release date: March 27, 2005 [eBook #15478]
Most recently updated: December 14, 2020

Language: English

Credits: E-text prepared by Juliet Sutherland, Linda Cantoni, Joshua Hutchinson, and the Project Gutenberg Online Distributed Proofreading Team

*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK NEW YORK TIMES CURRENT HISTORY: THE EUROPEAN WAR, VOL 2, NO. 1, APRIL, 1915 ***

#### E-text prepared by Juliet Sutherland, Linda Cantoni, Joshua Hutchinson,
and the Project Gutenberg Online Distributed Proofreading Team

# CURRENT HISTORY

### A MONTHLY MAGAZINE

## THE EUROPEAN WAR

## VOLUME II.

### From the Beginning to March, 1915

#### With Index

## Number 1, April, 1915

#### NEW YORK
THE NEW YORK TIMES COMPANY
1915

H.M. Hussein Kemal—The New Sultan of Egypt,
Which Was Recently Declared a British Protectorate

The Russian Royal Family—The Children of the Czar Have Inherited the Regal Beauty of Their Mother—(Photo from Paul Thompson)

## The New York Times Current History

A Monthly Magazine

### The European War

April, 1915 - September, 1915

## Germany's War Zone and Neutral Flags

## The German Decree and Interchange of Notes Answering American Protests to Germany and Britain

BERLIN, Feb. 4, (by wireless to Sayville, L.I.)—The German Admiralty today issued the following communication:

The waters around Great Britain and Ireland, including the whole English Channel, are declared a war zone on and after Feb. 18, 1915.

Every enemy merchant ship found in this war zone will be destroyed, even if it is impossible to avert dangers which threaten the crew and passengers.

Also neutral ships in the war zone are in danger, as in consequence of the misuse of neutral flags ordered by the British Government on Jan. 31, and in view of the hazards of naval warfare, it cannot always be avoided that attacks meant for enemy ships endanger neutral ships.

Shipping northward, around the Shetland Islands, in the eastern basin of the North Sea, and a strip of at least thirty nautical miles in breadth along the Dutch coast, is endangered in the same way.

### AMERICAN NOTE TO GERMANY.

Feb. 10, 1915.

The Secretary of State has instructed Ambassador Gerard at Berlin to present to the German Government a note to the following effect:

The Government of the United States, having had its attention directed to the proclamation of the German Admiralty, issued on the 4th of February, that the waters surrounding Great Britain and Ireland, including the whole of the English Channel, are to be considered as comprised within the seat of war; that all enemy merchant vessels found in those waters after the 18th inst. will be destroyed, although it may not always be possible to save crews and passengers; and that neutral vessels expose themselves to danger within this zone of war because, in view of the misuse of neutral flags said to have been ordered by the British Government on the 31st of January and of the contingencies of maritime warfare, it may not be possible always to exempt neutral vessels from attacks intended to strike enemy ships, feels it to be its duty to call the attention of the Imperial German Government, with sincere respect and the most friendly sentiments, but very candidly and earnestly, to the very serious possibilities of the course of action apparently contemplated under that proclamation.

The Government of the United States views those possibilities with such grave concern that it feels it to be its privilege, and, indeed, its duty, in the circumstances to request the Imperial German Government to consider before action is taken the critical situation in respect of the relation between this country and Germany which might arise were the German naval forces, in carrying out the policy foreshadowed in the Admiralty's proclamation, to destroy any merchant vessel of the United States or cause the death of American citizens.

It is, of course, not necessary to remind the German Government that the sole right of a belligerent in dealing with neutral vessels on the high seas is limited to visit and search, unless a blockade is proclaimed and effectively maintained, which this Government does not understand to be proposed in this case. To declare or exercise a right to attack and destroy any vessel entering a prescribed area of the high seas without first certainly determining its belligerent nationality and the contraband character of its cargo would be an act so unprecedented in naval warfare that this Government is reluctant to believe that the Imperial Government of Germany in this case contemplates it as possible.

The suspicion that enemy ships are using neutral flags improperly can create no just presumption that all ships traversing a prescribed area are subject to the same suspicion. It is to determine exactly such questions that this Government understands the right of visit and search to have been recognized.

This Government has carefully noted the explanatory statement issued by the Imperial German Government at the same time with the proclamation of the German Admiralty, and takes this occasion to remind the Imperial German Government very respectfully that the Government of the United States is open to none of the criticisms for unneutral action to which the German Government believes the Governments of certain other neutral nations have laid themselves open; that the Government of the United States has not consented to or acquiesced in any measures which may have been taken by the other belligerent nations in the present war which operate to restrain neutral trade, but has, on the contrary, taken in all such matters a position which warrants it in holding those Governments responsible in the proper way for any untoward effects on American shipping which the accepted principles of international law do not justify; and that it, therefore, regards itself as free in the present instance to take with a clear conscience and upon accepted principles the position indicated in this note.

If the commanders of German vessels of war should act upon the presumption that the flag of the United States was not being used in good faith and should destroy on the high seas an American vessel or the lives of American citizens, it would be difficult for the Government of the United States to view the act in any other light than as an indefensible violation of neutral rights, which it would be very hard, indeed, to reconcile with the friendly relations now happily subsisting between the two Governments.

If such a deplorable situation should arise, the Imperial German Government can readily appreciate that the Government of the United States would be constrained to hold the Imperial Government of Germany to a strict accountability for such acts of their naval authorities, and to take any steps it might be necessary to take to safeguard American lives and property and to secure to American citizens the full enjoyment of their acknowledged rights on the high seas.

The Government of the United States, in view of these considerations, which it urges with the greatest respect and with the sincere purpose of making sure that no misunderstandings may arise, and no circumstances occur, that might even cloud the intercourse of the two Governments, expresses the confident hope and expectation that the Imperial German Government can and will give assurance that American citizens and their vessels will not be molested by the naval forces of Germany otherwise than by visit and search, though their vessels may be traversing the sea area delimited in the proclamation of the German Admiralty. It is stated for the information of the Imperial Government that representations have been made to his Britannic Majesty's Government in respect to the unwarranted use of the American flag for the protection of British ships.

### AMERICAN NOTE TO ENGLAND.

Feb. 10, 1915.

The Secretary of State has instructed Ambassador Page at London to present to the British Government a note to the following effect:

The department has been advised of the declaration of the German Admiralty on Feb. 4, indicating that the British Government had on Jan. 31 explicitly authorized the use of neutral flags on British merchant vessels, presumably for the purpose of avoiding recognition by German naval forces. The department's attention has also been directed to reports in the press that the Captain of the Lusitania, acting upon orders or information received from the British authorities, raised the American flag as his vessel approached the British coasts, in order to escape anticipated attacks by German submarines. Today's press reports also contain an alleged official statement of the Foreign Office defending the use of the flag of a neutral country by a belligerent vessel in order to escape capture or attack by an enemy.

Assuming that the foregoing reports are true, the Government of the United States, reserving for future consideration the legality and propriety of the deceptive use of the flag of a neutral power in any case for the purpose of avoiding capture, desires very respectfully to point out to his Britannic Majesty's Government the serious consequences which may result to American vessels and American citizens if this practice is continued.

The occasional use of the flag of a neutral or an enemy under the stress of immediate pursuit and to deceive an approaching enemy, which appears by the press reports to be represented as the precedent and justification used to support this action, seems to this Government a very different thing from an explicit sanction by a belligerent Government for its merchant ships generally to fly the flag of a neutral power within certain portions of the high seas which are presumed to be frequented with hostile warships. The formal declaration of such a policy of general misuse of a neutral's flag jeopardizes the vessels of the neutral visiting those waters in a peculiar degree by raising the presumption that they are of belligerent nationality regardless of the flag which they may carry.

In view of the announced purpose of the German Admiralty to engage in active naval operations in certain delimited sea areas adjacent to the coasts of Great Britain and Ireland, the Government of the United States would view with anxious solicitude any general use of the flag of the United States by British vessels traversing those waters. A policy such as the one which his Majesty's Government is said to intend to adopt would, if the declaration of the German Admiralty be put in force, it seems clear, afford no protection to British vessels, while it would be a serious and constant menace to the lives and vessels of American citizens.

The Government of the United States, therefore, trusts that his Majesty's Government will do all in their power to restrain vessels of British nationality in the deceptive use of the United States flag in the sea area defined by the German declaration, since such practice would greatly endanger the vessels of a friendly power navigating those waters and would even seem to impose upon the Government of Great Britain a measure of responsibility for the loss of American lives and vessels in case of an attack by a German naval force.

You will impress upon his Majesty's Government the grave concern which this Government feels in the circumstances in regard to the safety of American vessels and lives in the war zone declared by the German Admiralty.

You may add that this Government is making earnest representations to the German Government in regard to the danger to American vessels and citizens if the declaration of the German Admiralty is put into effect.

### GERMANY'S ANSWER.

BERLIN, (via London,) Feb. 18.—German Government's reply to the American note follows:

The Imperial Government has examined the communication from the United States Government in the same spirit of good-will and friendship by which the communication appears to have been dictated. The Imperial Government is in accord with the United States Government that for both parties it is in a high degree desirable to avoid misunderstandings which might arise from measures announced by the German Admiralty and to provide against the occurrence of incidents which might trouble the friendly relations which so far happily exist between the two Governments.

With regard to the assuring of these friendly relations, the German Government believes that it may all the more reckon on a full understanding with the United States, as the procedure announced by the German Admiralty, which was fully explained in the note of the 4th inst., is in no way directed against legitimate commerce and legitimate shipping of neutrals, but represents solely a measure of self-defense, imposed on Germany by her vital interests, against England's method of warfare, which is contrary to international law, and which so far no protest by neutrals has succeeded in bringing back to the generally recognized principles of law as existing before the outbreak of war.

In order to exclude all doubt regarding these cardinal points, the German Government once more begs leave to state how things stand. Until now Germany has scrupulously observed valid international rules regarding naval warfare. At the very beginning of the war Germany immediately agreed to the proposal of the American Government to ratify the new Declaration of London, and took over its contents unaltered, and without formal obligation, into her prize law.

The German Government has obeyed these rules, even when they were diametrically opposed to her military interests. For instance, Germany allowed the transportation of provisions to England from Denmark until today, though she was well able, by her sea forces, to prevent it. In contradistinction to this attitude, England has not even hesitated at a second infringement of international law, if by such means she could paralyze the peaceful commerce of Germany with neutrals. The German Government will be the less obliged to enter into details, as these are put down sufficiently, though not exhaustively, in the American note to the British Government dated Dec. 29, as a result of five months' experience.

All these encroachments have been made, as has been admitted, in order to cut off all supplies from Germany and thereby starve her peaceful civil population—a procedure contrary to all humanitarian principles. Neutrals have been unable to prevent the interruption of their commerce with Germany, which is contrary to international laws.

The American Government, as Germany readily acknowledges, has protested against the British procedure. In spite of these protests and protests from other neutral States, Great Britain could not be induced to depart from the course of action she had decided upon. Thus, for instance, the American ship Wilhelmina recently was stopped by the British, although her cargo was destined solely for the German civil population, and, according to the express declaration of the German Government, was to be employed only for this purpose.

Germany is as good as cut off from her overseas supply by the silent or protesting toleration of neutrals, not only in regard to such goods as are absolute contraband, but also in regard to such as, according to acknowledged law before the war, are only conditional contraband or not contraband at all. Great Britain, on the other hand, is, with the toleration of neutral Governments, not only supplied with such goods as are not contraband or only conditional contraband, but with goods which are regarded by Great Britain, if sent to Germany, as absolute contraband, namely, provisions, industrial raw materials, &c., and even with goods which have always indubitably been regarded as absolute contraband.

The German Government feels itself obliged to point out with the greatest emphasis that a traffic in arms, estimated at many hundreds of millions, is being carried on between American firms and Germany's enemies. Germany fully comprehends that the practice of right and the toleration of wrong on the part of neutrals are matters absolutely at the discretion of neutrals, and involve no formal violation of neutrality. Germany, therefore, did not complain of any formal violation of neutrality, but the German Government, in view of complete evidence before it, cannot help pointing out that it, together with the entire public opinion of Germany, feels itself to be severely prejudiced by the fact that neutrals, in safeguarding their rights in legitimate commerce with Germany according to international law, have up to the present achieved no, or only insignificant, results, while they are making unlimited use of their right by carrying on contraband traffic with Great Britain and our other enemies.

If it is a formal right of neutrals to take no steps to protect their legitimate trade with Germany, and even to allow themselves to be influenced in the direction of the conscious and willful restriction of their trade, on the other hand, they have the perfect right, which they unfortunately do not exercise, to cease contraband trade, especially in arms, with Germany's enemies.

In view of this situation, Germany, after six months of patient waiting, sees herself obliged to answer Great Britain's murderous method of naval warfare with sharp counter-measures. If Great Britain in her fight against Germany summons hunger as an ally, for the purpose of imposing upon a civilized people of 70,000,000 the choice between destitution and starvation or submission to Great Britain's commercial will, then Germany today is determined to take up the gauntlet and appeal to similar allies.

Germany trusts that the neutrals, who so far have submitted to the disadvantageous consequences of Great Britain's hunger war in silence, or merely in registering a protest, will display toward Germany no smaller measure of toleration, even if German measures, like those of Great Britain, present new terrors of naval warfare.

Moreover, the German Government is resolved to suppress with all the means at its disposal the importation of war material to Great Britain and her allies, and she takes it for granted that neutral Governments, which so far have taken no steps against the traffic in arms with Germany's enemies, will not oppose forcible suppression by Germany of this trade.

Acting from this point of view, the German Admiralty proclaimed a naval war zone, whose limits it exactly defined. Germany, so far as possible, will seek to close this war zone with mines, and will also endeavor to destroy hostile merchant vessels in every other way. While the German Government, in taking action based upon this overpowering point of view, keeps itself far removed from all intentional destruction of neutral lives and property, on the other hand, it does not fail to recognize that from the action to be taken against Great Britain dangers arise which threaten all trade within the war zone, without distinction. This a natural result of mine warfare, which, even under the strictest observance of the limits of international law, endangers every ship approaching the mine area. The German Government considers itself entitled to hope that all neutrals will acquiesce in these measures, as they have done in the case of the grievous damages inflicted upon them by British measures, all the more so as Germany is resolved, for the protection of neutral shipping even in the naval war zone, to do everything which is at all compatible with the attainment of this object.

In view of the fact that Germany gave the first proof of her good-will in fixing a time limit of not less than fourteen days before the execution of said measures, so that neutral shipping might have an opportunity of making arrangements to avoid threatening danger, this can most surely be achieved by remaining away from the naval war zone. Neutral vessels which, despite this ample notice, which greatly affects the achievement of our aims in our war against Great Britain, enter these closed waters will themselves bear the responsibility for any unfortunate accidents that may occur. Germany disclaims all responsibility for such accidents and their consequences.

Germany has further expressly announced the destruction of all enemy merchant vessels found within the war zone, but not the destruction of all merchant vessels, as the United States seems erroneously to have understood. This restriction which Germany imposes upon itself is prejudicial to the aim of our warfare, especially as in the application of the conception of contraband practiced by Great Britain toward Germany—which conception will now also be similarly interpreted by Germany—the presumption will be that neutral ships have contraband aboard. Germany naturally is unwilling to renounce its rights to ascertain the presence of contraband in neutral vessels, and in certain cases to draw conclusions therefrom.

Germany is ready, finally, to deliberate with the United States concerning any measures which might secure the safety of legitimate shipping of neutrals in the war zone. Germany cannot, however, forbear to point out that all its efforts in this direction may be rendered very difficult by two circumstances: First, the misuse of neutral flags by British merchant vessels, which is indubitably known to the United States; second, the contraband trade already mentioned, especially in war materials, on neutral vessels.

Regarding the latter point, Germany would fain hope that the United States, after further consideration, will come to a conclusion corresponding to the spirit of real neutrality. Regarding the first point, the secret order of the British Admiralty, recommending to British merchant ships the use of neutral flags, has been communicated by Germany to the United States and confirmed by communication with the British Foreign Office, which designates this procedure as entirely unobjectionable and in accordance with British law. British merchant shipping immediately followed this advice, as doubtless is known to the American Government from the incidents of the Lusitania and the Laertes.

Moreover, the British Government has supplied arms to British merchant ships and instructed them forcibly to resist German submarines. In these circumstances, it would be very difficult for submarines to recognize neutral merchant ships, for search in most cases cannot be undertaken, seeing that in the case of a disguised British ship from which an attack may be expected the searching party and the submarine would be exposed to destruction.

Great Britain, then, was in a position to make the German measures illusory if the British merchant fleet persisted in the misuse of neutral flags and neutral ships could not otherwise be recognized beyond doubt. Germany, however, being in a state of necessity, wherein she was placed by violation of law, must render effective her measures in all circumstances, in order thereby to compel her adversary to adopt methods of warfare corresponding with international law, and so to restore the freedom of the seas, of which Germany at all times is the defender and for which she today is fighting.

Germany therefore rejoices that the United States has made representations to Great Britain concerning the illegal use of their flag, and expresses the expectation that this procedure will force Great Britain to respect the American flag in the future. In this expectation, commanders of German submarines have been instructed, as already mentioned in the note of Feb. 4, to refrain from violent action against American merchant vessels, so far as these can be recognized.

In order to prevent in the surest manner the consequences of confusion—though naturally not so far as mines are concerned—Germany recommends that the United States make its ships which are conveying peaceful cargoes through the British war zone discernible by means of convoys.

Germany believes it may act on the supposition that only such ships would be convoyed as carried goods not regarded as contraband according to the British interpretation made in the case of Germany.

How this method of convoy can be carried out is a question concerning which Germany is ready to open negotiations with the United States as soon as possible. Germany would be particularly grateful, however, if the United States would urgently recommend to its merchant vessels to avoid the British naval war zone, in any case until the settlement of the flag question. Germany is inclined to the confident hope that the United States will be able to appreciate in its entire significance the heavy battle which Germany is waging for existence, and that from the foregoing explanations and promises it will acquire full understanding of the motives and the aims of the measures announced by Germany.

Germany repeats that it has now resolved upon the projected measures only under the strongest necessity of national self-defense, such measures having been deferred out of consideration for neutrals.

If the United States, in view of the weight which it is justified in throwing and able to throw into the scales of the fate of peoples, should succeed at the last moment in removing the grounds which make that procedure an obligatory duty for Germany, and if the American Government, in particular, should find a way to make the Declaration of London respected—on behalf, also, of those powers which are fighting on Germany's side—and there by make possible for Germany legitimate importation of the necessaries of life and industrial raw material, then the German Government could not too highly appreciate such a service, rendered in the interests of humane methods of warfare, and would gladly draw conclusions from the new situation.

### BRITAIN'S ANSWER.

LONDON, Feb. 19.—The full text of Great Britain's note regarding the flag, as handed to the American Ambassador, follows:

The memorandum communicated on the 11th of February calls attention in courteous and friendly terms to the action of the Captain of the British steamer Lusitania in raising the flag of the United States of America when approaching British waters, and says that the Government of the United States feels certain anxiety in considering the possibility of any general use of the flag of the United States by British vessels traversing those waters, since the effect of such a policy might be to bring about a menace to the lives and vessels of United States citizens.

It was understood that the German Government announced their intention of sinking British merchant vessels at sight by torpedoes, without giving any opportunity of making any provision for the saving of the lives of non-combatant crews and passengers. It was in consequence of this threat that the Lusitania raised the United States flag on her inward voyage.

On her subsequent outward voyage a request was made by United States passengers, who were embarking on board of her, that the United States flag should be hoisted presumably to insure their safety. Meanwhile, the memorandum from your Excellency had been received. His Majesty's Government did not give any advice to the company as to how to meet this request, and it understood that the Lusitania left Liverpool under the British flag.

It seems unnecessary to say more as regards the Lusitania in particular.

In regard to the use of foreign flags by merchant vessels, the British Merchant Shipping act makes it clear that the use of the British flag by foreign merchant vessels is permitted in time of war for the purpose of escaping capture. It is believed that in the case of some other nations there is similar recognition of the same practice with regard to their flag, and that none of them has forbidden it.

It would, therefore, be unreasonable to expect his Majesty's Government to pass legislation forbidding the use of foreign flags by British merchant vessels to avoid capture by the enemy, now that the German Government have announced their intention to sink merchant vessels at sight with their non-combatant crews, cargoes, and papers, a proceeding hitherto regarded by the opinion of the world not as war, but piracy.

It is felt that the United States Government could not fairly ask the British Government to order British merchant vessels to forgo a means, always hitherto permitted, of escaping not only capture but the much worse fate of sinking and destruction.

Great Britain always has, when a neutral, accorded to vessels of other States at war the liberty to use the British flag as a means of protection against capture, and instances are on record when United States vessels availed themselves of this facility during the American civil war. It would be contrary to fair expectation if now, when conditions are reversed, the United States and neutral nations were to grudge to British ships the liberty to take similar action.

The British Government have no intention of advising their merchant shipping to use foreign flags as a general practice or to resort to them otherwise than for escaping capture or destruction. The obligation upon a belligerent warship to ascertain definitely for itself the nationality and character of a merchant vessel before capturing it, and a fortiori before sinking and destroying it, has been universally recognized.

If that obligation is fulfilled, the hoisting of a neutral flag on board a British vessel cannot possibly endanger neutral shipping, and the British Government holds that if loss to neutrals is caused by disregard of this obligation it is upon the enemy vessel disregarding it and upon the Government giving the orders that it should be disregarded that the sole responsibility for injury to neutrals ought to rest.

### ALLIES' DECLARATION OF REPRISALS.

LONDON, March 1.—Following is the text of the statement read by Premier Asquith in the House of Commons today and communicated at the same time to the neutral powers in their capitals as an outline of the Allies' policy of retaliation against Germany for her "war zone" decree:

Germany has declared the English Channel, the north and west coasts of France, and the waters around the British Isles a war area, and has officially given notice that all enemy ships found in that area will be destroyed, and that neutral vessels may be exposed to danger.

This is, in effect, a claim to torpedo at sight, without regard to the safety of the crew or passengers, any merchant vessel under any flag. As it is not in the power of the German Admiralty to maintain any surface craft in these waters, the attack can only be delivered by submarine agency.

The law and customs of nations in regard to attacks on commerce have always presumed that the first duty of the captor of a merchant vessel is bringing it before a prize court, where it may be tried and where regularities of the capture may be challenged, and where neutrals may recover their cargo.

The sinking of prizes is, in itself, a questionable act, to be resorted to only in extraordinary circumstances, and after provision has been made for the safety of all crews and passengers.

The responsibility of discriminating between neutral and enemy vessels and between neutral and enemy cargoes obviously rests with the attacking ship, whose duty it is to verify the status and character of the vessel and cargo, and to preserve all papers before sinking or capturing the ship. So, also, the humane duty to provide for the safety of crews of merchant vessels, whether neutral or enemy, is an obligation on every belligerent.

It is upon this basis that all previous discussions of law for regulating warfare have proceeded. The German submarine fulfills none of these obligations. She enjoys no local command of the waters wherein she operates. She does not take her captures within the jurisdiction of a prize court. She carries no prize crew which can be put aboard prizes which she seizes. She uses no effective means of discriminating between neutral and enemy vessels. She does not receive on board for safety the crew of the vessel she sinks. Her methods of warfare, therefore, are entirely outside the scope of any international instruments regulating operations against commerce in time of war.

The German declaration substitutes indiscriminate destruction for regulated captures. Germany has adopted this method against the peaceful trader and the non-combatant, with the avowed object of preventing commodities of all kinds, including food for the civilian population, from reaching or leaving the British Isles or Northern France.

Her opponents are, therefore, driven to frame retaliatory measures in order in their turn to prevent commodities of any kind from reaching or leaving Germany.

These measures will, however, be enforced by the British and French Governments without risk to neutral ships or neutral or non-combatant lives, and in strict observation of the dictates of humanity. The British and French Governments will, therefore, hold themselves free to detain and take into port ships carrying goods of presumed enemy destination, ownership, or origin.

It is not intended to confiscate such vessels or cargoes unless they would otherwise be liable to confiscation. Vessels with cargoes which sailed before this date will not be affected.

### Britain's New and Original Blockade

### American Protests Following the "War Zone" Decrees Defined

The first definite statement of the real character of the measures adopted by Great Britain and her allies for restricting the trade of Germany was obtained at Washington on March 17, 1915, when Secretary Bryan made public the text of all the recent notes exchanged between the United States Government and Germany and the Allies regarding the freedom of legitimate American commerce in the war zones. These notes, six in all, show that Great Britain and France stand firm in their announced intention to cut off all trade with Germany. The communications revealed that the United States Government, realizing the difficulties of maintaining an effective blockade by a close guard of an enemy coast on account of the newly developed activity of submarines, asked that "a radius of activity" be defined. Great Britain and France replied with the announcement that the operations of blockade would not be conducted "outside of European waters, including the Mediterranean."

The definition of a "radius of activity" for the allied fleet in European waters, including the Mediterranean, is the first intimation of the geographical limits of the reprisal order. Its limits were not given more exactly, the Allies contend, because Germany was equally indefinite in proclaiming all the waters surrounding Great Britain and Ireland a "war zone." The measures adopted are those of a blockade against all trade to and from Germany—not the historical kind of blockade recognized in international law, but a new and original form.

The several notes between the United States and the belligerent Governments follow. The stars in the German note mean that as it came to the State Department in cipher certain words were omitted, probably through telegraphic error. In the official text of the note the State Department calls attention to the stars by an asterisk and a footnote saying "apparent omission." In the French note the same thing occurs, and is indicated by the footnote "undecipherable group," meaning that the cipher symbols into which the French note was put by our Embassy in Paris could not be translated back into plain language by the State Department cipher experts. From the context it is apparent that the omitted words in the German note are "insist upon," or words to that effect.

### AMERICAN NOTE TO THE BELLIGERENTS.

The following identic note was sent by the Secretary of State to the American Ambassadors at London and Berlin:

WASHINGTON, Feb. 20, 1915.

You will please deliver to Sir Edward Grey the following identic note, which we are sending England and Germany:

In view of the correspondence which has passed between this Government and Great Britain and Germany, respectively, relative to the declaration of a war zone by the German Admiralty, and the use of neutral flags by the British merchant vessels, this Government ventures to express the hope that the two belligerent Governments may, through reciprocal concessions, find a basis for agreement which will relieve neutral ships engaged in peaceful commerce from the great dangers which they will incur in the high seas adjacent to the coasts of the belligerents.

The Government of the United States respectfully suggests that an agreement in terms like the following might be entered into. This suggestion is not to be regarded as in any sense a proposal made by this Government, for it of course fully recognizes that it is not its privilege to propose terms of agreement between Great Britain and Germany, even though the matter be one in which it and the people of the United States are directly and deeply interested. It is merely venturing to take the liberty, which it hopes may be accorded a sincere friend desirous of embarrassing neither nation involved, and of serving, if it may, the common interests of humanity. The course outlined is offered in the hope that it may draw forth the views and elicit the suggestions of the British and German Governments on a matter of capital interest to the whole world.

Germany and Great Britain to agree:

First—That neither will sow any floating mines, whether upon the high seas or in territorial waters; that neither will plant on the high seas anchored mines, except within cannon range of harbors for defensive purposes only; and that all mines shall bear the stamp of the Government planting them, and be so constructed as to become harmless if separated from their moorings.

Second—That neither will use submarines to attack merchant vessels of any nationality, except to enforce the right of visit and search.

Third—-That each will require their respective merchant vessels not to use neutral flags for the purpose of disguise or ruse de guerre.

Germany to agree: That all importations of food or foodstuffs from the United States (and from such other neutral countries as may ask it) into Germany shall be consigned to agencies to be designated by the United States Government; that these American agencies shall have entire charge and control without interference on the part of German Government of the receipt and distribution of such importations, and shall distribute them solely to retail dealers bearing licenses from the German Government entitling them to receive and furnish such food and foodstuffs to non-combatants only; that any violation of the terms of the retailers' licenses shall work a forfeiture of their rights to receive such food and foodstuffs for this purpose, and that such food and foodstuffs will not be requisitioned by the German Government for any purpose whatsoever, or be diverted to the use of the armed forces of Germany.

Great Britain to agree: That food and foodstuffs will not be placed upon the absolute contraband list, and that shipments of such commodities will not be interfered with or detained by British authorities, if consigned to agencies designated by the United States Government in Germany for the receipt and distribution of such cargoes to licensed German retailers for distribution solely to the non-combatant population.

In submitting this proposed basis of agreement this Government does not wish to be understood as admitting or denying any belligerent or neutral right established by the principles of international law, but would consider the agreement, if acceptable to the interested powers, a modus vivendi based upon expediency rather than legal right, and as not binding upon the United States either in its present form or in a modified form until accepted by this Government.

BRYAN.

### II.—GERMANY'S REPLY.

The German reply, handed to the American Ambassador at Berlin, follows:

BERLIN, March 1, 1915.

The undersigned has the honor to inform his Excellency, Mr. James W. Gerard, Ambassador of the United States of America, in reply to the note of the 22d inst., that the Imperial German Government have taken note with great interest of the suggestion of the American Government that certain principles for the conduct of maritime war on the part of Germany and England be agreed upon for the protection of neutral shipping. They see therein new evidence of the friendly feelings of the American Government toward the German Government, which are fully reciprocated by Germany.

It is in accordance with Germany's wishes also to have maritime war conducted according to rules, which, without discriminatingly restricting one or the other of the belligerent powers in the use of their means of warfare, are equally considerate of the interests of neutrals and the dictates of humanity. Consequently it was intimated in the German note of the 16th inst. that observation of the Declaration of London on the part of Germany's adversaries would create a new situation from which the German Government would gladly draw the proper conclusions.

Proceeding from this view, the German Government have carefully examined the suggestion of the American Government and believe that they can actually see in it a suitable basis for the practical solution of the questions which have arisen.

With regard to the various points of the American note, they beg to make the following remarks:

First—With regard to the sowing of mines, the German Government would be willing to agree, as suggested, not to use floating mines and to have anchored mines constructed as indicated. Moreover, they agree to put the stamp of the Government on all mines to be planted. On the other hand, it does not appear to them to be feasible for the belligerents wholly to for ego the use of anchored mines for offensive purposes.

Second—The German Government would undertake not to use their submarines to attack mercantile of any flag except when necessary to enforce the right of visit and search. Should the enemy nationality of the vessel or the presence of contraband be ascertained, submarines would proceed in accordance with the general rules of international law.

Third—As provided in the American note, this restriction of the use of the submarines is contingent on the fact that enemy mercantile abstain from the use of the neutral flag and other neutral distinctive marks. It would appear to be a matter of course that such mercantile vessels also abstain from arming themselves and from all resistance by force, since such procedure contrary to international law would render impossible any action of the submarines in accordance with international law.

Fourth—The regulation of legitimate importations of food into Germany suggested by the American Government appears to be in general acceptable. Such regulation would, of course, be confined to importations by sea, but that would, on the other hand, include indirect importations by way of neutral ports. The German Government would, therefore, be willing to make the declarations of the nature provided in the American note so that the use of the imported food and foodstuffs solely by the non-combatant population would be guaranteed. The Imperial Government must, however, in addition (* * * * *)1 having the importation of other raw material used by the economic system of non-combatants, including forage, permitted. To that end the enemy Governments would have to permit the free entry into Germany of the raw material mentioned in the free list of the Declaration of London, and to treat materials included in the list of conditional contraband according to the same principles as food and foodstuffs.

The German Government venture to hope that the agreement for which the American Government have paved the way may be reached after due consideration of the remarks made above, and that in this way peaceable neutral shipping and trade will not have to suffer any more than is absolutely necessary from the unavoidable effects of maritime war. These effects could be still further reduced if, as was pointed out in the German note of the 16th inst., some way could be found to exclude the shipping of munitions of war from neutral countries to belligerents on ships of any nationality.

The German Government must, of course, reserve a definite statement of their position until such time as they may receive further information from the American Government enabling them to see what obligations the British Government are, on their part, willing to assume.

The undersigned avails himself of this occasion, &c.

VON JAGOW.

Dated, Foreign Office, Berlin, Feb. 28, 1915.

GERARD.

### III.—GREAT BRITAIN'S REPLY.

The reply of Great Britain to the American note of Feb. 20, handed to the American Ambassador at London, was as follows:

LONDON, March 15, 1915.

Following is the full text of a memorandum dated March 13, which Grey handed me today:

"On the 22d of February last I received a communication from your Excellency of the identic note addressed to his Majesty's Government and to Germany respecting an agreement on certain points as to the conduct of the war at sea. The reply of the German Government to this note has been published and it is not understood from the reply that the German Government are prepared to abandon the practice of sinking British merchant vessels by submarines, and it is evident from their reply that they will not abandon the use of mines for offensive purposes on the high seas as contrasted with the use of mines for defensive purposes only within cannon range of their own harbors, as suggested by the Government of the United States. This being so, it might appear unnecessary for the British Government to make any further reply than to take note of the German answer.

"We desire, however, to take the opportunity of making a fuller statement of the whole position and of our feeling with regard to it. We recognize with sympathy the desire of the Government of the United States to see the European war conducted in accordance with the previously recognized rules of international law and the dictates of humanity. It is thus that the British forces have conducted the war, and we are not aware that these forces, either naval or military, can have laid to their charge any improper proceedings, either in the conduct of hostilities or in the treatment of prisoners or wounded. On the German side it has been very different.

"1. The treatment of civilian inhabitants in Belgium and the North of France has been made public by the Belgian and French Governments and by those who have had experience of it at first hand. Modern history affords no precedent for the sufferings that have been inflicted on the defenseless and non-combatant population in the territory that has been in German military occupation. Even the food of the population was confiscated until in Belgium an international commission, largely influenced by American generosity and conducted under American auspices, came to the relief of the population and secured from the German Government a promise to spare what food was still left in the country, though the Germans still continue to make levies in money upon the defenseless population for the support of the German Army.

"2. We have from time to time received most terrible accounts of the barbarous treatment to which British officers and soldiers have been exposed after they have been taken prisoner, while being conveyed to German prison camps. One or two instances have already been given to the United States Government founded upon authentic and first-hand evidence which is beyond doubt. Some evidence has been received of the hardships to which British prisoners of war are subjected in the prison camps, contrasting, we believe, most unfavorably with the treatment of German prisoners in this country. We have proposed, with the consent of the United States Government, that a commission of United States officers should be permitted in each country to inspect the treatment of prisoners of war. The United States Government have been unable to obtain any reply from the German Government to this proposal, and we remain in continuing anxiety and apprehension as to the treatment of British prisoners of war in Germany.

"3. At the very outset of the war a German mine layer was discovered laying a mine field on the high seas. Further mine fields have been laid from time to time without warning, and, so far as we know, are still being laid on the high seas, and many neutral as well as British vessels have been sunk by them.

"4. At various times during the war German submarines have stopped and sunk British merchant vessels, thus making the sinking of merchant vessels a general practice, though it was admitted previously, if at all, only as an exception, the general rule to which the British Government have adhered being that merchant vessels, if captured, must be taken before a prize court. In one case already quoted in a note to the United States Government a neutral vessel carrying foodstuffs to an unfortified town in Great Britain has been sunk. Another case is now reported in which a German armed cruiser has sunk an American vessel, the William P. Frye, carrying a cargo of wheat from Seattle to Queenstown. In both cases the cargoes were presumably destined for the civil population. Even the cargoes in such circumstances should not have been condemned without the decision of a prize court, much less should the vessels have been sunk. It is to be noted that both these cases occurred before the detention by the British authorities of the Wilhelmina and her cargo of foodstuffs, which the German Government allege is the justification for their own action.

"The Germans have announced their intention of sinking British merchant vessels by torpedo without notice and without any provision for the safety of the crews. They have already carried out this intention in the case of neutral as well as of British vessels, and a number of non-combatant and innocent lives on British vessels, unarmed and defenseless, have been destroyed in this way.

"5. Unfortified, open, and defenseless towns, such as Scarborough, Yarmouth, and Whitby, have been deliberately and wantonly bombarded by German ships of war, causing in some cases considerable loss of civilian life, including women and children.

"6. German aircraft have dropped bombs on the east coast of England, where there were no military or strategic points to be attacked. On the other hand, I am aware of but two criticisms that have been made on British action in all these respects:

"1. It is said that the British naval authorities also have laid some anchored mines on the high seas. They have done so, but the mines were anchored and so constructed that they would be harmless if they went adrift, and no mines whatever were laid by the British naval authorities till many weeks after the Germans had made a regular practice of laying mines on the high seas.

"2. It is said that the British Government have departed from the view of international law which they had previously maintained, that foodstuffs destined for the civil population should never be interfered with, this charge being founded on the submission to a prize court of the cargo of the Wilhelmina. The special considerations affecting this cargo have already been presented in a memorandum to the United States Government, and I need not repeat them here.

"Inasmuch as the blockade of all foodstuffs is an admitted consequence of blockade, it is obvious that there can be no universal rule based on considerations of morality and humanity which is contrary to this practice. The right to stop foodstuffs destined for the civil population must therefore in any case be admitted if an effective 'cordon' controlling intercourse with the enemy is drawn, announced, and maintained. Moreover, independently of rights arising from belligerent action in the nature of blockade, some other nations, differing from the opinion of the Governments of the United States and Great Britain, have held that to stop the food of the civil population is a natural and legitimate method of bringing pressure to bear on an enemy country as it is upon the defense of a besieged town. It is also upheld on the authority of both Prince Bismarck and Count Caprivi, and therefore presumably is not repugnant to German morality.

"The following are the quotations from Prince Bismarck and Count Caprivi on this point. Prince Bismarck in answering, in 1885, an application from the Kiel Chamber of Commerce for a statement of the view of the German Government on the question of the right to declare as contraband foodstuffs that were not intended for military forces said: 'I reply to the Chamber of Commerce that any disadvantage our commercial and carrying interests may suffer by the treatment of rice as contraband of war does not justify our opposing a measure which it has been thought fit to take in carrying on a foreign war. Every war is a calamity which entails evil consequences not only on the combatants but also on neutrals. These evils may easily be increased by the interference of a neutral power with the way in which a third carries on the war to the disadvantage of the subjects of the interfering power, and by this means German commerce might be weighted with far heavier losses than a transitory prohibition of the rice trade in Chinese waters. The measure in question has for its object the shortening of the war by increasing the difficulties of the enemy and is a justifiable step in war if impartially enforced against all neutral ships.'

"Count Caprivi, during a discussion in the German Reichstag on the 4th of March, 1892, on the subject of the importance of international protection for private property at sea, made the following statements: 'A country may be dependent for her food or for her raw products upon her trade. In fact, it may be absolutely necessary to destroy the enemy's trade.' 'The private introduction of provisions into Paris was prohibited during the siege, and in the same way a nation would be justified in preventing the import of food and raw produce.'

"The Government of Great Britain have frankly declared, in concert with the Government of France, their intention to meet the German attempt to stop all supplies of every kind from leaving or entering British or French ports by themselves stopping supplies going to or from Germany. For this end, the British fleet has instituted a blockade effectively controlling by cruiser 'cordon' all passage to and from Germany by sea. The difference between the two policies is, however, that, while our object is the same as that of Germany, we propose to attain it without sacrificing neutral ships or non-combatant lives, or inflicting upon neutrals the damage that must be entailed when a vessel and its cargo are sunk without notice, examination, or trial.

"I must emphasize again that this measure is a natural and necessary consequence of the unprecedented methods repugnant to all law and morality which have been described above which Germany began to adopt at the very outset of the war and the effects of which have been constantly accumulating."

American Ambassador, London.

### IV.—AMERICAN INQUIRY ON REPRISAL METHOD.

The American Government on March 5 transmitted identic messages of inquiry to the Ambassadors at London and Paris inquiring from both England and France how the declarations in the Anglo-French note proclaiming an embargo on all commerce between Germany and neutral countries were to be carried into effect. The message to London was as follows:

WASHINGTON, March 5, 1915.

In regard to the recent communications received from the British and French Governments concerning restraints upon commerce with Germany, please communicate with the British Foreign Office in the sense following:

The difficulty of determining action upon the British and French declarations of intended retaliation upon commerce with Germany lies in the nature of the proposed measures in their relation to commerce by neutrals.

While it appears that the intention is to interfere with and take into custody all ships, both outgoing and incoming, trading with Germany, which is in effect a blockade of German ports, the rule of blockade that a ship attempting to enter or leave a German port, regardless of the character of its cargo, may be condemned is not asserted.

The language of the declaration is "the British and French Governments will, therefore, hold themselves free to detain and take into port ships carrying goods of presumed enemy destination, ownership, or origin. It is not intended to confiscate such vessels or cargoes unless they would otherwise be liable to condemnation."

The first sentence claims a right pertaining only to a state of blockade. The last sentence proposes a treatment of ships and cargoes as if no blockade existed. The two together present a proposed course of action previously unknown to international law.

As a consequence neutrals have no standard by which to measure their rights or to avoid danger to their ships and cargoes. The paradoxical situation thus created should be changed and the declaring powers ought to assert whether they rely upon the rules governing a blockade or the rules applicable when no blockade exists.

The declaration presents other perplexities. The last sentence quoted indicates that the rules of contraband are to be applied to cargoes detained. The rules covering non-contraband articles carried in neutral bottoms is that the cargoes shall be released and the ships allowed to proceed.

This rule cannot, under the first sentence quoted, be applied as to destination. What, then, is to be done with a cargo of non-contraband goods detained under the declaration? The same question may be asked as to conditional contraband cargoes.

The foregoing comments apply to cargoes destined for Germany. Cargoes coming out of German forts present another problem under the terms of the declaration. Under the rules governing enemy exports only goods owned by enemy subjects in enemy bottoms are subject to seizure and condemnation. Yet by the declaration it is purposed to seize and take into port all goods of enemy "ownership and origin." The word "origin" is particularly significant. The origin of goods destined to neutral territory on neutral ships is not, and never has been, a ground for forfeiture, except in case a blockade is declared and maintained. What, then, would the seizure amount to in the present case except to delay the delivery of the goods? The declaration does not indicate what disposition would be made of such cargoes if owned by a neutral or if owned by an enemy subject. Would a different rule be applied according to ownership? If so, upon what principles of international law would it rest? And upon what rule, if no blockade is declared and maintained, could the cargo of a neutral ship sailing out of a German port be condemned? If it is not condemned, what other legal course is there but to release it?

While this Government is fully alive to the possibility that the methods of modern naval warfare, particularly in the use of submarines for both defensive and offensive operations, may make the former means of maintaining a blockade a physical impossibility, it feels that it can be urged with great force that there should be also some limit to "the radius of activity," and especially so if this action by the belligerents can be construed to be a blockade. It would certainly create a serious state of affairs if, for example, an American vessel laden with a cargo of German origin should escape the British patrol in European waters only to be held up by a cruiser off New York and taken into Halifax.

Similar cablegrams sent to Paris.

BRYAN.

### V.—BRITISH REPLY TO THE AMERICAN INQUIRY.

The reply from the British Government transmitted by the American Ambassador at London to the Secretary of State concerning the method of enforcing the reprisal order follows:

LONDON, March 15, 1915.

Following is the full text of a note dated today and an Order in Council I have just received from Grey:

"1. His Majesty's Government have had under careful consideration the inquiries which, under instructions from your Government, your Excellency addressed to me on the 8th inst., regarding the scope and mode of application of the measures foreshadowed in the British and French declarations of the 1st of March, for restricting the trade of Germany. Your Excellency explained and illustrated by reference to certain contingencies the difficulty of the United States Government in adopting a definite attitude toward these measures by reason of uncertainty regarding their bearing upon the commerce of neutral countries.

"2. I can at once assure your Excellency that subject to the paramount necessity of restricting German trade his Majesty's Government have made it their first aim to minimize inconvenience to neutral commerce. From the accompanying copy of the Order in Council, which is to be published today, you will observe that a wide discretion is afforded to the prize court in dealing with the trade of neutrals in such manner as may, in the circumstances, be deemed just, and that full provision is made to facilitate claims by persons interested in any goods placed in the custody of the Marshal of the prize court under the order. I apprehend that the perplexities to which your Excellency refers will for the most part be dissipated by the perusal of this document, and that it is only necessary for me to add certain explanatory observations.

"3. The effect of the Order in Council is to confer certain powers upon the executive officers of his Majesty's Government. The extent to which those powers will be actually exercised and the degree of severity with which the measures of blockade authorized will be put into operation are matters which will depend on the administrative orders issued by the Government and the decisions of the authorities specially charged with the duty of dealing with individual ships and cargoes, according to the merits of each case. The United States Government may rest assured that the instructions to be issued by his Majesty's Government to the fleet and customs officials and Executive Committees concerned will impress upon them the duty of acting with the utmost dispatch consistent with the object in view, and of showing in every case such consideration for neutrals as may be compatible with that object, which is, succinctly stated, to establish a blockade to prevent vessels from carrying goods for or coming from Germany."

HERR VON JAGOW—
German Secretary for Foreign Affairs—(Photo from Rogers)

MAXIMILIAN HARDEN—Editor of Die Zukunft,
Germany's Most Brilliant Journalist, Who Has Been Severe
in His Strictures Upon the United States—(Photo from Brown Bros.)

"4. His Majesty's Government has felt most reluctant, at the moment of initiating a policy of blockade, to exact from neutral ships all the penalties attaching to a breach of blockade. In their desire to alleviate the burden which the existence of a state of war at sea must inevitably impose on neutral sea-borne commerce, they declare their intention to refrain altogether from the exercise of the right to confiscate ships or cargoes which belligerents have always claimed in respect of breaches of blockade. They restrict their claim to the stopping of cargoes destined for or coming from the enemy's territory.

"5. As regards cotton, full particulars of the arrangements contemplated have already been explained. It will be admitted that every possible regard has been had to the legitimate interests of the American cotton trade.

"6. Finally, in reply to the penultimate paragraph of your Excellency's note, I have the honor to state that it is not intended to interfere with neutral vessels carrying enemy cargo of non-contraband nature outside European waters, including the Mediterranean."

(Here follows the text of the Order in Council, which already has been printed.)

American Ambassador, London.

### VI.—FRENCH GOVERNMENT'S ANSWER.

The French Government transmitted the following message:

PARIS, March 14, 1915.

French Government replies as follows:

"In a letter dated March 7 your Excellency was good enough to draw my attention to the views of the Government of the United States regarding the recent communications from the French and British Governments concerning a restriction to be laid upon commerce with Germany. According to your Excellency's letter, the declaration made by the allied Governments presents some uncertainty as regards its application, concerning which the Government of the United States desires to be enlightened in order to determine what attitude it should take.

"At the same time your Excellency notified me that, while granting the possibility of using new methods of retaliation against the new use to which submarines have been put, the Government of the United States was somewhat apprehensive that the allied belligerents might (if their action is to be construed as constituting a blockade) capture in waters near America any ships which might have escaped the cruisers patrolling European waters. In acknowledging receipt of your Excellency's communication I have the honor to inform you that the Government of the republic has not failed to consider this point as presented by the Government of the United States, and I beg to specify clearly the conditions of application, as far as my Government is concerned of the declaration of the allied Governments. As well set forth by the Federal Government, the old methods of blockade cannot be entirely adhered to in view of the use Germany has made of her submarines, and also by reason of the geographical situation of that country. In answer to the challenge to the neutrals as well as to its own adversaries contained in the declaration, by which the German Imperial Government stated that it considered the seas surrounding Great Britain and the French coast on the Channel as a military zone, and warned neutral vessels not to enter the same on account of the danger they would run, the allied Governments have been obliged to examine what measures they could adopt to interrupt all maritime communication with the German Empire and thus keep it blockaded by the naval power of the two allies, at the same time, however, safeguarding as much as possible the legitimate interests of neutral powers and respecting the laws of humanity which no crime of their enemy will induce them to violate.

"The Government of the republic, therefore, reserves to itself the right of bringing into a French or allied port any ship carrying a cargo presumed to be of German origin, destination, or ownership, but it will not go to the length of seizing any neutral ship except in case of contraband. The discharged cargo shall not be confiscated. In the event of a neutral proving his lawful ownership of merchandise destined to Germany, he shall be entirely free to dispose of same, subject to certain conditions. In case the owner of the goods is a German, they shall simply be sequestrated during the war.

"Merchandise of enemy origin shall only be sequestrated when it is at the same time the property of an enemy. Merchandise belonging to neutrals shall be held at the disposal of its owner to be returned to the port of departure.

"As your Excellency will observe, these measures, while depriving the enemy of important resources, respect the rights of neutrals and will not in any way jeopardize private property, as even the enemy owner will only suffer from the suspension of the enjoyment of his rights during the term of hostilities.

"The Government of the republic, being desirous of allowing neutrals every facility to enforce their claims, (here occurred an undecipherable group of words,) give the prize court, an independent tribunal, cognizance of these questions, and in order to give the neutrals as little trouble as possible it has specified that the prize court shall give sentence within eight days, counting from the date on which the case shall have been brought before it.

"I do not doubt, Mr. Ambassador, that the Federal Government, comparing on the one hand the unspeakable violence with which the German Military Government threatens neutrals, the criminal actions unknown in maritime annals already perpetrated against neutral property and ships, and even against the lives of neutral subjects or citizens, and on the other hand the measures adopted by the allied Governments of France and Great Britain, respecting the laws of humanity and the rights of individuals, will readily perceive that the latter have not overstepped their strict rights as belligerents.

"Finally, I am anxious to assure you that it is not and it has never been the intention of the Government of the republic to extend the action of its cruisers against enemy merchandise beyond the European seas, the Mediterranean included."

SHARP.

### British Order in Council

### Declaring a Blockade of German Ports

LONDON, March 15.—The British Order in Council decreeing retaliatory measures on the part of the Government to meet the declaration of the Germans that the waters surrounding the United Kingdom are a military area, was made public today. The text of the order follows:

Whereas, the German Government has issued certain orders which, in violation of the usages of war, purport to declare that the waters surrounding the United Kingdom are a military area in which all British and allied merchant vessels will be destroyed irrespective of the safety and the lives of the passengers and the crews, and in which neutral shipping will be exposed to similar danger in view of the uncertainties of naval warfare, and

Whereas, in the memorandum accompanying the said orders, neutrals are warned against intrusting crews, passengers, or goods to British or allied ships, and

Whereas, such attempts on the part of the enemy give to his Majesty an unquestionable right of retaliation; and

Whereas, his Majesty has therefore decided to adopt further measures in order to prevent commodities of any kind from reaching or leaving Germany, although such measures will be enforced without risk to neutral ships or to neutral or non-combatant life and in strict observance of the dictates of humanity; and

Whereas, the allies of his Majesty are associated with him in the steps now to be announced for restricting further the commerce of Germany, his Majesty is therefore pleased by and with the advice of his Privy Council to order, and it is hereby ordered, as follows:

First—No merchant vessel which sailed from her port of departure after March 1, 1915, shall be allowed to proceed on her voyage to any German port. Unless this vessel receives a pass enabling her to proceed to some neutral or allied port to be named in the pass, the goods on board any such vessel must be discharged in a British port and placed in custody of the Marshal of the prize court. Goods so discharged, if not contraband of war, shall, if not requisitioned for the use of his Majesty, be restored by order of the court and upon such terms as the court may in the circumstances deem to be just to the person entitled thereto.

Second—No merchant vessel which sailed from any German port after March 1, 1915, shall be allowed to proceed on her voyage with any goods on board laden at such port. All goods laden at such port must be discharged in a British or allied port. Goods so discharged in a British port shall be placed in the custody of the Marshal of the prize court, and if not requisitioned for the use of his Majesty shall be detained or sold under the direction of the prize court.

The proceeds of the goods so sold shall be paid into the court and dealt with in such a manner as the court may in the circumstances deem to be just, provided that no proceeds of the sale of such goods shall be paid out of the court until the conclusion of peace, except on the application of a proper officer of the Crown, unless it be shown that the goods had become neutral property before the issue of this order, and provided also that nothing herein shall prevent the release of neutral property, laden at such enemy port, on the application of the proper officer of the Crown.

Third—Every merchant vessel which sailed from her port of departure after March 1, 1915, on her way to a port other than a German port and carrying goods with an enemy destination, or which are enemy property, may be required to discharge such goods in a British or allied port. Any goods so discharged in a British port shall be placed in the custody of the Marshal of the prize court, and unless they are contraband of war shall, if not requisitioned for the use of his Majesty, be restored by an order of the court upon such terms as the court may in the circumstances deem to be just to the person entitled thereto, and provided that this article shall not apply in any case falling within Article 2 or 4 of this order.

Fourth—Every merchant vessel which sailed from a port other than a German port after March 1, 1915, and having on board goods which are of enemy origin, or are enemy property, may be required to discharge such goods in a British or allied port. Goods so discharged in a British port shall be placed in the custody of the Marshal of the prize court, and, if not requisitioned for the use of his Majesty, shall be detained or sold under the direction of the prize court. The proceeds of the goods so sold shall be paid into the court and be dealt with in such a manner as the court may in the circumstances deem to be just, provided that no proceeds of the sale of such goods shall be paid out of the court until the conclusion of peace except on the application of a proper officer of the Crown, unless it be shown that the goods had become neutral property before the issue of this order, and provided also that nothing herein shall prevent the release of neutral property of enemy origin on application of the proper officer of the Crown.

Fifth—Any person claiming to be interested in or to have any claim in respect of any goods not being contraband of war placed in the custody of the Marshal of the prize court under this order, or in the proceeds of such goods, may forthwith issue a writ in the prize court against the proper officer of the Crown and apply for an order that the goods should be restored to him, or that their proceeds should be paid to him, or for such other order as the circumstances of the case may require.

The practice and procedure of the prize court shall, so far as applicable, be followed mutatis mutandis in any proceedings consequential upon this order.

Sixth—A merchant vessel which has cleared for a neutral port from a British or allied port, or which has been allowed to pass as having an ostensible destination to a neutral port and proceeds to an enemy port, shall, if captured on any subsequent voyage be liable to condemnation.

Seventh—Nothing in this order shall be deemed to affect the liability of any vessel or goods to capture or condemnation independently of this order.

Eighth—Nothing in this order shall prevent the relaxation of the provisions of this order in respect of the merchant vessels of any country which declares that no commerce intended for or originating in Germany, or belonging to German subjects, shall enjoy the protection of its flag.

## Germany's Submarine War

LONDON, March 13.—The Admiralty announced tonight that the British collier Invergyle was torpedoed today off Cresswell, England, and sunk. All aboard were saved.

This brings the total British losses of merchantmen and fishing vessels, either sunk or captured during the war, up to 137. Of these ninety were merchant ships and forty-seven were fishing craft.

A further submarine casualty today was the torpedoing of the Swedish steamer Halma off Scarborough, and the loss of the lives of six of her crew.

The Admiralty announces that since March 10 seven British merchant steamers have been torpedoed by submarines. Two of them, it is stated, were sunk, and of two others it is said that "the sinking is not confirmed." Three were not sunk.

The two steamers officially reported sunk were the Invergyle and the Indian City, which was torpedoed off the Scilly Islands on March 12. The crew of the Indian City was reported rescued.

The two steamers whose reported sinking is not yet officially confirmed are the Florazan, which was torpedoed at the mouth of the Bristol Channel on March 11, all of her crew being landed at Milford Haven, with the exception of one fireman, and the Andalusian, which was attacked off the Scilly Islands on March 12. The crew of the Andalusian is reported to have been rescued.

The Adenwen was torpedoed in the English Channel on March 11, and has since been towed into Cherbourg. Her crew was landed at Brisham.

The steamer Headlands was torpedoed on March 12 off the Scilly Islands. It is reported that her crew was saved. The steamer Hartdale was torpedoed on March 13 off South Rock, in the Irish Channel. Twenty-one of her crew were picked up and two were lost.

Supplementary to the foregoing the Admiralty tonight issued a report giving the total number of British merchant and fishing vessels lost through hostile action from the outbreak of the war to March 10. The statement says that during that period eighty-eight merchant vessels were sunk or captured. Of these fifty-four were victims of hostile cruisers, twelve were destroyed by mines, and twenty-two by submarines. Their gross tonnage totaled 309,945.

In the same period the total arrivals and sailings of overseas steamers of all nationalities of more than 300 tons net were 4,745.

Forty-seven fishing vessels were sunk or captured during this time. Nineteen of these were blown up by mines and twenty-eight were captured by hostile craft. Twenty-four of those captured were caught on Aug. 26, when the Germans raided a fishing fleet.

Dotted portion indicates the limits of "War Zone" defined in the German order which became effective Feb. 18, 1915.

## German People Not Blinded

By Karl Lamprecht

[Published in New York by the German Information Service, Feb. 3, 1915.]

Denying flatly that the German people were swept blindly and ignorantly into the war by the headlong ambitions of their rulers—the view advanced by Dr. Charles W. Eliot, President Emeritus of Harvard University, and Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler, President of Columbia—Dr. Karl Lamprecht, Professor of History in the University of Leipsic and world-famous German historian, has addressed the open letter which appears below to the two distinguished American scholars. Dr. Lamprecht asserts that under the laws which govern the German Empire the people as citizens have a deciding will in affairs of state and that Germany is engaged in the present conflict because the sober judgment of the German people led them to resort to arms.

Dr. C.W. Eliot, President Emeritus of Harvard University; Dr. N.M. Butler, President of Columbia University.

Gentlemen: I feel confident that you are not in ignorance of my regard and esteem for the great American Republic and its citizens. They have been freely expressed on many occasions and have taken definite form in the journal of my travels through the United States, published in the booklet "Americana," 1905.

My sentiments and my judgment have not changed since 1905. I now refer, gentlemen, to the articles and speeches which you have published about my country and which have aroused widespread interest. I will not criticise your utterances one by one. If I did that I might have to speak on occasion with a frankness that would be ungracious, considering the fine appreciation which both of you still feel for old Germany. It would be specially ungracious toward you, President Eliot, for in quite recent times you honored me by your ready help in my scientific labors. All I want to do is to remove a few fundamental errors—in fact, only one. I feel in duty bound to do so, since many well-disposed Americans share that error.

The gravest and perhaps most widely spread misconception about us Germans is that we are the serfs of our Princes. (Fuerstenknechte,) servile and dependent in political thought. That false notion has probably been dispelled during the initial weeks of the present war.

With absolute certainty the German Nation, with one voice and correctly, diagnosed the political situation without respect to party or creed and unanimously and of its own free will acted.

But this misconception is so deep rooted that more extended discussion is needed. I pass on to other matters.

The essential point is that public opinion have free scope of development. Every American will admit that. Now, public opinion finds its expression in the principles that govern the use of the suffrage. The German voting system is the freest in the world, much freer than the French, English, or American system, because not only does it operate in accordance with the principle that every one shall have a direct and secret vote, but the powers of the State are exercised faithfully and conscientiously to carry out that principle in practice. The constitutional life of the German Nation is of a thoroughly democratic character.

Those who know that were not surprised that our Social Democrats marched to war with such enthusiasm. Already among their ranks many have fallen as heroes, never to be forgotten by any German when his thoughts turn to the noble blood which has saturated foreign soil—thank God, foreign soil! Many of the Socialist leaders and adherents are wearing the Iron Cross, that simple token that seems to tell you when you speak of its bearer, "Now, this is a fearless and faithful soul."

Let it be said once and for all: He who wants to understand us must accept our conception that constitutionally we enjoy so great a political freedom that we would not change with any country in the world. Everybody in America knows that our manners and customs have been democratic for centuries, while in France and England they have been ever aristocratic. Americans, we know, always feel at home on German soil.

But the Kaiser, you will say, speaks of "his monarchy," therefore must the Germans be Fuerstenknechte, (servants of Princes.)

First of all, as to the phrase "Fuerstenknechte." Does not the King of England speak of his "subjects"? That word irritates a German, because he is conscious that he is not a subject, but a citizen of the empire. Yet he will not infer from the English King's use of the term in formal utterances that an Englishman is a churl, a "servant of his King." That would be a superficial political conception.

As to our Princes, most of us, including the Social Democrats, are glad in our heart of hearts that we have them. As far back as our history runs, and that is more than 2,000 years, we have had Princes. They have never been more than their name, "Fuerst," implies, the first and foremost of German freemen, "primi inter pares." Therefore they have never acted independently, never without taking the people into counsel. That would have been contrary to the most important fundamental principles of German law; hence our people have never been "de jure" without their representatives. Even in the times of absolute monarchy the old "estates of the realm" had their being as a representative body, and wherever and whenever these privileges were suppressed it was regarded as a violation of our fundamental rights and is so still regarded.

Our princely houses are as old as our monasteries, our cities, and our cathedrals. A thousand years ago the Guelphs were a celebrated family, and the Wettins have ruled over their lands for eight centuries. In the twelfth century the Wittelsbachs and Thuringians were Princes under the great Kaisers of the Hohenstaufen dynasty. Among these great families the Hapsburgs (thirteenth century) and the Hohenzollerns (fifteenth century) are quite young. All have their roots in Germany and belong to the country.

We glory in our Princes. They link our existence with the earliest centuries of our history. They preserve for us the priceless independence of our small home States.

We are accused of militarism. What is this new and terrible crime? Since the years of the wars of liberation against France and Napoleon we have had what amounts practically to universal conscription. Only two generations later universal suffrage was introduced. The nation has been sternly trained by its history in the ways of discipline and self-restraint. Germans are very far from mistaking freedom for license and independence for licentiousness.

Germany has a long past. She enjoys the inheritance of an original and priceless civilization. She holds clearly formulated ideals. To the future she has all this to bequeath and, in addition, the intellectual wealth of her present stage of development. Consider Germany's contributions to the arts, the poetical achievements of the period of Schiller and Goethe, the music of Handel, Bach, Haydn, Mozart, and Beethoven; the thought systems of Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel!

The last decade has reawakened these great men in the consciousness of the German Nation. Enriched by the consciousness and message of an intellectual past, our people were moving forward to new horizons.

At that moment the war hit us. If you could only have lived these weeks in Germany I do not doubt that what you would have seen would have led your ripe experience to a fervent faith in a Divinely guided future of mankind. The great spiritual movement of 1870, when I was a boy growing up, was but a phantom compared to July and August of 1914. Germany was a nation stirred by the most sacred emotions, humble and strong, filled with just wrath and a firm determination to conquer—a nation disciplined, faithful, and loving.

In that disposition we have gone to war and still fight. As for the slanders of which we have been the victims, ask the thousands of Frenchmen who housed German soldiers in 1870 and 1871, or ask the Belgians of Ghent and Bruges! They will give you a different picture of the "Furor Teutonicus." They will tell you that the "raging German" generally is a good-natured fellow, ever ready for service and sympathy, who, like Parsifal, gazes forth eagerly into a strange world which the war has opened to his loyal and patriotic vision.

KARL LAMPRECHT.

## Reveille

By JOHN GALSWORTHY.

[From King Albert's Book.]

In my dream I saw a fertile plain, rich with the hues of Autumn. Tranquil it was and warm. Men and women, children, and the beasts worked and played and wandered there in peace. Under the blue sky and the white clouds low-hanging, great trees shaded the fields; and from all the land there arose a murmur as from bees clustering on the rose-colored blossoms of tall clover. And, in my dream, I roamed, looking into every face, the faces of prosperity, broad and well favored—of people living in a land of plenty, of people drinking of the joy of life, caring nothing for the morrow. But I could not see their eyes, that seemed ever cast down, gazing at the ground, watching the progress of their feet over the rich grass and the golden leaves already fallen from the trees. The longer I walked among them the more I wondered that never was I suffered to see the eyes of any, not even of the little children, not even of the beasts. It was as if ordinance had gone forth that their eyes should be banded with invisibility.

While I mused on this, the sky began to darken. A muttering of distant winds and waters came traveling. The children stopped their play, the beasts raised their heads; men and women halted and cried to each other: "The River—the River is rising! If it floods, we are lost! Our beasts will drown; we, even we, shall drown! The River!" And women stood like things of stone, listening; and men shook their fists at the black sky and at that traveling mutter of the winds and waters; and the beasts sniffed at the darkening air.

Then, clear, I heard a Voice call: "Brothers! The dike is breaking! The River comes! Link arms, brothers; with the dike of our bodies we will save our home! Sisters, behind us, link arms! Close in the crevices, children! The River!" And all that multitude, whom I had seen treading quietly the grass and fallen leaves with prosperous feet, came hurrying, their eyes no longer fixed on the rich plain, but lifted in trouble and defiance, staring at that rushing blackness. And the Voice called: "Hasten, brothers! The dike is broken. The River floods!"

And they answered: "Brother, we come!"

Thousands and thousands they pressed, shoulder to shoulder—men, women, and children, and the beasts lying down behind, till the living dike was formed. And that blackness came on, nearer, nearer, till, like the whites of glaring eyes, the wave crests glinted in the dark rushing flood. And the sound of the raging waters was as a roar from a million harsh mouths.

But the Voice called: "Hold, brothers! Hold!"

And from the living dike came answer: "Brother! We hold!"

Then the sky blackened to night. And the terrible dark water broke on that dike of life; and from all the thin living wall rose such cry of struggle as never was heard.

But above it ever the Voice called: "Hold! My brave ones, hold!"

And ever the answer came from those drowning mouths, of men and women, of little children and the very beasts: "Brother! We hold!" But the black flood rolled over and on. There, down in its dark tumult, beneath its cruel tumult, I saw men still with arms linked; women on their knees, clinging to earth; little children drifting—dead, all dead; and the beasts dead. And their eyes were still open facing that death. And above them the savage water roared. But clear and high I heard the Voice call: "Brothers! Hold! Death is not! We live!"

## Can Germany Be Starved Out?

An Answer by Sixteen German Specialists2

[From The Annalist of New York, March 1, 1915.]

BERLIN, Feb. 1, 1915.

Probably the most interesting economic problem in the world at this moment is whether England can succeed in starving out Germany. While the world at large is chiefly interested in the vast political issues involved, the question interests the Germans not only from that standpoint, but also—and how keenly!—from the mere bread-and-butter standpoint. For if Germany cannot feed its own population during the long war that its foes are predicting with so much assurance, her defeat is only a question of time.

That the German Government is keenly aware of the dangers of the situation is evident from the rigorous measures that it has taken to conserve and economize the food supply. After having fixed maximum prices for cereals soon after the war began, the Government last week decided to requisition and monopolize all the wheat and rye in the country, and allow the bakers to sell only a limited quantity of bread (2.2 pounds per capita a week) to each family. It had previously taken measures to restrict the consumption of cereals for other purposes than breadmaking; the feeding of rye was prohibited and its use in producing alcohol was restricted by 40 per cent.; a percentage of potato flour was ordered added to rye flour, and of the latter to wheat flour in making bread. These are but a few of the economic measures adopted by the Government since the outbreak of the war.

The general opinion of the people in Germany is that the country cannot be starved out, and this opinion is asserted with a great deal of patriotic fervor, particularly by newspaper editors. The leading scientists of the country, moreover, have taken up the question in a thoroughgoing way and investigated it in all its bearings. A little book ("Die Deutsche Volksernährung und der Englische Aushungerungsplan") has just been issued, giving the conclusions of sixteen specialists in various fields, which will be briefly summarized here. Economists, statisticians, physiologists, agricultural chemists, food specialists, and geologists have all taken part in producing a composite view of the whole subject; it is not a book of special contributions by individual specialists, but is written in one cast and represents the compared and boiled-down conclusions of the sixteen scholars.

The authors by no means regard the problem of feeding Germany without foreign assistance as an easy and simple one; on the contrary, they say it is a serious one, and calls for the supreme effort of the authorities and of every individual German; and only by energetic, systematic, and continued efforts of Government and people can they prevent a shortage of food from negativing the success of German arms. Yet they feel bound to grapple the problem as one calling for solution by the German people alone, for very small imports of food products can be expected from the neutral countries of Europe, and none at all from the United States and other oversea countries, and the small quantities that do come in will hardly be more than enough to make good the drain upon Germany's own available stocks in helping to feed the people of Belgium and Poland.

The simplest statistical elements of the problem are the following: Germany, with a population of 68,000,000, was consuming food products, when the war broke out, equivalent to an aggregate of 90,420 billion calories, including 2,307,000 tons of albumen; whereas the amount now available, under unchanged methods of living and feeding, is equal to only 67,870 billion calories, with 1,543,000 tons of albumen. Thus, there will be an apparent deficit of 22,590 billion calories and 764,000 tons of albumen. On the other hand, the authors hold that the minimum physiological requirements are only 56,750 billion calories, containing 1,605,000 tons of albumen, which would give a large surplus of calories and a small deficit of albumen, but they make certain recommendations which, if carried into effect, would bring the available supply up to 81,250 billion calories and 2,023,000 tons of albumen.

Germany raises (average for 1912-13) about 4,500,000 tons of wheat and imports nearly 2,000,000 tons, (about 73,000,000 bushels.) On the other hand, it exports about 530,000 tons net of the 11,900,000 tons of rye produced. It imports nearly 3,000,000 tons of low-grade barley and about 1,000,000 of maize, both chiefly for feeding stock. Its net imports of grain and legumes are 6,270,000 tons. Of its fruit consumption, about 30 per cent. has been imported. While Germany has been producing nearly its entire meat supply at home, this has been accomplished only by the very extensive use of foreign feedstuffs. The authors of this work estimate that the imports of meats and animals, together with the product from domestic animals fed with foreign feedstuffs, amount to not less than 33 per cent. of the total consumption. They also hold that about 58 per cent. of the milk consumed in Germany represents imports and the product of cows fed with foreign feedstuffs. Nearly 40 per cent. of the egg consumption was hitherto imported. The consumption of fish has averaged 576,000 tons, of which not less than 62 per cent. was imported; and the home fisheries are now confined, besides the internal waters, almost wholly to the Baltic Sea—which means the loss of the catch of 142,000 tons hitherto taken from the North Sea. Even the German's favorite beverage, beer, contains 13 per cent. of imported ingredients.

The authors assume, as already intimated, that nearly all of these imports will be lost to Germany during the full duration of the war, and they take up, under this big limitation, the problem of showing how Germany can live upon its own resources and go on fighting till it wins. They undertake to show how savings can be made in the use of the supplies on hand, and also how production can be increased or changed so as to keep the country supplied with food products.

In the first place, they insist that the prohibition of the export of grain be made absolute; in other words, the small exception made in favor of Switzerland, which has usually obtained most of its grain from Germany, must be canceled. Savings in the present supplies of grain and feedstuffs must be made by a considerable reduction in the live stock, inasmuch as the grain, potatoes, turnips, and other stuffs fed to animals will support a great many more men if consumed directly by them. From the stock of cattle the poorer milkers must be eliminated and converted into beef, 10 per cent. of the milch cows to be thus disposed, of. Then swine, in particular, must be slaughtered down to 65 per cent. of the present number, they being great consumers of material suitable for human food. In Germany much skim milk and buttermilk is fed to swine; the authors demand that this partial waste of very valuable albumens be stopped. The potato crop—of which Germany produces above 50,000,000 tons a year, or much more than any other land—must be more extensively drawn upon than hitherto for feeding the people. To this end potato-drying establishments must be multiplied; these will turn out a rough product for feeding animals, and a better sort for table use. It may be added here that the Prussian Government last Autumn decided to give financial aid to agricultural organizations for erecting drying plants; also, that the Imperial Government has decreed that potatoes up to a maximum of 30 per cent. may be used by the bakers in making bread—a measure which will undoubtedly make the grain supply suffice till the 1915 crop is harvested. It is further recommended that more vegetables be preserved, whether directly in cold storage or by canning or pickling. Moreover, the industrial use of fats suitable for human food (as in making soaps, lubricating oils, &c.) must be stopped, and people must eat less meat, less butter, and more vegetables. Grain must not be converted into starch. People must burn coke rather than coal, for the coking process yields the valuable by-product of sulphate of ammonia, one of the most valuable of fertilizers, and greatly needed by German farmers now owing to the stoppage of imports of nitrate of soda from Chile.

In considering how the German people may keep up their production of food, the authors find that various factors will work against such a result. In the first place, there is a shortage of labor, nearly all the able-bodied young and middle-aged men in the farming districts being in the war. There is also a scarcity of horses, some 500,000 head having already been requisitioned for army use, and the imports of about 140,000 head (chiefly from Russia) have almost wholly ceased. The people must therefore resort more extensively to the use of motor plows, and the State Governments must give financial assistance to insure this wherever necessary; and such plows on hand must be kept more steadily in use through company ownership or rental. It may be remarked here, again, that the Prussian Government is also assisting agricultural organizations to buy motor plows. The supply of fertilizers has also been cut down by the war. Nitrate has just been mentioned. The authors recommend that the Government solve this problem by having many of the existing electrical plants turn partly to recovering nitrogen from the atmosphere. This, they say, could be done without reducing the present production of electricity for ordinary purposes, since only 19 per cent. of the effective capacity of the 2,000,000 horse power producible by the electrical plants of Germany is actually used. The supply of phosphoric fertilizers is also endangered through the stoppage of imports of phosphate rock (nearly 1,000,000 tons a year) as well as the material from which to make sulphuric acid; also, through the reduction in the production of the iron furnaces of the country, from the slag of which over 2,000,000 tons of so-called Thomas phosphate flour was produced, will involve a big reduction in the make of that valuable fertilizer. Thus, there is a lack of horses, of fertilizers, and of the guiding hand of man. This last, however, can be partly supplied by utilizing for farm work such of the prisoners of war as come from the farm. As Germany now holds considerably more than 600,000 prisoners, it can draw many farm laborers from among them. Prisoners are already used in large numbers in recovering moorland for agricultural purposes.

This latter remark suggests one of the recommendations of the authors for increasing agricultural production—the increased recovery of moorlands. They show that Germany has at least 52,000 square miles (more than 33,000,000 acres) of moors convertible into good arable land, which, with proper fertilizing, can be made at once richly productive; they yield particularly large crops of grain and potatoes. Moreover, the State Governments must undertake the division of large landed estates among small proprietors wherever possible—and this is more possible just now than ever, owing to the fact that many large owners have been killed in battle. The reason for such a division is that the small holder gets more out of the acre than the large proprietor.

As Germany makes a large surplus of sugar, the authors advise that the area planted in beets be reduced and the land thus liberated be planted in grain, potatoes, and turnips; as a matter of fact, it is reported that the Government is now considering the question of reducing the beetroot acreage by one-fourth. The authors also recommend that sugar be used to some extent in feeding stock, sweeting low-grade hay and roots with it to make them more palatable and nutritious. It is also regarded as profitable to leave 20 per cent. of sugar in the beets, so as to secure a more valuable feed product in the remnants. Still another agricultural change is to increase the crops of beans, peas, and lentils—vegetables which contain when dried as much nutrition as meat. Germany will need to increase its home production of these crops to replace the 300,000 tons of them hitherto imported.

Such are the principal points covered by these experts. Their conclusion is that, if their recommendations be carried out fully, and various economies be practiced—they could not be touched on in the limits of this article—Germany can manage to feed its people. But they insist, in their earnest, concluding words, that this can only be done by carrying out thoroughly all the methods of producing and saving food products advised by them. It is a serious problem, indeed, but one which, all Germany is convinced, can and will be solved.

## Hoch Der Kaiser

BY GEORGE DAVIES

HOCH DER KAISER! Amen! Amen!

We of the pulpit and bar,

We of the engine and car;

Hail to the Caesar who's given us men,

Our rightful heritage back again.

Who kicks the dancing shoes from our feet;

Snatches our mouths from the hot forced meat;

Drags us away from our warm padded stalls;

From our ivory keys, our song books and balls;

Orders man's hands from the children's go-carts;

Closes our fool schools of "ethics" and "arts."

Puts our ten fingers on triggers and swords,

Marshals us into War's legions by hordes.

Hoch der Kaiser! Amen! Amen!

We of the sea and the land;

We of the clerking band;

Hail to the Caesar who's given us men

Our rightful heritage back again.

WHO SUMMONS:

These women who write of loves that are loose,

(Those little perversionist scribes of the Deuce!)

Laughter of lies lilting lewd at their lips,

Their souls and brains both in a maudlin eclipse;

Their bosoms as bare as their stories and songs;

These coaxers of dogs with their "rights" and their wrongs.

WHO COMMANDS:

Strike from their shoulders the transparent mesh;

Mark the Red Cross on the cloth for their flesh.

WHO ORDAINS:

Ye, men who seem women in work and at play;

Ye, who do blindly as women may say;

Ye, who kill life in the smug cabarets;

Ye, all, at the beck of the little tea-tray;

Ye, all, of the measure of daughters of clay.

Waken to face me: be women no more;

But fellow-men born, from top branch to the core;

Men who must fight—who can kill, who can die,

While women once more shall be covered and shy.

Hoch der Kaiser! Amen! Amen!

We of the hills and the homes;

We of the plows and the tomes;

Hail to the Caesar who's given us men

Our rightful heritage back again.

## The Submarine of 1578

[From The London Times, Jan. 16, 1915.]

The earliest description of a practical under-water boat is given by William Bourne in his book entitled "Inventions or Devices," published in 1578. Instructions for building such a boat are given in detail, and it has been conjectured that Cornelius van Drebbel, a Dutch physician, used this information for the construction of the vessel with which in the early part of the seventeenth century he carried out some experiments on the Thames. It is doubtful, however, whether van Drebbel's boat was ever entirely submerged, and the voyage with which he was credited, from Westminster to Greenwich, is supposed to have been made in an awash condition, with the head of the inventor above the surface. More than one writer at the time referred to van Drebbel's boat and endeavored to explain the apparatus by which his rowers were enabled to breathe under water.

Van Drebbel died in 1634, and no illustration of his boat has been discovered. Nineteen years later the vessel illustrated here was constructed at Rotterdam from the designs of a Frenchman named de Son. This is supposed to be the earliest illustration of any submarine, and the inscription under the drawing, which was printed at Amsterdam in the Calverstraat, (in the Three Crabs,) is in old Dutch, of which the following is a translation:

The inventor of this ship will undertake to destroy in a single day a hundred vessels, and such destruction could not be prevented by fire, storm, bad weather, or the force of the waves, saving only that the Almighty should otherwise will it.

The figures on the drawing refer to the following explanations:

1. The beam wherewith power shall be given to the ship.

2. The rudder of the ship, somewhat aft.

3. The keel plate.

4. The two ends of the ship, iron plated.

5. Iron bolts and screws.

6. How deep the ship goes into the water when awash.

7. The pivots on which the paddle-wheel turns.

8. Air holes.

9. Gallery along which men can move.

The inset is a drawing of the paddle-wheels which fill the centre portion of the boat and which work upon the pivot marked 7.

Vain would it be for ships lying in harbor to be regarded as safe, for the inventor could reach anywhere unless prevented by betrayal. None but he could control the craft. Therefore it may truly be called the lightning of the sea.

Its power shall be proven by a trip to the East Indies in six weeks or to France and back in a day, for as fast as a bird flieth can one travel in this boat.

This boat was 72 feet in length, and her greatest height was 12 feet, while the greatest breadth was 8 feet, tapering off to points at the end. Capt. Murray Sueter in his book on submarines gives these and other particulars of the vessel. At either end the boat had a cabin, the air in which remained good for about three hours, and in the middle of the boat was a large paddlewheel rotated by clockwork mechanism, which, it was claimed, would run for eight hours when once wound up. The iron tips at the ends of the vessel were intended for ramming, and the inventor was confident he could sink the biggest English ship afloat by crushing in her hull under water. The boat was duly launched, but on trial of the machinery being made the paddlewheel, though it revolved in air, would not move in the water, the machinery being not powerful enough. This, says Capt. Sueter, was apparently the only reason for de Son's failure, for his principles were distinctly sound, and he was certainly the first inventor of the mechanically propelled semi-submarine boat. After her failure de Son exhibited her for a trifle to any casual passer-by.

## The Torpedo.

By Katharine Drayton Mayrant Simons, Jr.

Death, our mother, gave us her three gray gifts from the sea—

(Cherish your birthright, Brothers!)—speed, cunning, and certainty.

And mailèd Mars, he blest us—but his blessing was most to me!

For the swift gun sometimes falters, sparing the foe afar,

And the hid mine wastes destruction on the drag's decoying spar,

But I am the wrath of the Furies' path—of the war god's avatar!

Mine is the brain of thinking steel man made to match his own,

To guard and guide the death disks packed in the war head's hammered cone,

To drive the cask of the thin air flask as the gyroscope has shown.

My brother, the gun, shrieks o'er the sea his curse from the covered deck,

My brother, the mine, lies sullen-dumb, agape for the dreadnought's wreck,

I glide on the breath of my mother, Death, and my goal is my only check!

More strong than the strength of armored ships is the firing pin's frail spark,

More sure than the helm of the mighty fleet are my rudders to their mark,

The faint foam fades from the bright screw blades—and I strike from the under dark!

Death, our mother, gave us her three gray gifts from the sea—

(Cherish your birthright, Brothers!)—speed, cunning, and certainty.

And mailèd Mars, he blest us—but his blessing was most to me!

## "God Punish England, Brother"

## A New Hymn of Germany's Gospel of Hatred

[From Public Opinion, London, Feb. 5, 1915.]

The amazing outburst of hatred against England in Germany is responsible for a new form of greeting which has displaced the conventional formulas of salutation and farewell: "God punish England!" ("Gott strafe England!") is the form of address, to which the reply is: "May God punish her!" ("Gott mög'es strafen!")

"This extraordinary formula," says The Mail, "which is now being used all over Germany, is celebrated in a set of verses by Herr Hochstetter in a recent number of the well-known German weekly, Lustige Blätter. In its way this poem is as remarkable as Herr Ernst Lissauer's famous 'Hymn of Hate.'"

Among the prayers at Bruges Cathedral on the Kaiser's birthday was this German chant of hate, "God Punish England!"

### A HYMN OF HATE.

Translated by

G. VALENTINE WILLIAMS.

This is the German greeting

When men their fellows meet,

The merchants in the market-place,

The beggars in the street.

A pledge of bitter enmity,

Thus runs the wingèd word:

"God punish England, brother!—

Yea! Punish her, O Lord!"

With raucous voice, brass-throated,

Our German shells shall bear

This curse that is our greeting

To the "cousin" in his lair.

This be our German battle cry,

The motto on our sword:

"God punish England, brother!—Yea!

Punish her, O Lord!"

By shell from sea, by bomb from air,

Our greeting shall be sped,

Making each English homestead

A mansion of the dead.

And even Grey will tremble

As falls each iron word:

"God punish England, brother!—

Yea! Punish her, O Lord!"

This is the German greeting

When men their fellows meet,

The merchants in the market-place,

The beggars in the street.

A pledge of bitter enmity,

Thus runs the winged word:

"God punish England, brother!—

Yea! Punish her, O Lord!"

"What German Lutheran pastors think of the gospel of hate that is at present being preached throughout the Fatherland may be judged from an article on the subject written for the Vossische Zeitung of Berlin, by Dr. Julius Schiller of Nürnberg, who describes himself as a royal Protestant pastor," says The Morning Post.

"Before the war, the pastor writes, it was considered immoral to hate; now, however, Germans know that they not only may, but they must hate. Herr Lissauer's 'Hymn of Hate' against England is, he declares, a faithful expression of the feelings cherished in the depths of the German soul.

"'All protests against this hate,' the pastor writes, 'fall on deaf ears; we strike down all hands that would avert it. We cannot do otherwise; we must hate the brood of liars. Our hate was provoked, and the German can hate more thoroughly than any one else. A feeling that this is the case is penetrating into England, but the fear of the German hate is as yet hidden. There is a grain of truth in Lord Curzon's statement that the phlegmatic temperament of his countrymen is incapable of hating as the Germans hate.

"'We Germans do, as a matter of fact, hate differently than the sons of Albion. We Germans hate honorably, for our hatred is based on right and justice. England, on the other hand, hates mendaciously, being impelled by envy, ill-will, and jealousy. It was high time that we tore the mask from England's face, that we finally saw England as she really is.

"'We hate with a clean conscience, although religion seems to condemn as unæsthetic everything that is included in the word hate.' The Pastor concludes by asserting that 'we, who are fighting for truth and right with clean hands and a clean conscience, must have Him on our side Who is stronger than the strongest battalions. Hence our courage and our confidence in a fortunate outcome of the world conflagration. The dawn will soon appear that announces that the "Day of Harvest" for Germany has broken.'"

"The avowal that the love of good Germans for Germany is inseparable from hatred of other countries shows how deeply the aggressiveness of German policy has sunk into the nation's mood," says The Times. "Only by constantly viewing their own country as in a natural state of challenge to all others can Germans have come to absorb the view that hatred is the normal manifestation of patriotism. It is a purely militarist conception.

"Hate is at bottom a slavish passion, and remote from that heroic spirit of the warrior with which the Germans represent themselves as facing a world in arms. The hater subjects his mind to the domination of what he hates; he loses his independence and volition and becomes the prey of the hated idea. At last he cannot free his mind from the obsession; and the deliberate cultivation of hate in the conscientious German manner is a kind of mental suicide."

## The Great Hour.

By HERMANN SUDERMANN.

Whether, O Father in Heaven, we still put our trust in You,

Whether You are but a dream of a sacred past,

See now, we swear to You, Witness of Truth,

Not we have wanted it—

This murder, this world-ending murder—

Which now, with blood-hot sighs,

Stamps o'er the shuddering earth.

True to the earth, the bread-giving earth,

Happy and cheery in business and trade,

Peaceful we sat in the oak tree's shade,

Peaceful,

Though we were born to the sword.

Circled around us, for ever and ever,

Greed, sick with envy, and nets lifted high,

Full of inherited hatred.

Every one saw it, and every one felt

The secret venom, gushing forth,

Year after year,

Heavy and breath-bated years.

But hearts did not quiver

Nor hands draw the sword.

And then it came, the hour

Of sacred need, of pregnant Fate,

And what it brings forth, we will shape,

The brown gun in our mastering hand.

Ye mothers, what ye once have borne,

In honor or in vice,

Bring forth to every sacred shrine—

Your country's sacrifice.

Ye brides, whom future happiness,

Once kissed—it but seemed true,

Bring back to fair Germania

What she has given you.

Ye women, in silks or in linen,

Offer your husbands now.

Bid them goodbye, with your children,

With smiles and a blessing vow.

Ye all are doomed to lie sleepless,

Many a desolate night,

And dream of approaching conquests

And of your hero's might.

And dream of laurel and myrtle,

Until he shall return,

Till he, your master and shepherd,

Shall make the old joys burn.

And if he fell on the Autumn heath

And fell deep into death,

He died for Germania's greatness,

He died for Germania's breath.

The Fatherland they shall let stand,

Upon his blood-soaked loam,

And ne'er again shall they approach

Our sacred, peaceful home.

—Translated by Herman J. Mankiewicz.

H.M. GUSTAF V—King of Sweden—
(Photo from Underwood & Underwood)

H.M. HAAKON VII—King of Norway—
(Photo from Underwood & Underwood)

## The Peace of the World

## A Famous Englishman's Diagnosis of the War Disease and His Prescription for a Permanent Cure

By H.G. Wells

(COPYRIGHT, 1915, BY THE NEW YORK TIMES COMPANY.)

(Copyrighted in Great Britain and Ireland.)

### I.

Probably there have never been before in the whole past of mankind so many people convinced of the dreadfulness of war, nor so large a proportion anxious to end war, to rearrange the world's affairs so that this huge hideousness of hardship, suffering, destruction, and killing that still continues in Europe may never again be repeated.

The present writer is one of this great majority. He wants as far as possible to end war altogether, and contrive things so that when any unavoidable outbreak does occur it may be as little cruel and mischievous as it can be.

But it is one thing to desire a thing and another thing to get it. It does not follow because this aspiration for world-peace is almost universal that it will be realized. There may be faults in ourselves, unsuspected influences within us and without, that may be working to defeat our superficial sentiments. There must be not only a desire for peace, but a will for peace, if peace is to be established forever. If out of a hundred men ninety-nine desire peace and trouble no further, the one man over will arm himself and set up oppression and war again. Peace must be organized and maintained. This present monstrous catastrophe is the outcome of forty-three years of skillful, industrious, systematic world armament. Only by a disarmament as systematic, as skillful, and as devoted may we hope to achieve centuries of peace.

No apology is needed, therefore, for a discussion of the way in which peace may be organized and established out of the settlement of this war. I am going to set out and estimate as carefully as I can the forces that make for a peace organization and the forces that make for war. I am going to do my best to diagnose the war disorder. I want to find out first for my own guidance, and then with a view to my co-operation with other people, what has to be done to prevent the continuation and recrudescence of warfare.

Such an inquiry is manifestly the necessary first stage in any world pacification. So manifestly that, of course, countless others are also setting to work upon it. It is a research. It is a research exactly like a scientific exploration. Each of us will probably get out a lot of truth and a considerable amount of error; the truth will be the same and the errors will confute and disperse each other. But it is clear that there is no simple panacea in this matter, and that only by intentness and persistence shall we disentangle a general conception of the road the peace-desiring multitude must follow.

Now, first be it noted that there is in every one a certain discord with regard to war. Every man is divided against himself. On the whole, most of us want peace. But hardly any one is without a lurking belligerence, a lurking admiration for the vivid impacts, the imaginative appeals of war. I am sitting down to write for the peace of the world, but immediately before I sat down to write I was reading the morning's paper, and particularly of the fight between the Sydney and the Emden at Cocos Island.

I confess to the utmost satisfaction in the account of the smashing blows delivered by the guns of the Australian. There is a sensation of greatness, a beautiful tremendousness, in many of the crude facts of war; they excite in one a kind of vigorous exaltation; we have that destructive streak in us, and it is no good pretending that we have not; the first thing we must do for the peace of the world is to control that. And to control it one can do nothing more effective than to keep in mind the other side of the realities of war.

As my own corrective I have at hand certain letters from a very able woman doctor who returned last week from Calais. Lockjaw, gangrene, men tied with filthy rags and lying bitterly cold in coaly sheds; men unwounded, but so broken by the chill horrors of the Yser trenches as to be near demented—such things make the substance of her picture. One young officer talked to her rather dryly of the operations, of the ruined towns and villages, of the stench of dead men and horses, of the losses and wounds and mutilations among his men, of the list of pals he had lost. "Suddenly he began to cry. He broke down just like an overtaxed child. And he could not stop crying. He cried and cried, and I could do nothing to help him." He was a strong man and a brave man, and to that three months of war had brought him.

And then this again:

There were a fair number of Belgian doctors, but no nurses except the usual untrained French girls, almost no equipment, and no place for clean surgery. We heard of a house containing sixty-one men with no doctor or nurses—several died without having received any medical aid at all. Mrs. —— and I even on the following Wednesday found four men lying on straw in a shop with leg and foot wounds who had not been dressed since Friday and had never been seen by a doctor. In addition there were hundreds and hundreds of wounded who could walk trying to find shelter in some corner, besides the many unwounded French and Belgian soldiers quartered in the town.

As if this inferno of misery were not enough, there were added the refugees! These were not Belgians, as I had imagined, but French. It appears that both English and French armies have to clear the civil population out of the whole fighting area—partly to prevent spying and treachery, (which has been a curse to both armies,) and partly because they would starve. They are sent to Calais, and then by boat to Havre.

That first Sunday evening an endless procession flowed from the station to the quays in the drenching rain. Each family had a perambulator, (a surprisingly handsome one, too,) piled with sticks of bread, a few bundles of goods, and, when we peered inside, a couple of crying babies. There were few young people; mostly it was whimpering, frightened-looking children and wretched, bent old men and women. It seemed too bad to be true; even when they brushed past us in the rain we could not believe that their sodden figures were real. They were dematerialized by misery in some odd way.

Some of them slept in skating rinks, trucks, some in the Amiral Ganteaume. (One's senses could not realize that to the horrors of exile these people had added those of shipwreck next day.) Some certainly stood in the Booking Hall outside our hotel all night through. This sort of thing went on all the week, and was going on when we left.

Nevertheless, I was stirred agreeably by the imagination of the shells smashing the Emden and the men inside the Emden, and when I read the other day that the naval guns had destroyed over 4,000 men in the German trenches about Middlekirche I remarked that we were "doing well." It is only on the whole that we who want to end war hate and condemn war; we are constantly lapsing into fierceness, and if we forget this lurking bellicosity and admiration for hard blows in our own nature then we shall set about the task of making an end to it under hopelessly disabling misconceptions. We shall underrate and misunderstand altogether the very powerful forces that are against pacifist effort.

Let us consider first, then, the forces that are directly opposed to the pacification of the world, the forces that will work openly and definitely for the preservation of war as a human condition. And it has to be remembered that the forces that are for a thing are almost always more unified, more concentrated and effective than the forces that are against it. We who are against war and want to stop it are against it for a great multitude of reasons. There are other things in life that we prefer, and war stops these other things. Some of us want to pursue art, some want to live industrious lives in town or country, some would pursue scientific developments, some want pleasures of this sort or that, some would live lives of religion and kindliness, or religion and austerity.

But we all agree in fixing our minds upon something else than war. And since we fix our minds on other things, war becomes possible and probable through our general inattention. We do not observe it, and meanwhile the people who really care for war and soldiering fix their minds upon it. They scheme how it shall be done, they scheme to bring it about. Then we discover suddenly—as the art and social development, the industry and pleasant living, the cultivation of the civil enterprise of England, France, Germany, and Russia have discovered—that everything must be pushed aside when the war thinkers have decided upon their game. And until we of the pacific majority contrive some satisfactory organization to watch the war-makers we shall never end war, any more than a country can end crime and robbery without a police. Specialist must watch specialist in either case. Mere expressions of a virtuous abhorrence of war will never end war until the crack of doom.

The people who actually want war are perhaps never at any time very numerous. Most people sometimes want war, and a few people always want war. It is these last who are, so to speak, the living nucleus of the war creature that we want to destroy. That liking for an effective smash which gleamed out in me for a moment when I heard of the naval guns is with them a dominating motive. It is not outweighed and overcome in them as it is in me by the sense of waste, and by pity and horror and by love for men who can do brave deeds and yet weep bitterly for misery and the deaths of good friends. These war-lovers are creatures of a simpler constitution. And they seem capable of an ampler hate.

You will discover, if you talk to them skillfully, that they hold that war "ennobles," and that when they say ennobles they mean that it is destructive to the ten thousand things in life that they do not enjoy or understand or tolerate, things that fill them, therefore, with envy and perplexity—such things as pleasure, beauty, delicacy, leisure. In the cant of modern talk you will find them call everything that is not crude and forcible in life "degenerate." But back to the very earliest writings, in the most bloodthirsty outpourings of the Hebrew prophets, for example, you will find that at the base of the warrior spirit is hate for more complicated, for more refined, for more beautiful and happier living.

The military peoples of the world have almost always been harsh and rather stupid peoples, full of a virtuous indignation of all they did not understand. The modern Prussian goes to war today with as supreme a sense of moral superiority as the Arabs when they swept down upon Egypt and North Africa. The burning of the library of Alexandria remains forever the symbol of the triumph of a militarist "culture" over civilization. This easy belief of the dull and violent that war "braces" comes out of a real instinct of self-preservation against the subtler tests of peace. This type of person will keep on with war if it can. It is to politics what the criminal type is to social order; it will be resentful and hostile to every attempt to fix up a pacific order in the world.

This heavy envy which is the dominant characteristic of the pro-military type is by no means confined to it. More or less it is in all of us. In England one finds it far less frequently in professional soldiers than among sedentary learned men. In Germany, too, the more uncompromising and ferocious pro-militarism is to be found in the frock coats of the professors. Just at present England is full of virtuous reprehension of German military professors, but there is really no monopoly of such in Germany, and before Germany England produced some of the most perfect specimens of aggressive militarist conceivable. To read Froude upon Ireland or Carlyle upon the Franco-German War is to savor this hate-dripping temperament in its perfection.

Much of this literary bellicosity is pathological. Men overmuch in studies and universities get ill in their livers and sluggish in their circulations; they suffer from shyness, from a persuasion of excessive and neglected merit, old maid's melancholy, and a detestation of all the levities of life. And their suffering finds its vent in ferocious thoughts. A vigorous daily bath, a complete stoppage of wine, beer, spirits, and tobacco, and two hours of hockey in the afternoon would probably make decently tolerant men of all these fermenting professional militarists. Such a regimen would certainly have been the salvation of both Froude and Carlyle. It would probably have saved the world from the vituperation of the Hebrew prophets—those models for infinite mischief.

The extremist cases pass to the average case through insensible degrees. We are all probably, as a species, a little too prone to intolerance, and if we do in all sincerity mean to end war in the world we must prepare ourselves for considerable exercises in restraint when strange people look, behave, believe, and live in a manner different from our own. The minority of permanently bitter souls who want to see objectionable cities burning and men fleeing and dying form the real strength in our occasional complicities.

The world has had its latest object lesson in the German abuse of English and French as "degenerates," of the Russians as "Mongol hordes," of the Japanese as "yellow savages," but it is not only Germans who let themselves slip into national vanity and these ugly hostilities to unfamiliar life. The first line of attack against war must be an attack upon self-righteousness and intolerance. These things are the germ of uncompromising and incurable militarism everywhere.

Now, the attack upon self-righteousness and intolerance and the stern, self-satisfied militarism that arises naturally out of these things is to be made in a number of ways. The first is a sedulous propaganda of the truth about war, a steadfast resolve to keep the pain of warfare alive in the nerves of the careless, to keep the stench of war under the else indifferent nose. It is only in the study of the gloomily megalomaniac historian that aggressive war becomes a large and glorious thing. In reality it is a filthy outrage upon life, an idiot's smashing of the furniture of homes, a mangling, a malignant mischief, a scalding of stokers, a disemboweling of gunners, a raping of caught women by drunken soldiers. By book and pamphlet, by picture and cinematograph film, the pacifist must organize wisdom in these matters.

And not only indignation and distress must come to this task. The stern, uncompromising militarist will not be moved from his determinations by our horror and hostility. These things will but "brace" him. He has a more vulnerable side. The ultimate lethal weapon for every form of stupidity is ridicule, and against the high silliness of the militarist it is particularly effective. It is the laughter of wholesome men that will finally end war. The stern, strong, silent man will cease to trouble us only when we have stripped him of his last rag of pretension and touched through to the quick of his vanity with the realization of his apprehended foolishness. Literature will have failed humanity if it is so blinded by the monstrous agony in Flanders as to miss the essential triviality at the head of the present war. Not the slaughter of ten million men can make the quality of the German Kaiser other than theatrical and silly.

The greater part of the world is in an agony, a fever, but that does not make the cause of that fever noble or great. A man may die of yellow fever through the bite of a mosquito; that does not make a mosquito anything more than a dirty little insect or an aggressive imperialist better than a pothouse fool.

Henceforth we must recognize no heroic war but defensive war, and as the only honorable warriors such men as those peasants of Visé who went out with shotguns against the multitudinous overwhelming nuisance of invasion that trampled down their fields.

Or war to aid such defensive war.

### II.

But the people who positively admire and advocate and want war for its own sake are only a small, feverish minority of mankind. The greater obstacle to the pacification of the world is not the war-seeker, but the vast masses of people who for the most various motives support and maintain all kinds of institutions and separations that make for war. They do not want war, they do not like war, but they will not make sacrifices, they will not exert themselves in any way to make war difficult or impossible.

It is they who give the war maniac his opportunity. They will not lock the gun away from him, they will not put a reasonable limit to the disputes into which he can ultimately thrust his violent substitute for a solution. They are like the people who dread and detest yellow fever, but oppose that putting of petrol on the ponds which is necessary to prevent it because of the injury to the water flowers.

Now, it is necessary, if we are to have an intelligently directed anti-war campaign, that we should make a clear, sound classification of these half-hearted people, these people who do not want war, but who permit it. Their indecisions, their vagueness, these are the really effective barriers to our desire to end war forever.

And first, there is one thing very obvious, and that is the necessity for some controlling world authority if treaties are to be respected and war abolished. While there are numerous sovereign States in the world each absolutely free to do what it chooses, to arm its people or repudiate engagements, there can be no sure peace. But great multitudes of those who sincerely desire peace forever cannot realize this. There are, for example, many old-fashioned English liberals who denounce militarism and "treaty entanglements" with equal ardor; they want Britain to stand alone, unaggressive, but free; not realizing that such an isolation is the surest encouragement to any war-enamored power. Exactly the same type is to be found in the United States, and is probably even more influential there. But only by so spinning a web of treaties that all countries are linked by general obligations to mutual protection can a real world-pacification be achieved.

The present alliance against the insufferable militarism of Germany may very probably be the precursor of a much wider alliance against any aggression whatever in the future. Only through some such arrangement is there any reasonable hope of a control and cessation of that constant international bickering and pressure, that rivalry in finance, that competition for influence in weak neutral countries, which has initiated all the struggles of the last century, and which is bound to accumulate tensions for fresh wars so long as it goes on.

Already several States, and particularly the Government of the United States of America, have signed treaties of arbitration, and The Hague Tribunal spins a first web of obligations, exemplary if gossamer, between the countries of the world. But these are but the faint initial suggestions of much greater possibilities, and it is these greater possibilities that have now to be realized if all the talk we have had about a war to end war is to bear any fruit. What is now with each week of the present struggle becoming more practicable is the setting up of a new assembly that will take the place of the various embassies and diplomatic organizations, of a mediaeval pattern and tradition, which have hitherto conducted international affairs.

This war must end in a public settlement, to which all of the belligerents will set their hands; it will not be a bundle of treaties, but one treaty binding eight or nine or more powers. This settlement will almost certainly be attained at a conference of representatives of the various Foreign Offices involved. Quite possibly interested neutral powers will also send representatives. There is no reason whatever why this conference should dissolve, why it should not become a permanent conference upon the inter-relations of the participating powers and the maintenance of the peace of the world. It could have a seat and officials, a staff, and a revenue of its own; it could sit and debate openly, publish the generally binding treaties between its constituent powers, and claim for the support of its decisions their military and naval resources.

The predominance of the greater powers could be secured either by the representatives having multiple votes, according to the population represented, or by some sort of proportional representation. Each power could appoint its representatives through its Foreign Office or by whatever other means it thought fit. They could as conveniently be elected by a legislature or a nation. And such a body would not only be of enormous authority in the statement, interpretation, and enforcement of treaties, but it could also discharge a hundred useful functions in relation to world hygiene, international trade and travel, the control of the ocean, the exploration and conservation of the world's supplies of raw material and food supply. It would be, in fact, a World Council.

Today this is an entirely practicable and hopeful proposal if only we can overcome the opposition of those who cling to the belief that it is possible for a country to be at the same time entirely pacific and entirely unresponsible to and detached from the rest of mankind.

Given such a body, such a great alliance of world powers, much else in the direction of world pacification becomes possible. Without it we may perhaps expect a certain benefit from the improved good feeling of mankind and the salutary overthrow of the German military culture, but we cannot hope for any real organized establishment of peace.

I believe that a powerful support for the assembly and continuance of such a world congress as this could be easily and rapidly developed in North and South America, in Britain and the British Empire generally, in France and Italy, in all the smaller States of northern, central, and western Europe. It would probably have the personal support of the Czar, unless he has profoundly changed the opinions with which he opened his reign, the warm accordance of educated China and Japan, and the good will of a renascent Germany. It would open a new era for mankind.

### III.

Now, this idea of a congress of the belligerents to arrange the peace settlements after this war, expanding by the accession of neutral powers into a permanent world congress for the enforcement of international law and the maintenance of the peace of mankind, is so reasonable and attractive and desirable that if it were properly explained it would probably receive the support of nineteen out of every twenty intelligent persons.

Nevertheless, its realization is, on the whole, improbable. A mere universal disgust with war is no more likely to end war than the universal dislike for dying has ended death. And though war, unlike dying, seems to be an avoidable fate, it does not follow that its present extreme unpopularity will end it unless people not only desire but see to the accomplishment of their desire.

And here again one is likely to meet an active and influential opposition. Though the general will and welfare may point to the future management of international relations through a world congress, the whole mass of those whose business has been the direction of international relations is likely to be either skeptical or actively hostile to such an experiment. All the foreign offices and foreign ministers, the diplomatists universally, the politicians who have specialized in national assertion, and the courts that have symbolized and embodied it, all the people, in fact, who will be in control of the settlement, are likely to be against so revolutionary a change.

For it would be an entirely revolutionary change. It would put an end to secrecy. It would end all that is usually understood by diplomacy. It would clear the world altogether of those private understandings and provisional secret agreements, those intrigues, wire-pullings, and quasi-financial operations that have been the very substance of international relations hitherto. To these able and interested people, for the most part highly seasoned by the present conditions, finished and elaborated players at the old game, this is to propose a new, crude, difficult, and unsympathetic game. They may all of them, or most of them, hate war, but they will cling to the belief that their method of operating may now, after a new settlement, be able to prevent or palliate war.

All men get set in a way of living, and it is as little in human nature to give up cheerfully in the middle of life a familiar method of dealing with things in favor of a new and untried one as it is to change one's language or emigrate to an entirely different land. I realize what this proposal means to diplomatists when I try to suppose myself united to assist in the abolition of written books and journalism in favor of the gramophone and the cinematograph. Or united to adopt German as my means of expression. It is only by an enormous pressure of opinion in the world behind these monarchs, ministers, and representatives that they will be induced even to consider the possibility of adapting themselves to this novel style of international dealing through a permanent congress. It is only the consideration of its enormous hopefulness for the rest of the world that gives one the courage to advocate it.

In the question of the possible abolition of the present diplomatic system, just as in the case of the possible abolition of war, while on the side for abolition there must be a hugely preponderating interest and a hugely preponderating majority, it is, nevertheless, a dispersed interest and an unorganized, miscellaneous majority. The minority is, on the other hand, compact, more intensively and more immediately interested and able to resist such great changes with a maximum of efficiency. There is a tremendous need, therefore, for a world congress organization propaganda if this advantageously posted minority is to be overcome.

And from such countries as the American States in particular, and from the small liberal neutrals in Europe, whose diplomacy is least developed and least influential, liberal-minded people through the world are most disposed to expect, and do expect, a lead in this particular matter. The liberal forces in Britain, France, and Russia are extraordinarily embarrassed and enslaved by the vast belligerent necessities into which their lives have been caught. But they would take up such a lead with the utmost vigor and enthusiasm.

No one who has followed the diplomatic history of the negotiations that led to this war can doubt that if there had been no secret treaties, but instead open proclamations of intentions and an open discussion of international ambitions, the world might have been saved this catastrophe. It is no condemnation of any person or country to say this. The reserves and hesitations and misconceptions that led Germany to suppose that England would wait patiently while France and Belgium were destroyed before she herself received attention were unavoidable under the existing diplomatic conditions. What reasonable people have to do now is not to recriminate over the details in the working of a system that we can now all of us perceive to be hopelessly bad, but to do our utmost in this season of opportunity to destroy the obscurities in which fresh mischief may fester for our children.

Let me restate this section in slightly different words. At the end of this war there must be a congress of adjustment. The suggestion in this section is to make this congress permanent, to use it as a clearing house of international relationships and to abolish embassies.

Instead of there being a British Ambassador, for example, at every sufficiently important capital, and an ambassador from every important State in London, and a complex tangle of relationships, misstatements, and misconceptions arising from the ill-co-ordinated activities of this double system of agents, it is proposed to send one or several ambassadors to some central point, such as The Hague, to meet there all the ambassadors of all the significant States in the world and to deal with international questions with a novel frankness in a collective meeting.

This has now become a possible way of doing the world's business because of the development of the means of communication and information. The embassy in a foreign country, as a watching, remonstrating, proposing extension of its country of origin, a sort of eye and finger at the heart of the host country, is now clumsy, unnecessary, inefficient, and dangerous. For most routine work, for reports of all sorts, for legal action, and so forth, on behalf of traveling nationals, the consular service is adequate, or can easily be made adequate. What remains of the ambassadorial apparatus might very well merge with the consular system and the embassy become an international court civility, a ceremonial vestige without any diplomatic value at all.

### IV.

Given a permanent world congress developed out of the congress of settlement between the belligerents, a world alliance, with as a last resort a call upon the forces of the associated powers, for dealing with recalcitrants, then a great number of possibilities open out to humanity that must otherwise remain inaccessible. But before we go on to consider these it may be wise to point out how much more likely a world congress is to effect a satisfactory settlement at the end of this war than a congress confined to the belligerents.

The war has progressed sufficiently to convince every one that there is now no possibility of an overwhelming victory for Germany. It must end in a more or less complete defeat of the German and Turkish alliance, and in a considerable readjustment of Austrian and Turkish boundaries. Assisted by the generosity of the doomed Austrians and Turks, the Germans are fighting now to secure a voice as large as possible in the final settlement, and it is conceivable that in the end that settlement may be made quite an attractive one for Germany proper by the crowning sacrifice of suicide on the part of her two subordinated allies.

There can be little doubt that Russia will gain the enormous advantage of a free opening into the Mediterranean and that the battle of the Marne turned the fortunes of France from disaster to expansion. But the rest of the settlement is still vague and uncertain, and German imperialism, at least, is already working hard and intelligently for a favorable situation at the climax, a situation that will enable this militarist empire to emerge still strong, still capable of recuperation and of a renewal at no very remote date of the struggle for European predominance. This is a thing as little for the good of the saner German people as it is for the rest of the world, but it is the only way in which militant imperialism can survive at all.

The alternative of an imperialism shorn of the glamour of aggression, becoming constitutional and democratic—the alternative, that is to say, of a great liberal Germany—is one that will be as distasteful almost to the people who control the destinies of Germany today, and who will speak and act for Germany in the final settlement, as a complete submission to a Serbian conqueror would be.

At the final conference of settlement Germany will not be really represented at all. The Prussian militarist empire will still be in existence, and it will sit at the council, working primarily for its own survival. Unless the Allies insist upon the presence of representatives of Saxony, Bavaria, and so forth, and demand the evidence of popular sanctions—a thing they are very unlikely to demand—that is what "Germany" will signify at the conference. And what is true of Germany will be true, more or less, of several other of the allied powers.

A conference confined purely to the belligerents will be, in fact, a conference not even representative of the belligerents. And it will be tainted with all the traditional policies, aggressions, suspicions, and subterfuges that led up to the war. It will not be the end of the old game, but the readjustment of the old game, the old game which is such an abominable nuisance to the development of modern civilization. The idealism of the great alliance will certainly be subjected to enormous strains, and the whole energy of the Central European diplomatists will be directed to developing and utilizing these stresses.

This, I think, must be manifest even to the foreign offices most concerned. They must see already ahead of them a terrible puzzle of arrangement, a puzzle their own bad traditions will certainly never permit them to solve. "God save us," they may very well pray, "from our own cleverness and sharp dealing," and they may even welcome the promise of an enlarged outlook that the entry of the neutral powers would bring with it.

Every foreign office has its ugly, evil elements, and probably every foreign office dreads those elements. There are certainly Russian fools who dream about India, German fools who dream about Canada and South America, British fools who dream about Africa and the East; aggressionists in the blood, people who can no more let nations live in peace than kleptomaniacs can keep their hands in their own pockets. But quite conceivably there are honest monarchs and sane foreign ministers very ready to snatch at the chance of swamping the evil in their own Chancelleries.

It is just here that the value of neutral participation will come in. Whatever ambitions the neutral powers may have of their own, it may be said generally that they are keenly interested in preventing the settlement from degenerating into a deal in points of vantage for any further aggressions in any direction. Both the United States of America and China are traditionally and incurably pacific powers, professing and practicing an unaggressive policy, and the chief outstanding minor States are equally concerned in securing a settlement that shall settle.

And moreover, so wide reaching now are all international agreements that they have not only a claim to intervene juridically, but they have the much more pressing claim to participate on the ground that no sort of readjustment of Europe, Western Asia, and Africa can leave their own futures unaffected. They are wanted not only in the interests of the belligerent peoples, but for their own sakes and the welfare of the world all together.

### V.

Now a world conference, once it is assembled, can take up certain questions that no partial treatment can ever hope to meet. The first of the questions is disarmament. No one who has watched the politics of the last forty years can doubt the very great share the business and finance of armament manufacture has played in bringing about the present horrible killing, and no one who has read accounts of the fighting can doubt how much this industry has enhanced the torment, cruelty, and monstrosity of war.

In the old warfare a man was either stabbed, shot, or thrust through after an hour or so of excitement, and all the wounded on the field were either comfortably murdered or attended to before the dawn of the next day. One was killed by human hands, with understandable and tolerable injuries. But in this war the bulk of the dead—of the western Allies, at any rate—have been killed by machinery, the wounds have been often of an inconceivable horribleness, and the fate of the wounded has been more frightful than was ever the plight of wounded in the hands of victorious savages. For days multitudes of men have been left mangled, half buried in mud and filth, or soaked with water, or frozen, crying, raving between the contending trenches. The number of men that the war, without actual physical wounds, has shattered mentally and driven insane because of its noise, its stresses, its strange unnaturalness, is enormous. Horror in this war has overcome more men than did all the arrows of Cressy.

Almost all this enhanced terribleness of war is due to the novel machinery of destruction that science has rendered possible. The wholesale mangling and destroying of men by implements they have never seen, without any chance of retaliation, has been its most constant feature. You cannot open a paper of any date since the war began without reading of men burned, scalded, and drowned by the bursting of torpedoes from submarines, of men falling out of the sky from shattered aeroplanes, of women and children in Antwerp or Paris mutilated frightfully or torn to ribbons by aerial bombs, of men smashed and buried alive by shells. An indiscriminate, diabolical violence of explosives resulting in cruelties for the most part ineffective from the military point of view is the incessant refrain of this history.

The increased dreadfulness of war due to modern weapons is, however, only one consequence of their development. The practicability of aggressive war in settled countries now is entirely dependent on the use of elaborate artillery on land and warships at sea. Were there only rifles in the world, were an ordinary rifle the largest kind of gun permitted, and were ships specifically made for war not so made, then it would be impossible to invade any country defended by a patriotic and spirited population with any hopes of success because of the enormous defensive capacity of entrenched riflemen not subjected to an unhampered artillery attack.

Modern war is entirely dependent upon equipment of the most costly and elaborate sort. A general agreement to reduce that equipment would not only greatly minimize the evil of any war that did break out, but it would go a long way toward the abolition of war. A community of men might be unwilling to renounce their right of fighting one another if occasion arose, but they might still be willing to agree not to carry arms or to carry arms of a not too lethal sort, to carry pistols instead of rifles or sticks instead of swords. That, indeed, has been the history of social amelioration in a number of communities; it has led straight to a reduction in the number of encounters. So in the same way the powers of the world might be willing to adopt such a limitation of armaments, while still retaining the sovereign right of declaring war in certain eventualities. Under the assurances of a world council threatening a general intervention, such a partial disarmament would be greatly facilitated.

And another aspect of disarmament which needs to be taken up and which only a world congress can take up must be the arming of barbaric or industrially backward powers by the industrially and artillery forces in such countries as efficient powers, the creation of navies Turkey, Servia, Peru, and the like. In Belgium countless Germans were blown to pieces by German-made guns, Europe arms Mexico against the United States; China, Africa, Arabia are full of European and American weapons. It is only the mutual jealousies of the highly organized States that permit this leakage of power. The tremendous warnings of our war should serve to temper their foolish hostilities, and now, if ever, is the time to restrain this insane arming of the less advanced communities.

But before that can be done it is necessary that the manufacture of war material should cease to be a private industry and a source of profit to private individuals, that all the invention and enterprise that blossoms about business should be directed no longer to the steady improvement of man-killing. It is a preposterous and unanticipated thing that respectable British gentlemen should be directing magnificently organized masses of artisans upon the Tyneside in the business of making weapons that may ultimately smash some of those very artisans to smithereens.

At the risk of being called "Utopian" I would submit that the world is not so foolish as to allow that sort of thing to go on indefinitely. It is, indeed, quite a recent human development. All this great business of armament upon commercial lines is the growth of half a century. But it has grown with the vigor of an evil weed, it has thrown out a dark jungle of indirect advertisement, and it has compromised and corrupted great numbers of investors and financial people. It is perhaps the most powerful single interest of all those that will fight against the systematic minimization and abolition of war, and rather than lose his end it may be necessary for the pacifist to buy out all these concerns, to insist upon the various States that have sheltered them taking them over, lock, stock, and barrel, as going businesses.

From what we know of officialism everywhere, the mere transfer will involve almost at once a decline in their vigor and innovating energy. It is perhaps fortunate that the very crown of the private armaments business is the Krupp organization and that its capture and suppression is a matter of supreme importance to all the allied powers. Russia, with her huge population, has not as yet developed armament works upon a very large scale and would probably welcome proposals that minimized the value of machinery and so enhanced that of men. Beyond this and certain American plants for the making of rifles and machine guns only British and French capital is very deeply involved in the armaments trade. The problem is surely not too difficult for human art and honesty.

It is not being suggested that the making of arms should cease in the world, but only that in every country it should become a State monopoly and so completely under Government control. If the State can monopolize the manufacture and sale of spirits, as Russia has done, if it can, after the manner of Great Britain, control the making and sale of such a small, elusive substance as saccharin, it is ridiculous to suppose that it cannot keep itself fully informed of the existence of such elaborated machinery as is needed to make a modern rifle barrel. And it demands a very minimum of alertness, good faith, and good intentions for the various manufacturing countries to keep each other and the world generally informed upon the question of the respective military equipments. From this state of affairs to a definition of a permissible maximum of strength on land and sea for all the high contracting powers is an altogether practicable step. Disarmament is not a dream; it is a thing more practicable than a general hygienic convention and more easily enforced than custom and excise.

Now none of this really involves the abandonment of armies or uniforms or national service. Indeed, to a certain extent it restores the importance of the soldier at the expense of machinery. A world conference for the suppressing of the peace and the preservation of armaments would neither interfere with such dear incorrigible squabbles as that of the orange and green factions in Ireland, (though it might deprive them of their more deadly weapons,) nor absolutely prohibit war between adjacent States. It would, however, be a very powerful delaying force against the outbreak of war, and it would be able to insist with a quite novel strength upon the observation of the rules of war.

It is no good pretending that mere pacifism will end war; what will end war, what, indeed, may be ending war at the present time, is war—against militarism. Force respects itself and no other power. The hope for a world of peace in the future lies in that, in the possibility of a great alliance, so powerful that it will compel adhesions, an alliance prepared to make war upon and destroy and replace the Government of any State that became aggressive in its militarism. This alliance will be in effect a world congress perpetually restraining aggressive secession, and obviously it must regard all the No-Man's Lands—and particularly that wild waste, the ocean—as its highway. The fleets and marines of the allied world powers must become the police of the wastes and waters of the earth.

### VI.

Now, such a collective control of belligerence and international relations is the obvious common sense settlement of the present world conflict, it is so manifest, so straight-forward that were it put plainly to them it would probably receive the assent of nineteen sane men out of twenty in the world. This, or some such thing as this, they would agree, is far better than isolations and the perpetual threat of fresh warfare.

But against it there work forces, within these people and without, that render the attainment of this generally acceptable solution far less probable than a kind of no-solution that will only be a reopening of all our hostilities and conflicts upon a fresh footing. Some of these forces are vague and general, and can only be combated by a various and abundant liberal literature, in a widely dispersed battle in which each right-thinking man must do as his conscience directs him. There are the vague national antagonisms, the reservations in favor of one's own country's righteousness, harsh religious and social and moral cant of the Carlyle type, greed, resentment, and suspicion. The greatest of these vague oppositions is that want of faith which makes man say war has always been and must always be, which makes them prophesy that whatever we do will become corrupted and evil, even in the face of intolerable present evils and corruptions.

When at the outbreak of the war I published an article headed "The War That Will End War," at once Mr. W.L. George hastened to reprove my dreaming impracticability. "War there has always been." Great is the magic of a word! He was quite oblivious to the fact that war has changed completely in its character half a dozen times in half a dozen centuries; that the war we fought in South Africa and the present war and the wars of mediaeval Italy and the wars of the Red Indians have about as much in common as a cat and a man and a pair of scissors and a motor car—namely, that they may all be the means of death.

If war can change its character as much as it has done it can change it altogether; if peace can be kept indefinitely in India or North America, it can be kept throughout the world. It is not I who dream, but Mr. George and his like who are not yet fully awake, and it is their somnolence that I dread more than anything else when I think of the great task of settlement before the world.

It is this rather hopeless, inert, pseudo-sage mass of unbelievers who render possible the continuation of war dangers. They give scope for the activities of the evil minority which hates, which lives by pride and grim satisfactions, and which is therefore anxious to have more war and more. And it is these inert half-willed people who will obstruct the disentanglement of the settlement from diplomatic hands. "What do we know about the nuance of such things?" they will ask, with that laziness that apes modesty. It is they who will complain when we seek to buy out the armaments people. Probably all the private armament firms in the world could be bought up for seventy million pounds, but the unbelievers will shake their heads and say: "Then there will only be something else instead."

Yet there are many ungauged forces on the side of the greater settlement. Cynicism is never more than a half-truth, and because man is imperfect it does not follow that he must be futile. Russia is a land of strange silences, but it is manifest that whatever the innermost quality of the Czar may be, he is no clap-trap vulgar conqueror of the Wilhelm-Napoleon pattern. He began his reign, and he may yet crown his reign, with an attempt to establish peace on a newer, broader foundation. His religion, it would seem, is his master and not his servant. There has been no Russian Bernhardi.

And there has been much in America, much said and much done, since the war broke out that has surprised the world. I may confess for myself, and I believe that I shall speak for many other Europeans in this matter, that what we feared most in the United States was levity. We expected mere excitement, violent fluctuations of opinion, a confused irresponsibility, and possibly mischievous and disastrous interventions. It is no good hiding an open secret. We judged America by the peace headline. It is time we began to offer our apologies to America and democracy. The result of reading endless various American newspapers and articles, of following the actions of the American Government, of talking to representative Americans, is to realize the existence of a very clear, strong national mentality, a firm, self-controlled, collective will, far more considerable in its totality than the world has ever seen before.

We thought the United States would be sentimentally patriotic and irresponsible, that they would behave as though the New World was, indeed, a separate planet, and as though they had neither duties nor brotherhood in Europe. It is quite clear, on the contrary, that the people of the United States consider this war as their affair also, and that they have the keenest sense of their responsibility for the general welfare of mankind.

So that as a second chance, after the possibility of a broad handling of the settlement by the Czar, and as a very much bigger probability, is the insistence by America upon her right to a voice in the ultimate settlement and an initiative from the Western Hemisphere that will lead to a world congress. There are the two most hopeful sources of that great proposal. It is the tradition of British national conduct to be commonplace to the pitch of dullness, and all the stifled intelligence of Great Britain will beat in vain against the national passion for the ordinary. Britain, in the guise of Sir Edward Grey, will come to the congress like a family solicitor among the Gods. What is the good of shamming about this least heroic of Fatherlands? But Britain would follow a lead; the family solicitor is honest and well-meaning. France and Belgium and Italy are too deeply in the affair, or without sufficient moral prestige, for a revolutionary initiative in international relationship.

There is, however, a possible third source from which the proposal for a world congress might come, with the support of both neutrals and belligerents, and that is The Hague. Were there a man of force and genius at The Hague now, a man speaking with authority and not as the scribes, he might thrust enormous benefits upon the world.

It is from these three sources that I most hope for leading now. Of the new Pope and his influence I know nothing. But in the present situation of the world's affairs it behooves us ill to wait idle until leaders clear the way for us. Every man who realizes the broad conditions of the situation, every one who can talk or write or echo, can do his utmost to spread his realization of the possibilities of a world congress and the establishment of world law and world peace that lie behind the monstrous agonies and cruelties and confusions of this catastrophic year. Given an immense body of opinion initiatives may break out effectively anywhere; failing it, they will be fruitless everywhere.

## Small But Great-souled.

By EMMELINE PANKHURST.

[From King Albert's Book.]

The women of Great Britain will never forget what Belgium has done for all that women hold most dear.

In the days to come mothers will tell their children how a small but great-souled nation fought to the death against overwhelming odds and sacrificed all things to save the world from an intolerable tyranny.

The story of the Belgian people's defense of freedom will inspire countless generations yet unborn.

## Zeppelin Raids on London

By the Naval Correspondent of The London Times

[From The London Times, Jan. 22, 1915.]

Some doubt has been thrown by correspondents upon the ability of the Zeppelins to reach London from Cuxhaven, the place from which the raiders of Tuesday night appear to have started. The distance which the airships traveled, including their manoeuvres over the land, must have been quite 650 miles. This is not nearly as far as similar airships have traveled in the past. One of the Zeppelins flew from Friedrichshafen, on Lake Constance, to Berlin, a continuous flight of about 1,000 miles, in thirty-one hours. Our naval officers will also recall the occasion of the visit of the First Cruiser Squadron to Copenhagen in September, 1912, when the German passenger airship Hansa was present. The Hansa made the run from Hamburg to Copenhagen, a distance of 198 miles, in seven hours, and Count Zeppelin was on board her. Supposing an airship left Cuxhaven at noon on some day when the conditions were favorable and traveled to London, she could not get back again by noon next day if she traveled at the half-power speed which the vessels on Tuesday appear to have used. But if she did the run at full speed—that is to say, at about fifty miles an hour—she could reach London by 9 o'clock the same evening, have an hour to manoeuvre over the capital, and return by 7 o'clock next morning. With a favorable wind for her return journey, she might make an even longer stay. Given suitable conditions, therefore, as on Tuesday, there appears to be no reason why, as far as speed and fuel endurance are concerned, these vessels should not reach London from Cuxhaven.

With regard also to the amount of ammunition a Zeppelin can carry, this depends, of course, on the lifting power of the airship and the way in which it is distributed. The later Zeppelins are said to be able to carry a load of about 15,000 pounds, which is available for the crew, fuel for the engines, ballast, provisions, and spare stores, a wireless installation, and armament or ammunition. With engines of 500 horse power, something like 360 pounds of fuel is used per hour to drive them at full speed. Thus for a journey of twenty hours the vessel would need at least 7200 pounds of fuel. The necessary crew would absorb 2000 pounds more, and probably another 1500 pounds would be taken up for ballast and stores. Allowing a weight of 250 pounds for the wireless equipment, there would remain about 4000 pounds for bombs, or something less than two tons of explosives, for use against a target 458 miles from the base. This amount of ammunition could be increased proportionately as the conditions were altered by using a nearer base, or by proceeding at a slower and therefore more economical speed, &c.

It is noteworthy that although the German airships were expected to act as scouts in the North Sea they do not appear to have accomplished anything in this direction. Possibly this has been due to the fear of attack by our men-of-war or aircraft if the movements were made in daytime, when alone they would be useful for this purpose. What happened during the Christmas Day affair, when, as the official report said, "a novel combat" ensued between the most modern cruisers on the one hand and the enemy's aircraft and submarines on the other, would not tend to lessen this apprehension. On the other hand, the greater stability of the atmosphere at night makes navigation after dark easier, and I believe that it has been usual in all countries for airships to make their trial trips at night.

Radius of Action of a Modern Zeppelin

The above outline map, which we reproduce from "The Naval Annual," shows in the dotted circle the comparative radius of action of a modern Zeppelin at half-power—about 36 knots speed—with other types of air machines, assuming her to be based on Cologne. It is estimated that aircraft of this type, with a displacement of about 22 tons, could run for 60 hours at half-speed, and cover a distance equivalent to about 2160 sea miles. This would represent the double voyage, out and home, from Cologne well to the north of the British Isles, to Petrograd, to Athens, or to Lisbon. The inner circle shows the radius of action of a Parseval airship at half-power—about 30 knots—based on Farnborough, and the small inner circle represents the radius of action of a hydro-aeroplane based on the Medway.]

It is customary also for the airships to carry, in addition to explosive and incendiary bombs, others which on being dropped throw out a light and thereby help to indicate to the vessel above the object which it is desired to aim at. Probably some of the bombs which were thrown in Norfolk were of this character. It is understood that all idea of carrying an armament on top of the Zeppelins has now been abandoned, and it is obvious that if searchlight equipment or guns of any sort were carried the useful weight for bombs would have to be reduced unless the range of action was diminished. It will have been noticed that the Zeppelins which came on Tuesday appear to have been anxious to get back before daylight, which looks as if they expected to be attacked if they were seen, as it is fairly certain they would have been.

Assuming the raid of Tuesday to have been in the nature of a trial trip, it is rather curious that it was not made before. Apparently the Zeppelins can only trust themselves to make a raid of this description in very favorable circumstances. Strong winds, heavy rain, or even a damp atmosphere are all hindrances to be considered. That there will be more raids is fairly certain, but there cannot be many nights when the Germans can hope to have a repetition of the conditions of weather and darkness which prevailed this week. It should be possible, more or less, to ascertain the nights in every month in which, given other suitable circumstances, raids are likely to be made. In view of the probability that the attacks made by British aviators on the Zeppelin bases at Düsseldorf and Friedrichshafen caused a delay in the German plans for making this week's attack, it would appear that the most effective antidote would be a repetition of such legitimate operations.

JULIUS CAESAR ON THE AISNE

[From The New Yorker Herold (Morgenblatt.)]

It has repeatedly been pointed out that 2000 years ago Julius Caesar fought on the battlegrounds of the Aisne, which are now the location of the fierce fighting between the Germans and the French. It is probably less known, however, that in this present war Caesar's "Commentarii de Bello Gallico" are used by French officers as a practical text book on strategy. The war correspondent of the Corriere della Serra reports this some what astonishing fact.

A few weeks ago he visited his friend, a commanding Colonel of a French regiment, in his trench, which was furnished with bare necessities only. In a corner on a small table lay the open volume of "Commentarii Caesaris," which the visitor took into his hand out of curiosity in order to see what passage the Colonel had just been reading. There he found the description of the fight against the Remer, who, at that time, lived in the neighborhood of the present city of Rheims. Principally with the aid of his Numidian troops, Caesar at that time had prevented the Remer from crossing the River Axona, today called the Aisne.

Caesar's camp was only a few kilometers from Berry-au-Bac, in the vicinity of Pontavert, the headquarters of the division to which the regiment of the Colonel belonged. This Colonel had received the order to cross the River Aisne with Moroccans and Spahis, and for this purpose he had studied the description of Caesar. To the astonished question of the reporter, what made him occupy his mind with the study of Caesar, the Frenchman replied:

"Caesar's battle descriptions form a book from which even in this present day war a great deal may be learned. Caesar is by no means as obsolete as you seem to think. I ask you to consider, for instance, that the trenches which have gained so much importance in this war date back to Julius Caesar."

H.M. CHRISTIAN X—King of Denmark—
(Photo from Paul Thompson)

PRESENT AND FUTURE QUEENS OF THE NETHERLANDS—
Queen Wilhelmina with Her Little Daughter Juliana, Princess of Orange

## Sir John French's Own Story

## Continuing the Famous Dispatches of the British Commander in Chief to Lord Kitchener

The previous dispatches, reviewing the operations of the British regular and territorial troops on the Continent under Field Marshal French's chief command, appeared in THE NEW YORK TIMES CURRENT HISTORY of Jan. 23, 1915, bringing the account of operations to Nov. 20, 1914. The official dispatch to Earl Kitchener presented below records the bitter experiences of the Winter in the trenches from the last week of November until Feb. 2, 1915.

The following dispatch was received on Feb. 12, 1915, from the Field Marshal Commanding in Chief, the British Army in the Field.

To the Secretary of State for War, War Office, London, S.W.

General Headquarters,

Feb. 2, 1915.

My Lord: I have the honor to forward a further report on the operations of the army under my command.

1. In the period under review the salient feature was the presence of his Majesty the King in the field. His Majesty arrived at Headquarters on Nov. 30 and left on Dec. 5.

At a time when the strength and endurance of the troops had been tried to the utmost throughout the long and arduous battle of Ypres-Armentières the presence of his Majesty in their midst was of the greatest possible help and encouragement.

His Majesty visited all parts of the extensive area of operations and held numerous inspections of the troops behind the line of trenches.

On Nov. 16 Lieutenant his Royal Highness the Prince of Wales, K.G., Grenadier Guards, joined my staff as aide de camp.

2. Since the date of my last report the operations of the army under my command have been subject almost entirely to the limitations of weather.

History teaches us that the course of campaigns in Europe, which have been actively prosecuted during the months of December and January, have been largely influenced by weather conditions. It should, however, be thoroughly understood throughout the country that the most recent development of armaments and the latest methods of conducting warfare have added greatly to the difficulties and drawbacks of a vigorous Winter campaign.

To cause anything more than a waste of ammunition long-range artillery fire requires constant and accurate observation; but this most necessary condition is rendered impossible of attainment in the midst of continual fog and mist.

Again, armies have now grown accustomed to rely largely on aircraft reconnoissance for accurate information of the enemy, but the effective performance of this service is materially influenced by wind and weather.

The deadly accuracy, range, and quick-firing capabilities of the modern rifle and machine gun require that a fire-swept zone be crossed in the shortest possible space of time by attacking troops. But if men are detained under the enemy's fire by the difficulty of emerging from a water-logged trench, and by the necessity of passing over ground knee-deep in holding mud and slush, such attacks become practically prohibitive owing to the losses they entail.

During the exigencies of the heavy fighting which ended in the last week of November the French and British forces had become somewhat mixed up, entailing a certain amount of difficulty in matters of supply and in securing unity of command.

By the end of November I was able to concentrate the army under my command in one area, and, by holding a shorter line, to establish effective reserves.

By the beginning of December there was a considerable falling off in the volume of artillery fire directed against our front by the enemy. Reconnoissance and reports showed that a certain amount of artillery had been withdrawn. We judged that the cavalry in our front, with the exception of one division of the Guard, had disappeared.

There did not, however, appear to have been any great diminution in the numbers of infantry holding the trenches.

3. Although both artillery and rifle fire were exchanged with the enemy every day, and sniping went on more or less continuously during the hours of daylight, the operations which call for special record or comment are comparatively few.

During the last week in November some successful minor night operations were carried out in the Fourth Corps.

On the night of Nov. 23-24 a small party of the Second Lincolnshire Regiment, under Lieut. E.H. Impey, cleared three of the enemy's advanced trenches opposite the Twenty-fifth Brigade, and withdrew without loss.

On the night of the 24th-25th Capt. J.R. Minshull Ford, Royal Welsh Fusiliers, and Lieut. E.L. Morris, Royal Engineers, with fifteen men of the Royal Engineers and Royal Welsh Fusiliers, successfully mined and blew up a group of farms immediately in front of the German trenches on the Touquet-Bridoux Road which had been used by German snipers.

On the night of Nov. 26-27 a small party of the Second Scots Guards, under Lieut. Sir E.H.W. Hulse, Bart., rushed the trenches opposite the Twentieth Brigade, and after pouring a heavy fire into them returned with useful information as to the strength of the Germans and the position of machine guns.

The trenches opposite the Twenty-fifth Brigade were rushed the same night by a patrol of the Second Rifle Brigade, under Lieut. E. Durham.

On Nov. 23 the One Hundred and Twelfth Regiment of the Fourteenth German Army Corps succeeded in capturing some 800 yards of the trenches held by the Indian Corps, but the general officer commanding the Meerut Division organized a powerful counter-attack, which lasted throughout the night. At daybreak on Nov. 24 the line was entirely re-established.

The operation was a costly one, involving many casualties, but the enemy suffered far more heavily.

We captured over 100 prisoners, including 3 officers, as well as 3 machine guns and two trench mortars.

On Dec. 7 the concentration of the Indian Corps was completed by the arrival of the Sirhind Brigade from Egypt.

On Dec. 9 the enemy attempted to commence a strong attack against the Third Corps, particularly in front of the trenches held by the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders and the Middlesex Regiment.

They were driven back with heavy loss, and did not renew the attempt. Our casualties were very slight.

During the early days of December certain indications along the whole front of the allied line induced the French commanders and myself to believe that the enemy had withdrawn considerable forces from the western theatre.

Arrangements were made with the commander of the Eighth French Army for an attack to be commenced on the morning of Dec. 14.

Operations began at 7 A.M. by a combined heavy artillery bombardment by the two French and the Second British Corps.

The British objectives were the Petit Bois and the Maedelsteed Spur, lying respectively to the west and the southwest of the village of Wytschaete.

At 7:45 A.M. the Royal Scots, with great dash, rushed forward and attacked the former, while the Gordon Highlanders attacked the latter place.

The Royal Scots, commanded by Major F.J. Duncan, D.S.O., in face of a terrible machine gun and rifle fire, carried the German trench on the west edge of the Petit Bois, capturing two machine guns and fifty-three prisoners, including one officer.

The Gordon Highlanders, with great gallantry, advanced up the Maedelsteed Spur, forcing the enemy to evacuate their front trench. They were, however, losing heavily, and found themselves unable to get any further. At nightfall they were obliged to fall back to their original position.

Capt. C. Boddam-Whetham and Lieut. W.F.R. Dobie showed splendid dash, and with a few men entered the enemy's leading trenches; but they were all either killed or captured.

Lieut. G.R.V. Hume-Gare and Lieut. W.H. Paterson also distinguished themselves by their gallant leading.

Although not successful, the operation was most creditable to the fighting spirit of the Gordon Highlanders, most ably commanded by Major A.W.F. Baird, D.S.O.

As the Thirty-second French Division on the left had been unable to make any progress, the further advance of our infantry into the Wytschaete Wood was not practicable.

Possession of the western edge of the Petit Bois was, however, retained.

The ground was devoid of cover and so water-logged that a rapid advance was impossible, the men sinking deep in the mud at every step they took.

The artillery throughout the day was very skillfully handled by the C.A.R.A.'s of the Fourth and Fifth Divisions—Major Gen. F.D.V. Wing, C.B.; Brig. Gen. G.F. Milne, C.B., D.S.O., and Brig. Gen. J.E.W. Headlam, C.B., D.S.O.

The casualties during the day were about 17 officers and 407 other ranks. The losses of the enemy were very considerable, large numbers of dead being found in the Petit Bois and also in the communicating trenches in front of the Gordon Highlanders, in one of which a hundred were counted by a night patrol.

On this day the artillery of the Fourth Division, Third Corps, was used in support of the attack, under orders of the General Officer Commanding Second Corps.

The remainder of the Third Corps made demonstrations against the enemy with a view to preventing him from detaching troops to the area of operations of the Second Corps.

From Dec. 15 to 17 the offensive operations which were commenced on the 14th were continued, but were confined chiefly to artillery bombardment.

The infantry advance against Wytschaete Wood was not practicable until the French on our left could make some progress to afford protection to that flank.

On the 17th it was agreed that the plan of attack as arranged should be modified; but I was requested to continue demonstrations along my line in order to assist and support certain French operations which were being conducted elsewhere.

4. In his desire to act with energy up to his instructions to demonstrate and occupy the enemy, the General Officer Commanding the Indian Corps decided to take the advantage of what appeared to him a favorable opportunity to launch attacks against the advanced trenches in his front on Dec. 18 and 19.

The attack of the Meerut Division on the left was made on the morning of the 19th with energy and determination, and was at first attended with considerable success, the enemy's advanced trenches being captured. Later on, however, a counter-attack drove them back to their original position with considerable loss.

The attack of the Lahore Division commenced at 4:30 A.M. It was carried out by two companies each of the First Highland Light Infantry and the First Battalion, Fourth Gurkha Rifles of the Sirhind Brigade, under Lieut. Col. R.W.H. Ronaldson. This attack was completely successful, two lines of the enemy's trenches being captured with little loss.

Before daylight the captured trenches were filled with as many men as they could hold. The front was very restricted, communication to the rear impossible.

At daybreak it was found that the position was practically untenable. Both flanks were in the air, and a supporting attack, which was late in starting, and, therefore, conducted during daylight, failed, although attempted with the greatest gallantry and resolution.

Lieut. Col. Ronaldson held on till dusk, when the whole of the captured trenches had to be evacuated, and the detachment fell back to its original line.

By the night of Dec. 19 nearly all the ground gained during the day had been lost.

From daylight on Dec. 20 the enemy commenced a heavy fire from artillery and trench mortars on the whole front of the Indian Corps. This was followed by infantry attacks, which were in especial force against Givenchy, and between that place and La Quinque Rue.

At about 10 A.M. the enemy succeeded in driving back the Sirhind Brigade and capturing a considerable part of Givenchy, but the Fifty-seventh Rifles and Ninth Bhopals, north of the canal, and the Connaught Rangers, south of it, stood firm.

The Fifteenth Sikhs of the Divisional Reserve were already supporting the Sirhind Brigade. On the news of the retirement of the latter being received, the Forty-seventh Sikhs were also sent up to reinforce Gen. Brunker. The First Manchester Regiment, Fourth Suffolk Regiment, and two battalions of French territorials under Gen. Carnegy were ordered to launch a vigorous counter-attack to retake by a flank attack the trenches lost by the Sirhind Brigade.

Orders were sent to Gen. Carnegy to divert his attack on Givenchy village, and to re-establish the situation there.

A battalion of the Fifty-eighth French Division was sent to Annequin in support.

About 5 P.M. a gallant attack by the First Manchester Regiment and one company of the Fourth Suffolk Regiment had captured Givenchy, and had cleared the enemy out of the two lines of trenches to the northeast. To the east of the village the Ninth Bhopal Infantry and Fifty-seventh Rifles had maintained their positions, but the enemy were still in possession of our trenches to the north of the village.

Gen. Macbean, with the Secunderabad Cavalry Brigade, Second Battalion, Eighth Gurkha Rifles, and the Forty-seventh Sikhs, was sent up to support Gen. Brunker, who, at 2 P.M., directed Gen. Macbean to move to a position of readiness in the second line trenches from Maris northward, and to counter-attack vigorously if opportunity offered.

Some considerable delay appears to have occurred, and it was not until 1 A.M. on the 21st that the Forty-seventh Sikhs and the Seventh Dragoon Guards, under the command of Lieut. Col. H.A. Lempriere, D.S.O., of the latter regiment, were launched in counter-attack.

They reached the enemy's trenches, but were driven out by enfilade fire, their gallant commander being killed.

The main attack by the remainder of Gen. Macbean's force, with the remnants of Lieut. Col. Lempriere's detachment, (which had again been rallied,) was finally rushed in at about 4:30 A.M., and also failed.

In the northern section of the defensive line the retirement of the Second Battalion, Second Gurkha Rifles, at about 10 A.M. on the 20th, had left the flank of the First Seaforth Highlanders, on the extreme right of the Meerut Division line, much exposed. This battalion was left shortly afterward completely in the air by the retirement of the Sirhind Brigade.

The Fifty-eighth Rifles, therefore, were ordered to support the left of the Seaforth Highlanders, to fill the gap created by the retirement of the Gurkhas.

During the whole of the afternoon strenuous efforts were made by the Seaforth Highlanders to clear the trenches to their right and left. The First Battalion, Ninth Gurkha Rifles, reinforced the Second Gurkhas near the orchard where the Germans were in occupation of the trenches abandoned by the latter regiment. The Garhwal Brigade was being very heavily attacked, and their trenches and loopholes were much damaged; but the brigade continued to hold its front and attack, connecting with the Sixth Jats on the left of the Dehra Dun Brigade.

No advance in force was made by the enemy, but the troops were pinned to their ground by heavy artillery fire, the Seaforth Highlanders especially suffering heavily.

Shortly before nightfall the Second Royal Highlanders, on the right of the Seaforth Highlanders, had succeeded in establishing touch with the Sirhind Brigade; and the continuous line (though dented near the orchard) existed throughout the Meerut Division.

Early in the afternoon of Dec. 20 orders were sent to the First Corps, which was then in general army reserve, to send an infantry brigade to support the Indian Corps.

The First Brigade was ordered to Bethune, and reached that place at midnight on Dec. 20-21. Later in the day Sir Douglas Haig was ordered to move the whole of the First Division in support of the Indian Corps.

The Third Brigade reached Bethune between 8 A.M. and 9 A.M. on the 21st, and on the same date the Second Brigade arrived at Lacon at 1 P.M.

The First Brigade was directed on Givenchy, via Pont Fixe, and the Third Brigade, through Gorre, on the trenches evacuated by the Sirhind Brigade. The Second Brigade was directed to support, the Dehra Dun Brigade being placed at the disposal of the General Officer Commanding Meerut Division.

At 1 P.M. the General Officer Commanding First Division directed the First Brigade in attack from the west of Givenchy in a northeasterly direction, and the Third Brigade from Festubert in an east-northeasterly direction, the object being to pass the position originally held by us and to capture the German trenches 400 yards to the east of it.

By 5 P.M. the First Brigade had obtained a hold in Givenchy, and the ground south as far as the canal; and the Third Brigade had progressed to a point half a mile west of Festubert.

By nightfall the First South Wales Borderers and the Second Welsh Regiment of the Third Brigade had made a lodgment in the original trenches to the northeast of Festubert, the First Gloucestershire Regiment continuing the line southward along the track east of Festubert.

The First Brigade had established itself on the east side of Givenchy.

By 3 P.M. the Third Brigade was concentrated at Le Touret, and was ordered to retake the trenches which had been lost by the Dehr Dun Brigade.

By 10 P.M. the support trenches west of the orchard had been carried, but the original fire trenches had been so completely destroyed that they could not be occupied.

This operation was performed by the First Loyal North Lancashire Regiment and the First Northamptonshire Regiment, supported by the Second King's Royal Rifle Corps, in reserve.

Throughout this day the units of the Indian Corps rendered all the assistance and support they could in view of their exhausted condition.

At 1 P.M. on the 22d Sir Douglas Haig took over command from Sir James Willcocks. The situation in the front line was then approximately as follows:

South of the La Bassée Canal the Connaught Rangers of the Ferozepore Brigade had not been attacked. North of the canal a short length of our original line was still held by the Ninth Bhopals and the Fifty-seventh Rifles of the same brigade. Connecting with the latter was the First Brigade, holding the village of Givenchy and its eastern and northern approaches. On the left of the First Brigade was the Third Brigade. Tenth had been lost between the left of the former and the right of the latter. The Third Brigade held a line along, and in places advanced to, the east of the Festubert Road. Its left was in communication with the right of the Meerut Division line, where troops of the Second Brigade had just relieved the First Seaforth Highlanders. To the north, units of the Second Brigade held an indented line west of the orchard, connecting with half of the Second Royal Highlanders, half of the Forty-first Dogras, and the First Battalion Ninth Gurkha Rifles. From this point to the north the Ninth Jats and the whole of the Garhwal Brigade occupied the original line which they had held from the commencement of the operations.

The relief of most units of the southern sector was effected on the night of Dec. 22. The Meerut Division remained under the orders of the First Corps, and was not completely withdrawn until Dec. 27.

In the evening the position at Givenchy was practically re-established, and the Third Brigade had reoccupied the old line of trenches.

During the 23d the enemy's activities ceased, and the whole position was restored to very much its original condition.

In my last dispatch I had occasion to mention the prompt and ready help I received from the Lahore Division, under the command of Major Gen. H.B.B. Watkis, C.B., which was thrown into action immediately on arrival, when the British forces were very hard pressed during the battle of Ypres-Armentières.

The Indian troops have fought with the utmost steadfastness and gallantry whenever they have been called upon.

Weather conditions were abnormally bad, the snow and floods precluding any active operations during the first three weeks of January.

5. At 7:30 A.M. on Jan. 25 the enemy began to shell Bethune, and at 8 A.M. a strong hostile infantry attack developed south of the canal, preceded by a heavy bombardment of artillery, minenwerfers, and, possibly, the explosion of mines, though the latter is doubtful.

The British line south of the canal formed a pronounced salient from the canal on the left, thence running forward toward the railway triangle and back to the main La Bassée-Bethune Road, where it joined the French. This line was occupied by half a battalion of the Scots Guards, and half a battalion of the Coldstream Guards, of the First Infantry Brigade. The trenches in the salient were blown in almost at once, and the enemy's attack penetrated this line. Our troops retired to a partially prepared second line, running approximately due north and south from the canal to the road, some 500 yards west of the railway triangle. This second line had been strengthened by the construction of a keep half way between the canal and the road. Here the other two half battalions of the above-mentioned regiments were in support.

These supports held up the enemy, who, however, managed to establish himself in the brick stacks and some communication trenches between the keep, the road, and the canal—and even beyond the west of the keep on either side of it.

The London Scottish had in the meantime been sent up in support, and a counter-attack was organized with the First Royal Highlanders, part of the First Cameron Highlanders, and the Second King's Royal Rifle Corps, the latter regiment having been sent forward from the Divisional Reserve.

The counter-attack was delayed in order to synchronize with a counter-attack north of the canal which was arranged for 1 P.M.

At 1 P.M. these troops moved forward, their flanks making good progress near the road and the canal, but their centre being held up. The Second Royal Sussex Regiment was then sent forward, late in the afternoon, to reinforce. The result was that the Germans were driven back far enough to enable a somewhat broken line to be taken up, running from the culvert on the railway, almost due south to the keep, and thence southeast to the main road.

The French left near the road had also been attacked and driven back a little, but not to so great an extent as the British right. Consequently the French left was in advance of the British right, and exposed to a possible flank attack from the north.

The Germans did not, however, persevere further in their attack.

The above-mentioned line was strengthened during the night, and the First Guards Brigade, which had suffered severely, was withdrawn into reserve and replaced by the Second Infantry Brigade.

While this was taking place another and equally severe attack was delivered north of the canal against the village of Givenchy.

At 8:15 A.M., after a heavy artillery bombardment with high explosive shells, the enemy's infantry advanced under the effective fire of our artillery, which, however, was hampered by the constant interruption of telephonic communication between the observers and batteries. Nevertheless, our artillery fire, combined with that of the infantry in the fire trenches, had the effect of driving the enemy from its original direction of advance, with the result that his troops crowded together on the northeast corner of the village and broke through into the centre of the village as far as the keep, which had been previously put in a state of defense.

The places underlined in the above map indicate the points around La Bassée and southward to Arras, where part of the British Expeditionary Force was heavily engaged.

The Germans had lost heavily, and a well-timed local counter-attack, delivered by the reserves of the Second Welsh Regiment and First South Wales Borderers, and by a company of the First Royal Highlanders, (lent by the First Brigade as a working party—this company was at work on the keep at the time,) was completely successful, with the result that after about an hour's street fighting all who had broken into the village were either captured or killed, and the original line around the village was re-established by noon.

South of the village, however, and close to the canal, the right of the Second Royal Munster Fusiliers fell back in conformity with the troops south of the canal, but after dark that regiment moved forward and occupied the old line.

During the course of the attack on Givenchy the enemy made five assaults on the salient at the northeast of the village about French Farm, but was repulsed every time with heavy loss.

6. On the morning of Jan. 29 attacks were made on the right of the First Corps, south of the canal in the neighborhood of La Bassée.

The enemy, (part of the Fourteenth German Corps,) after a severe shelling, made a violent attack with scaling ladders on the keep, also to the north and south of it. In the keep and on the north side the Sussex Regiment held the enemy off, inflicting on him serious losses. On the south side the hostile infantry succeeded in reaching the Northamptonshire Regiment's trenches, but were immediately counter-attacked and all killed. Our artillery co-operated well with the infantry in repelling the attack.

In this action our casualties were inconsiderable, but the enemy lost severely, more than 200 of his killed alone being left in front of our position.

7. On Feb. 1 a fine piece of work was carried out by the Fourth Brigade in the neighborhood of Cuinchy.

Some of the Second Coldstream Guards were driven from their trenches at 2:30 A.M., but made a stand some twenty yards east of them in a position which they held till morning.

A counter-attack, launched at 3:15 A.M., by one company of the Irish Guards and half a company of the Second Coldstream Guards, proved unsuccessful, owing to heavy rifle fire from the east and south.

At 10:05 A.M., acting under orders of the First Division, a heavy bombardment was opened on the lost ground for ten minutes; and this was followed immediately by an assault by about fifty men of the Second Coldstream Guards with bayonets, led by Capt. A. Leigh Bennett, followed by thirty men of the Irish Guards, led by Second Lieut. F.F. Graham, also with bayonets. These were followed by a party of Royal Engineers with sand bags and wire.

All the ground which had been lost was brilliantly retaken, the Second Coldstream Guards also taking another German trench and capturing two machine guns.

Thirty-two prisoners fell into our hands.

The General Officer Commanding First Division describes the preparation by the artillery as "splendid, the high explosive shells dropping in the exact spot with absolute precision."

In forwarding his report on this engagement, the General Officer Commanding First Army writes as follows:

Special credit is due—

(i) To Major Gen. Haking, commanding First Division, for the prompt manner in which he arranged this counter-attack and for the general plan of action, which was crowned with success.

(ii) To the General Officer commanding the Fourth Brigade (Lord Cavan) for the thorough manner in which he carried out the orders of the General Officer commanding the division.

(iii) To the regimental officers, non-commissioned officers, and men of the Second Coldstream Guards and Irish Guards, who, with indomitable pluck, stormed two sets of barricades, captured three German trenches, two machine guns, and killed or made prisoners many of the enemy.

8. During the period under report the Royal Flying Corps has again performed splendid service.

Although the weather was almost uniformly bad and the machines suffered from constant exposure, there have been only thirteen days on which no actual reconnoissance has been effected. Approximately, 100,000 miles have been flown.

In addition to the daily and constant work of reconnoissance and co-operation with the artillery, a number of aerial combats have been fought, raids carried out, detrainments harassed, parks and petrol depots bombed, &c.

Various successful bomb-dropping raids have been carried out, usually against the enemy's aircraft material. The principle of attacking hostile aircraft whenever and wherever seen (unless highly important information is being delivered) has been adhered to, and has resulted in the moral fact that enemy machines invariably beat immediate retreat when chased.

Five German aeroplanes are known to have been brought to the ground, and it would appear probable that others, though they have managed to reach their own lines, have done so in a considerably damaged condition.

9. In my dispatch of Nov. 20, 1914, I referred to the reinforcements of territorial troops which I had received, and I mentioned several units which had already been employed in the fighting line.

In the positions which I held for some years before the outbreak of this war I was brought into close contact with the territorial force, and I found every reason to hope and believe that, when the hour of trial arrived, they would justify every hope and trust which was placed in them.

The Lords Lieutenant of Counties and the associations which worked under them bestowed a vast amount of labor and energy on the organization of the territorial force; and I trust it may be some recompense to them to know that I, and the principal commanders serving under me, consider that the territorial force has far more than justified the most sanguine hopes that any of us ventured to entertain of their value and use in the field. Commanders of cavalry divisions are unstinted in their praise of the manner in which the yeomanry regiments attached to their brigades have done their duty, both in and out of action. The service of divisional cavalry is now almost entirely performed by yeomanry, and divisional commanders report that they are very efficient.

Army corps commanders are loud in their praise of the territorial battalions, which form part of nearly all the brigades at the front in the first line, and more than one of them have told me that these battalions are fast approaching—if they have not already reached—the standard of efficiency of regular infantry.

I wish to add a word about the Officers' Training Corps. The presence of the Artists' Rifles (Twenty-eighth Battalion, the London regiment) with the army in France enabled me also to test the value of this organization.

Having had some experience in peace of the working of the Officers' Training Corps, I determined to turn the Artists' Rifles (which formed part of the Officers' Training Corps in peace time) to its legitimate use. I therefore established the battalion as a training corps for officers in the field.

The cadets passed through a course, which includes some thoroughly practical training, as all cadets do a tour of forty-eight hours in the trenches, and afterward write a report on what they see and notice. They also visit an observation post of a battery or group of batteries, and spend some hours there.

A commandant has been appointed, and he arranges and supervises the work, sets schemes for practice, administers the school, delivers lectures, and reports on the candidates.

The cadets are instructed in all branches of military training suitable for platoon commanders.

Machine-gun tactics, a knowledge of which is so necessary for all junior officers, is a special feature of the course of instruction.

When first started, the school was able to turn out officers at the rate of seventy-five a month. This has since been increased to 100.

Reports received from divisional and army corps commanders on officers who have been trained at the school are most satisfactory.

10. Since the date of my last report I have been able to make a close personal inspection of all the units in the command. I was most favorably impressed by all I saw.

The troops composing the army in France have been subjected to as severe a trial as it is possible to impose upon any body of men. The desperate fighting described in my last dispatch had hardly been brought to a conclusion when they were called upon to face the rigors and hardships of a Winter campaign. Frost and snow have alternated with periods of continuous rain.

The men have been called upon to stand for many hours together almost up to their waists in bitterly cold water, only separated by one or two hundred yards from a most vigilant enemy.

Although every measure which science and medical knowledge could suggest to mitigate these hardships was employed, the sufferings of the men have been very great.

In spite of all this they presented, at the inspections to which I have referred, a most soldierlike, splendid, though somewhat war-worn, appearance. Their spirit remains high and confident; their general health is excellent, and their condition most satisfactory.

I regard it as most unfortunate that circumstances have prevented any account of many splendid instances of courage and endurance, in the face of almost unparalleled hardship and fatigue in war, coming regularly to the knowledge of the public.

Reinforcements have arrived from England with remarkable promptitude and rapidity. They have been speedily drafted into the ranks, and most of the units I inspected were nearly complete when I saw them. In appearance and quality the drafts sent out have exceeded my most sanguine expectations, and I consider the army in France is much indebted to the Adjutant General's Department at the War Office for the efficient manner in which its requirements have been met in this most essential respect.

With regard to these inspections I may mention in particular the fine appearance presented by the Twenty-seventh and Twenty-eighth Divisions, composed principally of battalions which had come from India. Included in the former division was the Princess Patricia's Royal Canadian Regiment. They are a magnificent set of men, and have since done excellent work in the trenches.

It was some three weeks after the events recorded in Paragraph 4 that I made my inspection of the Indian Corps, under Sir James Willcocks. The appearance they presented was most satisfactory and fully confirmed my opinion that the Indian troops only required rest and a little acclimatizing to bring out all their fine inherent fighting qualities.

I saw the whole of the Indian Cavalry Corps, under Lieut. Gen. Rimington, on a mounted parade soon after their arrival. They are a magnificent body of cavalry and will, I feel sure, give the best possible account of themselves when called upon.

In the meantime, at their own particular request, they have taken their turn in the trenches and performed most useful and valuable service.

11. The Right Rev. Bishop Taylor Smith, C.V.O., D.D., Chaplain General to the Forces, arrived at my headquarters on Jan. 6, on a tour of inspection throughout the command.

The Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster has also visited most of the Irish regiments at the front and the principal centres on the line of communications.

In a quiet and unostentatious manner the Chaplains of all denominations have worked with devotion and energy in their respective spheres.

The number with the forces in the field at the commencement of the war was comparatively small, but toward the end of last year the Rev. J.M. Simms, D.D., K.H.C., principal Chaplain, assisted by his secretary, the Rev. W. Drury, reorganized the branch and placed the spiritual welfare of the soldier on a more satisfactory footing. It is hoped that the further increase of personnel may be found possible.

I cannot speak too highly of the devoted manner in which all the Chaplains, whether with the troops in the trenches or in attendance on the sick and wounded in casualty clearing stations and hospitals on the line of communications, have worked throughout the campaign.

Since the commencement of hostilities the work of the Royal Army Medical Corps has been carried out with untiring zeal, skill, and devotion. Whether at the front under conditions such as obtained during the fighting on the Aisne, when casualties were heavy and accommodation for their reception had to be improvised, or on the line of communications, where an average of some 11,000 patients have been daily under treatment, the organization of the medical service has always been equal to the demands made upon it.

The careful system of sanitation introduced into the army has, with the assistance of other measures, kept the troops free from any epidemic, in support of which it is to be noticed that since the commencement of the war some 500 cases only of enteric have occurred.

The organization for the first time in war of motor ambulance convoys is due to the initiative and organizing powers of Surgeon General T.J. O'Donnell, D.S.O., ably assisted by Major P. Evans, Royal Army Medical Corps.

Two of these convoys, composed entirely of Red Cross Society personnel, have done excellent work under the superintendence of regular medical officers.

Twelve hospital trains ply between the front and the various bases. I have visited several of the trains when halted in stations, and have found them conducted with great comfort and efficiency.

During the more recent phase of the campaign the creation of rest depots at the front has materially reduced the wastage of men to the line of communications.

Since the latter part of October, 1914, the whole of the medical arrangements have been in the hands of Surgeon General Sir A.T. Sloggett, C.M.G., K.H.S., under whom Surgeon General T.P. Woodhouse and Surgeon General T.J. O'Donnell have been responsible for the organization on the line of communications and at the front respectively.

12. The exceptional and peculiar conditions brought about by the weather have caused large demands to be made upon the resources and skill of the Royal Engineers.

Every kind of expedient has had to be thought out and adopted to keep the lines of trenches and defense work effective.

The Royal Engineers have shown themselves as capable of overcoming the ravages caused by violent rain and floods as they have been throughout in neutralizing the effect of the enemy's artillery.

In this connection I wish particularly to mention the excellent services performed by my Chief Engineer, Brig. Gen. G.H. Fowke, who has been indefatigable in supervising all such work. His ingenuity and skill have been most valuable in the local construction of the various expedients which experience has shown to be necessary in prolonged trench warfare.

13. I have no reason to modify in any material degree my views of the general military situation, as expressed in my dispatch of Nov. 20, 1914.

14. I have once more gratefully to acknowledge the valuable help and support I have received throughout this period from Gen. Foch, Gen. D'Urbal, and Gen. Maud'huy of the French Army. I have the honor to be, your Lordship's most obedient servant,

J.D.P. FRENCH, Field Marshal, Commanding in Chief, the British Army in the Field.

## The Cathedral of Rheims

BY EMILE VERHAEREN

(From Les Blés Mouvants)

Done into English verse by Joyce Kilmer.

He who walks through the meadows of Champagne

At noon in Fall, when leaves like gold appear,

Sees it draw near

Like some great mountain set upon the plain,

From radiant dawn until the close of day,

Nearer it grows

To him who goes

Across the country. When tall towers lay

Their shadowy pall

Upon his way,

He enters, where

The solid stone is hollowed deep by all

Its centuries of beauty and of prayer.

Ancient French temple! thou whose hundred Kings

Watch over thee, emblazoned on thy walls,

Tell me, within thy memory-hallowed halls

What chant of triumph, or what war-song rings?

Thou hast known Clovis and his Frankish train,

Whose mighty hand Saint Remy's hand did keep

And in thy spacious vault perhaps may sleep

An echo of the voice of Charlemagne.

For God thou hast known fear, when from His side

Men wandered, seeking alien shrines and new,

But still the sky was bountiful and blue

And thou wast crowned with France's love and pride.

Sacred thou art, from pinnacle to base;

And in thy panes of gold and scarlet glass

The setting sun sees thousandfold his face;

Sorrow and joy, in stately silence pass

Across thy walls, the shadow and the light;

Around thy lofty pillars, tapers white

Illuminate, with delicate sharp flames,

The brows of saints with venerable names,

And in the night erect a fiery wall,

A great but silent fervor burns in all

Those simple folk who kneel, pathetic, dumb,

And know that down below, beside the Rhine—

Cannon, horses, soldiers, flags in line—

With blare of trumpets, mighty armies come.

Suddenly, each knows fear:

Swift rumors pass, that every one must hear,

The hostile banners blaze against the sky

And by the embassies mobs rage and cry.

Now war has come, and peace is at an end,

On Paris town the German troops descend.

They turned back, and driven to Champagne.

And now, as to so many weary men,

The glorious temple gives them welcome, when,

It meets them at the bottom of the plain.

At once, they set their cannon in its way.

There is no gable now, nor wall

That does not suffer, night and day,

As shot and shell in crushing torrents fall,

The stricken tocsin quivers through the tower;

The triple nave, the apse, the lonely choir

Are circled, hour by hour,

With thundering bands of fire

And Death is scattered broadcast among men.

And then

That which was splendid with baptismal grace;

The stately arches soaring into space,

The transepts, columns, windows gray and gold,

The organ, in whose tones the ocean rolled,

The crypts, of mighty shades the dwelling places,

The Virgin's gentle hands, the Saints' pure faces,

All, even the pardoning hands of Christ the Lord

Were struck and broken by the wanton sword

Of sacrilegious lust.

O beauty slain, O glory in the dust!

Strong walls of faith, most basely overthrown!

The crawling flames, like adders glistening

Ate the white fabric of this lovely thing.

Now from its soul arose a piteous moan.

The soul that always loved the just and fair.

Granite and marble loud their woe confessed,

The silver monstrances that Pope has blessed.

The chalices and lamps and crosiers rare

Were seared and twisted by a flaming-breath;

The horror everywhere did rage and swell,

The guardian Saints into this furnace fell,

Their bitter tears and screams were stilled in death.

Around the flames armed hosts are skirmishing,

The burning sun reflects the lurid scene;

The German Army fighting for its life,

Rallies its torn and terrified left wing;

And, as they near this place

The imperial eagles see

Before them in their flight,

Here, in the solemn night,

The old cathedrals, to the years to be

Showing, with wounded arms, their own disgrace.

## Music of War

By Rudyard Kipling

The following speech was delivered by Mr. Kipling on Jan. 27, 1915, at a meeting in London promoted by the Recruiting Bands Committee, and held with the object of raising bands in the London district as an aid to recruiting.

The most useful thing that a civilian can do in these busy days is to speak as little as possible, and if he feels moved to write, to confine his efforts to his check book. [Laughter.] But this is an exception to that very sound rule. We do not know the present strength of the new armies. Even if we did it would not be necessary to make it public. But we may assume that there are several battalions in Great Britain which were not in existence at the end of last July, and some of them are in London. Nor is it any part of our national policy to explain how far these battalions are prepared for the work which is ahead of them. They were born quite rightly in silence. But that is no reason why they should continue to walk in silence for the rest of their lives. [Cheers.] Unfortunately up to the present most of them have been obliged to walk in silence or to no better accompaniment than whistles and concertinas and other meritorious but inadequate instruments of music with which they have provided themselves. In the beginning this did not matter so much. More urgent needs had to be met; but now that the new armies are what they are, we who cannot assist them by joining their ranks owe it to them to provide them with more worthy music for their help, their gratification, and their honor. [Cheers.]

I am not a musician, so if I speak as a barbarian I must ask you and several gentlemen on the platform here to forgive me. From the lowest point of view a few drums and fifes in the battalion mean at least five extra miles in a route march, quite apart from the fact that they can swing a battalion back to quarters happy and composed in its mind, no matter how wet or tired its body may be. Even when there is no route marching, the mere come and go, the roll and flourishing of drums and fifes around the barracks is as warming and cheering as the sight of a fire in a room. A band, not necessarily a full band, but a band of a dozen brasses and wood-winds, is immensely valuable in the district where men are billeted. It revives memories, it quickens association, it opens and unites the hearts of men more surely than any other appeal can, and in this respect it aids recruiting perhaps more than any other agency. I wonder whether I should say this—the tune that it employs and the words that go with that tune are sometimes very remote from heroism or devotion, but the magic and the compelling power is in them, and it makes men's souls realize certain truths that their minds might doubt.

Further, no one, not even the Adjutant, can say for certain where the soul of the battalion lives, but the expression of that soul is most often found in the band. [Cheers.] It stands to reason that 1,200 men whose lives are pledged to each other must have some common means of expression, some common means of conveying their moods and their thoughts to themselves and their world. The band feels the moods and interprets the thoughts. A wise and sympathetic bandmaster—and the masters that I have met have been that—can lift a battalion out of depression, cheer it in sickness, and steady and recall it to itself in times of almost unendurable stress. [Cheers.] You may remember a beautiful poem by Sir Henry Newbolt, in which he describes how a squadron of weary big dragoons were led to renewed effort by the strains of a penny whistle and a child's drum taken from a toyshop in a wrecked French town. I remember in India, in a cholera camp, where the men were suffering very badly, the band of the Tenth Lincolns started a regimental sing-song and went on with that queer, defiant tune, "The Lincolnshire Poacher." It was their regimental march that the men had heard a thousand times. There was nothing in it—nothing except all England, all the East Coast, all the fun and daring and horse play of young men bucketing about big pastures in the moonlight. But as it was given, very softly at that bad time in that terrible camp of death, it was the one thing in the world that could have restored, as it did restore, shaken men back to their pride, humor, and self-control. [Cheers.] This may be an extreme instance, but it is not an exceptional one. Any man who has had anything to do with the service will tell you that the battalion is better for music at every turn, happier, more easily handled, with greater zest in its daily routine, if that routine is sweetened with melody and rhythm—melody for the mind and rhythm for the body.

Our new armies have been badly served in this essential. Of all the admirable qualities which they have shown none is more wonderful than the spirit which has carried them through the laborious and distasteful groundwork of their calling without one note of music, except that which the same indomitable spirit provided out of their own heads. We have all seen them marching through the country, through the streets of London, in absolute silence and the crowds through which they passed as silent as themselves for the lack of the one medium that could convey and glorify the thoughts that are in us all today.

We are a tongue-tied brood at the best. The bands can declare on our behalf without shame and without shyness something of what we all feel and help us to reach a hand toward the men who have risen up to save us. In the beginning the more urgent requirements of the new armies overrode all other considerations. Now we can get to work on some other essentials. The War Office has authorized the formation of bands for some of the London battalions, and we may hope presently to see the permission extended throughout Great Britain. We must not, however, cherish unbridled musical ambitions, because a full band means more than forty pieces, and on that establishment we should even now require a rather large number of men; but I think it might be possible to provide drums and fifes for every battalion, full bands at the depots, and a proportion of battalion bands on half, or even one-third, establishments.

But this is not a matter to be settled by laymen; it must be discussed seriously between bandmasters and musicians—present, past, and dug up. [Laughter.] They may be trusted to give their services with enthusiasm. We have had many proofs in the last six months that people only want to know what the new army needs, and it will be gladly and cheerfully given. The army needs music, its own music, for, more than in any other calling, soldiers do not live by bread alone. From time immemorial the man who offers his life for his land has been compassed at every turn of his service with elaborate ceremonial and observance, of which music is no small part, all carefully designed to support and uphold him. It is not seemly and it is not expedient that any portion of that ritual should be slurred or omitted now. [Cheers.]

## America and a New World State

## How the United States May Take the Lead in the Formation of a World Confederation for the Prevention of Future Wars

By Norman Angell

The object of this article is to show that however much America may attempt to hold herself free in Europe she will very deeply feel the effects, both material and moral, of upheavals like that which is now shaking the old Continent; that even though there be no aggressive action against her, the militarization of Europe will force upon America also a militarist development; and that she can best avoid these dangers and secure her own safety and free development by taking the lead in a new world policy which is briefly this:

To use her position to initiate and guide a grouping of all the civilized powers having as its object the protection of any one of its members that is the victim of aggression. The aid to be given for such an object should not be, in the case of the United States, military but economic, by means of the definite organization of non-intercourse against the recalcitrant power. America's position of geographical and historical remoteness from European quarrels places her in a particularly favorable position to direct this world organization, and the fact of undertaking it would give her in some sense the moral leadership of the western world, and make her the centre of the World State of the future.

(COPYRIGHT, 1915, BY THE NEW YORK TIMES COMPANY.)

### I.

In the discussion of America's relation to the rest of the world we have always assumed almost as an axiom that America has nothing to do with Europe, is only in the faintest degree concerned with its politics and developments, that by happy circumstance of geography and history we are isolated and self-sufficing, able to look with calm detachment upon the antics of the distant Europeans. When a European landed on these shores we were pretty certain that he left Europe behind him; only quite recently, indeed, have we realized that we were affected by what he brought with him in the way of morals and traditions, and only now are we beginning dimly to realize that what goes on on the other side of the world can be any affair of ours. The famous query of a certain American statesmen, "What has America to do with abroad?" probably represented at bottom the feelings of most of us.

In so far as we established commercial relations with Europe at all, we felt and still feel probably that they were relations of hostility, that we were one commercial unit, Europe another, and that the two were in competition. In thinking thus, of course, we merely accepted the view of international politics common in Europe itself, the view, namely, that nations are necessarily trade rivals—the commercial rivalry of Britain and Germany is presumed to be one of the factors explaining the outbreak of the present war. The idea that nations do thus compete together for the world's trade is one of the axioms of all discussion in the field of international politics.

Well, both these assumptions in the form in which we make them involve very grave fallacies, the realization of which will shortly become essential to the wise direction of this country's policy. If our policy, in other words, is to be shrewd and enlightened, we must realize just how both the views of international relationship that I have indicated are wrong.

I will take first the more special one—that of the assumed necessary rivalry of nations in trade—as its clearer understanding will help in what is for us the larger problem of the general relationship of this country to other civilized powers. I will therefore try and establish first this proposition—that nations are not and can not be trade rivals in the sense usually accepted; that, in other words, there is a fundamental misconception in the prevailing picture of nations as trading units—one might as well talk of red-haired people being the trade rivals of black-haired people.

And I will then try and establish a second proposition, namely, that we are intimately concerned with the condition of Europe, and are daily becoming more so, owing to processes which have become an integral part of our fight against nature, of the feeding and clothing of the world; that we cannot much longer ignore the effects of those tendencies which bind us to our neighbors; that the elementary consideration of self-protection will sooner or later compel us to accept the facts and recognize our part and lot in the struggles of Christendom; and that if we are wise, we shall not take our part therein reluctantly, dragged at the heels of forces we cannot resist, but will do so consciously, anticipating events. In other words, we shall take advantage of such measure of detachment as we do possess, to take the lead in a saner organization of western civilization; we shall become the pivot and centre of a new world State.

There is not the faintest hope of America taking this lead unless a push or impetus is given to her action by a widespread public feeling, based on the recognition of the fallacy of the two assumptions with which I began this article. For if America really is independent of the rest of the world, little concerned with what goes on therein, if she is in a position to build a sort of Chinese wall about herself, and, secure in her own strength, to develop a civilization and future of her own, still more if the weakness and disintegration of foreign nations, however unfortunate for them, is for America an opportunity of expanding trade and opportunities, why then, of course, it would be the height of folly for the United States to incur all the risks and uncertainties of an adventure into the sea of foreign politics.

What as a matter of simple fact is the real nature of trade between nations? If we are to have any clear notion at all as to just what truth there is in the notion of the necessary commercial rivalry of States, we must have some fairly clear notion of how the commercial relationship of nations works. And that can best be illustrated by a supposititious example. At the present time we are talking, for instance, of "capturing" German or British or French trade.

Now, when we talk thus of "German" trade in the international field, what do we mean? Here is the ironmaster in Essen making locomotives for a light railway in an Argentine province, (the capital for which has been subscribed in Paris)—which has become necessary because of the export of wool to Bradford, where the trade has developed owing to sales in the United States, due to high prices produced by the destruction of sheep runs, owing to the agricultural development of the West.

But for the money found in Paris, (due, perhaps, to good crops in wine and olives, sold mainly in London and New York,) and the wool needed by the Bradford manufacturer, (who has found a market for blankets among miners in Montana, who are smelting copper for a cable to China, which is needed because the encouragement given to education by the Chinese Republic has caused Chinese newspapers to print cable news from Europe)—but for such factors as these, and a whole chain of equally interdependent ones throughout the world, the ironmaster in Essen would not have been able to sell his locomotives.

How, therefore, can you describe it as part of the trade of "Germany" which is in competition with the trade of "Britain" or "France" or "America"? But for the British, French, and American trade, it could not have existed at all. You may say that if the Essen ironmaster could have been prevented from selling his locomotives the order would have gone to an American one.

H.M. PETER I—King of Servia

WALTER H. PAGE—American Ambassador to Great Britain
—(Photo from Paul Thompson)

But this community of German workmen, called into existence by the Argentina trade, maintains by its consumption of coffee a plantation in Brazil, which buys its machinery in Chicago. The destruction, therefore, of the Essen trade, while it might have given business to the American locomotive maker, would have taken it from, say, an American agricultural implement maker. The economic interests involved sort themselves, irrespective of the national groupings. I have summarized the whole process as follows, and the need for getting some of these simple things straight is my excuse for quoting myself:

Co-operation between nations has become essential for the very life of their peoples. But that co-operation does not take place as between States at all. A trading corporation, "Britain" does not buy cotton from another corporation, "America." A manufacturer in Manchester strikes a bargain with a merchant in Louisiana in order to keep a bargain with a dyer in Germany, and three or a much larger number of parties enter into virtual, or, perhaps, actual, contract, and form a mutually dependent economic community, (numbering, it may be, with the work people in the group of industries involved, some millions of individuals)—an economic entity, so far as one can exist, which does not include all organized society.

The special interests of such a community may become hostile to those of another community, but it will almost certainly not be a "national" one, but one of a like nature, say a shipping ring or groups of international bankers or Stock Exchange speculators. The frontiers of such communities do not coincide with the areas in which operate the functions of the State.

How could a State, say Britain, act on behalf of an economic entity such as that just indicated? By pressure against America or Germany? But the community against which the British manufacturer in this case wants pressure exercised is not "America" or "Germany"—both Americans and Germans are his partners in the matter. He wants it exercised against the shipping ring or the speculators or the bankers who are in part British....

This establishes two things, therefore: The fact that the political and economic units do not coincide, and the fact which follows as a consequence—that action by political authorities designed to control economic activities which take no account of the limits of political jurisdiction is necessarily irrelevant and ineffective.—(From "Arms and Industry: A Study of the Foundations of International Polity." Page 28. Putnams: New York.)

The fallacy of the idea that the groups we call nations must be in conflict because they struggle together for bread and the means of sustenance is demonstrated immediately when we recall the simple facts of historical development. When, in the British Islands, the men of Wessex were fighting with the men of Sussex, far more frequently and bitterly than today the men of Germany fight with those of France, or either with those of Russia, the separate States which formed the island were struggling with one another for sustenance, just as the tribes which inhabited the North American Continent at the time of our arrival there were struggling with one another for the game and hunting grounds. It was in both cases ultimately a "struggle for bread."

At that time, when Britain was composed of several separate States, that struggled thus with one another for land and food, it supported with great difficulty anything between one and two million inhabitants, just as the vast spaces now occupied by the United States supported about a hundred thousand, often subject to famine, frequently suffering great shortage of food, able to secure just the barest existence of the simplest kind.

Today, although Britain supports anything from twenty to forty times, and North America something like a thousand times, as large a population in much greater comfort, with no period of famine, with the whole population living much more largely and deriving much more from the soil than did the men of the Heptarchy, or the Red Indians, the "struggle for bread" does not now take the form of struggle between groups of the population. The more they fought, the less efficiently did they support themselves; the less they fought one another, the more efficiently did they all support themselves.

This simple illustration is at least proof of this, that the struggle for material things did not involve any necessary struggle between the separate groups or States; for those material things are given in infinitely greater abundance when the States cease to struggle. Whatever, therefore, was the origin of those conflicts, that origin was not any inevitable conflict in the exploitation of the earth. If those conflicts were concerned with material things at all, they arose from a mistake about the best means of obtaining them, exploiting the earth, and ceased when those concerned realized the mistake.

Just as Britain supported its population better when Englishmen gave up fighting between themselves, so the world as a whole could support its population better if it gave up fighting.

Moreover, we have passed out of the stage when we could massacre a conquered population to make room for us. When we conquer an inferior people like the Filipinos, we don't exterminate them, we give them an added chance of life. The weakest don't go to the wall.

But at this point parenthetically I want to enter a warning. You may say, if this notion of the rivalry of nations is false, how do you account for the fact of its playing so large a part in the present war?

Well, that is easily explained—men are not guided necessarily by their interest even in their soberest moments, but by what they believe to be their interest. Men do not judge from the facts, but from what they believe to be the facts. War is the "failure of human understanding." The religious wars were due to the belief that two religions could not exist side by side. It was not true, but the false belief provoked the wars. Our notions as to the relation of political power to a nation's prosperity are just as false, and this fallacy, like the older one, plays its part in the causation of war.

Now, let us for a moment apply the very general rule thus revealed to the particular case of the United States at this present juncture.

American merchants may in certain cases, if they are shrewd and able, do a very considerably increased trade, though it is just as certain that other merchants will be losing trade, and I think there is pretty general agreement that as a matter of simple fact the losses of the war so far have for America very considerably and very obviously overbalanced the gains. The loss has been felt so tangibly by the United States Government, for instance, that a special loan had to be voted in order to stop some of the gaps. Whole States, whose interests are bound up with staples like cotton, were for a considerable time threatened with something resembling commercial paralysis.

While we may admit advances and gains in certain isolated directions, the extra burden is felt in all directions of commerce and industry. And that extra burden is visible through finance—the increased cost of money, the scarcity of capital, the lower negotiability of securities, the greater uncertainty concerning the future. It is by means of the financial reaction that America, as a whole, has felt the adverse effects of this war. There is not a considerable village, much less a considerable city, not a merchant, not a captain of industry in the United States that has not so felt it. It is plainly evident that by the progressive dearness of money, the lower standard of living that will result in Europe, the effect on immigration, and other processes which I will touch upon at greater length later, any temporary stimulus which a trade here and there may receive will be more than offset by the difficulties due to financial as apart from industrial or commercial reactions.

This war will come near to depriving America for a decade or two of its normal share of the accumulated capital of the older peoples, whether that capital be used in paying war indemnities or in paying off the cost of the war or in repairing its ravages. In all cases it will make capital much dearer, and many enterprises which with more abundant capital might have been born and might have stimulated American industry will not be born. For the best part of a generation perhaps the available capital of Europe will be used to repair the ravages of war there, to pay off the debts created by war, and to start life normally once more. We shall suffer in two ways.

In a recent report issued by the Agricultural Department at Washington is a paragraph to the effect that one of the main factors which have operated against the development of the American farm is the difficulty that the farmer has found in securing abundant capital and the high price that he has to pay for it when he can secure it. It will in the future be of still higher price, and still less abundant, because, of course, the capital of the world is a common reservoir—if it is dearer in one part, it is dearer to some extent in all parts.

So that if for many years the American farmhouse is not so well built as it might be, the farm not so well worked, rural life in America not so attractive as it might be, the farmer's wife burdened with a little more labor than she might otherwise have, and if she grows old earlier than she might otherwise, it will be in part because we are paying our share of the war indemnities and the war costs.

But this scarcity of capital operates in another way. One of the most promising fields for American enterprise is, of course, in the undeveloped lands to the south of us, but in the development of those lands we have looked and must look for the co-operation of European capital. Millions of French and British money have poured into South America, building docks and railroads and opening up the country, and that development of South America has been to our advantage because quite frequently these enterprises were under the actual management of Americans, using to the common advantage the savings of the thrifty Frenchman and the capital of the wealthy Englishman.

For, of course, as between the older and the newer worlds there has gone on this very beneficent division of labor: the Old World having developed its soil, built its cities, made its roads, has more capital available for outside employment than have the population of newer countries that have so much of this work before them. And now this possibility of fruitful co-operation is, for the time being, and it may be for many years, suspended. I say nothing of the loss of markets in the older countries which will be occasioned by sheer loss of population and the lower standard of living. That is one of the more obvious but not perhaps the most important of the ways in which the war affects us commercially.

Speaking purely in terms of commercial advantage—and these, I know, do not tell the whole story (I am not for a moment pretending they do)—the losses that we shall suffer through this war are probably very much more considerable than those we should suffer by the loss of the Philippines in the event, say, of their being seized by some hostile power; and we suffer these losses, although not a single foreign soldier lands upon our soil. It is literally and precisely true to say that there is not one person from Hudson Bay to Cape Horn that will not be affected in some degree by what is now going on in Europe. And it is at least conceivable that our children and children's children will feel its effects more deeply still.

Nor is America escaping the military any more than she has escaped the commercial and financial effects of this war. She may never be drawn into active military co-operation with other nations, but she is affected none the less. Indeed the military effects of this war are already revealing themselves in a demand for a naval programme immensely larger than any American could have anticipated a year ago, by plans for an enormously enlarged army. All this is the most natural result.

Just consider, for instance, the ultimate effect of a quite possible outcome of the present conflict—Germany victorious and the Prussian effort next directed at, say, the conquest of India. Imagine India Prussianized by Germany, so that, with the marvelous efficiency in military organization which she has shown, she is able to draw on an Asiatic population of something approaching 400,000,000.

Whether the situation then created would really constitute a menace for us or not, this much would be certain—that the more timid and timorous among us would believe it to be a menace, and it would furnish an irresistible plea for a very greatly enlarged naval and military establishment. We too, in that case would probably be led to organize our nation on the lines on which the European military nations have organized theirs, with compulsory military service, and so forth.

Indeed, even if Germany is not victorious the future contains possibilities of a like result; imagine, what is quite possible, that Russia becomes the dominant factor in Europe after this war and places herself at the head of a great Slav confederacy of 200,000,000, with her power extending incidentally to the Pacific coast of Asia, and, it may be the day after tomorrow, over 100,000,000 or 200,000,000 of Asiatics. We should thus have a militarized power of 200,000,000 or 300,000,000 or 400,000,000 souls, autocratically governed, endowed with western technical knowledge in the manipulation of the instruments of war, occupying the Pacific coast line directly facing our Pacific coast line. It is quite conceivable, therefore, that as the outcome of either of the two possible results of this war we may find ourselves embarked upon a great era of militarization.

Our impregnability does not protect us from militarism. It is quite true that this country, like Russia, cannot be permanently invaded; it is quite true that hostile navies need not necessarily be resisted by navies of our own so far as the protection of our coasts is concerned. But there is no such thing as absolute certainty in these matters. While personally I believe that no country in the world will ever challenge the United States, that the chances are a hundred to one against it, it is on just that one chance that the militarist bases his plea for armaments and secures them.

But, unfortunately, we are already committed to a good deal more than just mere defense of American territory; problems arising out of the Philippines and the Panama Canal and the Monroe Doctrine have already committed us to a measure of intervention in the political affairs of the outside world. In brief, if the other nations of the world have great armies and navies—and tomorrow those other nations will include a reorganized China as they already include a westernized Japan—if there is all that weight of military material which might be used against us, then in the absence of those other guarantees which I shall suggest, we shall be drawn into piling up a corresponding weight of material as against that of the outside world.

And, of course, just as we cannot escape the economic and the military reaction of European development, neither can we escape the moral. If European thought and morality did, by some fatality, really develop in the direction of a Nietzschean idealization of military force, we might well get in the coming years a practical submergence of that morality which we believe to be distinctively American, and get throughout the older hemisphere a type of society based upon authority, reproducing it may be some features of past civilizations, Mongol, Asiatic, or Byzantine. If that were to happen, if Europe were really to become a mere glorified form of, say, certain Asiatic conceptions that we all thought had had their day, why, then, of course America could not escape a like transformation of outlook, ideals, and morals.

For there is no such thing as one nation standing out and maintaining indefinitely a social spirit, an attitude toward life and society absolutely distinct and different from that of the surrounding world. The character of a society is determined by the character of its ideas, and neither tariffs nor coastal defenses are really efficient in preventing the invasion of ideas, good or bad. The difference between the kind of society which exists in Illinois today and that which existed there 500 years ago is not a difference of physical vigor or of the raw materials of nature; the Indian was as good a man physically as the modern Chicagoan, and possessed the same soil. What makes the difference between the two is accumulated knowledge, the mind. And there never was yet on this planet a change of ideas which did not sooner or later affect the whole planet.

The "nations" that inhabited this continent a couple of thousand years ago were apparently quite unconcerned with what went on in Europe or Asia, say, in the domain of mathematical and astronomical knowledge. But the ultimate effect of that knowledge on navigation and discovery was destined to affect them—and us—profoundly. But the reaction of European thought upon this continent, which originally required twenty, or, for that matter, two hundred or two thousand years to show itself, now shows itself, in the industrial and commercial field, for instance, through our banking and Stock Exchanges, in as many hours, or, for that matter, minutes.

It is difficult, of course, for us to realize the extent to which each nation owes its civilization to others, how we have all lived by taking in each other's washing. As Americans, for instance, we have to make a definite effort properly to realize that our institutions, the sanctity of our homes and all the other things upon which we pride ourselves, are the result of anything but the unaided efforts of a generation or two of Americans, perhaps owing a little to certain of the traditions that we may have taken from Britain.

One has to stop and uproot impressions that are almost instinctive, to remember that our forefathers reached these shores by virtue of knowledge which they owed to the astronomical researches of Egyptians and Chaldeans, who inspired the astronomers of Greece, who inspired those of the Renaissance in Italy, Spain, and Germany, keeping alive and developing not merely the art of measuring space and time, but also that conception of order in external nature without which the growth of organized knowledge, which we call science, enabling men to carry on their exploitation of the world, would have been impossible; that our very alphabet comes from Rome, who owed it to others; that the mathematical foundation of our modern mechanical science—without which neither Newton nor Watt nor Stevenson nor Ericson nor Faraday nor Edison could have been—is the work of Arabs, strengthened by Greeks, protected and enlarged by Italians; that our conceptions of political organization, which have so largely shaped our political science, come mainly from the Scandinavian colonists of a French province; that British intellect, to which perhaps we owe the major part of our political impulses, has been nurtured mainly by Greek philosophy; that our Anglo-Saxon law is principally Roman, and our religion almost entirely Asiatic in its origins; that for those things which we deem to be the most important in our lives, our spiritual and religious aspirations, we go to a Jewish book interpreted by a Church Roman in origin, reformed mainly by the efforts of Swiss and German theologians.

And this interaction of the respective elements of the various nations, the influence of foreigners, in other words, and of foreign ideas, is going to be far more powerful in the future than it has been in the past. Morally, as well as materially, we are a part of Europe. The influence which one group exercises on another need not operate through political means at all; indeed, the strongest influences are non-political.

American life and civilization may be transformed by European developments, though the Governments of Europe may leave us severely alone. Luther and Calvin had certainly a greater effect in England than Louis XIV. or Napoleon. Gutenberg created in Europe a revolution more powerful than all the military revolutions of the last ten centuries. Greece and Palestine did not transform the world by their political power. Yet these simple and outstanding truths are persistently ignored by our political and historical philosophers and theorists. For the most part our history is written with a more sublime disregard of the simple facts of the world than is shown perhaps in any other department of human thought and inquiry.

You may today read histories of Europe written by men of worldwide and pre-eminent reputation, professing to tell the story of the development of human society, in which whole volumes will be devoted to the effect of a particular campaign or military alliance in influencing the destinies of a people like the French or the German. But in those histories you will find no word as to the effect of such trifles as the invention of the steam engine, the coming of the railroad, the introduction of the telegraph and cheap newspapers and literature on the destiny of those people; volumes as to the influence which Britain may have had upon the history of France or Germany by the campaigns of Marlborough, but absolutely not one word as to the influence which Britain had upon the destinies of those people by the work of Watt and Stephenson.

A great historian philosopher laying it down that the "influence" of England was repelled or offset by this or that military alliance, seriously stated that "England" was losing her influence on the Continent at a time when her influence was transforming the whole lives of Continental people to a greater degree than they had been transformed since the days of the Romans.

I have gone into this at some length to show mainly two things—first, that neither morally nor materially, neither in our trade nor in our finance, nor in our industry, nor in all those intangible things that give value to life can there be such a thing as isolation from the rest of Christendom. If European civilization takes a "wrong turning"—and it has done that more than once in the past—we can by no means escape the effects of that catastrophe. We are deeply concerned, if only because we may have to defend ourselves against it and in so doing necessarily transform in some degree our society and ourselves.

And I wanted to show, secondly, that not only as a simple matter of fact as things stand are we in a very real sense dependent upon Europe, that we want European capital and European trade, and that if we are to do the best for American prosperity we must increase that dependence, but that if we are effectively to protect those things that go deeper even than trade and prosperity, we must co-operate with Europe intellectually and morally. It is not for us a question of choice. For good or evil, we are part of the world affected by what the rest of the world becomes and affected by what it does. And I want to show in my next article that only by frankly facing the fact (which we cannot deny) that we are a part of the civilized world and must play our part in it, shall we achieve real security for our material and moral possessions and do the best that we know for the general betterment of American life.

### II.—AMERICA'S FUTURE ATTITUDE

In my last article I attempted to show how deeply must America feel, sooner or later, and for good or evil, the moral and material results of the upheavals in Europe and the new tendencies that will be generated by them. I attempted to show, too, how impossible it is for us to escape our part of all the costs, how we shall pay our share of the indemnities, and how our children and children's children may be affected even more profoundly than we ourselves.

The shells may not hit us, yet there is hardly a farmhouse in our country that will not, however unconsciously, be affected by these far-off events. We may not witness the trains of weary refugees trailing over the roads, but (if we could but see the picture) there will be an endless procession of our own farmers' wives with a hardened and shortened life and their children with less ample opportunities.

And our ideals of the future will in some measure be twisted by the moral and material bankruptcy of Europe. Those who consider at all carefully the facts hinted at in my last article—too complex to be more than hinted at in the space available—will realize that the "isolation" of America is an illusion of the map, and is becoming more so every day; that she is an integral part of Occidental civilization whether she wishes it or not, and that if civilization in Europe takes the wrong turn we Americans would suffer less directly but not less vitally than France or Britain or Germany.

All this, of course, is no argument for departing from our traditional isolation. Our entrance into the welter might not change things or it might change them for the worse or the disadvantages might be such as to outweigh the advantages. The sensible question for America is this: "Can we affect the general course of events in Europe—in the world, that is—to our advantage by entering in; and will the advantage of so doing be of such extent as to offset the risks and costs?"

Before answering that question I want to indicate by very definite proposals or propositions a course of action and a basis for estimating the effect. I will put the proposal with reference to America's future attitude to Europe in the form of a definite proposition thus:

That America shall use her influence to secure the abandonment by the powers of Christendom of rival group alliances and the creation instead of an alliance of all the civilized powers having as its aim some common action—not necessarily military—which will constitute a collective guarantee of each against aggression.

Thus when Germany, asked by the Allies at the prospective peace to remove the menace of her militarism by reducing her armaments, replies, "What of my protection against Russia?" Christendom should, with America's help, be in a position to reply: "We will all protect you against Russia, just as we would all protect Russia against you."

The considerations which support such a policy on America's part are mainly these: First, that if America does not lend the assistance of her detachment from European quarrels to such an arrangement, Europe of herself may not prove capable of it. Second, that if Europe does not come to some such arrangement the resulting unrest, militarism, moral and material degeneration, for the reasons above indicated and for others to be indicated presently, will most unfavorably affect the development of America, and expose her to dangers internal and external much greater than those which she would incur by intervention. Third, that if America's influence is in the manner indicated made the deciding factor in the establishment of a new form of world society, she would virtually take the leadership of Western civilization, and her capital become the centre of the political organization of the new world State. While "world domination" by military means has always proved a dangerous diet for all nations that have eaten of it heretofore, the American form of that ambition would have this great difference from earlier forms—that it would be welcomed instead of being resisted by the dominated. America would have given a new meaning to the term and found a means of satisfying national pride, certainly more beneficial than that which comes of military glory.

I envisage the whole problem, however, first and last in this discussion on the basis of America's interest; and the test which I would apply to the alternatives now presenting themselves is simply this: What on balance is most advantageous, in the broadest and largest sense of the term, in its moral as well as its material sense, to American interest?

Now I know full well that there is much to be said against the step which I think America should initiate. I suppose the weight of the reasons against it would be in some such order as the following: First, that it is a violation of the ancient tradition of American statecraft and of the rule laid down by Washington concerning the avoidance of entangling alliances. Second, that it may have the effect which he feared of dragging this country into war on matters in which it had no concern. Third, that it will militarize the country, and so, Fourth, lead to the neglect of those domestic problems upon which the progress of our nation depends.

I will take the minor points first and will deal with the major consideration presently.

First, I would remind the reader of what I pointed out in the last article, that there is no such thing as being unaffected by the military policies of Europe, and there never has been. At this present moment a campaign for greatly increased armaments is being waged on the strength of what is taking place in the Old World, and our armaments are directly and categorically dictated by what foreign nations do in the matter. So that it is not a question in practice of being independent of the policies of other nations; we are not independent of their policies.

We may refuse to co-operate with them, to have anything to do with them. Even then our military policy will be guided by theirs, and it is at least conceivable that in certain circumstances we should become thoroughly militarized by the need for preparing against what our people would regard as the menace of European military ambitions. This tendency, if it became sufficiently acute, would cause neglect of domestic problems hardly less mischievous than that occasioned by war.

In my last article I touched upon a quite possible turn of the alliance groupings in Europe—the growing influence of Russia, the extension of that influence to the Asiatic populations on her borders, (Japan and Russia are already in alliance,) so that within the quite measurable future we may be confronted by a military community drawing on a population of 500,000,000 souls, autocratically governed and endowed with all the machinery of destruction which modern science has given to the world. A Russo-Chino-Japanese alliance might on behalf of the interest or dignity of one of the members of such a group challenge this country in some form or another, and a Western Europe with whom we had refused to co-operate for a common protection might as a consequence remain an indifferent spectator of the conflict.

Such a situation would certainly not relieve us from the burdens of militarism merely because we declined to enter into any arrangement with the European powers. As a matter of fact, of course, this present war destroyed the nationalist basis of militarism itself. The militarist may continue to talk about international agreement between nations being impossible as a means of insuring a nation's safety, and a nation having no security but the strength of its own arms, but when it actually comes to the point even he is obliged to trust to agreement with other nations and to admit that even in war a nation can no longer depend merely upon the strength of its arms; it has to depend upon co-operation, which means an agreement of some kind with other nations as well.

Just as the nations have by forces stronger than their own volition been brought into industrial and commercial co-operation, so, strangely enough, have they been brought by those same forces into military co-operation. While the warrior and militarist have been talking the old jargon of nationalism and holding international co-operation up to derision as a dream, they have themselves been brought to depend upon foreigners. War itself has become internationalist.

There is something of sardonic humor in the fact that it is the greatest war of history which is illustrating the fact that even the most powerful of the European nations must co-operate with foreigners for its security. For no one of the nine or ten combatants of the present war could have maintained its position or defended itself alone. There is not one nation involved that would not believe itself in danger of destruction but for the help of foreigners; there is not one whose national safety does not depend upon some compact or arrangement with foreign nations. France would have been helpless but for the help of Britain and of Russia. Russia herself could not have imposed her will upon Germany if Germany could have thrown all her forces on the eastern frontier. Austria could certainly not have withstood the Russian flood single handed. Quite obviously the lesser nations, Serbia, Belgium, and the rest, would be helpless victims but for the support of their neighbors.

And it should be noted that this international co-operation is not by any means always with similar and racially allied nations. Republican France finds itself, and has been for a generation, the ally of autocratic Russia. Australia, that much more than any other country has been obsessed by the yellow peril and the danger from Japan, finds herself today fighting side by side with the Japanese. And as to the ineradicable hostility of races preventing international co-operation, there are fighting together on the soil of France as I write, Flemish, Walloons, and negroes from Senegal, Turcos from Northern Africa, Gurkhas from India, co-operating with the advance on the other frontier of Cossacks, and Russians of all descriptions. This military and political co-operation has brought together Mohammedan and Christian; Catholic, Protestant, and Orthodox; negro, white and yellow; African, Indian, and European; monarchist, republican, Socialist, reactionary—there seems hardly a racial, religious, or political difference that has stood in the way of rapid and effective co-operation in the common need.

Thus the soldier himself, while defending the old nationalist and exclusive conceptions, is helping to shrink the spaces of the world and break down old isolations and show how interests at the uttermost ends of the earth react one upon the other.

But even apart from this influence, as already noted, America cannot escape the military any more than she has escaped the commercial and financial effects of this war. She may never be drawn into active military co-operation with other nations, but she is affected none the less—by a demand for a naval programme immensely larger than any American could have anticipated a year since, by plans for an enormously enlarged army.

That, it will be argued, is the one thing needed—to be stronger than our prospective enemy. And, of course, any enemy—whether he be one nation or a group—who really does contemplate aggression, would on his side take care to be stronger than us. War and peace are matters of two parties, and any principle which you may lay down for one is applicable to the other. When we say "Si vis pacem, para bellum" we must apply it to all parties. One eminent upholder of this principle has told us that the only way to be sure of peace is to be so much stronger than your enemy that he will not dare to attack you. Apply that to the two parties and you get this result—here are two nations or two groups of nations likely to quarrel. How shall they keep the peace? And we say quite seriously that they will keep the peace if each is stronger than the other.

This principle, therefore, which looks at first blush like an axiom, is, as a matter of fact, an attempt to achieve a physical impossibility and always ends, as it has ended in Europe on this occasion, in explosion. You cannot indefinitely pile up explosive material without an accident of some sort occurring; it is bound to occur. But you will note this: that the militarist—while avowing by his conduct that nations can no longer in a military sense be independent, that they are obliged to co-operate with others and consequently depend upon some sort of an arrangement, agreement, compact, alliance with others—has adopted a form of compact which merely perpetuates the old impossible situation on a larger scale! He has devised the "balance of power."

For several generations Britain, which has occupied with reference to the Continent of Europe somewhat the position which we are now coming to occupy with regard to Europe as a whole, has acted on this principle—that so long as the powers of the Continent were fairly equally divided she felt she could with a fair chance of safety face either one or the other. But if one group became so much stronger than the other that it was in danger of dominating the whole Continent, then Britain might find herself faced by an overwhelming power with which she would be unable to deal. To prevent this she joined the weaker group. Thus Britain intervened in Continental politics against Napoleon as she has intervened today against the Kaiser.

But this policy is merely a perpetuation on a larger scale of the principle of "each being stronger than the other." Military power, in any case, is a thing very difficult to estimate; an apparently weaker group or nation has often proved, in fact, to be the stronger, so that there is a desire on the part of both sides to give the benefit of the doubt to themselves. Thus the natural and latent effort to be strongest is obviously fatal to any "balance." Neither side, in fact, desires a balance; each desires to have the balance tilted in its favor. This sets up a perpetual tendency toward rearrangement, and regroupings and reshufflings in these international alliances sometimes take place with extraordinary and startling rapidity, as in the case of the Balkan States.

It is already illustrated in the present war; Italy has broken away from a definite and formal alliance which every one supposed would range her on the German side. There is at least a possibility that she may finally come down upon the Anglo-Franco-Russian side. You have Japan, which little more than a decade ago was fighting bitterly against Russia, today ranged upon the side of Russia.

The position of Russia is still more startling. In the struggles of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries Britain was almost always on the side of Russia; then for two generations she was taught that any increase of the power of Russia was a particularly dangerous menace. That once more was a decade ago suddenly changed, and Britain is now fighting to increase both relatively and absolutely the power of a country which her last war on the Continent was fought to check. The war before that which Great Britain fought upon the Continent was fought in alliance with Germans against the power of France. As to the Austrians, whom Britain is now fighting, they were for many years her faithful allies. So it is very nearly true to say of nearly all the combatants respectively that they have no enemy today that was not, historically speaking, quite recently an ally, and not an ally today that was not in the recent past an enemy.

These combinations, therefore, are not, never have been, and never can be permanent. If history, even quite recent history, has any meaning at all, the next ten or fifteen or twenty years will be bound to see among these tan combatants now in the field rearrangements and permutations out of which the crushed and suppressed Germany that is to follow the war—a Germany which will embrace, nevertheless, a hundred million of the same race, highly efficient, highly educated, trained for co-ordination and common action—will be bound sooner or later to find her chance.

If America should by any catastrophe join Britain or any other nation for the purpose of maintaining a "balance of power" in the world, then indeed would her last state be worse than her first. The essential vice of the balance of power is that it is based upon a fundamentally false assumption as to the real relationship of nations and as to the function and nature of force in human affairs. The limits of the present article preclude any analysis of most of the monstrous fallacies, but a hint can be given of one or two.

First, of course, if you could get such a thing as a real "balance of power"—two parties confronting one another with about equal forces—you would probably get a situation most favorable to war. Neither being manifestly inferior to the other, neither would be disposed to yield; each being manifestly as good as the other, would feel in "honor" bound to make no concession. If a power quite obviously superior to its rival makes concessions the world may give it credit for magnanimity in yielding, but otherwise it would always be in the position of being compelled to vindicate its courage. Our notions of honor and valor being what they are, no situation could be created more likely to bring about deadlocks and precipitate fights. All the elements are there for bringing about that position in which the only course left is "to fight it out."

The assumption underlying the whole theory of the balance of power is that predominant military power in a nation will necessarily—or at least probably—be exercised against its weaker neighbors to their disadvantage. Thus Britain has acted on the assumption that if one power dominated the Continent, British independence, more truly perhaps British predominance in the world would be threatened.

Now, how has a society of individuals—the community within the frontiers of a nation—met this difficulty which now confronts the society of nations, the difficulty that is of the danger of the power of an individual or a group? They have met it by determining that no individual or group shall exercise physical power or predominance over others; that the community alone shall be predominant. How has that predominance been secured? By determining that any one member attacked shall be opposed by the whole weight of the community, (exercised, say, through the policeman.) If A flies at B's throat in the street with the evident intention of throttling him to death, the community, if it is efficient, immediately comes to the support of B.

And you will note this: that it does not allow force to be used for the settlement of differences by anybody. The community does not use force as such at all; it merely cancels the force of units and determines that nobody shall use it. It eliminates force. And it thus cancels the power of the units to use it against other units (other than as a part of the community) by standing ready at all times to reduce the power of any one unit to futility. If A says that B began it, the community does not say, "Oh, in that case you may continue to use your force; finish him off." It says, on the contrary, "Then we'll see that B does not use his force; we'll restrain him, we won't have either of you using force. We'll cancel it and suppress it wherever it rears its head." For there is this paradox at the basis of all civilized intercourse: force between men has but one use—to see that force settles no difference between them.

And this has taken place because men—individually—have decided that the advantage of the security of each from aggression outweighs the advantage which each has in the possible exercise of aggression. When nations have come to the same decision—and not a moment before—they will protect themselves from aggression in precisely the same way—by agreeing between them that they will cancel by their collective power the force of any one member exercised against another.

I emphasize the fact that you must get this recognition of common interest in a given action before you can get the common action. We have managed it in the relations between individuals because, the numbers being so much greater than in the case of nations, individual dissent goes for less. The policeman, the judge, the jailer have behind them a larger number relatively to individual exceptions than is the case with nations. For the existence of such an arrangement by no means implies that men shall be perfect, that each shall willingly obey all the laws which he enforces. It merely implies that his interest in the law as a whole is greater than his interest in its general violation.

No man for a single day of his life observes all the Ten Commandments, yet you can always secure a majority for the support of the Ten Commandments, for the simple reason that while there are a great many who would like to rob, all are in favor of being protected against the robber. While there are a great many who would like on occasion to kill, all are in favor of being protected against being killed. The prohibition of this act secures universal support embracing "all of the people all of the time"; the positive impulse to it is isolated and occasional—with some individuals perhaps all the time, but with all individuals only some of the time, if ever.

When you come to the nations, there is less disproportion between the strength of the unit and the society. Hence nations have been slower than individuals in realizing their common interest. Each has placed greater reliance on its own strength for its protection. Yet the principle remains the same. There may be nations which desire for their own interest to go to war, but they all want to protect themselves against being beaten. You have there an absolutely common interest. The other interest, the desire to beat, is not so universal; in fact, if any value can be given whatever to the statement of the respective statesmen, such an interest is non-existent.

There is not a single statesman in Christendom today who would admit for a moment that it is his desire to wage war on a neighboring nation for the purpose of conquering it. All this warfare is, each party to it declares, merely a means of protecting itself against the aggression of neighbors. Whatever insincerity there may be in these declarations we can at least admit this much, that the desire to be safe is more widespread than the desire to conquer, for the desire to be safe is universal.

We ought to be able, therefore, to achieve, on the part of the majority, action to that end. And on this same principle there can be no doubt that the nations as a whole would give their support to any plan which would help to secure them from being attacked. It is time for the society of nations to take this first step toward the creation of a real community; to agree, that is, that the influence of the whole shall be thrown against the one recalcitrant member.

The immensely increased contact between nations which has set up a greater independence (in the way hinted at in my last article) has given weight to the interest in security and taken from the interest in aggression. The tendency to aggression is often a blind impulse due to the momentum of old ideas which have not yet had time to be discredited and disintegrated by criticism. And of organization for the really common interest—that of security against aggression—there has, in fact, been none. If there is one thing certain it is that in Europe last July the people did not want war; they tolerated it, passively dragged by the momentum of old forces which they could not even formulate. The really general desire has never been organized; any means of giving effect to a common will—such as is given it in society within the frontiers—has never so far been devised.

I believe that it is the mission of America in her own interest to devise it; that the circumstances of her isolation, historical and geographical, enable her to do for the older peoples—and herself—a service which by reason of their circumstances, geographical and historical, they cannot do for themselves.

The power that she exercises to this end need not be military. I do not think that it should be military. This war has shown that the issues of military conflict are so uncertain, depending upon all sorts of physical accidents, that no man can possibly say which side will win. The present war is showing daily that the advantage does not always go with numbers, and the outcome of war is always to some extent a hazard and a gamble, but there are certain forces that can be set in operation by nations situated as the United States, that are not in any way a gamble and a hazard, the effect of which will be quite certain.

I refer to the pressure of such a thing as organized non-intercourse, the sending of a country to moral, social, economic Coventry. We are, I know, here treading somewhat unknown ground, but we have ample evidence to show that there do exist forces capable of organization, stronger, and more certain in their operation than military forces. That the world is instinctively feeling this is demonstrated by the present attitude of all the combatants in Europe to the United States. The United States relatively to powers like Russia, Britain, and Germany is not a great military power, yet they are all pathetically anxious to secure the good-will of the United States.

Why?

It can hardly be to save the shock to their moral feelings which would come from the mere disapproval of people on the other side of the world. If any percentage of what we have read of German methods is true, if German ethics bear the faintest resemblance to what they are so often represented to be, Germany must have no feeling in the political sphere to be hurt by the moral disapproval of the people of the United States. If German statesmen are so desperately anxious as they evidently are to secure the approval and good-will of the United States it is because they realize, however indistinctly, that there lie in the hands of the United States powers which could be loosed, more portentous than those held by the masters of many legions.

Just what these powers are and how they might be used to give America greater security than she could achieve by arms, to place her at the virtual head of a great world State, and to do for mankind as a whole a service greater than any yet recorded in written history, must be left to the third and concluding article of this series.

### III.—AMERICA AS LEADER.

In the preceding article I indicated that America might undertake at this juncture of international affairs an intervention in the politics of the Old World which is of a kind not heretofore attempted by any nation, an intervention, that is to say, that should not be military, but in the first instance mediatory and moral, having in view if needs be the employment of certain organized social and economic forces which I will detail presently.

The suggestion that America should take any such lead is resisted first on the ground that it is a violation of her traditional policy, and secondly that "economic and social forces" are bound to be ineffective unless backed by military, so that the plea would involve her in a militarist policy. With reference to these two points, I pointed out in the preceding article that America's isolation from a movement for world agreement would infallibly land her in a very pronounced militarist policy, the increase of her armaments, the militarization of her civilization and all that that implies.

There are open to America at this present moment two courses: one which will lead her to militarism and the indefinite increase of armaments—that is the course of isolation from the world's life, from the new efforts that will be made toward world organization; the other to anticipate events and take the initiative in the leadership of world organization, which would have the effect of rendering western civilization, including herself, less military, less dependent upon arms, and put the development of that civilization on a civilist rather than a militarist basis.

I believe that it is the failure to realize that this intervention can be non-military in character which explains the reluctance of very many Americans to depart from their traditional policy of non-intervention. With reference to that point it is surely germane to remember that the America of 1914 is not the America of 1776; circumstances which made Washington's advice sound and statesmanlike have been transformed. The situation today is not that of a tiny power not yet solidified, remote from the main currents of the world's life, out-matched in resources by any one of the greater powers of Europe. America is no longer so remote as to have little practical concern with Europe. Its contacts with Europe are instantaneous, daily, intimate, innumerable—so much so indeed that our own civilization will be intimately affected and modified by certain changes which threaten in the older world.

I will put the case thus: Suppose that there are certain developments in Europe which would profoundly threaten our own civilization and our own security, and suppose further that we could without great cost to ourselves so guide or direct those changes and developments as to render them no longer a menace to this country. If such a case could be established, would not adherence to a formula established under eighteenth century conditions have the same relation to sound politics that the incantations and taboos of superstitious barbarians have to sound religion? And I think such a case can be established.

I wonder whether it has occurred to many Americans to ask why all the belligerents in this present war are showing such remarkable deference to American public opinion. Some Americans may, of course, believe that it is the sheer personal fascination of individual Americans or simple tenderness of moral feeling that makes Great Britain, France, Russia, Germany, and Austria take definitely so much trouble at a time when they have sufficient already, to demonstrate that they have taken the right course, that they are obeying all the laws of war, that they are not responsible for the war in any way, and so forth. Is it simply that our condemnation would hurt their feelings? This hardly agrees with certain other ideas which we hold as to the belligerents.

There is something beyond this order of motive at the bottom of the immense respect which all the combatants alike are paying to American opinion. It happened to the writer recently to meet a considerable number of Belgian refugees from Brussels, all of them full of stories (which I must admit were second or third or three-hundredth hand) of German barbarity and ferocity. Yet all were obliged to admit that German behavior in Brussels had on the whole been very good. But that, they explained, was "merely because the American Consul put his foot down." Yet one is not aware that President Wilson had authorized the American Consul so much as to hint at the possible military intervention of America in this war. Nevertheless there can be no doubt that these "Huns," so little susceptible in our view for the most part to moral considerations, were greatly influenced by the opinion of America; and we know also that the other belligerents have shown the same respect for the attitude of the United States.

I think we have here what so frequently happens in the development of the attitude of men toward large general questions: the intuitive recognition of a truth which those who recognize it are quite unable to put into words. It is a self-protective instinct, a movement that is made without its being necessary to think it out. (In the way that the untaught person is able instantly to detect the false note in a tune without knowing that such things as notes or crotchets and quavers exist.)

It is quite true that the Germans feared the bad opinion of the world because the bad opinion of the world may be translated into an element of resistance to the very ends which it is the object of the war to achieve for Germany.

Those ends include the extension of German influence, material and moral, of German commerce and culture. But a world very hostile to Germany might quite conceivably check both. We say, rightly enough, probably, that pride of place and power had its part—many declare the prominent part—in the motives that led Germany into this war. But it is quite conceivable that a universal revulsion of feeling against a power like Germany might neutralize the influence she would gain in the world by a mere extension of her territorial conquests.

Russia, for instance, has nearly five times the population and very many times the area of France; but one may doubt whether even a Russian would assert that Russian influence is five or ten times greater than that of France; still less that the world yielded him in any sense a proportionately greater deference than it yields the Frenchman. The extent to which the greatest power can impose itself by bayonets is very limited in area and depth. All the might of the Prussian Army cannot compel the children of Poland or of Lorraine to say their prayers in German; it cannot compel the housewives of Switzerland or Paraguay or of any other little State that has not a battleship to its name to buy German saucepans if so be they do not desire to. There are so many other things necessary to render political or military force effective, and there are so many that can offset it altogether.

We see these forces at work around us every day accomplishing miracles, doing things which a thousand years of fighting was never able to do—and then say serenely that they are mere "theories." Why do Catholic powers no longer execute heretics? They have a perfect right—even in international law—to do so. What is it that protects the heretic in Catholic countries? The police? But the main business of the police and the army used to be to hunt him down. What is controlling the police and the army?

By some sort of process there has been an increasing intuitive recognition of a certain code which we realize to be necessary for a decent society. It has come to be a sanction much stronger than the sanction of law, much more effective than the sanction of military force. During the German advance on Paris in August last I happened to be present at a French family conference. Stories of the incredible cruelties and ferocity of the Germans were circulating in the Northern Department, where I happened to be staying.

Every one was in a condition of panic, and two Frenchmen, fathers of families, were seeing red at the story of all these barbarities. But they had to decide—and the thing was discussed at a little family conference—where they should send their wives and children. And one of these Frenchmen, the one who had been most ferocious in his condemnation of the German barbarian, said quite naïvely and with no sense of irony or paradox: "Of course, if we could find an absolutely open town which would not be defended at all the women folk and children would be all right." His instinct, of course, was perfectly just. The German "savage" had had three quarters of a million people in his absolute power in Brussels, and so far as we know, not a child or a woman has been injured.

Indeed, in normal times our security against foreigners is not based upon physical force at all. I suppose during the last century some hundreds of thousands of British and American tourists have traveled through the historic cities of Germany, their children have gone to the German educational institutions, their invalids have been attended by German doctors and cut up by German surgeons in German sanatoria and health resorts, and I am quite sure that it never occurred to any one of these hundreds of thousands that their little children when in the educational institutions of these "Huns" were in any way in danger. It was not the guns of the American Navy or the British Navy that were protecting them; the physical force of America or of Great Britain could not certainly be the factor operative in, say, Switzerland or Austria, yet every Summer tens of thousands of them trust their lives and those of their women and children in the remote mountains of Switzerland on no better security than the expectation that a foreign community over whom we have no possibility of exercising force will observe a convention which has no sanction other than the recognition that it is to their advantage to observe it.

And we thus have the spectacle of millions of Anglo-Saxons absolutely convinced that the sanctity of their homes and the safety of their property are secure from the ravages of the foreigner only because they possess a naval and military force that overawes him, yet serenely leaving the protection of that military force, and placing life and property alike within the absolute power of that very foreigner against whose predatory tendencies we spend millions in protecting ourselves.

No use of military power, however complete and overwhelming, would pretend to afford a protection anything like as complete as that afforded by these moral forces. Sixty years ago Britain had as against Greece a preponderance of power that made her the absolute dictator of the latter's policy, yet all the British battleships and all the threats of "consequences" could not prevent British travelers being murdered by Greek brigands, though in Switzerland only moral forces—the recognition by an astute people of the advantage of treating foreigners well—had already made the lives and property of Britons as safe in that country as in their own.

In the same way, no scheme of arming Protestants as against Catholics, or Catholics as against Protestants (the method which gave us the wars of religion and massacre of St. Bartholomew) could assure that general security of spiritual and intellectual possessions which we now in large measure enjoy. So indeed with the more material things, France, Great Britain, and some of the older nations have sunk thousands of millions in foreign investments, the real security of which is not in any physical force which their Government could possibly exercise, but the free recognition of foreigners that it is to their advantage to adhere to financial obligations. Englishmen do not even pretend that the security of their investments in a country like the United States or the Argentine is dependent upon the coercion which the British Government is able to exercise over these communities.

The reader will not, I think, misunderstand me. I am not pleading that human nature has undergone or will undergo any radical transformation. Rather am I asserting that it will not undergo any; that the intention of the man of the tenth century in Europe was as good as that of the man of the twentieth, that the man of the tenth century was as capable of self-sacrifice—was, it may be, less self-seeking. But what I am trying to hint is that the shrinking of the world by our developed intercommunication has made us all more interdependent.

The German Government moves its troops against Belgium; a moratorium is immediately proclaimed in Rio de Janeiro, a dozen American Stock Exchanges are promptly closed and some hundreds of thousands of our people are affected in their daily lives. This worldwide effect is not a matter of some years or a generation or two. It is a matter of an hour; we are intimately concerned with the actions of men on the other side of the world that we have never seen and never shall see; and they are intimately concerned with us. We know without having thought it out that we are bound together by a compact; the very fact that we are dependent upon one another creates as a matter of fact a partnership. We are expecting the other man to perform his part; he has been doing so uninterruptedly for years, and we send him our goods or we take his bill of exchange, or our families are afloat in his ships, expecting that he will pay for his goods, honor the bill of exchange, navigate safely his ship—he has undertaken to do these things in the world-wide partnership of our common labor and then he fails. He does not do these things, and we have a very lively sense of the immorality of the doctrine which permits him to escape doing them.

And so there are certain things that are not done, certain lengths to which even in war time we cannot go. What will stop the war is not so much the fighting, any more than Protestant massacres prevented Catholic massacres. Men do not fear the enemy soldiers; they do fear the turning of certain social and moral forces against them. The German Government does not hesitate for a moment to send ten thousand of its own people to certain death under enemy guns even though the military advantage of so doing may be relatively trifling. But it dare not order the massacre of ten thousand foreign residents in Berlin. There is some force which makes it sometimes more scrupulous of the lives of its enemy than of the lives of its own people.

Yet why should it care? Because of the physical force of the armies ranged against it? But it has to meet that force in any case. It fears that the world will be stirred. In other words, it knows that the world at large has a very lively realization that in its own interest certain things must not be done, that the world would not live together as we now know it, if it permitted those things to be done. It would not so permit them.

At the bottom of this moral hesitation is an unconscious realization of the extent of each nation's dependence upon the world partnership. It is not a fear of physical chastisement; any nation will go to war against desperate odds if a foreign nation talks of chastising it. It is not that consideration which operates, as a thousand examples in history prove to us. There are forces outside military power more visible and ponderable than these.

There exists, of course, already a world State which has no formal recognition in our paper constitutions at all, and no sanction in physical force. If you are able to send a letter to the most obscure village of China, a telegram to any part of the planet, to travel over most of the world in safety, to carry on trade therewith, it is because for a generation the Post Office Departments of the world have been at work arranging traffic and communication details, methods of keeping their accounts; because the ship owner has been devising international signal codes; the banker arranging conditions of international credit; because, in fact, not merely a dozen but some hundreds of international agreements, most of them made not between Governments at all, but between groups and parties directly concerned, have been devised.

There is no overlord enforcing them, yet much of our daily life depends upon their normal working. The bankers or the shipowners or the makers of electric machinery have met in Paris or Brussels and decided that such shall be the accepted code, such the universal measurement for the lamp or instrument, such the conditions for the bill of exchange and from the moment that there is an agreement you do not need any sanction. If the instrument does not conform to the measurement it is unsalable and that is sanction enough.

ANTONIO SALANDRA—Minister of the Interior
and President of the Italian Ministry—(Photo from Bain)

JAMES W. GERARD—
American Ambassador to the German Empire

We have seen in the preceding article that the dependence of the nations goes back a good deal further than we are apt to think; that long before the period of fully developed intercommunication, all nations owed their civilization to foreigners. It was to their traffic with Gaul and the visits of the Phoenician traders that the early inhabitants of the British Isles learned their first steps in arts and crafts and the development of a civilized society, and even in what we know as the Dark Ages we find Charlemagne borrowing scholars from York to assist him in civilizing the Continent.

The civilization which our forefathers brought with them to America was the result of centuries of exchange in ideas between Britain and the Continent, and though in the course of time it had become something characteristically Anglo-Saxon, its origins were Greek and Arabic and Roman and Jewish. But the interdependence of nations today is of an infinitely more vital and insistent kind, and despite superficial setbacks becomes more vital every day. As late as the first quarter of the nineteenth century, for instance, Britain was still practically self-sufficing; her very large foreign trade was a trade in luxuries. She could still produce her own food, her population could still live on her own soil.

But if today by some sort of magic Britain could kill off all foreigners the means of livelihood for quite an appreciable portion of her population would have disappeared. Millions would be threatened by actual starvation. For Britain's overseas trade, on which so large a proportion of the population actually lives, is mainly with the outside world and not with her own empire. We have seen what isolation merely from two countries has meant for Great Britain. Britain is still maintaining her contacts with the world as a whole, but the cessation of relationship with two countries has precipitated the gravest financial crisis known in all her history, has kept her Stock Exchanges closed for months, has sent her Consols to a lower point than any known since the worst period of the Napoleonic wars, and has compelled the Government ruthlessly to pledge its credit for the support of banking institutions and all the various trades that have been most seriously hit.

Nor is Germany's isolation altogether complete. She manages through neutral countries and otherwise to maintain a considerable current of relationship with the outside world, but how deeply and disastrously the partial severance of contact has affected Germany we shall not at present, probably at no time, in full measure know.

All this gives a mere hint of what the organized isolation by the entire world would mean to any one nation. Imagine the position of a civilized country whose ports no ship from another country would enter, whose bills no banker would discount, a country unable to receive a telegram or a letter from the outside world or send one thereto, whose citizens could neither travel in other countries or maintain communications therewith. It would have an effect in the modern world somewhat equivalent to that of the dreadful edicts of excommunication and interdict which the papal power was able to issue in the mediaeval world.

I am aware, of course, that such a measure would fall very hardly upon certain individuals in the countries inflicting this punishment, but it is quite within the power of the Governments of those countries to do what the British Government has done in the case of persons like acceptors of German bills who found themselves threatened with bankruptcy and who threatened in consequence to create great disturbance around them because of the impossibility of securing payment from the German indorsers. The British Government came to the rescue of those acceptors, used the whole national credit to sustain them. It is expensive, if you will, but infinitely less expensive than a war, and, finally, most of the cost of it will probably be recovered.

Now if that were done, how could a country so dealt with retaliate? She could not attack all the world at once. Upon those neighbors more immediately interested could be thrown the burden of taking such defensive military measures as the circumstances might dictate. You might have a group of powers probably taking such defensive measures and all the powers of Christendom co-operating economically by this suggested non-intercourse. It is possible even that the powers as a whole might contribute to a general fund indemnifying individuals in those States particularly hit by the fact of non-intercourse. I am thinking, for instance, of shipping interests in a port like Amsterdam if the decree of non-intercourse were proclaimed against a power like Germany.

We have little conception of the terror which such a policy might constitute to a nation. It has never been tried, of course, because even in war complete non-intercourse is not achieved. At the present time Germany is buying and selling and trading with the outside world, cables from Berlin are being sent almost as freely to New York as cables from London and German merchants are making contracts, maintaining connections of very considerable complexity. But if this machinery of non-intercourse were organized as it might be, there would be virtually no neutrals, and its effect in our world today would be positively terrifying.

It is true that the American administration did try something resembling a policy of non-intercourse in dealing with Mexico. But, the thing was a fiction. While the Department of State talked of non-intercourse the Department of the Treasury was busy clearing ships for Mexico, facilitating the dispatch of mails, &c. And, of course, Mexico's communication with Europe remained unimpaired; at the exact moment when the President of the United States was threatening Huerta with all sorts of dire penalties Huerta's Government was arranging in London for the issue of large loans and the advertisements of these Mexican loans were appearing in The London Times. So that the one thing that might have moved Huerta's Government the United States Government was unable to enforce. In order to enforce it, it needed the co-operation of other countries.

I have spoken of the economic world State—of all those complex international arrangements concerning Post Offices, shipping, banking, codes, sanctions of law, criminal research, and the rest, on which so much of our civilized life depends. This world State is unorganized, incoherent. It has neither a centre nor a capital, nor a meeting place. The shipowners gather in Paris, the world's bankers in Madrid or Berne, and what is in effect some vital piece of world regulation is devised in the smoking room of some Brussels hotel. The world State has not so much as an office or an address, The United States should give it one. Out of its vast resources it should endow civilization with a Central Bureau of Organization—a Clearing House of its international activities as it were, with the funds needed for its staff and upkeep.

If undertaken with largeness of spirit, it would become the capital of the world. And the Old World looks to America to do this service, because it is the one which it cannot do for itself. Its old historic jealousies and squabbles, from which America is so happily detached, prevent any one power taking up and putting through this work of organization, but America could do it, and do it so effectively that from it might well flow this organization of that common action of all the nations against any recalcitrant member of which I have spoken as a means of enforcing non-militarily a common decision.

It is this world State which it should be the business of America during the next decade or two to co-ordinate, to organize. Its organization will not come into being as the result of a week-end talk between Ambassadors. There will be difficulties, material as well as moral, jealousies to overcome, suspicions to surmount. But this war places America in a more favorable position than any one European power. The older powers would be less suspicious of her than of any one among their number. America has infinitely greater material resources, she has a greater gift for improvised organization, she is less hidebound by old traditions, more disposed to make an attempt along new lines.

That is the most terrifying thing about the proposal which I make—it has never been tried. But the very difficulties constitute for America also an immense opportunity. We have had nations give their lives and the blood of their children for a position of supremacy and superiority. But we are in a position of superiority and supremacy which for the most part would be welcomed by the world as a whole and which would not demand of America the blood of one of her children. It would demand some enthusiasm, some moral courage, some sustained effort, faith, patience, and persistence. It would establish new standards in, and let us hope a new kind of, international rivalry.

One word as to a starting point and a possible line of progress. The first move toward the ending of this present war may come from America. The President of the United States will probably act as mediator. The terms of peace will probably be settled in Washington. Part of the terms of peace to be exacted by the Allies will probably be, as I have already hinted, some sort of assurance against future danger from German militarist aggression.

The German, rightly or wrongly, does not believe that he has been the aggressor—it is not a question at all of whether he is right or wrong; it is a question of what he believes. And he believes quite honestly and sincerely that he is merely defending himself. So what he will be mainly concerned about in the future is his security from the victorious Allies.

Around this point much of the discussion at the conclusion of this present war will range. If it is to be a real peace and not a truce an attempt will have to be made to give to each party security from the other, and the question will then arise whether America will come into that combination or not. I have already indicated that I think she should not come in, certainly I do not think she will come in, with the offer of military aid. But if she stays out of it altogether she will have withdrawn from this world congress that must sit at the end of the war a mediating influence which may go far to render it nugatory.

And when, after it may be somewhat weary preliminaries, an international council of conciliation is established to frame the general basis of the new alliance between the civilized powers for mutual protection along the lines indicated, America, if she is to play her part in securing the peace of the world, must be ready to throw at least her moral and economic weight into the common stock, the common moral and economic forces which will act against the common enemy, whoever he may happen to be.

That does not involve taking sides, as I showed in my last article. The policeman does not decide which of two quarrelers is right; he merely decides that the stronger shall not use his power against the weaker. He goes to the aid of the weaker, and then later the community deals with the one who is the real aggressor. One may admit, if you will, that at present there is no international law, and that it may not be possible to create one. But we can at least exact that there shall be an inquiry, a stay; and more often than not that alone would suffice to solve the difficulty without the application of definite law.

It is just up to that point that the United States should at this stage be ready to commit herself in the general council of conciliation, namely, to say this: "We shall throw our weight against any power that refuses to give civilization an opportunity at least of examining and finding out what the facts of the dispute are. After due examination we may reserve the right to withdraw from any further interference between such power and its antagonist. But, at least, we pledge ourselves to secure that by throwing the weight of such non-military influence as we may have on to the side of the weaker." That is the point at which a new society of nations would begin, as it is the point at which a society of individuals has begun. And it is for the purpose of giving effect to her undertaking in that one regard that America should become the centre of a definite organization of that world State which has already cut athwart all frontiers and traversed all seas.

It is not easy without apparent hyperbole to write of the service which America would thus render to mankind. She would have discovered a new sanction for human justice, would have made human society a reality. She would have done something immeasurably greater, immeasurably more beneficent than any of the conquests recorded in the long story of man's mostly futile struggles. The democracy of America would have done something which the despots and the conquerors of all time, from Alexander and Caesar to Napoleon and the Kaiser, have found to be impossible. Dangerous as I believe national vanity to be, America would, I think, find in the pride of this achievement—this American leadership of the human race—a glory that would not be vain, a world victory which the world would welcome.

## Sir Christopher Cradock.

By JOHN E. DOLSON.

Through the fog of the fight we could dimly see,

As ever the flame from the big guns flashed,

That Cradock was doomed, yet his men and he,

With their plates shot to junk, and their turrets smashed,

Their ship heeled over, her funnels gone,

Were fearlessly, doggedly fighting on.

Out-speeded, out-metaled, out-ranged, out-shot

By heavier guns, they were not out-fought.

Those men—with the age-old British phlegm,

That has conquered and held the seas for them,

And the courage that causes the death-struck man

To rise on his mangled stumps and try,

With one last shot from his heated gun,

To score a hit ere his spirit fly,

Then sink in the welter of red, and die

With the sighting squint fixed on his dead, glazed eye—

Accepted death as part of the plan.

So the guns belched flame till the fight had run

Into night; and now, in the distance dim,

We could see, by the flashes, the dull, dark loom

Of their hull, as it bore toward the Port of Doom,

Away on the water's misty rim—

Cradock and his few hundred men,

Never, in time, to be seen again.

While into the darkness their great shells streamed,

Little the valiant Germans dreamed

That Cradock was teaching them how to go

When the fate their daring, itself, had sealed,

Waiting, as yet, o'er the ocean's verge,

To their eyes undaunted would stand revealed;

And, snared by a swifter, stronger foe,

Out-classed, out-metaled, out-ranged, out-shot

By heavier guns, but not out-fought,

They, too, would sink in the sheltering surge.

## Battle of the Suez Canal

## A First-Hand Account of the Unsuccessful Turkish Invasion

[From The London Times, Feb. 19, 1915.]

ISMAILIA, Feb. 10.

Though skirmishing had taken place between the enemy's reconnoitring parties and our outposts during the latter part of January, the main attack was not developed until Feb. 2, when the enemy began to move toward the Ismailia Ferry. They met a reconnoitring party of Indian troops of all arms, and a desultory engagement ensued, to which a violent sand storm put a sudden end about 3 o'clock in the afternoon. The main attacking force pushed forward toward its destination after nightfall. From twenty-five to thirty galvanized iron pontoon boats, seven and a half meters in length, which had been dragged in carts across the desert, were hauled by hand toward the water, with one or two rafts made of kerosene tins in a wooden frame. All was ready for the attack.

The first warning of the enemy's approach was given by a sentry of a mountain battery, who heard, to him, an unknown tongue across the water. The noise soon increased. It would seem that Mudjah Ideen ("Holy Warriors")—said to be mostly old Tripoli fighters—accompanied the pontoon section and regulars of the Seventy-fifth Regiment, for loud exhortations often in Arabic of "Brothers die for the faith; we can die but once," betrayed the enthusiastic irregular.

The Egyptians waited till the Turks were pushing their boats into the water; then the Maxims attached to the battery suddenly spoke and the guns opened with case at point-blank range at the men and boats crowded under the steep bank opposite them.

Immediately, a violent fire broke out on both sides of the canal, the enemy replying to the rifles and machine gun fire and the battery on our bank. Around the guns it was impossible to stand up, but the gunners stuck to the work, inflicting terrible punishment.

A little torpedo boat with a crew of thirteen patrolling the canal dashed up and landed a party of four officers and men to the south of Tussum, who climbed up the eastern bank and found themselves in a Turkish trench, and escaped by a miracle with the news. Promptly the midget dashed in between the fires and enfiladed the eastern bank amid a hail of bullets, and destroyed several pontoon boats lying unlaunched on the bank. It continued to harass the enemy, though two officers and two men were wounded.

As the dark, cloudy night lightened toward dawn fresh forces came into action. The Turks, who occupied the outer, or day, line of the Tussum post, advanced, covered by artillery, against the Indian troops holding the inner, or night, position, while an Arab regiment advanced against the Indian troops at the Serapeum post.

The warships on the canal and lake joined in the fray. The enemy brought some six batteries of field guns into action from the slopes west of Kataib-el-Kheil. Shells admirably fused made fine practice at all the visible targets, but failed to find the battery above mentioned, which, with some help from a detachment of infantry, beat down the fire of the riflemen on the opposite bank and inflicted heavy losses on the hostile supports advancing toward the canal. A chance salvo wounded four men of the battery, but it ran more risk from a party of about twenty of the enemy who had crossed the canal in the dark and sniped the gunners from the rear till they were finally rounded up by the Indian cavalry and compelled to surrender.

Supported by land naval artillery the Indian troops took the offensive. The Serapeum garrison, which had stopped the enemy three-quarters of a mile from the position, cleared its front, and the Tussum garrison by a brilliant counter-attack drove the enemy back. Two battalions of Anatolians of the Twenty-eighth Regiment were thrown vainly into the fight. Our artillery gave them no chance, and by 3:30 in the afternoon a third of the enemy, with the exception of a force that lay hid in bushy hollows on the east bank between the two posts, were in full retreat, leaving many dead, a large proportion of whom had been killed by shrapnel.

Meanwhile the warships on the lake had been in action. A salvo from a battleship woke up Ismailia early, and crowds of soldiers and some civilians climbed every available sandhill to see what was doing till the Turkish guns sent shells sufficiently near to convince them that it was safer to watch from cover. A husband and wife took a carriage and drove along the lake front, much peppered by shells, till near the old French hospital, when they realized the danger and suddenly whisked around and drove back full gallop to Ismailia.

But the enemy's fire did more than startle. At about 11 in the morning two six-inch shells hit the Hardinge near the southern entrance of the lake. The first damaged the funnel and the second burst inboard. Pilot Carew, a gallant old merchant seaman, refused to go below when the firing opened and lost a leg. Nine others were wounded. One or two merchantmen were hit, but no lives were lost. A British gunboat was struck.

Then came a dramatic duel between the Turkish big gun or guns and a warship. The Turks fired just over and then just short of 9,000 yards. The warship sent in a salvo of more six-inch shells than had been fired that day.

During the morning the enemy moved toward Ismailia Ferry. The infantry used the ground well, digging shelter pits as they advanced, and were covered by a well-served battery. An officer, apparently a German, exposed himself with the greatest daring, and watchers were interested to see a yellow "pie dog," which also escaped, running about the advancing line. Our artillery shot admirably and kept the enemy from coming within 1,000 yards of the Indian outposts. In the afternoon the demonstration—for it was no more—ceased but for a few shells fired as "a nightcap." During the dark night that followed some of the enemy approached the outpost line of the ferry position with a dog, but nothing happened, and day found them gone.

At the same time as the fighting ceased at the ferry it died down at El Kantara. There the Turks, after a plucky night attack, came to grief on our wire entanglements. Another attempt to advance from the southeast was forced back by an advance of the Indian troops. The attack, during which it was necessary to advance on a narrow front over ground often marshy with recent inundations against our strong position, never had a chance. Indeed, the enemy was only engaged with our outpost line.

Late in the afternoon of the 3d there was sniping from the east bank between Tussum and Serapeum and a man was killed in the tops of a British battleship. Next morning the sniping was renewed, and the Indian troops, moving out to search the ground, found several hundred of the enemy in the hollow previously mentioned. During the fighting some of the enemy, either by accident or design, held up their hands, while others fired on the Punjabis, who were advancing to take the surrender, and killed a British officer. A sharp fight with the cold steel followed, and a British officer killed a Turkish officer with a sword thrust in single combat. The body of a German officer with a white flag was afterward found here, but there is no proof that the white flag was used. Finally all the enemy were killed, captured, or put to flight.

With this the fighting ended, and the subsequent operations were confined to "rounding up" prisoners and to the capture of a considerable amount of military material left behind. The Turks who departed with their guns and baggage during the night of the 3d still seemed to be moving eastward.

So ended the battle of the Suez Canal. Our losses have been amazingly small, totaling about 111 killed and wounded.

Showing the Turkish points of concentration in Palestine and the principal routes leading thence to the Suez Canal. The intervening desert Peninsula of Sinai constitutes a formidable obstacle to an invading force. Inset is a map of the Ottoman Empire showing in the northeast the Caucasus, where the Turks were routed by the Russians, who later advanced on Erzerum and Tabriz. The British expedition in the Persian Gulf region occupied Basra and was on Feb. 1, 1915, at Kurna, the point of confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates.

Our opponents have probably lost nearly 3,000 men. The Indian troops bore the brunt of the fighting and were well supported by the British and French warships and by the Egyptian troops. The Turks fought bravely and their artillery shot well if unluckily, but the intentions of the higher command are still a puzzle to British officers.

Did Djemal Pasha intend to try to break through our position under cover of demonstrations along a front over ninety miles in length with a total force, perhaps, of 25,000 men, or was he attempting a reconnoissance in force? If the former is the case, he must have had a low idea of British leadership or an amazing belief in the readiness and ability of sympathizers in Egypt to support the Turk. Certainly he was misinformed as to our positions, and on the 4th we buried on the eastern bank the bodies of two men, apparently Syrians or Egyptians, who were found with their hands tied and their eyes bandaged. Probably they were guides who had been summarily killed, having unwittingly led the enemy astray. If, on the other hand, Djemal Pasha was attempting a reconnoissance, it was a costly business and gave General Wilson a very handsome victory.

Till the last week of January there had been some doubt as to the road by which the Ottoman Commander in Chief in Syria intended to advance on the canal. Before the end of the month it was quite clear that what was then believed to be the Turkish advanced guard, having marched with admirable rapidity from Beersheba via El Auja, Djebel Libni, and Djifjaffa, was concentrating in the valleys just east of Kataib-el-Kheil, a group of hills lying about ten miles east of the canal, where it enters Lake Timsah. A smaller column detached from this force was sighted in the hills east of Ismailia Ferry. Smaller bodies had appeared in the neighborhood of El Kantara and between Suez and the Bitter Lakes.

The attacks on our advanced posts at El Kantara on the night of Jan. 26 and 27, and at Kubri, near Suez, on the following night, were beaten off. Hostile guns fired occasional shells, while our warships returned the compliment at any hostile column that seemed to offer a good target, and our aeroplanes dropped bombs when they had the chance; but in general the enemy kept a long distance off and was tantalizing. Our launches and boats, which were constantly patrolling the canal, could see him methodically intrenching just out of range of the naval guns.

By the night of Feb. 1 the enemy had prepared his plan of attack. To judge both from his movements during the next two days and the documents found on prisoners and slain, it was proposed to attack El Kantara while making a demonstration at El Ferdan, further south, and prevent reinforcements at the first-named post. The demonstration at Ismailia Ferry by the right wing of the Kataib-el-Kheil force which had been partly refused till then in order to prevent a counter-attack from the ferry, was designed to occupy the attention of the Ismailia garrison, while the main attack was delivered between the Tussum post, eight miles south of Ismailia, and the Serapeum post, some three miles further south. Eshref Bey's highly irregular force in the meantime was to demonstrate near Suez.

The selection of the Tussum and Serapeum section as the principal objective was dictated both by the consideration that success here would bring the Turks a few miles from Ismailia, and by the information received from patrols that the west bank of the canal between the posts, both of which may be described as bridgeheads, were unoccupied by our troops. The west bank between the posts is steep and marked by a long, narrow belt of trees. The east bank also falls steeply to the canal, but behind it are numerous hollows, full of brushwood, which give good cover. Here the enemy's advanced parties established themselves and intrenched before the main attack was delivered.

## A Full-Fledged Socialist State

## While Germany's Trade and Credit Are Holding Their Breath

By J. Laurence Laughlin

[From THE NEW YORK TIMES, March 9, 1915.]

Professor Laughlin, who makes the following remarkable study of the German financial emergency, was lecturer on political economy in Berlin on the invitation of the Prussian Cultur Ministerium in 1906, and since 1892 has been head of the Department of Political Economy in the University of Chicago. He is acknowledged to be one of the foremost American economists and the views here expressed are based on wide information.

In a great financial emergency conditions are immediately registered in the monetary and credit mechanism. Although the German Government and the Reichsbank had obviously been preparing for war long before, as soon as mobilization was ordered there was a currency panic. The private banks stopped payment in gold. Crowds then besieged the Reichsbank in order to get its notes converted into gold. Then the Banking act was suspended, so that the Reichsbank and private banks were freed from the obligation to give out gold for notes. At once all notes went to a discount in the shops as compared with gold. Thereupon, in summary fashion, the Military Governor of Berlin declared the notes to be a full legal tender and announced that any shop refusing to take them at par would be punished by confiscation of goods.

In Germany, as is well known, the main currency is supplied by the Reichsbank, covered by at least 33-1/3 per cent. in gold or silver, and the remaining two-thirds by commercial paper. Immediately after the outbreak of war there was a prodigious increase of loans at the Reichsbank, in consequence of which borrowers received notes or deposit accounts. Usually transactions are carried through by use of notes, and not by checks, as with us. On July 23, 1914, the notes stood at $472,500,000; deposits at $236,000,000; discounted bills and advances at $200,000,000. On Aug. 31 notes had increased to $1,058,500,000; deposits to $610,000,000; discounts and advances to $1,113,500,000, (by October this amount was lowered to about $750,000,000.) On the latter date the specie reserve stood at $409,500,000, or more than the legal one-third. Loans had been increased 556 per cent.; notes 223 per cent., and deposits 258 per cent. In short, $586,000,000 of notes had been issued beyond the amount required in normal times, (July 23.) Clearly this additional amount was not required by an increased exchange of goods, but by those persons whose resources were tied up and who needed a means of payment. The same was true of the large increase of deposits which resulted from the larger loans. A liberal policy of discounting was followed by which loans were given on the basis of securities or stocks of goods on hand. That is, non-negotiable assets were converted into a means of payment either in the form of notes or deposit credits.

At this juncture there was created a currency something after the fashion of the Aldrich-Vreeland emergency notes in this country. War credit banks were established by law to issue notes (Darlehnskassenscheine) in denominations of 10, 15, 20, and 50 marks as loans on stocks in trade and securities of all kinds, and were charged 6-1/2 per cent. interest. The goods on which these notes could be issued were not removed, but stamped with a Government seal. While not a legal tender, the notes were receivable at all imperial agencies. On securities classed at the Reichsbank as Class I. loans could be made up to 60 per cent. of their value as of July 31; as Class II., 40 per cent.; on the other German securities bearing a fixed rate of return, 50 per cent.; on other German securities bearing a varying rate of return, 40 per cent.; on Russian securities, a lower percentage. These institutions, therefore, took up some of the burden that would otherwise have fallen on the loan item of the Reichsbank. Hence the Reichsbank account does not show the whole situation.

To this point the methods followed were much the same as in London. Then came unusual happenings. In London for a few days the banks had wavered as to maintaining gold payments, but only temporarily. In Berlin drastic measures were undertaken to accumulate gold in the Reichsbank. Vienna reports it to be well known that Germany had been for eighteen months before straining every nerve to obtain gold. Whatever sums of gold were included in the so-called "war chest" in Spandau (said to be $30,000,000) were also deposited with the Reichsbank. Gold was even smuggled across the borders of Holland on the persons of spies. Urgent demands were made upon the people to turn in gold from patriotic motives. In this way over $400,000,000 of gold was gathered by July, 1914; and by the end of the year, after five months of war, it had risen to $523,000,000. Was Germany to maintain gold payments as well as Great Britain?

Evidently not. Gold was not given for notes on presentation. For purposes of exchanging goods the notes were in excess. Inconvertible, they must go to a discount with gold or with the money of outside countries using gold. But in order to get imports from other nations, like Holland, Scandinavia, and Denmark, Germany must either send goods, or gold, or securities. German industries, except those making war supplies, were not producing over 25 per cent. of capacity, and many were closed. The Siemens-Schuckert Works, even before the Landsturm was called out, lost 40 per cent. of their men on mobilization. The Humboldt Steel Works, near Cologne, employing 4,000 men, were closed early in August, as were nearly all the great iron works in the district between Düsseldorf and Duisburg. Probably 50 to 75 per cent. of the workers were called to the colors. The skilled artisans were in the army or in munition factories; the railways were in the hands of the military; and the merchant marine was shut up in home or foreign ports. There were said to be 1,500 idle ships in Hamburg alone. Few goods could be exported. Gold was refused for export, of course. A serious liquidation in foreign securities had been going on long before the war. Some foreign securities must have still remained. However that may be, a claim to funds in Germany (i.e., a bill drawn on Germany) was not redeemable in gold, and it fell in price. In normal times a bill could not fall below the shipping point in gold, (par with us for 4 marks is 95-1/4 cents in gold;) but, since gold could not be sent, exchange on Germany could fall to any figure, set only by a declining demand. Already bills on Germany have been quoted in New York at 82, showing a depreciation of German money in the international field of about 13 per cent. Likewise, as early as the first week of September, the Reichsbank notes were reported at a discount of 20 per cent., and as practically non-negotiable in a neighboring country like Holland.

The inevitable consequence of a depreciated currency must be a rise of prices, usually greater than the actual percentage of depreciation. To meet this situation there came a device possible in no other commercial country. The Government fixed prices at which goods could be sold. This mediaeval device could be enforced only in a land where such State interference had been habitual, and, of course, could give to the notes the fictitious purchasing power only inside the country. After the Christian Science fashion, one had only to believe the notes were of value to make them so; but in the cold world outside German jurisdiction their value would be gauged by the chances of getting gold for them. Here, then, we find Germany in all the mazes of our ancient "greenbackism," but still in possession of a large stock of gold. As soon as the war ends she may be able to return to gold payments at an early date—very much as did France after the ordeal of the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-1871.

In the present war conditions, however, largely cut off from other countries, (except some small trade with Switzerland, Holland, Denmark, and the like,) all ordinary relations which would influence German credit and industry must be counted out. There is no comparison of her prices and money with those of other countries in a free market, or with even a limited transportation of exports and imports. All commercial measurements are suspended for the time. Trade and credit are holding their breath. How long can they do it? Germany may have food enough; but how long can the stoppage of industry go on?

Moreover, attention must be called to one momentous thing. We are seeing today, under military law, the greatest experiment in socialism ever witnessed. All wealth, income, industry, capital, and labor are in the direct control and use of a military State. Food, everything, may be taken and distributed in common. I think never before in history have we had such a gigantic, full-fledged illustration of socialism in actual operation.

In the meanwhile, even though food may be provided, the reduction of industry in general has cut incomes right and left. That is, fewer goods are produced and exchanged. But goods are the basis of all credit. The less the goods exchanged, the less the credit operations. Nevertheless, the extraordinary issues of banknotes, the increase of deposits, as a result of quintupling the loans, means that former commitments in goods and securities cannot be liquidated. That is, the enormous increase of bank liabilities, to a considerable and unknown percentage, is not supported by liquid assets. These assets are "canned." Will they keep sweet? There is no new business, no foreign trade, sufficient to take up old obligations and renew those which are unpayable. Lessened incomes mean lessened consumption and lessened demand for goods. Hence the credit system is based on an uncertain and insecure foundation, dependent wholly upon contingencies far in the future which may, or may not, take the non-liquid assets out of cold storage and give them their original value.

Moreover, apart from definite destruction of wealth and capital in the war—which must be enormous, as represented by the national loans—the losses from not doing business in all main industries during the whole period of the war (except in making war supplies) must be very great. As it affects the income and expenditure of the working classes, it may be roughly measured by the great numbers of unemployed. If they are used on public works, their income is made up from taxes on the wealth of others. Luxuries will disappear, and not be produced or imported. Incomes expressed in goods, or material satisfactions, have been diminished—which is of no serious consequence, if they cover the minimum of actual subsistence. The prolongation of the war will, then, depend on the ability to provide the supplies for war.

The need for a medium of exchange is oversupplied. The lack is in the goods to be exchanged. The enormous extension of German note issues does not, and can not, diminish. In this country the expansion of credit and money immediately after the war (manifested by the issue of Clearing House certificates and emergency banknotes) has been cleared away by liquidation. In Germany the "canned" assets behind the depreciated currency cannot be liquidated until the end of the war. And their worth at that time will depend much on the future course of the war and the terms of peace. If German territory should be overrun and the tangible forms of capital in factories and fixed capital be destroyed, much of the liquidation might be indefinitely prolonged. Whatever of foreign trade is permanently lost would also increase the difficulties.

In a great financial emergency nearly every country has, at one time or another, been tempted to confuse the monetary with the fiscal functions of the Treasury. To borrow by the issue of money seems to have a seductive charm hard to resist. Lloyd George established a new precedent for Great Britain by issuing nearly $200,000,000 of Government currency notes, but this was done to provide notes for the public instead of coin (£1 and 10s.) and made unnecessary any emergency issues by the Bank of England, and a large gold fund has been accumulated behind them so that they are convertible. In Germany it does not seem likely that the Treasury notes will be largely used (having increased from $16,500,000 to about $200,000,000) as a means of borrowing, since the new loans are being issued in terms of longer maturities.

J. LAURENCE LAUGHLIN.

## Letters From Wives

[By Cable to The New York Tribune.]

London, March 8.—Edward Page Gaston, an American business man long resident in London, has just returned from Belgium, and brought with him many sad and touching relics of the battlefields in that distressful country, chiefly from the neighborhood of Mons. These pathetic memorials include letters from wives, sweethearts, and friends at home and letters written by soldiers now dead and never posted.

Turning these letters over, one comes across such an expression as this: "I congratulate you on your promotion. It seems too good to be true. Good-bye and God bless you, dear. God keep you in health and bring you safely back."

Alas! the soldier who got that letter came back no way at all to his sweetheart or his friends.

"If you don't come back, what shall I do?" is the cry that comes from another woman's heart, and he did not come back.

Mr. Gaston is going to put himself into communication with the War Office with regard to the fate of the relics, and as far as possible, they will be sent to the rightful owners.

## "War Children."

[Special Cable to THE NEW YORK TIMES.]

Paris, Feb. 24.—Professor Pinard of the Academy of Medicine contributes an article to the Matin showing that "war children" are stronger and healthier than their predecessors, and that France is rapidly repairing her battle losses.

An analysis of the Paris statistics for the last six months reveals a diminution of the death rate among mothers and children and a decrease in the number of children born dead.

Dr. Pinard further asserts that an extensive comparison of living children with those born earlier shows that the average weight of "war babies" is considerably higher than it used to be. This he considers due to the giving of natural instead of artificial nourishment by the mothers in consequence of the more serious attitude they take to their duty to the State.

This, says the professor, is one more instance of the spirit of regeneration animating France.

## No Premature Peace For Russia

## Proceedings at Opening of the Duma, Petrograd, Feb. 9, 1915

[From The London Times.]

PETROGRAD, Feb. 9.

The main impression left upon all who attended today's proceedings in the Duma may be summed up in a few words. The war has not shaken the determination of the Russian people to carry through the struggle to a victorious end.

Practically the whole House had assembled—the few vacant seats were due to death, chiefly on the field of battle—and the patriotic spirit permeating the proceedings was just as deeply emphasized as it was six months ago. The debates were several times interrupted by the singing of the National anthem, thunders of applause greeted the speeches of the President, the Premier, and the Foreign Minister, and the ovation to the British and French Ambassadors was, if anything, warmer and more enthusiastic than on the previous occasion.

I noticed that members applauded with special emphasis the words in which the President expressed his firm conviction that all efforts to disunite the Allies would prove fruitless.

In the course of his address the President eloquently and eulogistically referred to the rôle of Russia's allies in the present war. Speaking of England, he said:

Noble and mighty England, with all her strength, has come forward to defend the right. Her services to the common cause are great, their value inestimable. We believe in her and admire her steadfastness and valor.

The enemies of Russia have already frequently attempted to sow discord in these good and sincere relations, but such efforts are vain. The Russian truth-loving national soul, sensitive of any display of mendacity or insincerity, was able to sift the chaff from the wheat, and faith in our friends is unshaken. There is not a single cloud on the clear horizon of our lasting allied harmony. Heartfelt greetings to you, true friends, rulers of the waves and our companions in arms. May victory and glory go with you everywhere!

These remarks were constantly interrupted by outbursts of tremendous applause and by an ovation in honor of Sir George Buchanan, who bowed his acknowledgments.

Alluding to temperance reform, the orator fervently exclaimed:

Accept, great monarch, the lowly reverence of thy people. Thy people firmly believe that an end has been put for all eternity to this ancient curse.

The terrible war can not and must not end otherwise than victoriously for us and our allies. We will fight till our foes submit to the conditions and demands which the victors dictate to them. We are weary of the incessant brandishing of the sword, the menaces to Slavdom, and the obstacles to its natural growth. We will fight till the end, till we win a lasting peace worthy of the great sacrifices we have offered to our fatherland. In the name of our electorate, we here declare, "So wishes all Russia."

And you, brave warrior knights in the cold trenches, proudly bearing the standard of Russian imperialism, hearken to this national outburst. Your task is difficult. You are surrounded with trials and privations, but then you are Russian, for whom no obstacles exist.

A scene of indescribable enthusiasm ensued, the House rising and singing the national hymn.

The President's peroration was in part as follows:

The Premier, in the opening sentences of the speech which followed, said: "Our heroic army, the flower and the pride of Russia, strong as never before in its might, notwithstanding all its losses, grows and strengthens." He did not fail to remind his hearers that the war is yet far from ended, but he added that the Government, from the first, had soberly looked the danger in the face and frankly warned the country of the forthcoming sacrifices for the common cause and also for the strengthening of the mutual gravitation of the Slavonic races. He briefly referred to the Turkish defeat in the Caucasus as opening before the Russians a bright historical future on the shores of the Black Sea.

The Premier alluded to the tremendous change wrought in the national life by the abolition of the liquor traffic, which he designated a second serfdom vanishing at the behest of the Czar. After a few years of sober, persistent labor, we would no longer recognize Russia. The war had further raised the question of the creation in the world's markets of favorable conditions to the export of our agricultural products, and a general revision of conditions calculated hereafter to guarantee to Russia a healthy development on the principle of entire independence of Germany in all branches of the national life. In this direction the Government had already drafted and was preparing a series of elaborate measures. He concluded with the expression of his conviction that, if all fulfilled their duty in the spirit of profound devotion to the Emperor and of deep faith in the triumph of the country, the near future would open before us perhaps the best pages in Russian history.

The speeches of a peasant Deputy and a Polish representative were particularly impressive and well received. The Socialist leader's demand for peace called forth a smart rejoinder from a member of his own party.

### M. SAZANOF'S SPEECH.

This afternoon the session of the Duma was opened in the presence of the whole Cabinet, the members of the Council of the Empire, the Diplomatic Corps, and the Senators. The public galleries were filled.

M. Sazanof began his speech by recalling that six months ago in that place he had explained why Russia, in face of the brutal attempt by Germany and Austria upon the independence of Serbia and Belgium, had been able to adopt no other course than to take up arms in defense of the rights of nations. Russia, standing closely united and admirably unanimous in her enthusiasm against an enemy which had offered provocation, did not remain isolated, because she was immediately supported by France and Great Britain and, soon afterward, by Japan.

Passing in review the events of the war, the Minister said that the valiant Russian troops, standing shoulder to shoulder with their allies, had secured fresh laurels for their crown of glory. The Russian arms were marching steadfastly toward their goal, assured of final victory against an enemy who, blinded by the hope of an easy victory, was making desperate efforts, having recourse to all kinds of subterfuges, even the distortion of the truth.

To the relations of good neighborliness, faithfully maintained by Russia, Germany had everywhere opposed resistance, seeking to embroil Russia with neighboring countries, especially those to which Russia was bound by important interests.

All this [continued M. Sazanof] is sufficient for us to judge the value of German statements regarding the alleged envelopment of Germany by the Triple Entente. Equally worthless are the assertions that it was not Germany who began the war, for irrefutable documents exist to prove the contrary. Among the malevolent German inventions figure reports of Jewish pogroms which the Russian troops are alleged to have organized. I seize this opportunity of speaking in the parliamentary tribune to deny this calumny categorically, for, if the Jewish population in the theatre of war is suffering, that is an inevitable evil, since the inhabitants of regions where hostilities are proceeding are always severely tried. Moreover, eyewitnesses are unanimous in stating that the greatest devastation in Poland is the work of the Germans and Austrians.

The German Ambassador in Washington has zealously spread these reports in the attempt to create in the United States a feeling hostile to us, but the good sense of the Americans has prevented them from falling into the clumsily laid snare. I hope that the good relations between Russia and America will not suffer from these German intrigues.

The "Orange Book" recently published proved that the events on the Bosporus which preceded the war with Turkey were the result of German treachery toward the Ottoman Empire, which invited German instructors and the mission of General Liman von Sanders, hoping to perfect its army with the object of assuring its independence against the Russian danger insinuated by Berlin. Germany, however, took advantage of this penetration into the Turkish Army to make that army a weapon in realizing her political plans.

All the acts of the Turks since the appearance of the Goeben in the Dardanelles had been committed under the pressure of Germany, but the efforts of the Turks to evade responsibility for these acts could not prevent them from falling into the abyss into which they were rolling. The events on the Russo-Turkish frontier, while covering Russian arms with fresh glory, will bring Russia nearer to the realization of the political and economic problems bound up with the question of Russia's access to the open sea.

Passing to the documents relating to reforms in Armenia recently distributed among members of the Duma, M. Sazanof said:

The Russian Government disinterestedly endeavored to alleviate the lot of the Armenians, and the Russo-Turkish agreement of Jan. 26, 1914, is a historical document in which Turkey recognizes the privileged position of Russia in the Armenian question. When the war ends this exclusive position of Russia will be employed by the Imperial Government in a direction favorable to the Armenian population. Having drawn the sword in the defense of Serbia, Russia is acting under the influence of her sentiments toward a sister nation whose grandeur of soul in the present war has closely riveted the two countries.

After referring with satisfaction to the gallantry of Montenegro in fighting as she was doing in the common cause, M. Sazanof proceeded to speak of Greece. The relations of Russia with this tried friend of Serbia, he said, were perfectly cordial, and the tendency of the Hellenic people to put an end to the sufferings of their co-religionists groaning under the Ottoman yoke had the entire sympathy of the Imperial Government.

Passing to Rumania, M. Sazanof said that the relations between Russia and Rumania retained the friendly character which they acquired on the occasion of the visit of the Czar to Constanza. The constant Russophile demonstrations in Bucharest and throughout the whole country during the Autumn had brought into relief the hostile feelings of the Rumanians toward Austria-Hungary. He continued:

You are probably waiting, gentlemen, for a reply to a question which interests the whole world, viz., the attitude of those non-combatant countries whose interests counsel them to embrace the cause of Russia and that of her allies. In effect, public opinion in these countries, responsive to all that is meant by the national ideal, has long since pronounced itself in this sense, but you will understand that I cannot go into this question very profoundly, seeing that the Governments of these countries, with which we enjoy friendly relations, have not yet taken a definite decision. Now, it is for them to arrive at this decision, for they alone will be responsible to their respective nations if they miss a favorable opportunity to realize their national aspirations.

I must also mention with sincere gratitude the services rendered to us by Italy and Spain in protecting our compatriots in enemy countries. I must also emphasize the care lavished by Sweden on Russian travelers who were the victims of German brutality. I hope that this fact will strengthen the relations of good neighborliness between Russia and Sweden, which we desire to see still more cordial than they are.

Referring to Russo-Persian relations, M. Sazonof said:

Before the war with Turkey, we succeeded in putting an end to the secular Turco-Persian quarrel by means of the delimitation of the Persian Gulf and Mount Ararat region, thanks to which we preserved for Persia a disputed territory with an area of almost 20,000 square versts, part of which the Turks had invaded. Since the war the Persian Government has declared its neutrality, but this has not prevented Germany, Austria, and Turkey from carrying on a propaganda with the object of gaining Persian sympathies. These intrigues have been particularly intense in Azerbaijan, where the Turks succeeded in attracting to their side some of the Kurds in that country. Afterward Ottoman troops, violating Persian neutrality, crossed the Persian frontier and, supported by Kurdish bands, penetrated the districts where our detachments were in cantonments and transformed Azerbaijan into a part of the Russo-Turkish theatre of war.

I must say in passing that the presence of our troops in Persia is in no way a violation of neutrality, for they were sent there some years ago with the object of maintaining order in our frontier territory, and preventing its invasion by the Turks, who wished to establish there an advantageous base of action against the Caucasus. The Persian Government, powerless to take effective action against this aggression, protested, but without success. I must state that Anglo-Russian relations in regard to Persian affairs are more than ever based on mutual and sincere confidence and co-operation, which are a guarantee of the pacific settlement of any eventual conflict.

Passing to the Far East, M. Sazanof said the agreements signed in 1907 and 1910 with Japan had borne fruit during the present war, for Japan was with them. She had driven the Germans from the Pacific Ocean, and had seized the German base of Kiao-chau. Although Japan did not sign the agreement of Aug. 23, yet, since the Anglo-Japanese alliance contained an undertaking that a separate peace should not be concluded, therefore the German Government could not hope for peace with Japan before she had concluded peace with Great Britain, Russia, and France. Consequently, their relations with Japan gave them a firm friend. The demands addressed by Japan to China contain nothing contrary to our interests.

As for Russo-Chinese interests, he could state their constant improvement. The pourparlers in regard to Mongolia, though slow, were friendly, and he hoped to be able to announce shortly the signature of a triple Russo-Chinese-Mongolian treaty, which, while safeguarding the interests of Russia, would not injure those of China.

In conclusion, M. Sazanof expressed the hope that the close union of all Russians around the throne, which had been manifested since the beginning of the war, would remain unchanged until the completion of the great national task.

Speakers of the Progressist, Octobrist, and Nationalist Centre Parties agreed that a premature peace would be a crime against their country and humanity, and that therefore Russia was prepared to make every sacrifice so that Germany might be definitely crushed.

At the end of the sitting the following resolution was unanimously adopted:

The Duma, saluting the glorious exploits of our soldiers, sends to the Russian Army and Navy a cordial greeting and to our allies an expression of sincere esteem and sympathy. It expresses its firm conviction that the great national and liberating objects of the present war will be achieved, and declares the inflexible determination of the Russian Nation to carry on the war until conditions shall have been imposed on the enemy assuring the peace of Europe and the restoration of right and justice.

## To The Victors Belong The Spoils!

By MADELEINE LUCETTE RYLEY.

[From King Albert's Book.]

The Victor true is he who conquers fear,

Who knows no time save now—no place but here.

Who counts no cost—who only plays the game.

To him shall go the prize—Immortal Fame!

To the illustrious ruler and his gallant little nation, whose heroism and bravery are surely unparalleled in the whole of our world's history, I bow my head in respectful homage.

## Lessons of the War to March Ninth

By Charles W. Eliot

President Emeritus of Harvard University.

CAMBRIDGE, Mass., March 9, 1915.

To the Editor of The New York Times:

The observant world has now had ample opportunity to establish certain conclusions about the new kind of war and its availability as means of adjusting satisfactorily international relations; and it seems desirable in the interest of durable peace in Europe that those conclusions should be accurately stated and kept in public view.

In the first place, the destructiveness of war waged on the scale and with the intensity which conscript armies, the new means of transportation and communication, the new artillery, the aeroplanes, the high explosives, and the continuity of the fighting on battle fronts of unexampled length, by night as well as by day, and in stormy and wintry as well as moderate weather, make possible, has proved to be beyond all power of computation, and could not have been imagined in advance. Never before has there been any approach to the vast killing and crippling of men, the destruction of all sorts of man's structures—buildings, bridges, viaducts, vessels, and docks—and the physical ruin of countless women and children. On the seas vessels and cargoes are sunk, instead of being carried into port as formerly.

Through the ravaging of immense areas of crop-producing lands, the driving away of the people that lived on them, and the dislocation of commerce, the food supplies for millions of non-combatants are so reduced that the rising generation in several countries is impaired on a scale never approached in any previous war.

In any country which becomes the seat of war an immense destruction of fixed capital is wrought; and at the same time the quick capital of all the combatants, accumulated during generations, is thrown into the furnace of war and consumed unproductively.

In consequence of the enormous size of the national armies and the withdrawal of the able-bodied men from productive industries, the industries and commerce of the whole world are seriously interrupted, whence widespread, incalculable losses to mankind.

These few months of war have emphasized the interdependence of nations the world over with a stress never before equaled. Neutral nations far removed from Europe have felt keenly the effects of the war on the industries and trades by which they live. Men see in this instance that whatever reduces the buying and consuming capacity of one nation will probably reduce also the producing and selling capacity of other nations; and that the gains of commerce and trade are normally mutual, and not one-sided.

All the contending nations have issued huge loans which will impose heavy burdens on future generations; and the yield of the first loans has already been spent or pledged. The first loan issued by the British Government was nearly twice the national debt of the United States; and it is supposed that its proceeds will be all spent before next Summer. Germany has already spent $1,600,000,000 since the war broke out—all unproductively and most of it for destruction. She will soon have to issue her second great loan. In short, the waste and ruin have been without precedent, the destruction of wealth has been enormous, and the resulting dislocations of finance, industries, and commerce will long afflict the coming generations in all the belligerent nations.

All the belligerent nations have already demonstrated that neither urban life, nor the factory system, nor yet corroding luxury has caused in them any physical or moral deterioration which interferes with their fighting capacity. The soldiers of these civilized peoples are just as ready for hand-to-hand encounters with cold steel as any barbarians or savages have ever been. The primitive combative instincts remain in full force and can be brought into play by all the belligerents with facility. The progress of the war should have removed any delusions on this subject which Germany, Austria-Hungary, or any one of the Allies may have entertained. The Belgians, a well-to-do town people, and the Serbians, a poor rural population, best illustrate this continuity of the martial qualities; for the Belgians faced overwhelming odds, and the Serbians have twice driven back large Austrian forces, although they have a transport by oxen only, an elementary commissariat, no medical or surgical supplies to speak of, and scanty munitions of war. On the other hand, the principal combatants have proved that with money enough they can all use effectively the new methods of war administration and the new implements for destruction. These facts suggest that the war might be much prolonged without yielding any results more decisive than those it has already yielded; indeed, that its most probable outcome is a stalemate—unless new combatants enter the field.

Fear of Russian invasion seemed at first to prompt Germany to war; but now Germany has amply demonstrated that she has no reason to look with any keen apprehension on possible Russian aggression upon her territory, and that her military organization is adequate for defense against any attack from any quarter. The military experience of the last seven months proves that the defense, by the temporary intrenchment method, has a great advantage over the attack; so that in future wars the aggressor will always be liable to find himself at a serious disadvantage, even if his victim is imperfectly prepared.

These same pregnant months have also proved that armies can be assembled and put into the field in effective condition in a much shorter time than has heretofore been supposed to be possible; provided there be plenty of money to meet the cost of equipment, transportation, and supplies. Hence, the advantages of maintaining huge active armies, ready for instant attack or defense, will hereafter be less considerable than they have been supposed to be—if the declaration of war by surprise, as in August last, can hereafter be prevented. These considerations, taken in connection with the probable inefficacy against modern artillery of elaborate fortifications, suggest the possibility of a reduction throughout Europe of the peace-footing armies. It is conceivable that the Swiss militia system should satisfy the future needs of most of the European States.

Another important result of the colossal war has been achieved in these seven months. It has been demonstrated that no single nation in any part of the world can dominate the other nations, or, indeed, any other nation, unless the other principal powers consent to that domination; and, in the present state of the world, it is quite clear that no such domination will be consented to. As soon as this proposition is accepted by all the combatants, this war, and perhaps all war between civilized nations, will cease. It is obvious that in the interest of mankind the war ought not to cease until Germany is convinced that her ambition for empire in Europe and the world cannot be gratified. Deutschland über alles can survive as a shout of patriotic enthusiasm; but as a maxim of international policy it is dead already, and should be buried out of the sight and memory of men.

It has, moreover, become plain that the progress in civilization of the white race is to depend not on the supreme power of any one nation, forcing its peculiar civilization on other nations, but on the peaceful development of many different nationalities, each making contributions of its own to the progress of the whole, and each developing a social, industrial, and governmental order of its own, suited to its territory, traditions, resources, and natural capacities.

The chronic irritations in Europe which contributed to the outbreak of the war and the war itself have emphasized the value and the toughness of natural national units, both large and small, and the inexpediency of artificially dividing such units, or of forcing natural units into unnatural associations. These principles are now firmly established in the public opinion of Europe and America. No matter how much longer the present war may last, no settlement will afford any prospect of lasting peace in Europe which does not take just account of these principles. Already the war has demonstrated that just consideration of national feelings, racial kinship, and common commercial interests would lead to three fresh groupings in Europe—one of the Scandinavian countries, one of the three sections into which Poland has been divided, and one of the Balkan States which have a strong sense of Slavic kinship. In the case of Scandinavia and the Balkan States the bond might be nothing more than a common tariff with common ports and harbor regulations; but Poland needs to be reconstructed as a separate kingdom. Thoroughly to remove political sores which have been running for more than forty years, the people of Schleswig-Holstein and Alsace-Lorraine should also be allowed to determine by free vote their national allegiance. Whether the war ends in victory for the Allies, or in a draw or deadlock with neither party victorious and neither humiliated, these new national adjustments will be necessary to permanent peace in Europe. All the wars in Europe since 1864 unite in demonstrating that necessity.

Again, the war has already demonstrated that colonies or colonial possessions in remote parts of the world are not a source of strength to a European nation when at war, unless that nation is strong on the seas. Affiliated Commonwealths may be a support to the mother country, but colonies held by force in exclusive possession are not. Great Britain learned much in 1775 about the management of colonies, and again she learned in India that the policy of exploitation, long pursued by the East India Company, had become undesirable from every point of view. As the strongest naval power in the world, Great Britain has given an admiral example of the right use of power in making the seas and harbors of the world free to the mercantile marine of all the nations with which she competes. Her free-trade policy helped her to wise action on the subject of commercial extension. Nevertheless, the other commercial nations, watching the tremendous power in war which Great Britain possesses through her wide, though not complete, control of the oceans, will rejoice when British control, though limited and wisely used, is replaced by an unlimited international control. This is one of the most valuable lessons of the great war.

Another conviction is strongly impressed upon the commercial nations of the world by the developments of seven months of extensive fighting by land and sea, namely, the importance of making free to all nations the Kiel Canal and the passage from the Black Sea to the Aegean. So long as one nation holds the Dardanelles and the Bosporus, and another nation holds the short route from the Baltic to the North Sea, there will be dangerous restrictions on the commerce of the world—dangerous in the sense of provoking to war, or of causing sores which develop into malignant disease. Those two channels should be used for the common benefit of mankind, just as the Panama Canal or the Suez Canal is intended to be. Free seas, free inter-ocean canals and straits, the "open door," and free competition in international trade are needed securities for peace.

These lessons of the war are as plain now as they will be after six months or six years more fighting. Can the belligerent nations—and particularly Germany—take them to heart now, or must more millions of men be slaughtered and more billions of human savings be consumed before these teachings of seven fearful months be accepted?

For a great attainable object such dreadful losses and sufferings as continuation of the war entails might perhaps be borne; but the last seven months have proved that the objects with which Austria-Hungary and Germany went to war are unattainable in the present state of Europe. Austria-Hungary, even with the active aid of Germany and Turkey, cannot prevail in Serbia against the active or passive resistance of Serbia, Russia, Rumania, Greece, Italy, France, and Great Britain. Germany cannot crush France supported by Great Britain and Russia, or keep Belgium, except as a subject and hostile province, and in defiance of the public opinion of the civilized world. In seven months Great Britain and France have made up for their lack of preparedness and have brought the military operations of Germany in France to a standstill. On the other hand, Great Britain and France must already realize that they cannot drive the German armies out of France and Belgium without a sacrifice of blood and treasure from which the stoutest hearts may well shrink.

Has not the war already demonstrated that jealous and hostile coalitions armed to the teeth will surely bring on Europe not peace and advancing civilization, but savage war and an arrest of civilization? Has it not already proved that Europe needs one comprehensive union or federation competent to procure and keep for Europe peace through justice? There is no alternative except more war.

CHARLES W. ELIOT.

## Belgium's King And Queen

By PAUL HERVIEU

Translation by Florence Simmonds.

[From King Albert's Book.]

Once upon a time there lived a King and a Queen....

Indeed, it would be the most touching and edifying fairy-tale imaginable, this true story of H.M. Albert I. and H.M. Queen Elizabeth.

It would tell of their quiet and noble devotion to their daily tasks, of the purity of their happy family life....

Suddenly, the devil would intervene, with his threats and his offers....

Then we should hear of the sovereigns and the people of Belgium agreeing at once in their sense of honor and heroism.

Then the dastardly invasion, and the innumerable host of infernal spirits breathing out sulphur, belching torrents of iron, and raining fire; city dwellings transformed into the shattered columns of cemeteries; innocent creatures tortured and victimized; and the King and Queen with their kingdom reduced to a sandhill on the shore, and the remnant of their valiant army around them.

And at last, at last! That turn of the tide which all humanity worthy of the name desires so ardently, and which even the baser sort now sees to be surely approaching.

At this point in the story, at this page of the legendary tale, how the children would clap their hands, with all that love of justice innate in children, and how the faces of worthy parents would beam with the approval of satisfied consciences!

And in the future, those who contemplate the royal arms with the pious admiration due to them, will see a blooming rose side by side with the lion of Belgium, typifying the immortal share of H.M. Queen Elizabeth in the glory of H.M. Albert I.

## The European War As Seen By Cartoonists

[German Cartoon]

#### The American Protest

—From Lustige Blaetter, Berlin.

JOHN BULL: "Now, what's he throwing at me for? A little bit of piracy is no reason for getting bad-tempered."

[French Cartoon]

#### The Peasant and the War

—From Le Rire, Paris

"Confound their infernal shells! If a feller didn't have to work it would be better to stay home these days."

[German Cartoon]

#### Victory!

—From Lustige Blaetter, Berlin.

[This cartoon was published on the Kaiser's birthday, Jan. 27, 1915.]

[English Cartoon]

#### "The Outcast"

—From Punch, London.

A place in the shadow.

[Italian Cartoon]

#### The Dream of a Madman

—From L'Asino, Rome.

WILLIAM: "Attention! Forward! March! One—two...."

[German Cartoon]

#### Night Scene in Trafalgar Square

—From Lustige Blaetter, Berlin.

"Goddam, Mister Nelson! What are you looking for down here?"

"Well, just suppose you stay up there for a while among the Zeppelins yourself."

[English Cartoon]

#### The Riddle of the Sands

—From Punch, London.

TURKISH CAMEL: "Where to?"

GERMAN OFFICER: "Egypt."

TURKISH CAMEL: "Guess again."

[German Cartoon]

#### The Theatre in the Field

THE ENGLISH THEATRE IN THE FIELD—"With the permission of French and Kitchener, Hicks's Operetta Company went from London to the front and played before the British soldiers."

THE GERMAN THEATRE IN THE FIELD—"Major Walter Kirchoff (of the Royal Opera House). Lieutenant Hall Wegener (of the German Theatre). Dispatch Rider, Carl Clewing (of the Royal Playhouse)."

—From Lustige Blaetter, Berlin.

[English Cartoon]

#### Trench Amenities

—From Punch, London.

BRITISH TOMMY (returning to trench in which he has lately been fighting, now temporarily occupied by the enemy): "Excuse me—any of you blighters seen my pipe?"

[Italian Cartoon]

#### Quo Vadis?

—From L'Asino, Rome.

[German Cartoon]

#### The Gutter Snipes

—From Lustige Blaetter, Berlin.

[German Cartoon]

#### A London Family Scene

—From Meggendorfer-Blaetter, Munich.

[A favorite theme of German cartoonists is England's supposed mortal terror of Zeppelins.]

[English Cartoon]

#### The Dissemblers

—From Punch, London.

EMPEROR OF AUSTRIA: "Now what do we really want to say?"

SULTAN OF TURKEY: "Well, of course we couldn't say that; not on his birthday."

[German Cartoon]

#### Lord Kitchener Wants You!

—From Simplicissimus, Munich.

"Lord Kitchener needs recruits!"

[English Cartoon]

#### Willy-Nilly

—From The Sketch, London.

GERMAN OFFICIAL REPORT: "Our progress is maintained."

[German Cartoon]

#### A Shaky Affair

—From Lustige Blaetter, Berlin.

THE TRIPLE VICTORY: "Confound it, there goes another pillar."

[English Cartoon]

#### The Return of the Raider

—From Punch, London.

KAISER: "Well, I AM surprised!"

TIRPITZ: "So were we."

[Italian Cartoon]

#### What Is There Inside?

—From L'Asino, Rome.

[The words that the observer has uncovered are as follows: Militarism, Religious Mania, Megalomania, Loquacity, Homicidal Mania, Imperialism, Neronism.]

[English Cartoon]

#### "Sound and Fury"

—From Punch, London.

KAISER: "Is all my high seas fleet safely locked up?"

ADMIRAL VON TIRPITZ: "Practically all, Sire."

KAISER: "Then let the starvation of England begin!"

[English Cartoon]

#### The Flight That Failed

—From Punch, London.

THE EMPEROR: "What! No babes, sirrah?"

THE MURDERER: "Alas, Sire, none."

THE EMPEROR: "Well, then, no babes, no iron crosses."

[English Cartoon]

#### "A Fortified Town"

—From The Sketch, London.

A. Little Muddlecome, as known to its inhabitants.

B. Little Muddlecome, the fortified town—according to Germany.

[South African Cartoon]

#### No Family Resemblance

—From The Cape Times, Cape Town, South Africa.

THE GERMAN EAGLE (tearfully): "As bird to bird—surely you won't desert me?"

THE AMERICAN EAGLE: "Desert you! I'm an eagle, not a vulture!"

## The Chances of Peace and the Problem of Poland

By J. Ellis Barker

[From The Nineteenth Century and After, Leonard Scott Publishing Company.]

A century ago, at the Congress of Vienna, the question of Poland proved extremely difficult to solve. It produced dangerous friction among the assembled powers, and threatened to lead to the break-up of the congress. The position became so threatening that, on the 3d of January, 1815, Austria, Great Britain, and France felt compelled to conclude a secret separate alliance directed against Prussia and Russia, the allies of Austria and Great Britain in the war against Napoleon. Precautionary troop movements began, and war among the allies might have broken out had not, shortly afterward, Napoleon quitted Elba and landed in France. Fear of the great Corsican reunited the powers.

Because of the great and conflicting interests involved, the question of Poland may prove of similar importance and difficulty at the congress which will conclude the present war. Hence, it seems desirable to consider it carefully and in good time. It is true that the study of the Polish problem does not seem to be very urgent at the present moment. In view of the slow progress of the Allies in the east and west, it appears that the war will be long drawn out. Still, it is quite possible that it will come to an early and sudden end. Austria-Hungary is visibly tiring of the hopeless struggle into which she was plunged by Germany, and which hitherto has brought her nothing but loss, disgrace, and disaster. After all, the war is bound to end earlier or later in an Austro-German defeat, and if it should be fought to the bitter end Austria-Hungary will obviously suffer far more severely than will Germany. A protracted war, which would lead merely to the lasting impoverishment of Germany, would bring about the economic annihilation of impecunious Austria. Besides, while a complete defeat would cause to Germany only the loss of territories in the east, west, and north which are largely inhabited by disaffected Poles, Frenchmen, and Danes, and would not very greatly reduce the purely German population of Germany, it would probably result in the dissolution of the Dual Monarchy, which lacks a homogeneous population, and it might lead to Austria's disappearance as a great State. If complete disaster should overwhelm the empire of Francis Joseph, Hungary would undoubtedly make herself independent. The Dual Monarchy would become a heap of wreckage, and in the end the German parts of Austria would probably become a German province, Vienna a provincial Prussian town, the proud Hapsburgs subordinate German princelings. If, on the other hand, Austria-Hungary should make quickly a separate peace with her opponents, she would presumably lose only the Polish parts of Galicia to the new kingdom of Poland, and Bosnia and Herzegovina to Serbia; and she might receive most satisfactory compensation for these losses by the acquisition of the German parts of Silesia and by the adherence of the largely Roman Catholic South German States, which have far more in common with Austria than with Protestant Prussia. As a result of the war, Austria-Hungary might be greatly strengthened at Germany's cost, provided the monarchy makes peace without delay. In any case, only by an early peace can the bulk of the lands of the Hapsburgs be preserved for the ruling house, and can national bankruptcy be avoided. There is an excellent and most valuable precedent for such action on Austria's part. Bismarck laid down the essence of statesmanship in the maxim "Salus Publica Suprema Lex," and defined in his memoirs the binding power of treaties of alliance by the phrase "Ultra posse nemo obligatur." Referring particularly to the Austro-German alliance, he wrote that "no nation is obliged to sacrifice its existence on the altar of treaty fidelity." Before long the Dual Monarchy may take advantage of Bismarck's teaching. After all, it cannot be expected that she should go beyond her strength, and that she should ruin herself for the sake of Germany, especially as she cannot thereby save that country from inevitable defeat. Austria-Hungary should feel particularly strongly impelled to ask for peace without delay, as her recent and most disastrous defeat in Serbia has exasperated the people and threatens to lead to risings and revolts not only in the Slavonic parts of the monarchy but also in Hungary. Civil war may be said to be in sight.

The Dual Monarchy is threatened besides by the dubious and expectant attitude of Italy and Rumania. If Austria-Hungary should hesitate much longer to make peace, Italy and Rumania may find a sufficient pretext for war and may join the Entente powers. Italy naturally desires to acquire the valuable Italian portions of Austria-Hungary on her borders, and Rumania the very extensive Rumanian parts of the Dual Monarchy adjoining that kingdom. To both powers it would be disastrous if Austria-Hungary should make peace before they had staked out their claims by militarily occupying the territory which they covet. Both States may therefore be expected to abandon their neutrality and to invade Austria-Hungary without delay as soon as they hear that that country seriously contemplates entering upon peace negotiations; it follows that if Austria-Hungary wishes to withdraw from the stricken field she must open negotiations with the utmost secrecy and conclude them with the utmost speed. It is clear that if Italy and Rumania should be given the much desired opportunity of joining the Entente powers, the Dual Monarchy would lose not only Polish Galicia and Serbian Bosnia and Herzegovina but Rumanian Transylvania and the Banat, with about 5,000,000 inhabitants, and the largely Italian Trentino, Istria, and Dalmatia, with at least 1,000,000 people, as well. These vast losses would probably lead to the total dismemberment of the State, for the remaining subject nationalities would also demand their freedom. Self-preservation is the first law and the first duty of individuals and of States. It is therefore conceivable, and is indeed only logical, that Austria-Hungary will conclude overnight a separate peace. If she should take that wise and necessary step, isolated Germany would either have to give up the unequal struggle or fight on single-handed. In the latter case, her defeat would no doubt be rapid. It seems, therefore, quite possible that the end of the war may be as sudden as was its beginning. Hence, the consideration of the Polish question seems not only useful but urgent....

From the very beginning Prussia, Austria, and Russia treated Poland as a corpus vile, and cut it up like a cake, without any regard to the claims, the rights, and the protests of the Poles themselves. Although history only mentions three partitions, there were in reality seven. There were those of 1772, 1793, and 1795, already referred to; and these were followed by a redistribution of the Polish territories in 1807, 1809, and 1815. In none of these were the inhabitants consulted or even considered. The Congress of Vienna established the independence of Cracow, but Austria-Hungary, asserting that she considered herself "threatened" by the existence of that tiny State, seized it in 1846.

While Prussia, Austria, and Russia, considering that might was right, had divided Poland among themselves, regardless of the passionate protests of the inhabitants, England had remained a spectator, but not a passive one, of the tragedy. She viewed the action of the allies with strong disapproval, but although she gave frank expression to her sentiments, she did not actively interfere. After all, no English interests were involved in the partition. It was not her business to intervene. Besides, she could not successfully have opposed single-handed the joint action of the three powerful partner States, especially as France, under the weak Louis XV., held aloof. However, English statesmen refused to consider as valid the five partitions which took place before and during the Napoleonic era.

The Treaty of Chaumont of 1814 created the Concert of Europe. At the Congress of Vienna of 1815 the frontiers of Europe were fixed by general consent. As Prussia, Austria, and Russia refused to recreate an independent Poland, England's opposition would have broken up the concert, and might have led to further wars. Unable to prevent the injustice done to Poland by her opposition, and anxious to maintain the unity of the powers and the peace of the world, England consented at last to consider the partition of Poland as a fait accompli, and formally recognized it, especially as the Treaty of Vienna assured the Poles of just and fair treatment under representative institutions. Article I. of the Treaty of Vienna stated expressly:

Les Polonais, sujets respectifs de la Russie, de l'Autriche et de la Prusse, obtiendront une représentation et des institutions nationales réglées d'après le mode d'existence politique que chacun des gouvernements auxquels ils appartiennent jugera utile et convenable de leur accorder.

By signing the Treaty of Vienna, England recognized not explicitly, but merely implicitly, the partition of Poland, and she did so unwillingly and under protest. Lord Castlereagh stated in a circular note addressed to Russia, Prussia, and Austria, that it had always been England's desire that an independent Poland, possessing a dynasty of its own, should be established, which, separating Austria, Russia, and Prussia, should act as a buffer State between them; that, failing its creation, the Poles should be reconciled to being dominated by foreigners, by just and liberal treatment which alone would make them satisfied. His note, which is most remarkable for its far-sightedness, wisdom, force, and restraint, was worded as follows:

The undersigned, his Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Plenipotentiary to the Congress of Vienna, in desiring the present note concerning the affairs of Poland may be entered on the protocol, has no intention to revive controversy or to impede the progress of the arrangements now in contemplation. His only object is to avail himself of this occasion of temperately recording, by the express orders of his Court, the sentiments of the British Government upon a European question of the utmost magnitude and influence.

The undersigned has had occasion in the course of the discussions at Vienna, for reasons that need not be gone into, repeatedly and earnestly to oppose himself, on the part of his Court, to the erection of a Polish Kingdom in union with and making part of the Imperial Crown of Russia.

The desire of his Court to see an independent power, more or less considerable in extent, established in Poland under a distinct dynasty, and as an intermediate State between the three great monarchies, has uniformly been avowed, and if the undersigned has not been directed to press such a measure, it has only arisen from a disinclination to excite, under all the apparent obstacles to such an arrangement, expectations which might prove an unavailing source of discontent among the Poles.

The Emperor of Russia continuing, as it is declared, still to adhere to his purpose of erecting that part of the Duchy of Warsaw which is to fall under his Imperial majesty's dominion, together with his other Polish provinces, either in whole or in part, into a kingdom under the Russian sceptre; and their Austrian and Prussian Majesties, the sovereigns most immediately interested, having ceased to oppose themselves to such an arrangement—the undersigned adhering, nevertheless, to all his former representations on this subject has only sincerely to hope that none of those evils may result from this measure to the tranquillity of the North, and to the general equilibrium of Europe, which it has been his painful duty to anticipate. But in order to obviate as far as possible such consequences, it is of essential importance to establish the public tranquillity throughout the territories which formerly constituted the Kingdom of Poland, upon some solid and liberal basis of common interest, by applying to all, however various may be their political institutions, a congenial and conciliatory system of administration.

Experience has proved that it is not by counteracting all their habits and usages as a people that either the happiness of the Poles, or the peace of that important portion of Europe, can be preserved. A fruitless attempt, too long persevered in, by institutions foreign to their manner and sentiments to make them forget their existence, and even language, as a people, has been sufficiently tried and failed. It has only tended to excite a sentiment of discontent and self-degradation, and can never operate otherwise than to provoke commotion and to awaken them to a recollection of past misfortunes.

The undersigned, for these reasons, and in cordial concurrence with the general sentiments which he has had the satisfaction to observe the respective Cabinets entertained on this subject, ardently desires that the illustrious monarchs to whom the destinies of the Polish Nation are confided, may be induced, before they depart from Vienna, to take an engagement with each other to treat as Poles, under whatever form of political institution they may think fit to govern them, the portions of that nation that may be placed under their respective sovereignties. The knowledge of such a determination will best tend to conciliate the general sentiment to their rule, and to do honor to the several sovereigns in the eyes of their Polish subjects. This course will consequently afford the surest prospect of their living peaceably and contentedly under their respective Governments....

This dispatch was sent on the 12th of January, 1815, exactly a century ago. The warnings were not heeded and the past century has been filled with sorrow for the Poles and with risings and revolutions, as Lord Castlereagh clearly foretold....

In Western Russia, in Eastern Prussia, and in Galicia there dwell about 20,000,000 Poles. If the war should end, as it is likely to end, in a Russian victory, a powerful kingdom of Poland will arise. According to the carefully worded manifesto of the Grand Duke the united Poles will receive full self-government under the protection of Russia. They will be enabled to develop their nationality, but it seems scarcely likely that they will receive entire and absolute independence. Their position will probably resemble that of Quebec in Canada, or of Bavaria in Germany, and if the Russians and Poles act wisely they will live as harmoniously together as do the French-speaking "habitants" of Quebec and the English-speaking men of the other provinces of Canada. Russia need not fear that Poland will make herself entirely independent, and only the most hot-headed and short-sighted Poles can wish for complete independence. Poland, having developed extremely important manufacturing industries, requires large free markets for their output. Her natural market is Russia, for Germany has industrial centres of her own. She can expect to have the free use of the precious Russian markets only as long as she forms part of that great State. At present, a spirit of the heartiest good-will prevails between Russians and Poles. The old quarrels and grievances have been forgotten in the common struggle. The moment is most auspicious for the resurrection of Poland.

While Prussia has been guilty of the partition of Poland, Russia is largely to blame for the repeated revolts and insurrection of her Polish citizens....

When the peace conditions come up for discussion at the congress which will bring the present war to an end—and that event may be nearer than most men think—the problem of Poland will be one of the greatest difficulty and importance. Austria-Hungary has comparatively little interest in retaining her Poles. The Austrian Poles dwell in Galicia outside the great rampart of the Carpathian Mountains, which form the natural frontier of the Dual Monarchy toward the northeast. The loss of Galicia, with its oilfields and mines, may be regrettable to Austria-Hungary, but it will not affect her very seriously. To Germany, on the other hand, the loss of the Polish districts will be a fearful blow. The supreme importance which Germany attaches to the Polish problem may be seen from this, that Bismarck thought it the only question which could lead to an open breach between Germany and Austria-Hungary. According to Crispi's Memoirs, Bismarck said to the Italian statesman on the 17th of September, 1877:

There could be but one cause for a breach in the friendship that unites Austria and Germany, and that would be a disagreement between the two Governments concerning Polish policy.... If a Polish rebellion should break out and Austria should lend it her support, we should be obliged to assert ourselves. We cannot permit the reconstruction of a Catholic kingdom so near at hand. It would be a Northern France. We have one France to look to already, and a second would become the natural ally of the first, and we should find ourselves entrapped between two enemies.

The resurrection of Poland would injure us in other ways as well. It could not come about without the loss of a part of our territory. We cannot possibly relinquish either Posen or Dantsic, because the German Empire would remain exposed on the Russian frontier, and we should lose an outlet on the Baltic.

In the event of Germany's defeat a large slice of Poland, including the wealthiest parts of Silesia, with gigantic coal mines, iron works, &c., would be taken away from her, and if the Poles should recover their ancient province of West Prussia, with Dantsic, Prussia's hold upon East Prussia, with Königsberg, would be threatened. The loss of her Polish districts would obviously greatly reduce Germany's military strength and economic power. It may therefore be expected that Germany will move heaven and earth against the re-creation of the Kingdom of Poland, and that she will strenuously endeavor to create differences between Russia and her allies. The statesmen of Europe should therefore, in good time, firmly make up their minds as to the future of Poland.

J. ELLIS BARKER.

## The Redemption Of Europe

By ALFRED NOYES.

[From King Albert's Book.]

... donee templa refereris

Under which banner? It was night

Beyond all nights that ever were.

The Cross was broken. Blood-stained might

Moved like a tiger from its lair;

And all that heaven had died to quell

Awoke, and mingled earth with hell.

For Europe, if it held a creed,

Held it through custom, not through faith.

Chaos returned, in dream and deed.

Right was a legend; Love—a wraith;

And That from which the world began

Was less than even the best in man.

God in the image of a Snake

Dethroned that dream, too fond, too blind,

The man-shaped God whose heart could break,

Live, die, and triumph with mankind.

A Super-snake, a Juggernaut,

Dethroned the highest of human thought.

The lists were set. The eternal foe

Within us as without grew strong,

By many a super-subtle blow

Blurring the lines of right and wrong

In Art and Thought, till nought seemed true

But that soul-slaughtering cry of New!

New wreckage of the shrines we made

Thro' centuries of forgotten tears ...

We knew not where their scorn had laid

Our Master. Twice a thousand years

Had dulled the uncapricious Sun.

Manifold worlds obscured the One;

Obscured the reign of Law, our stay,

Our compass through this darking sea,

The one sure light, the one sure way,

The one firm base of Liberty:

The one firm road that men have trod

Through Chaos to the Throne of God.

Choose ye, a hundred legions cried,

Dishonor or the instant sword!

Ye chose. Ye met that blood-stained tide.

A little kingdom kept its word;

And, dying, cried across the night,

Hear us, O earth, we chose the Right!

Whose is the victory? Though ye stood

Alone against the unmeasured foe;

By all the tears, by all the blood

That flowed, and have not ceased to flow;

By all the legions that ye hurled:

Back, thro' the thunder-shaken world;

By the old that have not where to rest,

By the lands laid waste and hearths defiled;

By every lacerated breast,

And every mutilated child,

Whose is the victory? Answer ye,

Who, dying, smiled at tyranny?

Under the sky's triumphal arch

The glories of the dawn begin.

Our dead, our shadowy armies march

E'en now, in silence, through Berlin;

Dumb shadows, tattered, blood-stained ghosts

But cast by what swift following hosts?

And answer, England! At thy side,

Thro' seas of blood, thro' mists of tears,

Thou that for Liberty hast died

And livest, to the end of years!

And answer, Earth! Far off, I hear

The peans of a happier sphere:

The trumpet blown at Marathon

Resounded over earth and sea,

But burning angel lips have blown

The trumpets of thy Liberty;

For who, beside thy dead, could deem

The faith, for which they died, a dream?

Earth has not been the same since then.

Europe from thee received a soul,

Whence nations moved in law, like men,

As members of a mightier whole,

Till wars were ended.... In that day,

So shall our children's children say.

## Germany Will End the War

## Only When a Peace Treaty Shall Assure Her Power

By Maximilian Harden

Maximilian Harden, who in the following article sets forth the ends which Germany is striving to accomplish in the war, is the George Bernard Shaw of Germany. He is considered the leading German editor and an expert in Germany on foreign politics. As editor and proprietor of Die Zukunft, his fiery, brooding spirit and keen insight and wit, coupled with powers of satire and caricature, made him a solitary and striking independent figure in the German press years before the other newspapers of Germany dared to criticise or attack the Government or the persons at the head of it.

After the dismissal of Prince Bismarck by the present Kaiser, Harden not only saw, but constantly and audaciously criticised, the weaknesses in the character of the Emperor. For this dangerous undertaking he was three times brought to trial for lèse majesté, and spent a year as a prisoner in a Prussian fortress. In 1907 he figured in a libel suit brought by General Kuno von Moltke, late Military Governor of Berlin, who, together with Count Zu Eulenburg and Count Wilhelm von Hohenau, one of the Emperor's Adjutants, had been mentioned by Harden in his paper as members of the so-called Camarilla or "Round Table" that sought to influence the Emperor's political actions by subtle manipulations. He was sentenced to four months' imprisonment, but appealed the case, and was let off two years later with a fine of $150.

In recently publishing the German article which is herewith translated the German New Vorker Revue carefully disclaimed any agreement with the sentiments therein expressed by Harden, which, it pointed out, must be regarded only as typical of German public opinion as is George Bernard Shaw of public opinion in England.

The scorners of war, the blonde, black, and gray children who have been defiling his name with syrupy tongues of lofty humanity and with slanderous scoldings, all have become silent. Or else they snort soldiers' songs; annihilate in confused little essays the allied powers arrayed against us; entreat a civilized world (Kulturwelt) juggling for mere turkey heads, to please grant us permission to do heavy and cruel deeds, to wage fierce and headlong war! Already they seem prepared to answer absolutely and unqualifiedly in the affirmative Luther's question whether "men of war also can be considered in a state of grace."

They write and talk much about the great scourge of war. That is all quite true. But we should also bear in mind how much greater is the scourge which is fended off by war. The sum and substance of the matter is this: In looking upon the office of war one must not consider how it strangles, burns, destroys. For that is what the simple eyes of children do which do not further watch the surgeon when he chops off a hand or saws off a leg; which do not see or perceive that it is a matter of saving the entire body. So we must look upon the office of war and of the sword with the eyes of men, and understand why it strangles and why it wreaks cruel deeds. Then it will justify itself and prove of its own accord that it is an office divine in itself, and as necessary and useful to the world as is eating, drinking, or any other work. But that some there are who abuse the office of war, who strangle and destroy without need, out of sheer wantonness—that is not the fault of the office, but of the person. Is there any office, work, or thing so good that wicked and wanton persons will not abuse it?

The organ tone of such words as these at last rolls forth once more in their native land.

Therefore cease the pitiful attempts to excuse Germany's action. No longer wail to strangers, who do not care to hear you, telling them how dear to us were the smiles of peace we had smeared like rouge upon our lips, and how deeply we regret in our hearts that the treachery of conspirators dragged us, unwilling, into a forced war. Cease, you publicists, your wordy war against hostile brothers in the profession, whose superiority you cannot scold away, and who merely smile while they pick up, out of your laboriously stirred porridge slowly warmed over a flame of borrowed alcohol, the crumbs on which their "selfishness" is to choke! That national selfishness does not seem a duty to you, but a sin, is something you must conceal from foreign eyes.

Cease, also, you popular writers, the degraded scolding of enemies that does not emanate from passion but out of greedy hankering for the applause of the masses, and which continually nauseates us amid the piety of this hour! Because our statemen failed to discover and foil shrewd plans of deception is no reason why we may hoist the flag of most pious morality. Not as weak-willed blunderers have we undertaken the fearful risk of this war. We wanted it. Because we had to wish it and could wish it. May the Teuton devil throttle those whiners whose pleas for excuses make us ludicrous in these hours of lofty experience. We do not stand, and shall not place ourselves, before the court of Europe. Our power shall create new law in Europe. Germany strikes. If it conquers new realms for its genius, the priesthood of all the gods will sing songs of praise to the good war.

Only he who is specially trained for a race of troops may go along into the field. Only the man versed in statecraft should be allowed to participate in the talk about the results of war. Not he who has out yonder proved an unworthy diplomat, nor the dilettante loafer sprayed with the perfume of volatile emotions. Manhood liability to military service requires manhood suffrage? That question may rest for the time being; likewise the desire for equality of that right shall not be argued today. But common sense should warn against the assumption of an office without the slightest special preliminary training. Politics is an art that can be mastered not in the leisure hours of the brain, but only by the passionate, self-sacrificing devotion of a whole lifetime. Now seek around you.

We are at the beginning of a war the development and duration of which are incalculable, and in which up to date no foe has been brought to his knees. To guide the sword to its goal, Tom, Dick, and Harry, Poet Arrogance and Professor Crumb advertise their prowess in the newspaper Advice and Assistance. Brave folk, whose knowledge concerning this new realm of their endeavor emanates solely from that same newspaper! Because they have for three months been busily reading their morning, noon, and evening editions, they think they have a special call to speak. Without knowledge of things that have transpired before, without knowledge of the persons concerned, without a suspicion of the needs of the situation and its possibilities, they judge the peoples of the earth and divide the world. Stupid talk, with which irreverent officiousness seeks to while away and shorten the period of anxious waiting for customers; but to prepare quietly and wisely and mightily in advance for terms of peace, that is the duty of the statesman.

We are waging this war not in order to punish those who have sinned, nor in order to free enslaved peoples and thereafter to comfort ourselves with the unselfish and useless consciousness of our own righteousness. We wage it from the lofty point of view and with the conviction that Germany, as a result of her achievements and in proportion to them, is justified in asking, and must obtain, wider room on earth for development and for working out the possibilities that are in her. The powers from whom she forced her ascendency, in spite of themselves, still live, and some of them have recovered from the weakening she gave them. Spain and the Netherlands, Rome and Hapsburg, France and England, possessed and settled and ruled great stretches of the most fruitful soil. Now strikes the hour for Germany's rising power. The terms of a peace treaty that does not insure this would leave the great effort unrewarded. Even if it brought dozens of shining billions into the National Treasury, the fate of Europe would be dependent upon the United States of America.

We are waging war for ourselves alone; and still we are convinced that all who desire the good would soon be able to rejoice in the result. For with this war there must also end the politics that have frightened away all the upright from entering into intimate relations with the most powerful Continental empire. We need land, free roads into the ocean, and for the spirit and language and wares and trade of Germany we need the same values that are accorded such goods anywhere else.

Only four persons not residents of Essen knew about the new mortar which the firm of Friedrich Krupp manufactured at its own expense and which later, because its shell rapidly smashed the strongest fortifications of reinforced concrete, our military authorities promptly acquired. Must we be ashamed of this instrument of destruction and take from the lips of the "cultured world" the wry reproach that from "Faust" and the Ninth Symphony we have sunk our national pride to the 42-centimeter guns? No! Only firm will and determination to achieve, that is to say, German power, distinguishes the host of warriors now embattled on the five huge fields of blood from the race of the poets and thinkers. Their brains, too, yearn back, throbbing for the realm of the muses. Before the remains of the Netherland Gothic, before the wonders of Flemish painting, their eyes light up in pious adoration. From the lips of the troops that marched from three streets into the parade plaza in Brussels there burst, when the last man stood in the ranks—and burst spontaneously—a German song. Out of all the trenches joyous cheers of thanks rise for the fearless musicmaster who, amid the raging fire, through horns and trumpets, wrapped in earth-colored gray, leads his band in blowing marches and battle songs and songs of dancing into the ears of the Frenchmen, harkening with pleasure.

Not only for the territories that are to feed their children and grandchildren is this warrior host battling, but also for the conquering triumph of the German genius, for the forces of sentiment that rise from Goethe and Beethoven and Bismarck and Schiller and Kant and Kleist, working on throughout time and eternity.

And never was there a war more just; never one the result of which could bring such happiness as must this, even for the conquered. In order that that spirit might conquer we were obliged to forge the mightiest weapons for it. Over the meadows of the Scheldt is wafted the word of the King:

How proud I feel my heart flame

When in every German land

I find such a warrior band!

For German land, the German sword!

Thus be the empire's strength preserved!

This strength was begotten by that spirit. The fashioning of such weapons was possible only because millions of industrious persons, with untiring and unremitting labors, transformed the poor Germany into the rich Germany, which was then able to prepare and conduct the war as a great industry. And what the spirit created once again serves the spirit. It shall not lay waste, nor banish us free men into slavery, but rather it shall call forth to the light of heaven a new, richer soul of life out of the ruins of a storm-tossed civilization. It shall, it must, it will conquer new provinces for the majesty of the noble German spirit (Deutschheit) that never will grow chill and numb, as the Roman did. Otherwise—and even though unnumbered billions flowed into the Rhine—the expense of this war would be shamefully wasted.

Our army did not set out to conquer Belgian territory.

In the war against four great powers, the west front of which alone stretched from the North Sea to the Alps, from Ghent almost to Geneva, it seemed impossible to achieve on Europe's soil a victory that would strengthen the roots of the conquering race. Gold cannot indemnify for the loss of the swarming young life which we were obliged to mourn even after ten weeks of war; and if, amid ten thousand of the fine fellows who died, there was even a single creative mind, then thousands of millions could not pay for its destruction.

And what stretch of land necessary for the German people, or useful in the real sense of the word, could France or even Russia vacate for us in Europe? To be "unassailable"—to exchange the soul of a Viking for that of a New Yorker, that of the quick pike for that of the lazy carp whose fat back grows moss covered in a dangerless pond—that must never become the wish of a German. And for the securing of more comfortable frontier protection only a madman would risk the life that is flourishing in power and wealth. Now we know what the war is for—not for French, Polish, Ruthenian, Esthonian, Lettish territories, nor for billions of money; not in order to dive headlong after the war into the pool of emotions and then allow the chilled body to rust in the twilight dusk of the Deliverer of Races.

No! To hoist the storm flag of the empire on the narrow channel that opens and locks the road into the ocean. I could imagine Germany's war lord, if, after Ostend, Calais, too, is captured, sending the armies and fleets back home from the east and front the west, and quietly saying to our enemies:

"You now have felt what Germany's strength and determination can do, and hereafter you will probably weigh the matter well before you venture to attack us. Of you Germany demands nothing further. Not even reimbursement for its expenses in this war—for those it is reimbursed by the wholesale terror which it evoked all around in the Autumn battles. Do you want anything of us? We shall never refuse a challenge to a quarrel. We shall remain in the Belgian netherland, to which we shall add the thin strip of coast up to the rear of Calais, (you Frenchmen have enough better harbors, anyway;) we terminate, of our own accord, this war which, now that we have safeguarded our honor, can bring us no other gains; we now return to the joy of fruitful work, and will grasp the sword again only if you attempt to crowd us out of that which we have won with our blood. Of a solemn peace conference, with haggling over terms, parchment, and seal, we have no need. The prisoners are to be freed. You can keep your fortresses if they do not seem to you to be worthless, if the rebuilding of them still seems worth while to you. Tomorrow is again a common day."

Do not lapse into dreams about United States of Europe, about mild-intentioned division of the Coburg heritage, (a bit of it to Holland, a bit to Luxemburg, perhaps even a bit to France. Any one with even the slightest nobility of feeling would reject the proffered dish of poison with a gesture of disgust,) nor be lulled into delusions of military and tax conventions that would deprive the country of its free right of determining its own destiny.

To the Belgians we are the Arch-imp and the Tenant of the Pool of Hell! We would remain so, even if every stone in Louvain and in Malines were replaced by its equivalent in gold. That rage can be overcome only after the race, praised by Schiller's fiery breath, sees its neighbors close at hand and draws advantage from intimate relations with them. Antwerp not pitted against, but working with, Hamburg and Bremen; Liège, side by side with Essen's, Berlin's, and Swabia's gun factories—Cockerill in combination with Krupp; iron, coal, woven stuff from old Germany and Belgium, introduced into the markets of the world by one and the same commercial spirit; our Kamerun and their Congo—such a warm blaze of advantage has burned away many a hatred. The wise man wins as his friend the deadly foe whose skull he cannot split, and he will rather rule and allow to feast on exceptional dainties this still cold and shy new friend than lose potential well-wishers of incalculable future good-will.

Only, never again a withered Reichsland! (imperial territory.) From Calais to Antwerp, Flanders, Limburg, Brabant, to behind the line of the Meuse forts, Prussian! (German Princes no longer haggle, German tribes no longer envy one another;) the Southern triangle with Alsace and Lorraine—and Luxemburg, too, if it desires—is to be an independent federated State, intrusted to a Catholic noble house. Then Germany would know for what it shed its blood.

We need land for our industries, a road into the ocean, an undivided colony, the assurance of a supply of raw materials and the most fertile well-spring of prosperity—a people industrious and efficient in its work.

Here they are: Ore and copper, glass and sugar, flax and wool. But here, too, there once lived Jan and Hubert van Eyck, Rubens, the reveler Ruysbroek, and Jordeans of the avid eyes. Here there always lived—to be sure,-in twilight—Germania's little soul, fluttering imagination.

And is there not here, too, that which—all too stormily and, as a rule, in all too harsh a tone of abuse—every German heart yearns for, a victory over England? On the seas such victory cannot be quickly won, indeed; can, indeed, never be won without great sacrifice. But with the German Empire, whose mortars loom threatening from one coast of the Channel, whose flag floats over the two greatest harbors of Europe and over the Congo basin—England would have to come into a friendly agreement as a power of equal strength, entitled to equal rights. If it is unwilling to do so? Lion, leap! On our young soil we await thee! The day of adventure wanes. But for the German who dares unafraid to desire things the harvest labor of heroic warriors has quickly filled the store-house.

## Louvain's New Streets

[By The Associated Press.]

LONDON, March 9.—The decision of the municipal authorities of Louvain, Belgium, to give American names to certain streets of the city is set forth in a formal resolution of thanks which was adopted on Washington's Birthday by the Burgomaster and Aldermen of Louvain and sent to the American Commission for Relief in Belgium. The resolution concludes as follows:

"The cradle of a university of five centuries' standing, and today herself partly in ruins, the City of Louvain cannot fail to associate with the memory of Washington, one of the greatest Captains, the name of the learned professor whose admirable precepts and high political attainments, as also his firmness of character and dignity of life, all contributed to carry him successively to the Presidency of Princeton University, the Governorship of New Jersey, and finally the Presidency of the United States.

"In order to perpetuate to future generations remembrances of these sentiments and our ardent gratitude, the Burgomaster and Aldermen have decided this day that in the new parts of the city, as they rise out of the ruins, three streets or squares shall receive the illustrious names of President Wilson, Washington, and American Nation."

## The State of Holland

## An Answer to H.G. Wells by Hendrik Willem van Loon

To the Editor of The New York Times:

My attention has been drawn to an article by H.G. Wells, published by THE NEW YORK TIMES and by CURRENT HISTORY in its March number which proposed that Holland give Germany the coup de grace, suddenly attack Aix and Cologne, cut off Germany's line of supplies, and thereby help win the war for the cause of justice. I am not writing this answer in any official capacity, but I have reason to believe that I write what most of my fellow-countrymen feel upon the subject.

Holland is neutral. The country is just as neutral as Belgium would have been had she not been invaded; as neutral as Denmark and Switzerland and the other small countries which are suffering so severely through this war. If any power should attack Holland, Holland would no longer be neutral, but would inundate the central part of the provinces of North and South Holland, would occupy the very strong position around Amsterdam, and would fight to the end. But unless attacked directly Holland will take no part in this war.

Mr. Wells hints at the idea of the righteousness of the cause of the Allies. All races and all colors have been brought together to beat Germany. Now Holland ought to do the same. She is in a position to exercise great power with her fresh troops. In the name of humanity, which has been so grievously maltreated in Belgium, let her join. I think that the answer of the greater part of our people would be somewhat as follows:

No quarrel was ever made by a single person. It takes two to start a fight. England and Germany are fighting for the supremacy of commerce. In the course of this quarrel Belgium has been sacrificed. We are extremely sorry. We have opened our frontiers to all of our southern neighbors, They were welcome to flee to us with all their belongings. We shall take care of them so long as they wish to stay. Our position is not always easy. The Dutch and the Belgian characters are very different. We do not always understand each other. But in the main the Belgians know that we shall share our food with them until the last, that in every way we shall make them as comfortable as we can. We are not a very graceful people. We often lack a certain charm of manner. The little potentates who are the Mayors of our small frontier towns are not always very tactful. But these things are minor matters. Holland is the natural place of refuge for her southern neighbors, and as long as they suffer from the German domination they know that with us they are safe. But should we have gone with the Allies when the Belgians suffered through no fault of their own?

For France there is in Holland the greatest personal sympathy. But she is far away from Holland. The direct issue is between England and Germany. The Hollander likes England, fashions his life as much as possible after the English pattern, prefers to do business with English people. Yet is there any reason why Holland should make the possible sacrifice of her own existence for the benefit of England?

Will Mr. Wells kindly glance through his history and see what we as a nation have suffered at the hands of England?

During three centuries we fought with England about a principle laid down by Grotius of Delft. We claimed that the sea was an open highway, free to all navigators. England used her best legal talent to prove the contrary. In this struggle we exhausted ourselves and we finally lost. Incidentally we saw our richest colonies go into the possession of England. The very colony in which I am writing this letter was taken from us in time of peace. Of course all this is past history and no Hollander is going to accuse an Englishman of acts committed by his great-grandfather. But the people will remember all those things, however vaguely, and they will distrust the nation that has constantly done them harm. We gave England her best King, (if one is to believe Mr. Macaulay.) William III. in order to destroy the power of Louis XIV., and greatly for the benefit of England incidentally, did the greatest harm to the country of his origin. After 1715, totally exhausted, we were obliged to see how England got ahead of us.

Then there are some other small items. I take one at random. While the Duke of Wellington danced the polka in Brussels the Prince of Orange with a small Dutch army stopped Napoleon's progress at Quatre Bras, and by disobeying the orders of the British commander saved the army of the allies and made the victory of Waterloo possible. Our thanks for this self-sacrifice was the mild abuse of Mr. Thackeray and other gentlemen who have ever since laughed at the clumsy Dutch troops who in truth so valiantly assisted the British and Prussians. In this matter a little more generosity on the part of British historians would have made us feel more cordial toward our English neighbors. It was ever thus. To read the story of the Armada one would believe that the English destroyed this dangerous Spanish fleet. As a matter of fact, competent historians know that certainly one-half of the glory for that feat goes to the Dutch sailors, who prevented the Spaniards from getting their supplies, their pilots, and their auxiliary army. These are merely examples. They are all small things. But there are so many of them, they return with such persistent regularity, that we would feel very little inclination to risk our national existence for a nation which, according to our feeling, (rightly or wrongly, I am not debating that question,) has never treated us with fairness, and which we had to fight for over three centuries before it would accept those general principles of international law which first of all were laid down by Grotius in the beginning of the seventeenth century.

Remember, however, that this does not mean any hostility to England. Mr. Wells undoubtedly knows that our ships have invariably done noble work in rescuing the victims of submarine attacks. He will know that our Government (to the great anger of Germany) has construed the articles of several international treaties in the most liberal way and has immediately released all such British subjects as were thrown upon our coast through the accidents of war. He will also know, if he has read the papers, that our entire country has turned out to do homage to the bravery of those men. The danger to the sailor of a British man-of-war who lands in Holland is that he will be killed by a severe attack of nicotine poisoning caused by the cigars which the people, in their desire to show their feelings and unable to break the strict law of neutrality, shower upon the Englishman who is fished out of the North Sea by our trawlers or our steamers.

But away deep under this very strong personal sympathy for England, and with very sincere admiration for the British form of government, the people of Holland cannot easily overcome a feeling of vague distrust that the nation which in the past has so often abused them cannot entirely be counted upon to treat them justly this time. Incidentally, I may say that the bungling of Mr. Churchill in Antwerp, which we know much better than do the people of England, is another reason why we are a bit afraid of the island across the North Sea.

We are indeed in the position of a dog that has often been beaten innocently and that is now smiled upon and asked to be good and attack another person who has never done him any harm. The comparison may not be very flattering to us, but Mr. Wells will understand what I mean. We have had the Germans with us always. Personally, taking them by and large, we like them not. Their ways are not our ways. Our undisciplined race abhors their system. We have seen the misery which they caused in Belgium more closely than any one else. The endless letters and pamphlets with which the Germans have inundated our land to prove the justice of their cause have made no impression whatsoever. We have with our own eyes seen the victims of their very strict explanation of Section 58, Article I., of the German military penal code. We have seen the Belgians hanging by their own red handkerchiefs, and we have with our own hands fed the multitude that had been deprived of everything. On the other hand, Germany has up to date been most scrupulous in her behavior toward us. In the past she has never done us any harm. We may not like her, but she has in a very careful way avoided all friction and has treated us with great consideration.

In view of all this, in view of the very sober attitude of our people upon all matters of our daily life, in view of these historical reflections, which have a very decided influence, would it be quite fair without any provocation on the side of Germany to go forth and attack her in the back, now that she is in such very dangerous straits? I repeat that this may not be the exact sentiment of all of my countrymen, but I believe that very many of us feel things that way. Perhaps we disagree in minor details, but we agree about the main issue.

We love our country. For centuries we have fought to maintain our individual civilization against the large neighbors who surround us. We try to live up to our good reputation as a home for all those who suffer. The people who are made homeless by Germany come to us and we try to feed them on such grain as the British Government allows to pass through the Channel. We try to continue in our duty toward all our neighbors, even when they declare the entire North Sea (in which we also have a certain interest) as a place of battle and blow up our ships with their mines. We patiently destroy the mines which swim away from our neighbors' territorial waters and land upon our shores. In short, we perform a very difficult act of balancing as well as we can. But it seems to us that under difficult circumstances we are following the only correct road which can lead to the ultimate goal which we wish to reach—the lasting respect of all those who will judge us without prejudice and malice.

It is very kind of Mr. Wells to offer us territorial compensation, but we respectfully decline such a reward for the sort of attack which was popular in the days of the old Machiavelli.

HENDRIK WILLEM VAN LOON.

New York, Feb. 26, 1915.

## Hungary After the War

By a Correspondent of The London Times

[From The London Times, Jan. 20, 1915.]

The allied powers are agreed that the European resettlement must be inspired by the principle of nationality. It will be but just if Hungary suffers severely from its application, for during the past forty years no European Government has sinned so deeply and persistently against that principle as has her Magyar Government. The old Hungary, whose name and history are surrounded by the glamour of romance, was not the modern "Magyarland." Its boasted constitutional liberties were, indeed, confined to the nobles, and the "Hungarian people" was composed, in the words of Verböczy's Tripartitum Code, of "prelates, barons, and other magnates, also all nobles, but not commoners." But the nobles of all Hungarian races rallied to the Hungarian banner, proud of the title of civis hungaricus. John Hunyádi, the national hero, was a Rumane; Zrinyi was a Croat, and many another paladin of Hungarian liberty was a non-Magyar. Latin was the common language of the educated. But with the substitution of Magyar for Latin during the nineteenth century, and with the growth of what is called the "Magyar State Idea," with its accompaniment of Magyar Chauvinism, all positive recognition of the rights and individuality of non-Magyar races gradually vanished.

The Magyar language itself is incapable of expressing the difference between "Hungarian" and "Magyar." The difference is approximately the same as between "British" and "English." The "Magyar State" set itself to Magyarize education and every feature of public life. Any protest was treated as "incitement against the Magyar State Idea" and was made punishable by two years' imprisonment. It was as though a narrow-minded English Administration should set itself to obliterate all traces of Scottish, Welsh, and Irish national feeling; or as though the Government of India should ignore the existence of all save one race and language in our great dependency.

In comparison with the Government of "Magyarland," the Government of Austria was a model of tolerance. In Austria, Poles and Ruthenes, Czechs, Germans, Italians, Serbo-Croatians, and Slovenes were entitled to the public use of their own languages and enjoyed various degrees of provincial self-government. The Austrian side of every Austro-Hungarian banknote bore an indication of its value in every language of the empire, whereas the Hungarian side was printed in Magyar alone. This was done in order to foster the belief that Hungary was entirely Magyar.

In reality, Hungary is as polyglot as Austria. Exact statistics are not obtainable, since the Magyar census returns have long been deliberately falsified for "Magyar State" reasons. Roughly speaking, it may, however, be said that, in Hungary proper, i.e., exclusive of Croatia-Slavonia, where the population is almost entirely Serbo-Croatian, there are perhaps 8,500,000 Magyars, including nearly 1,000,000 professing and a large number of baptized Jews. Against this total there are more than 2,000,000 Germans, including the numerous colonies on the Austrian border, the Swabians of the south, and the Saxons of Transylvania; more than 2,000,000 Slovaks, who inhabit chiefly the northwestern counties; between three and four million Rumanes, living between the Theiss and the Eastern Carpathians; some 500,000 Ruthenes, or Little Russians, who inhabit the northeastern counties; some 600,000 Serbs and Croats in the central southern counties; 100,000 Slovenes along the borders of Styria and Carinthia; and some 200,000 other non-Magyars, including about 90,000 gypsies, who speak a language of their own. Taking the population of Hungary proper at 18,000,000, the Magyars are thus in a minority, which becomes more marked when Croatia-Slavonia with its population of 2,600,000 southern Slavs is added.

Distribution of Nationalities in Hungary.

It would have been possible for the Magyars, after the restoration of the Hungarian Constitution under the Dual Settlement of 1867, to have built up a strong and elastic Transleithan polity based on the recognition of race individualities and equality of political rights for all. The non-Magyars would have accepted Magyar leadership the more readily in that they had been dragooned and oppressed by Austria during the period of reaction after 1849 as ruthlessly as the Magyars themselves. Deák and Eötvös, who were the last prominent Magyar public men with a Hungarian, as distinguished from a narrowly Magyar, conception of the future of their country, pleaded indeed for fair treatment of the non-Magyars, and trusted to the attractive force of the strong Magyar nucleus to settle automatically the question of precedence in the State. But in 1875, when Koloman Tisza, the father of Count Stephen Tisza, took office, these wise counsels were finally and definitely rejected in favor of what Baron Bánffy afterward defined as "national Chauvinism." Magyarization became the watchword of the State and persecution its means of action. Koloman Tisza concluded with the monarch a tacit pact under which the Magyar Government was to be left free to deal as it pleased with the non-Magyars as long as it supplied without wincing the recruits and the money required for the joint army. The Magyar Parliament became almost exclusively representative of the Magyar minority of the people. Out of the 413 constituencies of Hungary proper more than 400 were compelled, by pressure, bribery, and gerrymandering, to return Magyar or Jewish Deputies. The press and the banks fell entirely into Jewish hands, and the Magyarized Jews became the most vociferous of the "national Chauvinists."

Nothing like it has been seen before or since—save the Turkish revolution of 1908, when the Young Turks, under Jewish influence, broke away from the relatively tolerant methods of the old régime and adopted the system of forcible "Turkification" that led to the Albanian insurrections of 1910-12, to the formation of the Balkan League, and to the overthrow of Turkey in Europe.

The bitter fruits of the policy of Magyarization are now ripening. The oppressed Rumanes look not toward Austria, as in the old days when their great Bishop Siaguna made them a stanch prop of the Hapsburg dynasty, but across the Carpathians to Bucharest; the Serbo-Croatians of Hungary, Croatia-Slavonia, and Dalmatia, whose economic and political development the Magyars have deliberately hampered, turn their eyes no longer, as in the days of Jellatchich, toward Vienna, but await wistfully the coming of the Serbian liberators; the Ruthenes of the northeast hear the tramp of the Russian armies; the Slovaks of the northwest watch with dull expectancy for the moment when, united with their Slovak kinsmen of Moravia and their cousins, the Czechs of Bohemia, they shall form part of an autonomous Slav province stretching from the Elbe to the Danube. For the Magyars, who have thrown to the winds the wisdom of the wisest men, fate may reserve the possession of the fertile and well-watered Central Hungarian plain. There they may thrive in modesty and rue at their leisure the folly of having sacrificed their chance of national greatness to the vain pursuit of the "Magyar State Idea" under the demoralizing influence of Austro-German imperialism.

## The Watchers Of The Troad

By HARRY LYMAN KOOPMAN

Where Ilium's towers once rose and stretched her plain,

What forms, beneath the late moon's doubtful beam,

Half living, half of moonlit vapor, seem?

Surely here stand apart the kingly twain,

Here Ajax looms, and Hector grasps the rein,

Here Helen's fatal beauty darts a gleam,

Andromache's love here shines o'er death supreme.

To them, while wave-borne thunders roll amain

From Samos unto Ida, Calchas, seer

Of all that shall be, speaks: "Not the world's end

Is this, but end of our old world of strife,

Which, lasting until now, shall perish here.

Henceforth shall men strive but as friend and friend

Out of this death to rear a new world's life."

## The Union of Central Europe

## An Argument in Favor of a Union of the States Now Allied With Germany

By Franz von Liszt

Professor Franz von Liszt, author of the following article, is Director of the Criminal Law Seminar of the University of Berlin, and is regarded as one of the leading experts on criminal law in Germany. The article was published in the Neue Badische Landes-Zeitung of Mannheim, and evoked bitter criticism from many imperialistic quarters in the German press.

When new directions of development are first taken in history, it usually requires the lapse of several decades before we understand them in their true importance, and it takes much longer before proper terms describing them are adopted generally. In the interim, misconceptions of all kinds are the necessary consequence of clouded perception and confused terminology, especially when, for purposes of party politics, there figures in a greater or less degree a certain unwillingness to understand.

Such misunderstandings are not devoid of danger in times of peace; they may become pregnant with fate when, as in our day, the leading nations of the earth stand at the threshhold of a great change in their history. I am anxious, therefore, to defend against objections raised with more or less intentional misunderstanding the thoughts which I expressed in my recently published essay, "A Central European Union of States as the Next Goal of German Foreign Policy."

Let us for once put aside the word "Imperialism." Surely we are all agreed as one that it is an absolute essential of life for the German Empire to carry on world-politics, (Weltpolitik.) We have been engaged in that since the eighties of the nineteenth century. The first colonial possessions which the German Empire obtained were the fruits of a striving for world-politics that had not yet at that time come to full and clear consciousness.

But, conscious of our goal, we did not attempt the paths of world-politics until the end of the last century. At the celebration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the German Empire, on Jan. 18, 1896, our Kaiser uttered the words: "The German Empire has become a world empire, (Aus dem deutschen Reich ist ein Weltreich geworden.)" And the German Empire's groping for its way in world-politics found its expression in the first naval proposal of Tirpitz in the year 1898.

At that time the Imperial Chancellor Prince Hohenlohe expressly designated the policy of the German Empire as "world politics." Thereby a goal was sketched for the development of the German Empire. We have not lost sight of it since then, keeping unconfused despite many an illusion and many a failure. And today we all live in the firm faith that the world war, which we are determined to bring to a victorious conclusion by the exertion of all our forces as a people, will bring us the safe guarantee for the attainment of our goal in world politics.

On that score, then, there is absolutely no difference of opinion. But there does appear to be considerable difference of opinion as to the conception of world politics. Under that name one may mean a policy directed toward world domination (Weltherrschaft.) For that kind of world politics the word "Imperialism," borrowed from the period of Roman world domination of the second century of the Christian era, fits precisely.

Imperialism aims, directly or indirectly, through peaceful or forceful annexation or economic exploitation, to make the whole inhabited earth subject to its sway. Imperialistic is the policy of Great Britain, which has subjected one-fifth of the inhabited area of the earth to its sway and knows no bounds to the expansion of English rule. Imperialistic, too, is the policy of Russia, which for centuries has been extending its huge tentacles toward the Atlantic and toward the Mediterranean, the Pacific, and the Indian Oceans, never sated.

Such world domination has never endured permanently; it can endure least of all in our days, in which an array of mighty armed powers stand prepared to guard their independence. World domination sooner or later leads inevitably to an alliance of the States whose independence is threatened; and thereby it leads to the overthrow of the disturber of the peace. That, as we all confidently hope, will be the fate of England as well as of Russia in the present war....

World politics, however, may mean something else; policies based upon world value, (Weltgeltung.) The policy based on world domination differs from that based on world value, in that the former denies the equal rights of other States, while the latter makes that its premise. The State that asserts its rights to world values demands for itself what it concedes to the others: its right to expand and develop its political and economic influence, and to have a voice in the discussion whenever the political or economical relations of the various States at any point in the inhabited globe approach a state of change....

In this sense has the German Empire heretofore engaged in world politics in contrast with Russia and England. That it cannot be carried on successfully without overseas colonies, a strong foreign fleet, naval bases, and telegraphic connections through cable or wireless telegraph apparatus, needs no further elucidation. For this sort of world politics also the name "Imperialism" may be used. But such use of the word is misleading; I shall therefore hereafter avoid it.

And herein I think I have uncovered the deeper reason for an early misunderstanding of great consequence. It seems as though in a certain—to be sure, not a very great or very influential—circle of our German fellow-citizens the opinion prevails that the German Empire should substitute its claims for world domination for those of England. Such a view cannot be too soon or too sharply rebuked.

The claim for world domination would set the German Empire for many years face to face with a long series of bloody wars, the issue of which cannot be in doubt a moment to any one familiar with history. The enforcement of this claim, moreover, would of itself be the surrender of the German spirit to the spirit of our present opponent in the war. The idea of world domination, imperialism in the true sense of the word, is not a product grown on German soil; it is imported from abroad. To maintain that view in all seriousness is treachery to the inmost spirit of the German soul.

Perhaps I am mistaken in taking it for granted that such thoughts are today haunting many minds. Perhaps it is merely a matter of misapplied use of a large sounding word. In that case, however, it is absolutely necessary to create clear thinking. I take it for granted that I am voicing the sentiments of the souls of the vast overwhelming majority of Germans when I say: "We shall wage the war, if need be, to the very end, against the English and Russian lust for world domination, and for Germany's world value (Weltgeltung.")

But forthwith there appears a further difference of opinion, to be taken not quite so seriously, which I shall endeavor to define as objectively as possible. The German conservative press seems to be of the opinion that the goal for the winning of which we are waging the great war, and concerning which we are all of one mind, will be definitely attained immediately upon the conclusion of the war.

I, on the other hand, am convinced that in order permanently to insure for ourselves the fruits of victory, even after a victorious conclusion of the war, we shall need long and well planned labors of peace....

In my essay I used the statement: "England's claim for the domination of the sea, and therein for the domination of the world, remains a great danger to the peace of the world." To this view I adhere firmly. Let us take it for granted that the most extravagant hopes of our most reckless dreamers are fulfilled, that England is crowded out of Egypt, Mesopotamia, Persia, and is involved in a long-lasting war with the native Indians. An impossibly large dose of political naïveté is needed in order to make us believe that England would take this loss quietly for all time.

We may differ on the question whether we should meet England's efforts for rehabilitation of her world dominion in warlike, or, as I take it, in peaceful ways; but it would be an unpardonable piece of stupidity for us to rock ourselves to sleep in the mad delusion that those efforts would not be exerted. Even were England forced to her knees, she would not immediately give up her claim for world domination. We must count upon that.

And, counting upon that, we must estimate our own forces very carefully; rather account them weaker than they really are, than the reverse. I did that in my essay, and that is why the conservative press was so wrought up over it. To be sure, it carefully avoided discussing my reasons.

I started from the conception of world power which is fairly well established in the present political literature. From a point of view taken also by conservative writers I demanded as a characteristic of world power, in addition to the size of territories and the number of population, above all, the economic independence that makes it possible for a State, in a case of need, to produce, without export or import, all foodstuffs, necessities, raw materials, and all the finished or half-finished products it needs for its consumers in normal times, as well as to insure the sale of its surplus.

It is patent that this economic independence is influenced by the geographical position of the fatherland and its colonies. Now, I defended the theory (and my opponents made no attempt to confute it) that even after a victorious war the German Empire would not have fully attained this economic independence; that, accordingly, after the conclusion of peace, we must exert every effort to insure this economic independence in one way or another.

As to the course which we must follow to attain this goal, there may be various opinions. I proposed the establishment of a union of Central European States. The conservative press characterized that as "utterly pretentious."...

If the course I have proposed is considered inadvisable, let another be proposed. But on what colonies, forsooth, do those gentlemen count, that could furnish us with cotton and ore, petroleum and tobacco, wood and silk, and whatever else we need, in the quantity and quality we need? What colonies that could offer us—do not forget that—markets for the sale of our exporting industries? Even after the war we shall be dependent upon exports to and imports from abroad.

And so there is no other way of safeguarding our economic independence against England and Russia than by an economic alliance with the States that are our allies in this war, or at least that do not make common cause with our enemies. Aside from the fact, which I shall not discuss here, that only such an alliance can insure a firm position for us on the Atlantic Ocean, which in the next decades is bound to be the area of competition for the world powers.

Politics are not a matter of emotion, but of calm, intelligent deliberation. Let us leave emotional politics to our enemies. It is the German method to envisage the goal steadily, and with it the roads that lead to that goal. Our goal is not world domination. Whoever tries to talk that belief into the mind of the German people may confuse some heads that are already not very clear; but he cannot succeed in substituting Napoleon I. for Bismarck as our master teacher.

Our goal can only be the establishing of our value in the world among world powers, with equal rights to the same opportunities. And in order to attain this goal we must, even after the conclusion of peace, exert all our forces. A people that thinks it can rest on its laurels after victory has been won runs the risk sooner or later of losing that for which its sons shed their blood on the field of battle. With the conclusion of peace there begins for us anew the unceasing peaceful competition and the maintenance and strengthening of the world value which we have won through the war. German imperialism is and will remain the work of peace.

## Two Poor Little Belgian Fledglings

By PIERRE LOTI.

Translation by Florence Simmonds.

[From King Albert's Book.]

At evening, in one of our southern towns, a train full of Belgian refugees ran into the station, and the poor martyrs, exhausted and bewildered, got out slowly, one by one, on the unfamiliar platform, where French people were waiting to receive them. Carrying a few possessions caught up at random, they had got into the carriages without even asking whither they were bound, urged by their anxiety to flee, to flee desperately from horror and death, from unspeakable mutilation and Sadic outrage—from things that seemed no longer possible in the world, but which, it seems, were lying dormant in pietistic German brains, and had suddenly belched forth upon their land and ours, like a belated manifestation of original barbarism. They no longer possessed a village, nor a home, nor a family; they arrived like jetsam cast up by the waters, and the eyes of all were full of terrified anguish. Many children, little girls whose parents had disappeared in the stress of fire and battle; and aged women, now alone in the world, who had fled, hardly knowing why, no longer caring for life, but moved by some obscure instinct of self-preservation.

Two little creatures, lost in the pitiable throng, held each other tightly by the hand, two little boys obviously brothers, the elder, who may have been five years old, protecting the younger, of about three. No one claimed them, no one knew them. How had they been able to understand, finding themselves alone, that they, too, must get into this train to escape death? Their clothes were decent, and their little stockings were thick and warm; clearly they belonged to humble but careful parents; they were, doubtless, the sons of one of those sublime Belgian soldiers who had fallen heroically on the battlefield, and whose last thought had perhaps been one of supreme tenderness for them. They were not even crying, so overcome were they by fatigue and sleepiness; they could scarcely stand. They could not answer when they were questioned, but they seemed intent, above all, upon keeping a tight hold of each other. Finally the elder, clasping the little one's hand closely, as if fearing to lose him, seemed to awake to a sense of his duty as protector, and, half asleep already, found strength to say, in a suppliant tone, to the Red Cross lady bending over him: "Madame, are they going to put us to bed soon?" For the moment this was all they were capable of wishing, all that they hoped for from human pity—to be put to bed.

They were put to bed at once, together, of course, still holding each other tightly by the hand; and, nestling one against the other, they fell at the same moment into the tranquil unconsciousness of childish slumber.

Once, long ago, in the China Sea, during the war, two little frightened birds, smaller even than our wrens, arrived, I know not how, on board our ironclad, in our Admiral's cabin, and all day long, though no one attempted to disturb them, they fluttered from side to side, perching on cornices and plants.

At nightfall, when I had forgotten them, the Admiral sent for me. It was to show me, now without emotion, the two little visitors who had gone to roost in his room, perched upon a slender silken cord above his bed. They nestled closely together, two little balls of feathers, touching and almost merged one in the other, and slept without the slightest fear, sure of our pity. And those little Belgians sleeping side by side made me think of the two little birds lost in the China Sea. There was the same confidence and the same innocent slumber—but a greater tenderness was about to watch over them.

## What the Germans Desire

## Not Conquest, but a New Economical System of Europe

By Gustaf Sioesteen

The subjoined letter from Berlin, published originally in the Swedish Goteborgs Handels-Tidnung of Oct. 26, 1914, was immediately translated by the British Legation in Stockholm—this is the official English translation—and sent by the legation to Sir Edward Grey. THE NEW YORK TIMES CURRENT HISTORY is informed from a trustworthy source that the article is interpreted in London as expressing the real aims of Germany at the end of the war, should that power be successful. The founding of a commercial United States of Europe by means of an economical organization with new "buffer" States to be created between the German Empire and Russia, and with the other smaller European States, would be, according to this interpretation, the purpose of Germany at the conclusion of a victorious war. The passage in the Berlin correspondent's letter declaring that only such an enormous central European customs union, in the opinion of leading German statesmen, "could hold the United States of North America at bay" in order that, after this present war, the "world would only have to take into account two first-class powers, viz., Germany and the United States of America," is of peculiar interest to Americans.

BERLIN, Oct. 21.

Counting one's chickens before they are hatched is a pardonable failing with nations carrying on war with the feeling that their all is at stake. When sorrow is a guest of every household, when monetary losses cause depression, and the cry arises time after time, "What will be the outcome of all this?" then only the fairest illusions and the wildest flights of fancy can sustain the courage of the masses.

These illusions are not only egotistical but, curiously enough, altruistic, since mankind, even when bayoneting their fellow-creatures, want to persuade themselves and others that this is done merely for the benefit of their adversary. In accordance with this idea, in the opinion of all parties, the war will be brought to an end with an increase of power for their native country, as also a new Eden prevail throughout the whole civilized world.

The enemies of Germany, though they have hitherto suffered an almost unbroken series of reverses in the war, have already thoroughly thrashed out the subject as to what the world will look like when Germany is conquered. In German quarters the press has likewise painted the future, but the following lines are not intended to increase the row of fancy portraits, but merely to throw light on what is new in the demands conceived.

My representations are founded on special information, and I deem it best to make them now, when the most fantastic descriptions of the all-absorbing desire of conquest on the part of Germany have circulated in the press of the entire world.

Among other absurdities it has been declared that Germany intends to claim a fourth of France, making this dismembered country a vassal State, bound to the triumphal car of the conqueror by the very heaviest chains. It is incredible, but true, that such a statement has been made in the press by a Frenchman, formerly President of the Council.

In direct opposition to the fictitious demands of the Germans, I can advance a proposition which may sound paradoxical, viz., that the leading men in Germany, the Emperor and his advisers, after bringing the war to a victorious issue, will seriously seek expedients to avoid conquests, so far as this is compatible with the indispensable demands of order and stability for Europe.

First, as regards France. The entire world, as also the Germans, are moved to pity by her fate. Germany has never entertained any other wish than to be at peace with her western frontier. A considerable portion of France is now laid waste, and in a few weeks millions of soldiers will have been poured into still wider portions of this beautiful country. On what are the inhabitants of these French provinces to exist when the German and French armies have requisitioned everything eatable? Germany cannot feed the inhabitants of the French provinces occupied, nor can the Belgians do so, I imagine, for the provisions of Germany are simply sufficient for their own needs, England preventing any new supply on any large scale.

This is a totally new state of things in comparison with 1870, when Germany was still an agrarian country and had, moreover, a free supply on all her frontiers.

Can the French Government allow a considerable portion of their own population actually to starve, or be obliged to emigrate to other parts of France, there to live the life of nomads at the expense of England, while the deserted provinces are given over to desolation?

The idea prevails here that the French will compel their Government to enter on and conclude a separate treaty of peace when the fatal consequences of the war begin to assume this awful guise. England does not appear to have considered that this would be the result of her system of blockade.

The German conditions of peace as regards France will be governed by two principal factors with respect to their chief issues.

The first is the complete unanimity of the Emperor and the Chancellor that no population, not speaking German, will be incorporated in the German Empire, or obtain representation in the Diet. Germany already has sufficient trouble with the foreign element now present in the Diet. Consequently there can be no question of any considerable acquisition of territory from France, but the demands of Germany simply extend to the iron-ore fields of Lorraine, which are certainly of considerable value. For France these mining fields are of far less consideration than for Germany, whose immense iron trade is far more in need of the iron mines.

The second factor is that the Germans, owing to the strong public opinion, will never consent to Belgium regaining her liberty. The Chancellor of the Empire has, as long as it was possible, been opposed to the annexation of Belgium, having preferred, even during hostilities, to have re-established the Belgian Kingdom. It is significant that the military authorities have prohibited the German press from discussing the question of the future of Belgium. It is evident that there has prevailed a wish to leave the question open in order to insure a solution offering various possibilities. But subsequent to the discovery of the Anglo-Belgian plot, as previously stated, all idea of reinstating Belgium has been discarded.

The annexation of Belgium, however, makes it possible to grant France less stringent conditions. So long as Belgium—under some form of self-government—is under German sway there is no hope of revenge of France, and the conviction prevails here that after this war France will abstain from her dreams of aggrandizement and become pacific. Germany can then make reductions in the burdens laid on her people for military service by land.

To arrange the position of Belgium in relation to Germany will be a very interesting problem for German policy.

It is obvious that the annexation of Belgium cannot be defended from the point of view of the principle of nationality. The Belgians—half of them French, half of them Flemish—undoubtedly deem themselves but one nation. As a mitigating circumstance in favor of the annexation it is urged—above and beyond the intrigues carried on by Belgium with the English—that Belgium, in days of yore, for a long time formed a portion of the German Empire, and that the inhabitants of the little country, to a considerable degree, gain their livelihood by its being a land of transit for German products. Nationally, the annexation is not to be defended, but geographically, economically, and from a military point of view it is comprehensible.

At the east front of the central powers very different conditions prevail. Austria has no desire to make the conquest of any territory; indeed, just the contrary, would probably be willing to cede a portion of Galicia in favor of new States. Germany has not the slightest inclination to incorporate new portions of Slav or Lettish regions. Both Germans and Austrians wish to establish free buffer States between themselves and the great Russian Empire.

Not even the Baltic provinces, where Germans hold almost the same position as the Swedes in Finland, form an object for the German desire of conquest, but her wish is to make them, as also Finland, an independent State. Furthermore, the Kingdom of Poland and a Kingdom of Ukraine would be the outcome of decisive victories for the central powers.

What Germany would demand of these new States, whose very existence was the outcome of her success at arms, would simply be an economical organization in common with the German Empire, an enormous central European "Zollverein" ("Customs Union") with Germany at its heart. It is only such a union, in the opinion of leading German statesmen, which could hold the United States of North America at bay, and after this present war, moreover, the world would only have to take into account two first-class powers, viz., Germany and the United States of America.

A commencement of this new economical connection is being made by the negotiations entered on by representatives of Austria-Hungary and Germany concerning the proposed formation of a Customs Union. Since this union would include 120,000,000 individuals, it must be evident what an immense attraction it must exert on the surrounding smaller nations. Switzerland and Holland can scarcely escape this attraction, and the Scandinavian countries, it is said, would probably find it to their advantage, together with a liberated Finland, to form a Northern Customs Union, which later, on an independent basis, could enter in close union with the vast "Zollverein" of Central Europe.

This "Zollverein" would then include about 175,000,000 individuals. The adhesion of Italy to the vast union would not be inconceivable, and then the combination of the United States of Europe, founded on a voluntary commercial union, would be approaching its realization.

Such a commercial union, embracing various peoples, could only lead to moderation in foreign politics, and would be the best guarantee for the peace of the universe. A brisk interchange of commodities, a fruitful interchange of cultural ideas would result from such a union, connecting the polar seas with the Mediterranean, and the Netherlands with the Steppes of Southern Russia.

All States participating in this union would gain thereby. But one European country would be the loser, Great Britain, the land of promise for the middleman; that, according to German comprehension, at present gains a living by skimming the cream from the trade industry of other nations by facilitating the exchange of goods, and making profits by being the banking centre of the world.

The Germans declare that there is no reason for such a middleman's existence in our day. The banking system is now so developed in all civilized lands that, for example Sweden can remit direct to Australia or the Argentine for goods obtained thence, instead of making payment via London and there rate, by raising the exchange for sovereigns to an unnatural height, so that, as matter of fact, England levies a tax on all international interchange of commodities.

In opposition to this glorious vision of the days to come, which the Germans wish to realize by their victories in war, there is the alluring prospect of the Allies that by their victory they will deal a deathblow to German militarism. While the English, with their 200,000 troops, are good enough to promise no conquest of German territory—what says Russia to this?—at the close of the war, in the opinion of the Britons, there would still remain 65,000,000 Germans right in the centre of Europe, organized as a kingdom burdened with a war indemnity to a couple of tens of milliards in marks.

This nation, however, strengthened by 15,000,000 Germans in Austria, would be the greatest bearers of culture in the wide world—the nation with the best technical equipment of all others, glowing with ambition, with military training second to none, and gifted with an immense rate of increase as regards population. This nation would be forced to lay down her arms, lying as it does between the overbearing gigantic realm in the east and the warlike French to the west. The idea is incomprehensible. The universe would behold a competition in armaments such as it had never seen.

A victorious Germany, on the other hand, would become less and less military, since she would not need to arm herself to such an extent as now. She is already chiefly an industrial country. Her desire is to be wealthy, and wealth invariably smothers military instincts. Germany has set up far greater ideals as regards social developments than other countries, and all she asks is to be left in peace calmly to carry out these plans in the future. German militarism can only be conquered by the victory being on her side, since she has no thought of military supremacy, but simply of founding a new economical organization in Europe.

GUSTAF SIOESTEEN.

## Address To King Albert Of Belgium

By EMIL VERHAEREN.

Translation by Florence Simmonds.

[From King Albert's Book.]

Sire: This request to pay my respectful homage to you has given me the first real pleasure I have been permitted to feel since the good days of Liège. At this moment you are the one King in the world whose subjects, without exception, unite in loving and admiring him with all the strength of their souls. This unique fate is yours, Sire. No leader of men on earth has had it in the same degree as you.

In spite of the immensity of the sorrow surrounding you, I think you have a right to rejoice, and the more so as your consort, her Majesty the Queen, shares this rare privilege with you.

Sire, your name will be great throughout the ages to come. You are in such perfect sympathy with your people that you will always be their symbol. Their courage, their tenacity, their stifled grief, their pride, their future greatness, their immortality all live in you. Our hearts are yours to their very depths. Being yourself, you are all of us. And this you will remain.

Later on, when you return to your recaptured and glorious Belgium, you will only have to say the word, Sire, and all disputes will lose their bitterness and all antagonisms fade away. After being our strength and defender, you will become our peacemaker and reconciler. With deepest respect,

EMIL VERHAEREN.

## Foreshadowing a New Phase of War

## Financing the Allies and Small Nations Preparing for War

By Lloyd George, British Chancellor of the Exchequer

That there are "also other States preparing for war," and that financial arrangements had been made for their participation against Germany by the allied Governments of Great Britain, France, and Russia; moreover, that Russia would be enabled within a few months to export considerable quantities of her grain and do her own financing—this statement preceded the bombardment of the forts in the Dardanelles, probably to clear the way for Russia's commerce—are the outstanding features of the speech by Lloyd George presented below, foreshadowing a new phase in the war. The speech was made in the House of Commons on Feb. 15, 1915, to explain the results of the financial conference between the allied powers to unite their monetary resources, held in Paris during the week of Feb. 1. It may be regarded as one of the most momentous utterances of the war.

PARLIAMENTARY REPORT.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer, (Mr. Lloyd George,) who was called upon by the Speaker, said: I shall do my best to conform to the announcement of the Prime Minister that the statement I have to make about the financial conference in Paris shall be a brief one, but I am afraid my right honorable friend assumed that we are all endowed with the extraordinary gift of compression which he himself possesses. [Laughter.] The arrangements that were made between the three Ministers for recommendation to their respective Governments commit us to heavy engagements, and it is, therefore, important I should report them in detail to the House, and find some reason why we should undertake such liabilities.

This is the most expensive war which has ever been waged in material, in men, and in money. The conference in Paris was mostly concerned with money. For the year ending Dec. 31 next the aggregate expenditure of the Allies will not be far short of £2,000,000,000. The British Empire will be spending considerably more than either of our two great allies—probably up to £100,000,000 to £150,000,000 more than the highest figure to be spent by the other two great allies. We have created a new army; we have to maintain a huge navy. We are paying liberal separation allowances. We have to bring troops from the ends of the earth; we have to wage war not merely in Europe, but in Asia, in North, East, and South Africa. I must say just a few words as to the relative position of the three great countries which led us to make the arrangements on financial matters which we recommend to our respective Governments. Britain and France are two of the richest countries in the world. In fact, they are the great bankers of the world. We could pay for our huge expenditure on the war for five years, allowing a substantial sum for depreciation, out of the proceeds of our investments abroad. France could carry on the war for two or three years at least out of the proceeds of her investments abroad, and both countries would still have something to spare to advance to their allies. This is a most important consideration, for at the present moment the Allies are fighting the whole of the mobilized strength of Germany, with perhaps less than one-third of their own strength. The problem of the war to the Allies is to bring the remaining two-thirds of their resources and strength into the fighting line at the earliest possible moment. This is largely, though by no means entirely, a question of finance.

Russia is in a different position from either Britain or France. She is a prodigiously rich country in natural resources—about the richest country in the world in natural resources. Food, raw material—she produces practically every commodity. She has a great and growing population, a virile and industrious people. Her resources are overflowing and she has labor to develop them in abundance. By a stroke of the pen Russia has since the war began enormously increased her resources by suppressing the sale of all alcoholic liquors. [Cheers.] It can hardly be realized that by that means alone she has increased the productivity of her labor by something between 30 and 50 per cent., just as if she had added millions of laborers to the labor reserves of Russia without even increasing the expense of maintaining them, and whatever the devastation of the country may be Russia has more than anticipated its wastage by that great act of national heroism and sacrifice. [Cheers.] The great difficulty with Russia is that, although she has great natural resources, she has not yet been able to command the capital within her own dominions to develop those resources even during the times of peace. In time of war she has additional difficulties. She cannot sell her commodities for several reasons. One is that a good deal of what she depends upon for raising capital abroad will be absorbed by the exigencies of the war in her own country. Beyond that the yield of her minerals will not be quite as great, because the labor will be absorbed in her armies.

There is not the same access to her markets. She has difficulty in exporting her goods, and in addition to that her purchases abroad are enormously increased in consequence of the war. Russia, therefore, has special difficulty in the matter of financing outside purchases for the war. Those are some of the difficulties with which we were confronted.

France has also special difficulties. I am not sure that we quite realize the strain put upon that gallant country [cheers] up to the present moment. For the moment she bears far and away the greatest strain of the war in proportion to her resources. She has the largest proportion of her men under arms. The enemy are in occupation of parts of her richest territory. They are within fifty-five miles of her capital, exactly as if we had a huge German army at Oxford. It is only a few months since the bankers of Paris could hear the sound of the enemy's guns from their counting houses, and they can hear the same sound now, some of them, from their country houses. In those circumstances the money markets of a country are not at their very best. That has been one of the difficulties with which France has been confronted in raising vast sums of money to carry on the war and helping to finance the allied States.

There is a wonderful confidence, notwithstanding these facts, possessing the whole nation. [Cheers.] Nothing strikes the visitor to Paris more than that. There is a calm, a serene confidence, which is supposed to be incompatible with the temperament of the Celt by those who do do not know it. [Laughter.] There is a general assurance that the Germans have lost their tide, and that now the German armies have as remote a chance of crushing France as they have of overrunning the planet Mars. [Cheers.] That is the feeling which pervades every class of the community, and that is reflected in the money market there. The difficulties of France in that respect are passing away, and the arrangement that has now been made in France for the purpose of raising sums of money to promote their military purposes will, I have not the faintest doubt, be crowned with the completest success. [Cheers.]

But we have a number of small States which are compelled to look to the greater countries in alliance for financial support. There is Belgium, which until recently was a very rich country, devastated, desolate, and almost entirely in the hands of the enemy, with an army and a civil government to maintain, but with no revenue. We have to see that she does not suffer [cheers] until the period of restoration comes to her, and compensation. [Cheers.] Then there is Serbia, with the population of Ireland—a people of peasants maintaining an army of 500,000 and fighting her third great war within two years, and fighting that with great resource, great courage, and bravery. [Cheers.] But she had no reserve of wealth, and now no exports with which she can purchase munitions of war outside, and she has hardly any manufactures of her own. That is the position as far as the smaller States are concerned.

There are also other States preparing for war, and it is obviously our interest that they should be well equipped for that task. They can only borrow in the French and English markets.

But we had our own special difficulties, and I think I ought to mention those. Two-thirds of our food supplies are purchased abroad. The enormous quantities of raw materials for our manufactures and our industries are largely absorbed in war equipment, and our ships in war transport. We cannot pay as usual in exports, freights, and services; our savings for the moment are not what they would be in the case of peace. We cannot, therefore, pay for our imports in that way. We have to purchase abroad. We have to increase our purchases abroad for war purposes. In addition to that we have to create enormous credits to enable other countries to do the same thing. The balance is, therefore, heavily against us for the first time. There is no danger, but in a conference of the kind we had at Paris I could not overlook the fact that it was necessary for us to exercise great vigilance in regard to our gold.

These were the complex problems we had to discuss and adjust, and we had to determine how we could most effectually mobilize the financial resources of the Allies so as to be of the greatest help to the common cause. For the moment undoubtedly ours is still the best market in the world. An alliance in a great war to be effective needs that each country must bring all its resources, whatever they are, into the common stock. An alliance for war cannot be conducted on limited liability principles. If one country in the alliance has more trained and armed men ready with guns, rifles, and ammunition than another she must bring them all up against the common enemy, without regard to the fact that the others cannot for the moment make a similar contribution. But it is equally true that the same principle applies to the country with the larger navy or the country with the greater resources in capital and credit. They must be made available to the utmost for the purpose of the alliance, whether the other countries make a similar contribution or not. That is the principle upon which the conference determined to recommend to their respective Governments a mobilization of our financial resources for the war.

The first practical suggestion we had to consider was the suggestion that has been debated very considerably in the press—the suggestion of a joint loan. We discussed that very fully and we came to the conclusion that it was the very worst way of utilizing our resources. It would have frightened every Bourse and attracted none. It would have made the worst of every national credit and the best of none. Would the interest paid have been the interest upon which we could raise money, the rate at which France could have raised money, or the rate at which Russia could raise money? If we paid a high rate of interest we could never raise more money at low rates. If instead of raising £350,000,000 a few weeks ago for our own purposes we had floated a great joint loan of £1,000,000,000, the House can very well imagine what the result would have been. We decided after a good deal of discussion and reflection that each country should raise money for its own needs within its own markets in so far as their conditions allowed, but that if help were needed by any country for outside purchases then those who could best afford to render assistance for the time being should do so.

There was only one exception which we decided to recommend, and that was in the case of borrowings by small States. We decided that each of the great allied countries should contribute a portion of every loan made to the small States who were either in with us now or prepared to come in later on, that the responsibility should be divided between the three countries, and that at an opportune moment a joint loan should be floated to cover the advances either already made, or to be made, to these countries outside the three great allied countries. That was the only exception we made in respect of joint loans. Up to the present very considerable advances have been made by Russia, by France, and by ourselves to other countries. It is proposed that, if there is an opportune moment on the market, these should be consolidated at some time or other into one loan, that they should be placed upon the markets of Russia, France, and Great Britain, but that the liability shall be divided into three equal parts.

With regard to Russia, we have already advanced £32,000,000 for purchases here and elsewhere outside the Russian Empire. Russia has also shipped £8,000,000 of gold to this country, so that we have established credits in this country for Russia to the extent of £40,000,000 already. France has also made advances in respect of purchases in that country. Russia estimates that she will still require to establish considerable credits for purchases made outside her own country between now and the end of the year. I am not sure for the moment that it would be desirable for me to give the exact figure; I think it would be better not, because it would give an idea of the extent to which purchases are to be made outside by Russia. But for that purpose she must borrow. The amount of her borrowing depends upon what Russia can spare of her produce to sell in outside markets and also on the access to those markets.

If Russia is able within the course of the next few weeks or few months to export a considerable quantity of her grain, as I hope she will be, as in fact we have made arrangements that she should, [cheers,] then there will not be the same need to borrow for purchases either in this country or outside, because she can do her own financing to that extent.

The two Governments decided to raise the first £50,000,000 in equal sums on the French and British markets respectively. That will satisfy Russian requirements for a considerable time. As to further advances, the allied countries will consider when the time arrives how the money should be raised according to the position of the money markets at that time. I have said that we gave a guarantee to Russia that she need not hesitate a moment in giving her orders for any purchases which are necessary for the war on account of fear of experiencing any difficulty in the matter of raising money for payments. We confidently anticipate that by the time these first advances will have been exhausted the military position will have distinctly improved both in France and in Russia.

I may say that Treasury bills to the extent of £10,000,000 on the credit of Russia have been issued within the last few days. At 12 o'clock today the list closed, and the House will be very glad to hear that the amount was not merely subscribed but oversubscribed by the market, because this country is not quite as accustomed to Russian securities as France, and, therefore, it was an experiment. I think it is a very good omen for our relations, not merely during the war, but for our relations with Russia after the war, that the first great loan of that kind on Russian credit in the market has been such a complete success.

Now we have to consider the position of this country with regard to the possibility of our gold flitting in the event of very great credits being established in this country. The position of the three great allied countries as to gold is exceptionally strong. Russia and France have accumulated great reserves which have been barely touched so far during the war. I do not think the French reserve has been touched at all, or has been used in the slightest degree, and I think as far as the Russian reserve is concerned it has only been reduced by the transfer of £8,000,000 of gold from Russia to this country. Our accumulation of gold is larger than it has ever been in the history of this country. It has increased enormously since the commencement of the war. It is not nearly as large as that of Russia, France, or Germany, but it must be borne in mind that there is this distinction in our favor; up to the present we have had no considerable paper currency, and this is the great free market for the gold of the world. The quantity imported every year of, what shall I call it, raw gold, comes to something like £50,000,000, and here I am excluding what comes here by exchanges. The collapse of the rebellion in South Africa assures us of a large and steady supply from that country, and, therefore, there is no real need for any apprehension.

But still it would not have been prudent for us to have overlooked certain possibilities. I have already pointed out some of them—the diminution of exports, the increase of our imports, the absorption of our transports for war purposes, large credits established for our own and other countries, and a diminution in our savings for investments abroad. There is just a possibility that this might have the effect of inducing the export of gold to other countries. We therefore have to husband our gold and take care lest it should take wings and swarm to any other hive. We therefore made arrangements at this conference whereby, if our stock of gold were to diminish beyond a certain point—that is a fairly high point—the Banks of France and Russia should come to our assistance.

We have also made arrangements whereby France should have access to our markets for Treasury bills issued in francs. We have also initiated arrangements which we hope will help to restore the exchanges in respect of bills held in this country against Russian merchants, who, owing to the present difficulties of exchange, cannot discharge their liabilities in this country. They are quite ready and eager to pay, they have the money to pay, but, owing to difficulties of exchange, they cannot pay bills owing in this country. We therefore propose to accept Russian Treasury bills against these bills of exchange due from Russian merchants, Russia collecting the debts in rubles in her own country and giving us the Treasury bills in exchange. We hope that will assist very materially in the working of the exchanges. It will be very helpful to business between the two countries, and incidentally it will be very helpful to Russia herself in raising money in her own country for the purpose of financing the war.

We also received an undertaking from the Russian Government in return for the advances which we were prepared to make, that Russia would facilitate the export of Russian produce of every kind that may be required by the allied countries. This, I believe, will be one of the most fruitful parts of the arrangements entered into. An arrangement has also been made about the purchases by the allied countries in the neutral countries. There was a good deal of confusion. We were all buying in practically the same countries; we were buying against each other; we were putting up prices; it ended not merely in confusion, but I am afraid in a good deal of extravagance, because we were increasing prices against each other. It was very necessary that there should be some working arrangement that would eliminate this element of competition and enable us to co-ordinate, as it were, these orders. There will be less delay, there will be much more efficiency, and we shall avoid a good deal of the extravagance which was inevitable owing to the competition between the three countries.

I have done my best to summarize very briefly the arrangements which have been entered into, and I would only like to say this in conclusion. After six months of negotiation by the cable and three days of conferring face to face we realized that better results were achieved by means of a few hours of businesslike discussion by men anxious to come to a workable arrangement than by reams of correspondence. Misconceptions and misunderstandings were cleared away in a second which otherwise might take weeks to ferment into mischief, and it was our conclusion that these conferences might with profit to the cause of the Allies be extended to other spheres of co-operation. [Cheers.]

## Britain's Unsheathed Sword

By H.H. Asquith, England's Prime Minister

Stating the estimated costs of the war to Great Britain, outlining the operations of the French and British allied fleets in the Dardanelles, declaring the Allies' position in retaliation for the German "war zone" decree against Great Britain, and reaffirming the chief terms of peace, stated in his Guildhall speech of last November, on which alone England would consent to sheathe the sword, the following speech, delivered in the House of Commons on March 1, 1915, by Prime Minister Asquith, is one of the most important of the war.

In Committee of Supply.

Mr. Asquith, who was loudly cheered on rising, moved the supplementary vote of credit of £37,000,000 to meet the expenditure on naval and military operations and other expenditure arising out of the war during the year 1914-1915. He said:

The first of the two votes which appear upon the paper, the one which has just been read out, provides only for the financial year now expiring, and is a supplementary vote of credit. The vote that follows is a vote of credit for the financial year 1915-1916. I think it will probably be convenient if in submitting the first vote to the committee I make a general statement covering the whole matter. I may remind the committee that on Aug. 6 last year the House voted £100,000,000 in the first vote of credit, and that on Nov. 15 the House passed a supplementary vote of credit for £225,000,000, thus sanctioning total votes of credit for the now expiring financial year of £325,000,000. It has been found that this amount will not suffice for the expenditure which will have been incurred up to March 31, and we are therefore asking for a further vote of £37,000,000 to carry on the public service to that date. If the committee assents to our proposals it will raise the total amount granted by votes of credit for the year 1914-1915 to £362,000,000. I need not say anything as to the purposes for which this vote is required. They are the same as upon the last occasion. But I ought to draw attention to one feature in which the supplementary vote, which comes first, differs from the vote to be subsequently proposed for the services of the year 1915-1916. At the outbreak of the war the ordinary supply on a peace basis had been voted by the House, and consequently the votes of credit for the now current financial year, like those on all previous occasions, were to be taken in order to provide the amounts necessary for naval and military operations in addition to the ordinary grants of Parliament. It consequently follows that the expenditure charged, or chargeable, to votes of credit for this financial year represent, broadly speaking, the difference between the expenditure of the country on a peace footing and that expenditure upon a war footing. The total on that basis, if this supplementary vote is assented to, will be £362,000,000.

For reasons the validity of which the committee has recognized on previous occasions, I do not think it desirable to give the precise details of the items which make up the total, but without entering into that I may roughly apportion the expenditure. For the army and the navy, according to best estimates which can at present be framed, out of the total given there will be required approximately £275,000,000. That is in addition, as I have already pointed out, to the sum voted before the war for the army and the navy, which amounted in the aggregate to a little over £80,000,000. That leaves unaccounted for a balance of £87,000,000, of which approximately £38,000,000 represents advances for war expenditure made, or being made, to the self-governing dominions, Crown colonies, and protectorates, as explained in the Treasury minute last November, under which his Majesty's Government have undertaken to raise the loans required by the dominions to meet the heavy expenditure entailed upon them on the credit of the imperial exchequer. In addition to that sum of £38,000,000 there has been an advance to Belgium of £10,000,000, and to Serbia of £800,000. Further advances to these allies are under consideration, the details of which it is not possible yet to make public. The balance of, roughly, £28,000,000 is required for miscellaneous services covered by the vote of credit which have not yet been separately specified.

I think the committee will be interested to know what the actual cost of the war will have been to this country as far as we can estimate on March 31, the close of the financial year. The war will then have lasted for 240 days and the votes of credit up to that time, assuming this vote is carried, will amount to £362,000,000. It may be said, speaking generally, that the average expenditure from votes of credit will have been, roughly, £1,500,000 per day throughout the time. That, of course, is the excess due to the war over the expenditure on a peace footing. That represents the immediate charge to the taxpayers of this country for this year. But, as the committee knows, a portion of the expenditure consists of advances for the purpose of assisting or securing the food supplies of this country and will be recoverable in whole, or to a very large extent, in the near future. A further portion represents advances to the dominions and to other States which will be ultimately repaid. If these items are excluded from the account the average expenditure per day of the war is slightly lower, but after making full allowance for all the items which are in the nature of recoverable loans, the daily expenditure does not work out at less than £1,200,000.

These figures are averages taken over the whole period from the outbreak of the war, but at the outbreak of the war, after the initial expenditure on mobilization had been incurred, the daily expenditure was considerably below the average, as many charges had not yet matured. The expenditure has risen steadily and is now well over the daily average that I have given. To that figure must be added, in order to give a complete account of the matter, something for war services other than naval or military. At the beginning of the year these charges are not likely to be very considerable, but it will probably be within the mark to say that from April I we shall be spending over £1,700,000 a day above the normal, in consequence of the war.

Perhaps now I may say something which is not strictly in order on this vote, but concerns the vote of credit for the ensuing year, which amounts, as appears on the paper, to £250,000,000. The committee will at once observe an obvious distinction between the votes of credit taken for the current financial year and that which we propose to take for the ensuing year. As I have already pointed out, at the outbreak of war the ordinary supply of the year had been granted by the House, and accordingly the votes of credit for 1914-1915 were for the amounts required beyond the ordinary grants of Parliament for the cost of military and naval operations. When we came to frame the estimates for the ensuing year, 1915-1916, the Treasury was confronted with the difficulty, which amounted to an impossibility, of presenting to Parliament estimates in the customary form for navy and army expenditure, apart from the cost of the war. All the material circumstances have been set out in the Treasury minute of Feb. 5, and in principle have been approved by the House. As the committee will remember, the total of the estimates which we have presented for the army and the navy amount to only £15,000 for the army and £17,000 for the navy, and the remainder of the cost of both these services will be provided for out of votes of credit, and the vote of credit now being proposed provides for general army and navy service in as far as specific provision is not made for them in the small estimates already presented. This vote of credit, therefore, has two features which I believe are quite unique, and without precedent. In the first place, it is the largest single vote on record in the annals of this House, and, secondly, as I have said, it provides for the ordinary as well as for the emergency expenditure of the army and the navy. The House may ask on what principle or basis has this sum of £250,000,000 been arrived at. Of course it is difficult, and indeed impossible, to give any exact estimate, but as regards the period, so far as we can forecast it, for which this vote is being taken, it has been thought advisable to take a sum sufficient, so far as we can judge, to provide for all the expenditure which will come in course of payment up to approximately the second week in July—that is to say, a little over three months, or something like 100 days of war expenditure.

As regards the daily rate of expenditure—I have dealt hitherto with the expenditure up to March 31—the War Office calculates that from the beginning of April, 1915, the total expenditure on army services will be at the rate of £1,500,000 per day, with a tendency to increase. The total expenditure on the navy at the commencement of April will, it is calculated, amount to about £400,000 per day. The aggregate expenditure on the army and the navy services at the beginning of 1915-1916 is therefore £1,900,000 per day, with a tendency to increase, and for the purpose of our estimate the figure we have taken is a level £2,000,000 a day. On a peace footing the daily expenditure upon the army and the navy on the basis of the estimates approved last year was about £220,000 per day. So that the difference between £2,000,000 and £220,000 represents what we estimate to be the increased expenditure due to the war during the 100 days for which we are now providing.

There are other items belonging to the same category as those to which I have already referred in dealing with the supplementary vote with regard to advances to our own dominions and other States for which provision has also had to be made, and the balance of the total of £250,000,000 for which we are now asking, beyond the actual estimated expenditure for the army and the navy, will be applied to those and kindred or emergency purposes. Before I pass from the purely monetary aspect of the matter, it may be interesting to the committee to be reminded of what has been our expenditure upon the great wars of the past. In the great war which lasted for over twenty years, from 1793 to 1815, the total cost as estimated by the best authorities was £831,000,000. The Crimean war may be put down, taking everything into account, at £70,000,000. The total cost of the war charges in South Africa from 1899 to March 31, 1903, was estimated in a return presented to Parliament at £211,000,000. In presenting these two votes of credit the Government are making a large pecuniary demand on the House, a demand which in itself and beyond comparison is larger than has ever been made in the House of Commons by any British Minister in the whole course of our history.

We make it with the full conviction that after seven months of war the country and the whole empire are every whit as determined as they were at the outset [cheers] if need be at the cost of all we can command both in men and in money to bring a righteous cause to a triumphant issue. [Cheers.] There is much to encourage and to stimulate us in what we see. Nothing has shaken and nothing can shake our faith in the unbroken spirit of Belgium, [cheers,] in the undefeated heroism of indomitable Serbia, in the tenacity and resource with which our two great allies, one in the west and the other in the east, hold their far-flung lines and will continue to hold them till the hour comes for an irresistible advance. [Cheers.] Our own dominions and our great dependency of India have sent us splendid contributions of men, a large number of whom already are at the front, and before very long, in one or another of the actual theatres of war, the whole of them will be in the fighting line. [Cheers.] We hear today with great gratification that the Princess Patricia's Canadian regiment has been doing, during these last few days, most gallant and efficient service. [Cheers.]

We have no reason to be otherwise than satisfied with the progress of recruiting here at home. [Cheers.] The territorial divisions now fully trained are capable—I say it advisedly—of confronting any troops in the world, [cheers,] and the new armies, which have lately been under the critical scrutiny of skilled observers, are fast realizing all our most sanguine hopes. A war carried on upon this gigantic scale and under conditions for which there is no example in history is not always or every day a picturesque or spectacular affair. Its operations are of necessity in appearance slow and dragging. Without entering into strategic details, I can assure the committee that with all the knowledge and experience which we have now gained, his Majesty's Government have never been more confident than they are today in the power as well as the will of the Allies to achieve ultimate and durable victory. [Cheers.] I will not enter in further detail to what I may call the general military situation, but I should like to call the attention of the committee for a few moments to one or two aspects of the war which of late have come prominently into view.

I will refer first to the operations which are now in progress in the Dardanelles. [Cheers.] It is a good rule in war to concentrate your forces on the main theatre and not to dissipate them in disconnected and sporadic adventures, however promising they may appear to be. That consideration, I need hardly say, has not been lost sight of in the councils of the Allies. There has been and there will be no denudation or impairment of the forces which are at work in Flanders, and both the French and ourselves will continue to give them the fullest, and we believe the most effective, support. Nor, what is equally important, has there for the purpose of these operations been any weakening of the grand fleet. [Cheers.] The enterprise which is now going on, and so far has gone on in a manner which reflects, as I think the House will agree, the highest credit on all concerned, was carefully considered and conceived with very distinct and definite objects—political, strategic, and economical. Some of these objects are so obvious as not to need statement and others are of such a character that it is perhaps better for the moment not to state them. [Laughter and cheers.] But I should like to advert for a moment, without any attempt to forecast the future, to two features in this matter. The first is, that it once more indicates and illustrates the close co-operation of the Allies—in this case the French and ourselves—in the new theatre and under somewhat dissimilar conditions to those which have hitherto prevailed, and to acknowledge what I am sure the House of Commons will be most ready to acknowledge, that the splendid contingent from the French Navy that our allies have supplied [cheers] is sharing to the full both the hazards and the glory of the enterprise. [Cheers.] The other point on which I think it is worth while to dwell for a moment is that this operation shows in a very significant way the copiousness and the variety of our naval resources. [Cheers.] In order to illustrate that remark, take the names of the ships which have actually been mentioned in the published dispatches. The Queen Elizabeth, [cheers,] the first ship to be commissioned of the newest type of what are called superdreadnoughts, with guns of power and range never hitherto known in naval warfare. [Cheers.] Side by side with her is the Agamemnon, the immediate predecessor of the dreadnought, and in association with them the Triumph, the Cornwallis, the Irresistible, the Vengeance, and the Albion—representing, I think I am right in saying, three or four different types of the older predreadnought battleship which have been so foolishly and so prematurely regarded in some quarters as obsolete or negligible—all bringing to bear the power of their formidable twelve-inch guns on the fortifications, with magnificent accuracy and with deadly effects. [Cheers.] When, as I have said, these proceedings are being conducted, so far as the navy is concerned, without subtraction of any sort or kind from the strength and effectiveness of the grand fleet, I think a word of congratulation is due to the Admiralty for the way in which it has utilized all its resources. [Cheers.]

I pass from that to another new factor in these military and naval operations—the so-called German "blockade" of our coasts. [Cheers.] I shall have to use some very plain language. [Cheers.] I may, perhaps, preface what I have to say by the observation that it does not come upon us as a surprise. [Cheers.] This war began on the part of Germany with the cynical repudiation [cheers] of a solemn treaty on the avowed grounds that when a nation's interests required it, right and good faith must give way to force. ["Hear, hear!"] The war has been carried on, therefore, with a systematic—not an impulsive or a casual—but a systematic violation of all the conventions and practices by which international agreements had sought to mitigate and to regularize the clash of arms. [Cheers.] She has now, I will not say reached a climax, for we do not know what may yet be to come, but she has taken a further step without any precedent in history by mobilizing and organizing not upon the surface but under the surface of the sea a campaign of piracy and pillage. [Prolonged cheers.]

Are we—can we—here I address myself to the neutral countries of the world—are we to or can we sit quiet as though we were still under the protection of the restraining rules and the humanizing usages of civilized warfare? [Cheers.] We think we cannot. [Cheers.] The enemy, borrowing what I may, perhaps, for this purpose call a neutral flag from the vocabulary of diplomacy, describe these newly adopted measures by a grotesque and puerile perversion of language as a "blockade." [Laughter.] What is a blockade? A blockade consists in sealing up the war ports of a belligerent against sea-borne traffic by encircling their coasts with an impenetrable ring of ships of war. [Cheers.]

Where are these ships of war? [Cheers.] Where is the German Navy? [Cheers.] What has become of those gigantic battleships and cruisers on which so many millions of money have been spent and in which such vast hopes and ambitions have been invested? I think, if my memory serves me, they have only twice during the course of these seven months been seen upon the open sea. Their object in both cases was the same—murder, [cheers,] civilian outrage, and wholesale destruction of property in undefended seaside towns, and on each occasion when they caught sight of the approach of a British force they showed a clean pair of heels, and they hurried back at the top of their speed to the safe seclusion of their mine fields and their closely guarded forts.

Lord R. CECIL—Not all. [Laughter.]

Mr. ASQUITH—No; some had misadventures on the way. ["Hear, hear!" and laughter.] The plain truth is—the German fleet is not blockading, cannot blockade, and never will blockade our coasts.

I propose now to read to the committee the statement which has been prepared by his Majesty's Government and which will be public property tomorrow. It declares, I hope in sufficiently plain and unmistakable terms, the view which we take, not only of our rights, but of our duty. [Cheers.]

Germany has declared that the English Channel, the north and west coasts of France, and the waters around the British Isles are a "war area" and has officially notified that all enemy ships found in that area will be destroyed and that neutral vessels may be exposed to danger. This is, in effect, a claim to torpedo at sight, without regard to the safety of crew or passengers, any merchant vessel under any flag. As it is not in the power of the German Admiralty to maintain any surface craft in these waters, the attack can only be delivered by submarine agency. The law and custom of nations in regard to attacks on commerce have always presumed that the first duty of the captor of a merchant vessel is to bring it before a prize court, where it may be tried, and where the regularity of the capture may be challenged, and where neutrals may recover their cargoes. The sinking of prizes is in itself a questionable act, to be resorted to only in extraordinary circumstances and after provision has been made for the safety of all the crew or passengers—if there are passengers on board. The responsibility for discriminating between neutral and enemy vessels, and between neutral and enemy cargo, obviously rests with the attacking ship, whose duty it is to verify the status and character of the vessel and cargo and to preserve all papers before sinking or even capturing the ship. So, also, is the humane duty to provide for the safety of the crews of merchant vessels, whether neutral or enemy, an obligation on every belligerent. It is on this basis that all previous discussions of the law for regulating warfare at sea have proceeded.

The German submarine fulfills none of these obligations. She enjoys no local command of the waters in which she operates. She does not take her captures within the jurisdiction of a prize court; she carries no prize crew which she can put on board the prize she seizes. She uses no effective means of discriminating between a neutral and an enemy vessel; she does not receive on board, for safety, the crew of the vessel she sinks. Her methods of warfare are, therefore, entirely outside the scope of any of the international instruments regulating operations against commerce in time of war. The German declaration substitutes indiscriminate destruction for regulated capture. [Cheers.] Germany is adopting these methods against peaceful traders and non-combatant crews with the avowed object of preventing commodities of all kinds, including food for the civil population, from reaching or leaving the British Isles and Northern France.

Her opponents are therefore driven to frame retaliatory measures [loud cheers] in order, in their turn, to prevent commodities of any kind [loud cheers] from reaching or leaving the German Empire. [Renewed cheers.] These measures will, however, be enforced by the British and French Governments, without risk to neutral ships or to neutral or non-combatant lives, and with strict observance of the dictates of humanity. The British and French Governments will therefore hold themselves free to detain and take into port ships carrying goods of presumed enemy destination, ownership, or origin. It is not intended to confiscate such vessels or cargoes unless they would be otherwise liable to confiscation. Vessels with cargoes which have sailed before this date will not be affected. [Loud cheers.]

That, Sir, is our reply. [Cheers.] I may say, before I comment upon it, that the suggestion which I see is put forward from a German quarter that we have rejected some proposal or suggestion made to the two powers by the United States Government—I will not say anything more than that it is quite untrue. On the contrary, all we have said to the United States Government is that we are taking it into careful consideration in consultation with our allies.

Now the committee will have observed that in the statement which I have just read of the retaliatory measures we propose to adopt, the words "blockade" and "contraband" and other technical terms of international law do not occur. And advisedly so. In dealing with an opponent who has openly repudiated all the principles both of law and of humanity we are not going to allow our efforts to be strangled in a network of juridical niceties. [Cheers.] We do not intend to put into operation any measures which we do not think to be effective, [cheers,] and I need not say we shall carefully avoid any measure which would violate the rules either of humanity or of honesty. But, subject to those two conditions, I say not only to our enemy, but I say it on behalf of the Government, and I hope on behalf of the House of Commons, that under existing conditions there is no form of economic pressure to which we do not consider ourselves entitled to resort. [Loud cheers.] If, as a consequence, neutrals suffer inconvenience and loss of trade, we regret it, but we beg them to remember that this phase of the war was not initiated by us. [Cheers.] We do not propose either to assassinate their seamen or to destroy their goods. What we are doing we do solely in self-defense.

If, again, as is possible, hardship is caused to the civil and non-combatant population of the enemy by the cutting off of supplies, we are not doing more in this respect than was done in the days when Germany still acknowledged the authority of the law of nations sanctioned by the first and the greatest of her Chancellors, and as practiced by the expressed declaration of his successor. We are quite prepared to submit to the arbitrament of neutral opinion in this war in the circumstances in which we have been placed. We have been moderate and restrained, and we have abstained from things which we were provoked and tempted to do, and we have adopted the policy which recommends itself to reason, common sense, and to justice.

This new aspect of the war only serves to illustrate and to emphasize the truth that the gravity and the magnitude of the task which we have undertaken does not diminish, but increases, as the months roll by. The call for men to join our fighting forces, which is our primary need, has been and is being nobly responded to here at home and throughout the empire. That call, we say with all plainness and directness, was never more urgent or more imperious than today. For this is a war not only of men but of material. To take only one illustration, the expenditure upon ammunition on both sides has been on a scale and at a rate which is not only without all precedent but is far in excess of any expert forecast. At such a time patriotism has cast a heavy burden on the shoulders of all who are engaged in trades or manufactures which directly or indirectly minister to the equipment of our forces. It is a burden, let me add, which falls, or ought to fall, with even weight on both employers and employed. [Cheers.] Differences as to remuneration or as to profit, as to hours and conditions of labor, which in ordinary times might well justify a temporary cessation of work should no longer be allowed to do so. The first duty of all concerned is to go on producing with might and main what the safety of the State requires, [cheers,] and if this is done I can say with perfect confidence the Government on its part will insure a prompt and equitable settlement of disputed points, and in cases of proved necessity will give on behalf of the State such help as is in their power. [Cheers.] Sailors and soldiers, employers and workmen in the industrial world are all at this moment partners and co-operators in one great enterprise. The men in the shipyards and the engineering shops, the workers in the textile factories, the miner who sends the coal to the surface, the dockyard laborer who helps to load and unload the ships, and those who employ and organize and supervise their labors are one and all rendering to their country a service as vital and as indispensable as the gallant men who line the trenches in Flanders or in France or who are bombarding fortresses in the Dardanelles. [Cheers.]

I hear sometimes whispers, hardly more than whispers, of possible terms of peace. Peace is the greatest human good, but this is not the time to talk of peace. Those who talk of peace, however excellent their intentions, are in my judgment victims, I will not say of wanton, but of grievous self-delusion. Just now we are in the stress and tumult of a tempest which is shaking the foundations of the earth. The time to talk of peace is when the great tasks in which we and our allies embarked on the long and stormy voyage are within sight of accomplishment. Speaking at the Guildhall at the Lord Mayor's banquet last November I used this language, which has since been repeated almost in the same terms by the Prime Minister of France, and which I believe represents the settled sentiment and purpose of the country. I said:

We shall never sheathe the sword which we have not lightly drawn until Belgium recovers in full measure all and more than she has sacrificed, until France is adequately secured against the menace of aggression, until the rights of the smaller nationalities of Europe are placed upon an unassailable foundation, and until the military domination of Prussia is wholly and finally destroyed. [Cheers.]

What I said early in November, now, after four months, I repeat today. We have not relaxed nor shall we relax in the pursuit of every one and all of the aims which I have described. These are great purposes, and to achieve them we must draw upon all our resources, both material and spiritual. On the one side, the material side, the demands presented in these votes is for men, for money, for the fullest equipment of the purposes of war. On the other side, what I have called the spiritual side, the appeal is to those ancient inbred qualities of our race which have never failed us in times of stress—qualities of self-mastery, self-sacrifice, patience, tenacity, willingness to bear one another's burdens, a unity which springs from the dominating sense of a common duty, unfailing faith, inflexible resolve. [Loud cheers.]

## Sweden's Scandinavian Leadership

By a Swedish Political Expert

[From THE NEW YORK TIMES, Feb. 4, 1915.]

In common with a majority of the other countries of Europe, Sweden has had a full measure of experience in the difficulties confronting neutral powers while a world struggle like the present European conflict is in progress, and has learned that, even if it may prove effective in averting blood-shed, neutrality does not by any means insure a nation against the other vicissitudes of war. Aside from operations of a purely military character, the groups of belligerent powers are carrying on a commercial warfare of constantly increasing intensity. It is characteristic, perhaps, that both parties to the struggle, as time goes on, appear to become more and more indifferent to the injury incidentally inflicted on neutral countries.

Geographically situated so that it might provide easy transit for shipments both to Russia and to the German Empire, Sweden, as a matter of course, has become the object of lively interest to both groups of warring nations in their dual concern of securing advantages to themselves and placing obstacles in the way of the enemy. From the very beginning, however, Sweden has maintained an attitude of strictest neutrality and of loyal impartiality toward both sides in the struggle. It is the object of this article to set forth as briefly as possible the manner in which the neutrality of Sweden has been made manifest.

Immediately after the war broke out in August last year the Swedish Government proclaimed its intention to remain neutral throughout the conflict. Simultaneous action was taken by the Government for the strengthening of the country's defenses, in the firm conviction that only if there was behind it the armed strength with which to enforce it would the neutrality of Sweden be respected. A move of the most profound significance—the first in our endeavors to create in Scandinavia a neutral "centre" and to gird ourselves with a greater strength to make our peaceful intentions effective—was made on Aug. 8 of last year, when the Foreign Ministers of Sweden and Norway appeared in the representative assemblies of both peoples and delivered identically worded explanatory communications in which was embodied a statement to the effect that the Swedish and Norwegian Governments had agreed to maintain their neutrality throughout the war at any cost, and that the two Governments had exchanged mutually binding and satisfactory assurances with a view to preventing any situation growing out of the state of war in Europe from precipitating either country into acts of hostility directed against the other.

In the meantime, neutral commerce and shipping during the months that followed were exposed to most serious infringements by the warring powers, such as the closing of ports by mines; limitations in the rights of neutral shipping to the use of the sea (mare libre) and of other established routes of maritime trade; arbitrary broadening in the definition of what shall constitute contraband of war, &c. As an instance it may be stated that England for a time treated magnetic iron ore as contraband of war and that Germany still persists in so regarding certain classes of manufactured wood. In both these instances Swedish exports have suffered severely. On initiative taken by the Swedish Government in the middle of last November the Governments of Sweden, Denmark, and Norway lodged identically worded protests with the envoys of certain of the powers engaged in the war against measures taken by them which threatened serious disturbance to neutral traffic.

SIR PERCY SCOTT—British Admiral,
Who Asserted Before the War Began That the Submarine
Had Sounded the Deathknell of the Dreadnought—(Photo from Rogers)

GENERAL LOUIS BOTHA—The Famous Boer Leader,
Premier of the Union of South Africa, Now Commanding the
British South African Forces—(Photo from Paul Thompson)

One further step—of the utmost importance through what it accomplished toward establishing firmly the position of the neutral States in the north—was the meeting between the Kings of Sweden, Norway, and Denmark at Malmö on Dec. 19 last. This meeting was especially designed to provide an opportunity for taking counsel together regarding means which may be resorted to for the purpose of limiting and counteracting the economical difficulties imposed on the three countries through the war. The meeting at Malmö served not only to give most powerful expression to the common determination of the northern kingdoms to remain neutral, but it became the means also of agreeing upon and adopting a modus vivendi for continued co-operation between the three countries during the war for the protection of interests they have in common.

In this manner Sweden has led in a movement to establish for the northern countries a potential policy of neutrality with the practical aim of limiting and reducing to a minimum the economical difficulties consequent upon the existing state of war.

From what already has been said it appears clearly, too, how completely without justification have been the accusations which have been voiced from time to time in the press of countries that enter into either of the belligerent groups—that Sweden, now in one respect and now in another, had shown partiality to the adversary. Thus, suspicion has been cast, with no justification whatever, on the circumstance that during the last month Sweden has imported large quantities of necessaries which would have been both valuable and helpful to the belligerents. And yet, this increase in the Swedish imports is very readily explained on the ground that it was necessary, partly, in order to make up for an existing shortage in supplies due to stopped traffic during the first months of the war, and, partly, to insure ability to fill Swedish demands for some time to come. A country which desires to remain neutral is not in a position to submit to dictation from any of the belligerent nations, but this very thing is frequently interpreted by one party to a struggle as involving an understanding with the other.

But Sweden's peaceful resolve and her fixed determination to maintain her life as a nation against all attempts at encroachment would count for little if behind her word there did not exist the strength to make it good and material resources to fall back on when the demand comes. That these exist in Sweden will be shown in the following with some data of Sweden's economics.

With a population of 5,700,000, distributed over an area of 448,000 square kilometers, (170,977 square miles,) as compared with 9,415,000 square kilometers (3,025,600 square miles) in the United States, Sweden, in comparison with European countries in general, is very sparsely inhabited. The possibilities for growth and development, however, are great owing to natural resources, which are both rich and varied. Of Sweden's area, 40,000 square kilometers (15,266 square miles) is cultivated land. The value of the annual production of grain is estimated at about 340,000,000 kroner, (about $91,900,000,) offset by an import of grain which exceeds the export by about 70,000,000 kroner, (about $18,900,000.) From this it appears that agriculture as yet retains its place as the principal industry of the country. With the bigger half of the country's area timber and the rivers well adapted to logging, Sweden quite naturally has become one of the foremost countries in the world in the export of lumber, wood pulp, and manufactured wood. Another natural product of Sweden, and one of the utmost importance, is iron ore, of which there was exported in 1913 to the value of about 69,000,000 kroner, (about $18,500,000,) chiefly from the large mineral fields in the northernmost part of the country. Besides this production of raw material, Sweden has important manufacturing industries which thrive as a result of the abundant supply of water power, an extensive network of railroads, and a shipping industry which is in a state of flourishing development.

The total output of our Swedish industries (mining not included) in 1912 was appraised at a net (manufacturing) value of 1,778,000,000 kroner, (about $481,600,000.) Of this total, 476,000,000 kroner (about $128,600,000) represents foodstuffs and luxuries, 353,000,000 kroner (about $95,400,000) wood products, &c.; 222,000,000 kroner ($60,000,000) textile products, and so on.

A few figures will illustrate Sweden's exchange of products with foreign countries. In 1912 the foreign trade of Sweden reached a total of 1,554,000,000 kroner, (about $420,000,000.) The imports aggregated 794,000,000 kroner (about $214,600,000) and the exports 760,000,000 kroner, (about $205,400,000,) thus showing a relatively advantageous trade balance. Of the imported values, 28 per cent. was foodstuffs and luxuries, 45 per cent. raw materials, and 26 per cent. articles manufactured either wholly or in part. Of the exports, 14 per cent. was foodstuffs and luxuries, 23 per cent. raw materials, and not less than 63 per cent. articles of manufacture, finished completely or in part.

The principal industrial products represented among these exports are enumerated here:

Kroner
Wood products | 1,912,000,000 | $516,700,0003
Pulp and paper | 134,000,000 | 36,000,000
Metal products | 105,000,000 | 28,400,000
Machinery | 56,000,000 | 15,400,000
Matches | 16,000,000 | 4,300,000
Pottery products | 15,000,000 | 4,000,000

With regard to our exports, there have been especially large increases in those of pulp and machinery. The principal types of machinery which figure among the exports of Sweden are milk separators, oil motors, telephone apparatus, electric engines, and ball bearings. In these exports are plainly indicated the inventive genius of the Swedes and their aptitude for technical and industrial pursuits.

With reference to the Swedish railroads, this fact is deserving of mention: Sweden leads all Europe with 2.5 kilometers to each 1,000 inhabitants, (United States has 4.14 kilometers.) The mercantile marine of Sweden has experienced powerful growth in recent years. In 1912, with a net tonnage of 805,000, it held the sixth place among the merchant fleets of Europe, being ahead of, among other countries, Spain, Russia, and the Netherlands. Especially has the growth in Sweden's merchant marine been pronounced since 1904, when the first regular ocean lines with Swedish vessels were established. Today Swedish steamship lines are maintaining regular traffic with all parts of the world. Thus, among other things, Sweden has established freight lines, with steamers plying to both the east and west coasts of North America. Quite recently, despite the financial crisis brought on by the war, a company has been formed with the object of establishing passenger traffic with Swedish steamships of high speed between Gothenburg and either New York or Boston.

After scrutinizing these figures the reader ought not to be surprised at the assertion that Sweden is exceptionally well situated from an economical point of view, and, perhaps, is among the countries which have been least affected by the economical crisis consequent upon the war. The national debt of Sweden, which was created very largely with a view to financing the construction of the Government railroads and for other productive purposes, is at present only 720,000,000 kroner, (about $194,500,000.) This is only 126 kroner (a small fraction above $34) for each inhabitant, while the corresponding figure for France in 1913 was 591 kroner, (nearly $160;) the Netherlands, 282 kroner, ($70.62;) Great Britain, 280 kroner, ($70.57;) Germany, 276 kroner, ($70.40;) Italy, 270 kroner, ($70.30,) &c. Against the national debt of 720,000,000 kroner (about $194,500,000) Sweden has Crown assets at this time appraised at 1,761,000,000 kroner net, (nearly $476,000,000.)

Another evidence of the splendid financial condition of Sweden is afforded in the fact that, since the war broke out and countries which under normal conditions might be looked to for loans had closed their markets to foreign nations, the domestic market has been able to supply fully all, both public and private, demands for funds. Thus, when the Swedish Government, early last October, sought a loan of 30,000,000 kroner at home, this was fully subscribed in three days. Nor have municipalities or private banks encountered any difficulty in placing bonds for amounts of considerable size in the domestic market. The only loan for which the Swedish Government has contracted abroad during the crisis was for $5,000,000, and this was placed in New York for the purpose of facilitating payments for large purchases of American grain.

At least a few words with particular reference to the commercial intercourse between Sweden and the United States. According to statistics from the year 1912, the imports of Sweden from the United States were of the aggregate value of 60,000,000 kroner, (about $16,200,000,) while the exports aggregated 32,000,000 kroner, (about $8,600,000.) The principal imports were: Cotton, 17,000,000 kroner, (about $4,600,000;) oils, 12,000,000 kroner, (about $3,240,000;) copper, 6,200,000 kroner, (about $1,675,000;) machinery, 5,000,000 kroner, (about $1,350,000;) grain and flour, 2,300,000 kroner, (about $621,000;) bacon, 1,700,000 kroner, (about $460,000.) The principal articles of export in the same year were: Pulp, 12,400,000 kroner, (about $3,350,000;) manufactured iron and steel, 8,100,000 kroner, (about $2,200,000;) iron ore, 3,600,000 kroner, (about $973,000;) paper, 2,100,000 kroner, (about $568,000;) elastic gum refuse, 1,900,000 kroner, (about $514,000;) matches, 1,300,000 kroner, (about $350,000.)

Since the outbreak of hostilities in August last year there has been a tremendous increase in trade between Sweden and the United States. The tonnage employed in this trade has been multiplied many times in order adequately to care for the traffic. Sweden has sought to secure in the United States a multiplicity of necessaries which under normal conditions have been obtained from the belligerent countries. From the United States, too, there has come an increased demand for many Swedish products.

It is to be hoped that a large portion of this commerce, which has been the artificial outgrowth of unusual conditions, will continue, even after the present world crisis shall happily have become a thing of the past. Surely, it would be to the mutual advantage of both countries to develop and strengthen their direct trade relations.

## From England

By MAURICE HEWLETT.

[From King Albert's Book.]

O men of mickle heart and little speech,

Slow, stubborn countrymen of heath and plain,

Now have ye shown these insolent again

That which to Caesar's legions ye could teach,

That slow-provok'd is long-provok'd. May each

Crass Caesar learn this of the Keltic grain,

Until at last they reckon it in vain

To browbeat us who hold the Western reach.

For even as you are, we are, ill to rouse,

Rooted in Custom, Order, Church, and King;

And as you fight for their sake, so shall we,

Doggedly inch by inch, and house by house;

Seeing for us, too, there's a dearer thing

Than land or blood—and that thing Liberty.

## War Correspondence—The Beloved Hindenburg

## A Pen Portrait of the German Commander in Chief in the East

[By a Staff Correspondent of THE NEW YORK TIMES.]

GERMAN GREAT HEADQUARTERS, EAST, Feb. 10.—But for the "field gray" coat and the militant mustache, I should have taken him for a self-made American, a big business man or captain of industry, as he sat at his work desk, the telephone at his elbow, the electric push-buttons and reams of neat reports adding to the illusion. Quiet, unassuming, and democratic, he yet makes the same impression of virility and colossal energy that Colonel Roosevelt does, but with an iron restraint of discipline which the American never possessed, and an earnestness of face and eye that I had only seen matched in his Commander in Chief, the Kaiser. Here was a man whom the most neutral American could instantly admire and honor, regardless of the merits of the controversy. It was Hindenburg, the well beloved, the hope of Germany. He has already been "done" by journalists and Senator Beveridge, but 70,000,000 are pinning their faith to him, which makes him worth "doing" again—and again.

For a moment I nearly forgot that I was an American with "nerve," bent on making him say something, preferably indiscreet; it seemed almost a shame to bother this man whose brain was big with the fate of empire. But, although I hadn't been specially invited, but had just "dropped in" in informal American fashion, the Commander in Chief of all his Kaiser's forces in the east stopped making history long enough to favor me with a short but thought-provoking interview.

As to his past performances, the Field Marshal genially referred to the detailed official summary; as to the future, he protested.

"I am not a prophet. But this I can say. Tell our friends in America—and also those who do not love us—that I am looking forward with unshakable confidence to the final victory—and a well-earned vacation," he added whimsically. "I should like nothing better than to visit your Panama Exposition and meet your wonderful General Goethals, the master builder, for I imagine our jobs are spiritually much akin; that his slogan, too, has been 'durchhalten' ('hold out') until endurance and organization win out against heavy odds."

Then with sudden, paradoxical, terrific quiet earnest: "Great is the task that still confronts us, but greater my faith in my brave troops." One got indelibly the impression that he loved them all, suffered under their hardships and sorrowed for their losses.

"For you, this war is only a titanic drama; we Germans feel it with our hearts," he said thoughtfully.

The Field Marshal spoke warmly of the Austro-Hungarian troops, and cited the results of the close co-operation between his forces and the Austrian armies as striking proof of the proverb, "In union is strength." Like all other German Generals whom I had "done," he, too, had words of unqualified praise for the bravery of his enemies. "The Russians fight well; but neither mere physical bravery nor numbers, nor both together, win battles nowadays."

"How about the steam roller?"

"It hasn't improved the roads a bit, either going forward or backward," he said with a grim smile.

"Are you worrying over Grand Duke Nicholas's open secret?" I asked, citing the report via Petrograd and London of a new projected Russian offensive that was to take the form, not of a steam roller, but of a "tidal wave of cavalry."

"It will dash against a wall of loyal flesh and blood, barbed with steel—if it comes," he said simply.

My impression, growing increasingly stronger the more I have seen, that German military success had been to no small extent made possible by American inventive genius and high-speed American methods, received interesting partial confirmation from the Field Marshal, whose keen, restless mind, working over quite ordinary material, produced the new suggestive combination of ideas that, while "America might possibly be materially assisting Germany's enemies with arms, ammunition, and other war material, certain it was that America, in the last analysis, had helped Germany far more."

"But for America, my armies would possibly not be standing in Russia today—without the American railroading genius that developed and made possible for me this wonderful weapon, thanks largely to which we have been able with comparatively small numbers to stop and beat back the Russian millions again and again—steam engine versus steam roller. Were it for nothing else, America has proved one of our best friends, if not an ally.

"We are also awaiting with genuine interest the receipt of our first American guns," the Field Marshal added. How was Germany expecting to get guns from America? He was asked to explain the mystery.

"I read somewhere in the papers that a large shipment of heavy cannon had left America for Russia," he said with dry humor, "in transit for us—for if they're consigned to the Russians, we'll have them sooner or later, I hope;" adding, with his habitual tense earnestness, "the Americans are something more than shrewd, hard-headed business men. Have they ever vividly pictured to themselves a German soldier smashed by an American shell, or bored through the heart by an American bullet? The grim realism of the battlefield—that should make also the business man thoughtful."

"Shall you go west when you have cleaned up here in the east?" I suggested.

"I can't betray military secrets which I don't know myself, even to interest the newspaper readers," he said. He gave me the impression, however, that, east or west, he would be found fighting for the Fatherland so long as the Fatherland needed him.

"Now it means work again. You must excuse me," he concluded, courteously. "You want to go to the front. Where should you like to go?"

"To Warsaw," I suggested, modestly.

"I, too," he laughed, "but today—ausgeschlossen, ('nothing doing,' in Americanese.) Still—that may be yet."

"May I come along, your Excellency?"

"Certainly, then you can see for yourself what sort of 'barbarians' we Germans are."

"Dropping in on Hindenburg" yields some unimportant but interesting by-products. The railroad Napoleon, as all the world knows, lives and works in a palace, but this palace doesn't overawe one who has beaten professionally at the closed portals of Fifth Avenue. It would be considered a modest country residence in Westchester County or on Long Island. Light in color and four stories high, including garret, it looks very much like those memorials which soap kings and sundry millionaires put up to themselves in their lifetime—the American college dormitory, the modern kind that is built around three sides of a small court. The palace is as simple as the man.

The main entrance, a big iron gateway, is flanked by two guardhouses painted with white and black stripes, the Prussian "colors," and two unbluffable Landsturm men mount guard, who will tell you to go around to the back door.

The orderly who opens the front door is a Sergeant in field gray uniform. You mount a flight of marble steps, and saunter down a marble hall, half a block long. It is the reception hall. It is furnished with magnificent hand-carved, high-backed chairs without upholstery, lounging not being apparently encouraged here. They are Gothic structures backed up against the walls. There is no Brussels or Axminster carpet on the cold marble floor—not even Turkish rugs. Through this palace hall, up by the ceiling, runs a thick cable containing the all-important telephone wires. The offices open off the hall, the doors labeled with neatly printed signs telling who and what is within. If you should come walking down the street outside at 3 A.M. you would probably see the lights in Hindenburg's office still burning, as I did. At 3:30 they went out, indicating that a Field Marshal's job is not a sinecure.

## Feeling of the German People

## Complete Confidence in Victory and Resentment Toward England

[By a Staff Correspondent of THE NEW YORK TIMES.]

BERLIN, Feb. 12.—To the neutral American, intent only on finding out the truth, the most thought-provoking feature here (overlooked by foreign correspondents because of its very featureless obviousness) is the fact that Germany today is more confident of winning than at any time in the three months I have been here. This confidence must not be confused with cocksureness; it is rather the "looking forward with quiet confidence to ultimate victory," as General von Heeringen phrased it. Even more important is the corollary that, while the Germans have apparently never had any doubt that they would win out in the end, this "ultimate victory" does not seem so far off to them today as it did three months ago.

To one who has had an opportunity of personally sounding the undercurrents of German public opinion, this quiet optimism that has become noticeable only in the past few weeks (totally different in character from the enthusiasm that followed the declaration of war) has seemed particularly significant. Three months ago I was incessantly asked by Germans "how the situation looked to an American," and "how long I thought the war would last." When left to answer their own question, they almost invariably remarked: "It may last a long while yet." Today neutral opinion is no longer anxiously or even eagerly sought. The temporary need for this sort of moral support seems to have passed, and there are many indications that the well-informed layman expects 1915 to see the wind-up of the war, while I have talked with not a few professional men who have expressed the opinion that the war will be over by Summer—except against England.

This unanimous exception is significant because it indicates that to the German mind the war with Russia and France is, in prize-ring parlance, a twenty-round affair, which can and will be won on points, whereas with England it is a championship fight to a finish, to be settled only by a knockout. The idea is that Russia will be eliminated as a serious factor by late Spring at the latest, and then, Westward Ho! when France will not prolong the agony unduly, but will seize the first psychological moment that offers peace with honor, leaving Germany free to fight it out with the real enemy, England, though as to how, when, and where the end will come, there is less certainty and agreement. Some think that the knockout will be delivered in the shadow of the Pyramids; others, and probably the majority, believe that the winning blow must and will be delivered on English soil itself.

Time here is no factor, for the war against England is taking on increasingly an almost religious character; from the German point of view, it will soon be, not a war, but a crusade. I get one clue to this in the new phrase of leave-taking that has gained an astounding currency in the past few weeks. Instead of saying "Good-bye" or "Auf Wiedersehen," the German now says: "God punish England!" to which the equally fervent rejoinder is, "May He do so!" This new, polite formula for leave-taking originated among the officers and men in the field, but you hear it on all sides now, uttered with a sincerity and earnestness that is peculiarly impressive. The new style of saying "good-bye" has at least the merit of being no longer a perfunctory piece of rhetoric.

This optimism is no nation-wide attack of insanity, for the German, thorough even in forming his opinions, is the last person in the world to harbor delusions, and there is a perfect realization of the titanic task that still confronts Germany. Nor is this confidence in ultimate victory due to lack of information or to being kept in the dark by the "iron censorship," for the "iron censorship" is itself a myth. It is liberal, even judged by democratic standards, and surprisingly free from red tape. There is no embargo on the importation of foreign newspapers; even the anti-German journals of neutral countries have free entry and circulation, while at a number of well-known cosmopolitan cafés you can always read The London Times and The Daily Chronicle, only three days old, and for a small cash consideration the waiter will generally be able to produce from his pocket a Figaro, not much older. Not only English and French, but, even more, the Italian, Dutch, and Scandinavian papers are widely read and digested by Germans, while the German papers not only print prominently the French official communiqués, the Russian communiqués when available, and interesting chunks from the British "eyewitness" official reports, but most of their feature stories—the vivid, detailed war news—come from allied sources via correspondents in neutral countries. The German censor's task is here a relatively simple one, for German war correspondents never allow professional enthusiasm to run away with practical patriotism, and you note the—to an American—amusing and yet suggestive spectacle of war correspondents specializing in descriptions of sunsets and scenery.

The German was never much of a newspaper reader before the war, but now he can challenge the American commuter as an absorbent of the printed word. And not only has the German been suddenly educated into an avid newspaper reader, but he has developed a tendency to think for himself, to read between the lines, and interpret sentences. Thus, no German has any illusions about the military prowess of Austria; but her failure has caused no hard feelings. "The spirit is willing, but the leadership is weak," is the kindly verdict, with the hopeful assumption that the addition of a little German yeast will raise the standard of Austrian efficiency and improve the quality of leadership.

The Germans, being neither mad nor misinformed, why they face a world of foes with this new confidence becomes a question of importance to any one who wants to understand the real situation here. The answer is Hindenburg—not only the man himself, but all that he stands for, the personification of the German war spirit, the greatest moral asset of the empire today. He is idolized not only by the soldiers, but by the populace as well; not only by the Prussians, but by the Bavarians and even the Austrians. You cannot realize what a tremendous factor he has become until you discover personally the Carlylean hero worship of which he is the object.

Hindenburg woke up one morning to find himself famous; but his subsequent speedy apotheosis was probably not entirely spontaneous. In fact, there is reason to believe that he was carefully groomed for the rôle of a national hero at a critical time, the process being like the launching by American politicians of a Presidential or Gubernatorial boom at a time when a name to conjure with is badly needed. He is a striking answer to the Shakespearean question. His name alone is worth many army corps for its psychological effect on the people; it has a peculiarly heroic ring to the German ear, and part of the explanation of its magic lies probably in the fact that the last syllable, "burg," means fortress or castle. He inspires the most unbounded confidence in the German people; the Field Marshal looms larger than his Kaiser.

The cigarmakers were the first to recognize his claims to immortality and to confer it on him; but now almost every conceivable sort of merchandise except corsets is being trade marked Hindenburg. Babies, fishing boats, race horses, cafés, avenues and squares, a city of 60,000, a whole county, are being named after him, and minor poets are taking his name in vain daily, "Hindenburg Marches" are being composed in endless procession, a younger brother is about to publish his biography, and legends are already thickly clustering about his name. He laid the Russian bugaboo before it had a chance to make its début; there is not today the slightest nervousness about the possible coming of the Cossacks, and there will not be, so long as the Commander in Chief of all the armies in the east continues to find time to give sittings to portrait painters, pose for the moving-picture artists, autograph photographs, appear on balconies while school children sing patriotic airs, answer the Kaiser's telegrams of congratulation, acknowledge decorations, receive interminable delegations, personages, and journalists, and perform all the other time-consuming duties incident to having greatness thrust upon you; for things obviously cannot be in a very bad way when the master strategist can thus take "time out" from strategizing. But the influence of "our Hindenburg," as he is often affectionately called, is wider than the east; the magic of his name stiffens the deadline in the west, and the man in the street, whose faith is great, feels sure that when he has fought his last great battle in the east the turn of the French and English will come.

While the German in the street, thanks largely to Hindenburg, regards the military situation with optimism, he sees no grounds for pessimism in the present political situation. Italy and Bulgaria are regarded as "safe."

How the Germans regard the economic, industrial, and financial situation is rather hard to estimate, because their practical patriotism keeps them from making any public parade of their business troubles and worries, if they have any. The oft-repeated platitude that you would never suspect here that a war was going on if you didn't read the papers is quite just. Conditions—on the surface—are so normal that there is even a lively operatic fight on in Munich, where the personal friction between Musical Director Walters and the star conductor, Otto Hess, has caused a crisis in the affairs of the Royal Munich Opera, rivaling in interest the fighting at the front.

There are certainly fewer "calamity howlers" here than on Broadway during boom times, and you see no outward evidence of hard times, no acute poverty, no misery, no derelicts, for the war-time social organization seems as perfect as the military. In the last three months only one beggar has stopped me on the streets and tried to touch my heart and pocketbook—a record that seems remarkable to an American who has run the nocturnal gauntlet of peace-time panhandlers on the Strand or the Embankment.

Business is most certainly not going on as usual. You note many shops and stores with few or no customers in them. About the only people who are making any money are army contractors and the shopkeepers who sell things available for "Liebesgaben" ("love gifts") for the troops in the field. Those businesses hardest hit by the war are in a state of suspended animation, embalmed by the credit of the State.

But, again, the influence of Hindenburg is wider than the east—and the west; it permeates the business world and stiffens the economic backbone of the nation. It is no exaggeration to say that the whole German people, barring the inevitable though small percentage of weaklings, is trying with terrific earnestness to live up to the homely Hindenburgian motto, "Durchhalten!" ("Hold out,") or, in more idiomatic American, "See the thing through."

## Bombardment of the Dardanelles

## First Allied Attack Described by an Onlooker

[From THE NEW YORK TIMES, March 8, 1915.]

Athens, Saturday, March 6, (Dispatch to The London Daily Chronicle.)—The bombardment of the Dardanelles forts, according to the latest news, proceeds with success and cautious thoroughness. It is now anticipated that before another two weeks are over the allied fleet will be in the Sea of Marmora, and Constantinople will quickly fall to the victorious Allies.

Two features of the operations make extreme caution necessary for the attacking battleships. In the first place, the number of mines laid in the strait has been found to be enormous. They must all be picked up, and the work takes considerable time, seeing that it must be done thoroughly.

In the second place, the larger batteries, against whom the allied fleet is contending, are very skillfully hidden.

I have had an interesting talk with a gentleman who has just arrived from Tenedos, where, from the height of Mount Ilios, he witnessed the bombardment. He tells me:

"The sight was most magnificent. At first the fleet was ranged in a semi-circle some miles out to sea from the entrance to the strait. It afforded an inspiring spectacle as the ships came along and took up position, and the picture became most awe-inspiring when the guns began to boom.

"The bombardment at first was slow, shells from the various ships screaming through the air at the rate of about one every two minutes. Their practice was excellent, and with strong glasses I could see huge masses of earth and stonework thrown high up into the air. The din, even at the distance, was terrific, and when the largest ship, with the biggest guns in the world, joined in the martial chorus, the air was rent with ear-splitting noise.

"The Turkish batteries, however, were not to be drawn, and, seeing this, the British Admiral sent one British ship and one French ship close inshore toward the Sedd-el-Bahr forts.

"It was a pretty sight to see the two battleships swing rapidly away toward the northern cape, spitting fire and smoke as they rode. They obscured the pure atmosphere with clouds of smoke from their funnels and guns; yet through it all I could see they were getting home with the shots they fired.

"As they went in they sped right under the guns of the shore batteries, which could no longer resist the temptation to see what they could do. Puffs of white smoke dotted the landscape on the far shore, and dull booms echoed over the placid water. Around the ships fountains of water sprang up into the air. The enemy had been drawn, but his marksmanship was obviously very bad. I think I am right in saying that not a single shot directed against the ships came within a hundred yards of either."

## The French Battlefront

## Account of First Extended View of the Intrenchments Defending France

[By a Special Correspondent of THE NEW YORK TIMES.]

Paris, March 7.—I have just been permitted a sight of the French Army—the first accorded to any correspondent in so comprehensive a measure since the outbreak of the war. Under the escort of an officer of General Joffre's staff, I was allowed along a great section of the fighting line, into the trenches under fire, and also received scientific detailed information regarding this least known of European forces.

France has been so silent about her army and her Generals and so indifferent to the use of journalism in the war it is scarcely realized even in France that 450 of the 500 miles of fighting front are held by the French and only the remaining fifty by the British and Belgians. At the outbreak of the war no newspaper men were allowed with the army, and those who managed to get to the front, including myself, all returned to Paris under escort. Although we saw what a powerful machine it was and knew it was getting stronger every day, we were permitted to say very little about it—Germany, meanwhile, granting interviews, taking war correspondents to trenches and up in balloons in the campaign for neutral sympathy.

France, or, rather, General Joffre, for his is the first and last word on the subject of war correspondents, gradually decided to combat the German advertising.

Only he decided to go them one better, as I hope to show. There have been several trips, all tryouts. I was informed at the Foreign Office a month ago that when the representative of so important a paper as THE NEW YORK TIMES was to be taken to the front it would be for a more important trip than any up to that date—that I was to be saved up for such an occasion as I am now privileged to describe.

I propose to give as few names of places and Generals as possible, first, to meet the wishes of the personal censor, who is the same officer who escorted me throughout the trip, and, second, because I believe general facts relating to the morale of the French Army and their prospects in the Spring campaign will be of more interest than specific details concerning places where the lines have been established for the past six months.

From scores of letters received from America the first question which seems to arise in the minds of neutrals outside the war zone is, What are the prospects of the Germans taking Paris when the second great phase of the war is really under way? First, let me admit that a lurking fear that the Germans might penetrate the lines had caused me to make certain arrangements for the hasty exit of my family from Paris as soon as the Spring fighting began. I am now willing to cancel these arrangements, for I am convinced there is no danger to Paris.

The German Army, in my opinion, will never for a second time dictate terms of peace in Paris. I feel that I am in a position to make the statement, founded on an unusual knowledge of the facts, that should German ambition again fly that high they would need at least 3,000,000 men concentrated before the fortifications of Paris—these in addition to the enormous force to oppose the French and allied field armies.

The defenses of Paris since the city had its narrow escape before the battle of the Marne present one of the wonders of the world. Not only has Gallieni's army intrenched the surrounding country and barb-wired it until the idea of any forward advance seems preposterous, but every foot of ground is measured and the exact artillery ranges taken to every other foot of ground.

For instance, from every single trench which also contains an artillery observatory the exact distance is recorded to every other trench, to every house, hillock, tree, and shrub behind which the enemy might advance. In fact, the German organization which threatened to rule the world seems overtaken by French organization which became effective since the war began.

All through the trip it was this new spirit of organization that impressed me most. I have sent you many cables on the new spirit of the French, but never before dared to picture them in the rôle which to my mind they never before occupied—that of organizers. I started the trip to see the real French Army in the most open but unexpectant frame of mind. For weeks I had read only laconic official communiqués that told me nothing. I saw well-fed officers in beautiful limousines rolling about Paris with an air that the war was a million miles away. The best way now to explain my enthusiasm is to give the words of a famous English correspondent, also just returned from a similar trip, (he is Frederic Villiers, who began war corresponding with Archibald Forbes at the battle of Plevna, and this is his seventeenth war,) who said:

"In all my life this trip is the biggest show I have ever had."

The first point on the trip where the French intelligence proved superior to the German was that I was allowed to pay my own expenses. With the exception of motor cars and a hundred courtesies extended by the scores of French officers, I paid my own railroad fare, hotel and food bills.

"This army has nothing to hide," said one of the greatest Generals to me. "You see what you like, go where you desire, and if you cannot get there, ask."

This General was de Maud'Huy, the man who with a handful of territorials stopped the Prussian Guard before Arras shortly after the battle of the Marne and who since then has never lost a single trench. His name is now scarcely known, even in France, but I venture the prophecy that when the French Army marches down the Champs Elysées after the war is over, when the vanguard passes under the Arch de Triomph, de Maud'Huy—a nervous little firebrand—will be right up in the front rank with Joffre.

While our party did all the spectacular stunts the Germans have offered the correspondents in such profusion, such as visiting the trenches, where in our case a German shell burst thirty feet from us, splattering us with mud, also where snipers sent rifle balls hissing only a few feet away, almost our greatest treats were the scientific daily discourses given by our Captain concerning the entire history of the first campaign, explaining each event leading up to the present position of the two armies. He gave the exact location of every French and allied army corps on the entire front.

On the opposite side of the line he demonstrated the efficiency of the French secret service by detailing the position and name of every German regiment, also the date and the position it now holds. Thus, we were able to know during the journey that it was the crack Prussian Guard that was stopped by de Maud'Huy's Territorials and that the English section under General French was opposed by Saxons.

Our Captain by these lectures gave us an insight into the second great German blunder after the failure to occupy Paris, which was the failure immediately to swing a line across Northern France, thus cutting off Calais and Boulogne, where they could really have leveled a pistol at England's head. He explained that it was the superiority of the French cavalry that dictated that the line should instead run straight north through the edge of Belgium to the sea. His explanations went further than this, for he refuted many military arguments to the effect that cavalry became obsolete with the advent of aeroplanes.

Cavalry formerly was used to screen the infantry advance and also for shock purposes in the charges. Now that the lines are established, it is mostly used with the infantry in the trenches; but in the great race after the Marne to turn the western flanks it was the cavalry's ability to outstrip the infantry that kept the Germans from practically all of Northern France. In other words, the French chausseurs, more brilliant than the Uhlans, kept that northern line straight until the infantry corps had time to take up position.

My introduction to the real French Army was made at the point of junction with the English troops, so I was thus able to make some comparison between the types of the Allies. I did not see the Germans except as prisoners, although on this trip I was sometimes within a few yards of their lines. With all consideration for the statement that they are the greatest fighting machine the world has ever seen, all I can say is that the greatest fighting machine I have even seen is the French Army.

To me they seem invincible from the standpoints of power, intelligence, and humanity. This latter quality specially impressed me. I do not believe any army with such high ideals can easily be beaten, and I judge not only from Generals in command, but the men in the trenches. One morning I was going through the trenches near the most important point where the line was continually under fire.

Passing from the second line to a point less than a hundred yards from the German rifles I came face to face with a General of division. He was sauntering along for the morning's stroll he chose to take in the trenches with his men rather than on the safer roads at the rear. He smoked a cigarette and seemed careless of danger. He continually patted his soldiers on the back as he passed and called them "his little braves."

I could not help wondering whether the German General opposite was setting his men the same splendid example. I inquired the French General's name; he was General Fayolle, conceded by all the armies to be the greatest artillery expert in the world. Comradeship between officers and men always is well known in the French Army, but I never before realized how the officers were so willing to accept quite the same fate.

In Paris the popular appellation for a German is "boche." Not once at the front did I hear this word used by officers or men. They deplore it, just as they deplore many things that happen in Paris. Every officer I talked to declared the Germans were a brave, strong enemy; they waste no time calling them names.

"They are wonderful, but we will beat them," was the way one officer summed up the general feeling.

Another illustration of the French officer at the front: The City of Vermelles of 10,000 inhabitants was captured from the Germans after fifty-four days' fighting. It was taken literally from house to house, the French engineers sapping and mining the Germans out of every stronghold, destroying every single house, incidentally forever upsetting my own one-time idea that the French are a frivolous people. So determined were they to retake this town that they fought in the streets with artillery at a distance of twenty-one feet, probably the shortest range artillery duel in the history of the world.

The Germans before the final evacuation buried hundreds of their own dead. Every yard in the city was filled with little crosses—the ground was so trampled that the mounds of graves were crushed down level with the ground—and on the crosses are printed the names with the number of the German regiments. At the base of every cross there rests either a crucifix or a statue of the Virgin or a wreath of artificial flowers, all looted from the French graveyard.

With the German graves are French graves made afterward. I walked through this ruined city where, aside from the soldiery, the only sign of life I saw was a gaunt, prowling cat. With me past these hundreds of graves walked half a dozen French officers. They did not pause to read inscriptions; they did not comment on the loot and pillage of the graveyard; they scarcely looked even at the graves, but they kept constantly raising their hands to their caps in salute regardless of whether the cross numbered a French or a German life destroyed.

We were driving along back of the advance lines. On the road before us was a company of territorial infantry who had been eight days in the trenches and were now to have two days of repose at the rear. Plodding along the same road was a refugee mother and several little children in a donkey cart; behind the cart, attached by a rope, trundled a baby buggy with the youngest child inside. The buggy suddenly struck a rut in the road and overturned, spilling the baby into the mud. Terrible wails arose, and the soldiers stiffened to attention. Then, seeing the accident, the entire company broke ranks and rescued the infant. They wiped the dirt from its face and restored it to its mother in the cart.

So engrossing was the spectacle our motor halted, and our Captain from Great General Headquarters in his gorgeous blue uniform climbed from the car, discussing with the mother the safety of a baby buggy riding behind a donkey cart, at the same time congratulating the soldier who rescued the child.

Our trip throughout moved with that clockwork precision usually associated only with the Germans. The schedule throughout the week never varied from the arrangements made before we left Paris. When we arrived at certain towns we were handed slips of paper bearing our names and the hotel number of our room.

Amazing meals appeared at most amazing places, all the menus carefully thought out days before. Imagine fresh trout served you with other famous French delicacies in a little house in the battle zone, where only a few hundred yards of barbed wire and a few feet more of air separated you from the German trenches. During the German advance, also after the battle of the Marne, there were many towns in the districts where it was impossible to obtain tobacco, spirits, or food staples. This condition has entirely abated, and the commissariat is now so well supplied that soldiers have sufficient tobacco even in the trenches.

It was my privilege to take a brief ride at the front in an antebellum motor bus of glorious memory—there being nothing left in Paris but the subway. Buses are now used to carry fresh meat, although they have been used in transporting troops and also ammunition. We trundled quite merrily along a little country road in Northern France, the snow-white fields on either side in strange contrast to the scenery when last I rode in that bus. I am sure I rode in the same bus before the war in my daily trips to the Paris office of THE NEW YORK TIMES. Its sides are bullet riddled now, but the soldier conductor still jingles the bell to the motorman, although he carries a revolver where he used to wear the register for fares.

Trench life was one of the most interesting surprises of the trip. Every night since the war began I have heard pitying remarks about "the boys in the trenches," especially if the nights were cold. I was, therefore, prepared to find the men standing in water to the knees, shivering, wretched, sick, and unhappy. I found just the contrary—the trenches were clean, large, and sanitary, although, of course, mud is mud. I found the bottoms of the trenches in every instance corduroy-lined with modern drains, which allowed the feet to keep perfectly dry, and also the large dugouts where the men, except those doing sentry duty, sleep comfortably on dry straw. There are special dugouts for officers and artillery observers.

I also visited a large, perfectly equipped Red Cross First Aid camp, all built underground, extending from one line of trenches to another. All trenches, communication traverses, and observatory dugouts have received names which are printed on shingles affixed to the trenches on little upright posts. For instance, we entered one section of the trenches through Boyau d'Espagne, we traversed Avenue de Bois, Avenues Wagram and Friedland, and others commemorating Napoleonic victories. The dugouts of officers and observers were all called villas—Villa Chambéry, Villa Montmorency being examples. It all seemed like cozy camp life underground except that three times the morning of our visit it was necessary to flatten ourselves against the mud sidewalls while dead men on crossed rifles were carried out, every head in that particular bit of trench being bared as the sad procession disappeared.

Although the maps show the lines of fighting to be rather wavy, one must go to the front really to appreciate the irregular zigzag, snakelike line that it really is. The particular bit of trenches we visited cover a front of twelve miles, but so irregular is the line, so intricate and vast the system of intrenchments, that they measure 200 miles on that particular twelve-mile fighting front.

When one leaves the trenches at the rear of the communication boyaux, it is astonishing how little of the war can be seen. Ten feet after we left our trenches we could not see even the entrance. We stood in a beautiful open field having our pictures taken, and a few hundred yards away our motor waited behind some trees. Suddenly we heard a "zip zip" over our heads. German snipers were taking shots at us.

In addition to the enormous force of men constantly in the trenches along the entire line there is an equal size reserve line directly behind them in case of sudden attack. The artillery is posted considerably further to the rear along with revictualing stations, aeroplane hangars, and headquarters of the Generals, but through all this enormous mass of men which we passed daily going to and from our front observation posts never once did we get the impression of parade. Three were just troops, troops, troops everywhere, every hamlet, every village filled with them, every crossroads with their sentries. All of them, hardened by Winter and turns in the trenches, are in splendid condition, and as opposed to the Germans, at least to the German prisoners I have seen, each French soldier has a clear and definite knowledge of what the war is all about. The greatest event of his day is when the Paris newspapers arrive.

What impressed me greatly was that in all the officers' quarters were copies of the French "Yellow Book," the English "White Paper" and German documents attempting to prove their innocence in causing the conflict. It is not sufficient for French Generals or officers just to go to war; they must know why they go to war, down to the last papers in the case. In six months the French privates have acquired one habit from the British Tommies—that is drinking tea. Back of every section of trenches I found huge tea canteens, where thousands of cups are served daily to the soldiers who have decided for the first time in their life they really like such stuff. There one sees more soldiers at the same time than at any other place in the fighting zone; there they sit and discuss the future calmly and confidently, there being a distinct feeling that the war is likely to be over next Summer.

No one knows what the Spring tactics of General Joffre will be. Along the section of the front I visited the officers are all satisfied that the Commander in Chief's "nibbling tactics" have forced the Germans to retire on the average of two to three miles all along the line. The very name of that great man is spoken with reverence, almost with awe, by his "children at the front."

I, therefore, from the facilities given me, can only make one assertion in summing up my opinion of the French grand army of 1915, that it is strong, courageous, scientifically intelligent, and well trained as a champion pugilist after months of preparation for the greatest struggle of his career. The French Army waits eager and ready for the gong.

## Dodging Shells

[From The London Morning Post, Feb. 1, 1915.]

The Echo de Paris has published today a letter that throws a considerable amount of light upon the psychology of the French soldier, and that shows how he behaves himself when subjected to very trying fire and compelled to act on his own initiative. It is written by the man to his wife, and is as follows:

I am acting as guard to a convoy, and am comfortably installed, with no work to do, in the house of an old woman who has lent me a candle and writing materials. I shan't be suffering from the cold in the way I have done on previous nights, as I have a roof over me and a fire. What luxury! It's been freezing for several nights, and you feel the frost when you are sleeping in the open. But that is nothing to the three days we passed in the village of ——. We were stationed in the mairie. In front of us in the clock tower an artillery Captain was taking observations. On the road between the church and the mairie a Sergeant and four artillerymen were sending orders to the battery behind us. Suddenly a shell struck. We saw the artillerymen on the ground and the Sergeant alone left standing.

The fire was so thick that no one could think of going out. But suddenly one of the men moved, so I got up to find out about it, taking care to put on my knapsack. When I was among them I found that one had been hit right in the heart; two others were dying, one with his head in a pulp and the other with his thigh broken and the calf of his leg torn to a jelly. I helped the Sergeant to mend the telephone wire that had been broken by the shell, and all the time we were having shells and bits of brick breaking around us.

Then I went back to the mairie, and asked for some one who would not be frightened to come with me. Two of us went off to the village for a stretcher. I found one at the old ambulance, and was just leaving it when I heard the scream of a shell, and took cover in the chimney—just in time. A big black brute smashed half the house in. My comrade and I hurried off after the wounded man. Our pals were watching us from the mairie, wondering if we should ever get back. Old Gérome, (that's me,) they said, will get back all right, and when back at the mairie I began to give the wounded man first aid. Another shell came along, and the place shook, window panes rained upon us, and dust blinded us, but at last it cleared.

Left alone with my wounded man I went on dressing him, and when the others got back I got them to help me take him to the schoolhouse near by. I got congratulated by my comrades and the senior Sergeant, but the Colonel and Lieutenant said nothing, though later I heard they were pleased with me, but suddenly the Colonel said: "We can't stop here. Go and see if there's room in the cellars of the castle for four officers and thirty men. If there is don't come back, as we will follow you."

We got there at last, two of us, but the owner took a long time opening. Meanwhile scraps of roofs and walls were raining on us, but with our knapsacks on our heads we were a bit protected. At last our knocks were answered, and we learned that there was room for four officers, but not for thirty men! The Colonel and the men had to be warned, so my comrade started running back and I followed about fifteen yards behind.

We passed a gap in the houses, with no cover, nothing but gardens. A shell came along. I dropped, while the other man hid in a doorway. The bits of it sang about our ears. I then sang out: "As you are nearly there, go on, and I'll see if there is room in the farm near by." I reached the houses and waited to see that he got through, because if he'd fallen I should have had to go back to warn the rest. As he was going two shells burst in the courtyard of the mairie, and I thought of the Colonel and the rest, but at last my comrade; reached the place and went in, and I was free to try for the farm.

VICE ADMIRAL SIR DAVID BEATTY—Youngest of British Admirals,
Whose Fleet Sank the Bluecher, and Won the Battle of the Bight of Heligoland—
(From the painting by Philip Alexius Laszlo de Lombos)

COUNT VON REVENTLOW—The German Naval Critic
Who Has Intimated That the United States
Might Be a Divided Nation in Case of War

On my way I met a friend and asked him to join me. At the time I was thinking of you all, and it was not till later that I got frightened. There were five horses at the gate of the farm. I shifted them and showed my friend the entrance to the cellar. It was narrow, and he lost time through his knapsack, and these are the occasions when your life depends on seconds. I heard the scream that I know only too well, and guessed where the beast would lodge, and called out to him "That's for us." I shrank back with my knapsack over my head and tried to bury myself in the corner among the coal.

I had no time, though. The shell reached, smashed down part of the house, and burst in the basement a couple of yards from me. I heard no more, but stone, plaster, and bricks fell all around me on the coal heap. I was gasping, but found myself untouched. I got up and saw the poultry struggling and the horses struck down. I ran to the cellar, with the same luck as my friend.

My knapsack caught me. A shell screamed a second time again for us, and it struck, wallop, on the gable, while the ruins fell around my head. I pulled at my knapsack so vigorously that I fell into the cellar, and some of our men who were there called "Here's a poor brute done in." Not a bit of it. I was not touched then either.... At last the bombardment stopped, and we all got out. I noticed about forty hens. Some were pulped. Others had had their heads and legs cut off. In the muddle three horses lay dead. Their saddles were in ribbons. Equipment, revolvers, swords, all that had been left above the cellar had vanished, but there were bits of them to be seen on the roof. My rifle, which had been torn from my hands, was in fragments, and I was stupefied at not having been hit. I noticed, however, that my wrappings that were rolled around my knapsack had been pierced by a splinter of shell that had stuck an it. Later in the evening when I started cutting at my bread the knife stuck. I broke the bread open and found another bit of shell in it. I don't yet know why I was not made mincemeat of that day. There were fifty chances to one against me.

The two following days I stopped in the cellar, hearing nothing but their big shells, while the farm and the buildings near it were smashed in. Now it is all over. I am all right and bored to death mounting guard over wagons ten miles from the firing line, with a crowd of countrymen who have been commandeered with their wagons.

I ought to tell you that the two shells I saw fall on the mairie when my comrade was going there unfortunately killed one and wounded five. It was a bit of luck for me, as I always used to be hanging about the courtyard. That's the sad side of it, but we have an amusing time all the same. [The writer goes on to explain how he and his friends dressed up some men of straw in uniform and induced the Germans to shoot at them, and finally to charge them, while they fired at the Germans and brought several of them down. He continues.]

But that's nothing to what they'll get, and their villages will get, and their mairies, chateaux, and farms, and cellars, when we get there. I will respect old men, women, and children, but let their fighting men look out. I don't mind sacrificing my life to do my duty, and to defend those I love and who love me, but if I've got to lose my skin I want to lose it in Boche-land. I want the joy of getting into their dirty Prussia to avenge our beautiful land. Bandits! Let them and their choucroute factories look out! If you saw the countryside we are recovering—there's nothing left but ruins. Everything burned and smashed to bits. Cattle, more dead than alive, are bolting in all directions, and as for our poor women, when I see them I would destroy everything.

Our officers say: "We'll never be able to hold our men when we get into their country." But I say that I want to go there all the same, and yet when I say that I had a German prisoner to guard at the mairie. I gave him half my bread and knocked walnuts off the trees for him. All the time I saw five or more villages in flames around. Well, it all proves that a soldier should never say what he will do tomorrow. My job is to protect the flag, and the Boches can come on. Before they get it they'll have to get me.... Vive la France!

## Somali Volunteers

[From The London Times, Nov. 10, 1914.]

We have received from a correspondent a copy of a petition signed by the principal Somali chiefs in Jubaland, praying that they may be allowed to fight for England. The terms of this interesting document are as follows:

To His Highness the Governor, Through the Hakim of Jubaland: Salaams, yea, many salaams, with God's mercy, blessing, and peace. After salaams,

We, the Somali of Jubaland, both Herti and Ogaden, comprising all the tribes and including the Maghavbul, but not including the Tulamuya Ogaden, who live in Biskaya and Tanaland and the Marehan, desire humbly to address you.

In former days the Somali have fought against the Government. Even lately the Marehan have fought against the Government. Now we have heard that the German Government have declared war on the English Government. Behold, our "fitna" against the English Government is finished. As the monsoon wind drives the sandhills of our coast into new forms, so does this news of German evildoing drive our hearts and spears into the service of the English Government. The Jubaland Somali are with the English Government. Daily in our mosques we pray for the success of the English armies. Day is as night and night is as day with us until we hear that the English are victorious. God knows the right. He will help the right. We have heard that Indian askaris have been sent to fight for us in Europe. Humbly we ask why should not the Somali fight for England also? We beg the Government to allow our warriors to show their loyalty. In former days the Somali tribes made fitna against each other. Even now it is so; it is our custom; yet, with the Government against the Germans, we are as one, ourselves, our warriors, our women, and our children. By God it is so. By God it is so. By God it is so.

A few days ago many troops of the military left this country to eat up the Germans who have invaded our country in Africa. May God prosper them. Yet, O Hakim, with all humbleness we desire to beg of the Government to allow our sons and warriors to take part in this great war against the German evildoers. They are ready. They are eager. Grant them the boon. God and Mohammed are with us all.

If Government wish to take away all the troops and police from Jubaland, it is good. We pledge ourselves to act as true Government askaris until they return.

We humbly beg that this our letter may be placed at the feet of our King and Emperor, who lives in England, in token of our loyalty and our prayers.

[Here follow the signatures of all the principal Somali chiefs and elders living in Jubaland.]

## When King Peter Re-Entered Belgrade

[From The New York Evening Post, Feb. 15, 1915.]

PARIS, Jan. 29.

So King Peter himself became priest; and the great cathedral was filled with the sobbing of his people.

Everybody knows the story of the deliverance of Belgrade; how the little Serbian Army fell back for strategic reasons as the Austrians entered the city, but finally, after seventeen days of fighting without rest, (for the Serbian Army has had no reserves since the Turkish war,) knit its forces together, marched 100 miles in three days, and drove the Austrians headlong out of the capital.

King Peter rode at the head of his army. Shrapnel from the Austrian guns was still bursting over the city. But the people were too much overjoyed to mind. They lined the sidewalks and threw flowers as the troops passed. The soldiers marched in close formation; the sprays clung to them, and they became a moving flower garden. The scream of an occasional shell was drowned in the cheers.

They are emotional people, these Serbians. And something told them that, even with death and desolation all about them, they had reason to be elated. A few hours before, the Austrians had been established in Belgrade, confident that they were there to stay for months, if not for years. Now they were fleeing headlong over the River Save, their commissariat jammed at the bridge, their fighting men in a rout.

So King Peter rode through the streets of the capital with his army, and came to the cathedral. The great church was locked, because the priests had left the city on errands of mercy. But a soldier went through a window and undid the portals. The King and his officers and some of the soldiers and as many of the people as could get in crowded into the cathedral. And, lacking some one to say mass, the King became a priest—which is an ancient function of Kings—and, as he knelt, the officers and soldiers and people knelt. There was a vast silence for a moment; and then, in every part of the church, a sobbing.

This account is a free translation of a woman's letter, in Serbian, received in this city a few days ago by Miss Helen Losanich, who is here with Mme. Slavko Grouitch to interest Americans in helping her countrymen back to their devastated farms. Mme. Grouitch is an American by birth; but Miss Losanich is a Serbian, with the black hair and burning black eyes of the Slavs, and boasting twenty years perhaps. Her sister, Mme. Marincovich, is wife of the Serbian Minister of Commerce and Agriculture. It was Mme. Marincovich who had written the letter.

"I've just had this letter from my sister in Serbia," cried Miss Losanich, when a friend called, and she waved in one hand a dozen sheets closely written in a script that resembled Russian. "I've hardly had time to read it myself. But we will sit down and translate it into English, if you say.

"She says here that, when the Austrians had to leave Belgrade, they took 1,200 people as hostages—non-combatants, you know. When they came into the city first they gave assurances that all non-combatants would be safe; but for the last few days before they left, no non-combatant could walk on the street without being taken up as a hostage.

"Just imagine, it says here that they even took a little boy. He can fight when he is older, they say. You know, the Turks used to do that. They came and took our boys of nine and ten years, and trained them as soldiers in their janissaries; and when they had forgotten their own country they sent them back to fight against it. It is terrible, isn't it!

"The Austrians took the furniture from our people's houses and carried it across the River Save to the Semlin. They behaved frightfully, my sister says; brought all kinds of people with them, including women from the very lowest class; broke into the houses and stole the ladies' toilettes. One lady with many beautiful dresses found them all cut to ribbons when she got back to Belgrade.

"The Austrians brought lots of tea and crackers and conserves with them. Some soldiers had taken a lady's evening gown and pinned strawberries from strawberry-jam all over it, in appropriate places, and laid the gown out for the lady to see."

A merry smile illuminated Miss Losanich's face as she read this part of the letter.

"Our brother," she went on, "entered Belgrade with the army. He came back to Nish on leave about Christmas, the Serbian Christmas, which is about thirteen days later than yours. Nish is the temporary capital; and my sister is there. He told them all about Belgrade. He had been to his house; the whole house was upset, drawers forced, old letters opened and thrown on the floor, papers strewn about, King Peter's picture (autographed by the King) thrown on the floor, and King Ferdinand's picture stamped on.

"Brother went to a private sanitarium that our uncle has in Belgrade. The Austrians had seized this, and had begun making it over for a hospital. They wanted the Bulgarian Red Cross installed. They had brought quantities of biscuits and tea and conserves. But they had to leave in such a hurry they couldn't take the things with them. 'And now,' my sister says, 'we are eating them!'

"Across the street four of our cousins live—young men. They are all at the front now"—Miss Losanich laughed outright as she read this part—"their house was entered and all their clothes taken; dress suits, smoking jackets, linen, and all those things. It makes me laugh; it's naughty, I know. But they used to go out a good deal. I have seen them in those clothes so often. One of them wanted to marry me. He used to go out a great deal"—this with another merry peal of laughter.

"Mme. Grouitch's house was undisturbed; and ours. We used to know the Austrian attaché before the war. He was rather a nice fellow. Played tennis with us a good deal, and so on. He came into Belgrade with his army, and he came around to our house. The servants recognized him, because, you see, they knew him. The servants had stayed behind. He seemed to think he would like to make my sister's house his quarters, but after he had thought about it a while he went away.

"She says that she would like to go back to Belgrade, but the railroad has been destroyed—a big viaduct of stone at Ralya, about 17 kilometers from Belgrade; and they have to go from Ralya to Belgrade by carriage. There are so many wagons of the commissariat on the road—so many carriages have been seized by the Government—it is impossible for private citizens to get through.

"A gibbet was put up in the square after the Austrians came into the city and a man was hanged the first morning, in spite of the fact that the Austrians had promised safety to the non-combatants. Dr. Edward Ryan, the head of the American Red Cross in Belgrade, protested, and the gibbet was taken down. But my sister says that eighteen more people were hanged in the fortress down by the Save—she hears—where they wouldn't be seen.

"Mr. Bisserce, a Belgian, is director of the electric lighting plant in Belgrade. He is a nice man, and, being a Belgian, he does not like the Austrians. He wouldn't light the town until they made him, and he wouldn't give them a map of the system at all. He was bound in ropes and taken away as a hostage, and they haven't heard from him since.

"The most touching thing was the entrance of King Peter—" whereupon Miss Losanich told the story related above.

"Rubbish, straw, and dead horses were strewn through all the streets when the King and the army came in. The shooting was still going on. There was a jam of commissariat wagons at the bridge—you know there is a bridge across the Save. The Austrians couldn't get across fast enough, there was so much confusion—too many wanting to get over at one time. The Serbian artillery was shooting at them all the time. Presently the middle of the bridge went down. The men and the horses and the carriages and the wagons all went down together. They were pinned down by the masses of stone, but there were so many of them that they filled up the river and stuck up above the water. It was so bad that our people couldn't clear it up—so there is an awful odor all over the town.

"She says that the Austrians brought 17,000 wounded, thinking that they were going to stay for months—and perhaps for ever. They turned over quantities of them to Dr. Ryan at the American Red Cross Hospital.

"General Franck, the Austrian commander, made a remark—and he must have made it to Dr. Ryan, although my sister doesn't say so. General Franck said: 'If the Russians had fought the way the Serbians have, there wouldn't be an Austrian soldier left!'

"That's a good deal for the head of the Austrians to say, isn't it? We always expected victory; but even the most optimistic of us were surprised at what our peasant soldiers did.

"In the flight, the Austrians could not take care of their wounded, she says, and sent them back to Belgrade, many of them, as prisoners. Many must have died during the flight, too, for they got a jolting that wounded men can't stand.

"Our brother, who was a professor of chemistry, is a Sergeant now in charge of two German Krupp guns, which were captured from Turkey in the other war. He is at Banovo Brdo, a residence section outside Belgrade, on a hill. All the villas have been destroyed by the Austrian artillery fire.

"And," continued Miss Losanich, "she says that the toys sent by the Americans were received in Nish and distributed to the poor children for Christmas, and that the feeling of cordiality toward the Americans is growing fast."

## The Dragon's Teeth

BY CAROLINE DUER

Oh, sunny, quiet, fruitful fields of France,

Golden and green a month ago,

Through you the great red tides of war's advance

Sweep raging to and fro.

For patient toil of years,

Blood, fire and tears

Reward you now!

The dragon's teeth are sown, and in a night

There springs to life the armed host!

And men leap forth bewildered to the fight,

Legion for legion lost!

"Toll for my tale of sons,"

Roar out the guns,

"Cost what it cost!"

This is a "holy war"! A holy war?

With thousand millions maimed and dead!

To show one Power dares more than others dare—

That higher rears one Head!

How will you count your gain,

Lord of the slain,

When all is said?

The dragon's teeth are sown, and in a night

There springs to life the armed host!

And men leap forth bewildered to the fight,

Legion for legion lost!

"Toll for my tale of sons,"

Roar out the guns,

"Cost what it cost!"

Oh, tragedy of Nations! Who may see

The outcome, or foretell the end?

Hark men and weeping women, misery

That none may mend.

Ruin in peaceful marts,

Dazed commerce, stricken arts.

God, to the ravaged hearts

Some mercy send!

The dragon's teeth are sown, and in a night

There springs to life the armed host!

And men leap forth bewildered to the fight,

Legion for legion lost!

"Toll for my tale of sons,"

Roar out the guns,

"Cost what it cost!"

Copyright, 1914, by The New York Times Company.

## The Greatest of Campaigns

## The French Official Account

The Associated Press received in London on March 5, 1915, an official French historical review of the operations in the western theatre of war from its beginning up to the end of January, the first six months, which in terseness and dramatic power will rank among the world's most important military documents. The first chapter of the review was released for publication by The Associated Press on March 16 and appears below. It is one of those documents, rare in military annals, that frankly confesses a succession of initial reverses and official incompetence, only retrieved by exercise of the utmost skill in retreat.

### CHAPTER I

#### THE FRENCH SETBACKS IN AUGUST.

The first month of the campaign began with successes and finished with defeats for the French troops. Under what circumstances did these come about?

Our plan of concentration had foreseen the possibility of two principal actions, one on the right between the Vosges and the Moselle, the other on the left to the north of Verdun-Toul line, this double possibility involving the eventual variation of our transport. On Aug. 2, owing to the Germans passing through Belgium, our concentration was substantially modified by General Joffre in order that our principal effort might be directed to the north.

From the first week in August it was apparent that the length of time required for the British Army to begin to move would delay our action in connection with it. This delay is one of the reasons which explain our failures at the end of August.

Awaiting the moment when the operations in the north could begin, and to prepare for it by retaining in Alsace the greatest possible number of German forces, the General in Chief ordered our troops to occupy Mulhouse, (Mülhousen,) to cut the bridges of the Rhine at Huningue and below, and then to flank the attack of our troops, operating in Lorraine.

This operation was badly carried out by a leader who was at once relieved of his command. Our troops, after having carried Mulhouse, lost it and were thrown back on Belfort. The work had, therefore, to be recommenced afresh, and this was done from Aug. 14 under a new command.

Mulhouse was taken on the 19th, after a brilliant fight at Dornach. Twenty-four guns were captured from the enemy. On the 20th we held the approaches to Colmar, both by the plain and by the Vosges. The enemy had undergone enormous losses and abandoned great stores of shells and forage, but from this moment what was happening in Lorraine and on our left prevented us from carrying our successes further, for our troops in Alsace were needed elsewhere. On Aug. 28 the Alsace army was broken up, only a small part remaining to hold the region of Thann and the Vosges.

#### THE OPERATIONS IN LORRAINE.

The purpose of the operations in Alsace was, namely, to retain a large part of the enemy's forces far from the northern theatre of operations. It was for our offensive in Lorraine to pursue still more directly by holding before it the German army corps operating to the south of Metz.

This offensive began brilliantly on Aug. 14. On the 19th we had reached the region of Saarburg and that of the Etangs, (lakes,) and we held Dieuze, Morhange, Delme, and Château Salins.

On the 20th our success was stopped. The cause is to be found in the strong organization of the region, in the power of the enemy's artillery, operating over ground which had been minutely surveyed, and, finally, in the default of certain units.

On the 22d, in spite of the splendid behavior of several of our army corps, notably that of Nancy, our troops were brought back on to the Grand Couronne, while on the 23d and 24th the Germans concentrated reinforcements—three army corps, at least—in the region of Lunéville and forced us to retire to the south.

This retreat, however, was only momentary. On the 25th, after two vigorous counter-attacks, one from south to north and the other from west to east, the enemy had to fall back. From that time a sort of balance was established on this terrain between the Germans and ourselves. Maintained for fifteen days, it was afterward, as will be seen, modified to our advantage.

#### OPERATIONS IN BELGIAN LUXEMBOURG.

There remained the principal business, the battle of the north—postponed owing to the necessity of waiting for the British Army. On Aug. 20 the concentration of our lines was finished and the General in Chief gave orders for our centre and our left to take the offensive. Our centre comprised two armies. Our left consisted of a third army, reinforced to the extent of two army corps, a corps of cavalry, the reserve divisions, the British Army, and the Belgian Army, which had already been engaged for the previous three weeks at Liège, Namur, and Louvain.

The German plan on that date was as follows: From seven to eight army corps and four cavalry divisions were endeavoring to pass between Givet and Brussels, and even to prolong their movements more to the west. Our object was, therefore, in the first place, to hold and dispose of the enemy's centre and afterward to throw ourselves with all available forces on the left flank of the German grouping of troops in the north.

On Aug. 21 our offensive in the centre began with ten army corps. On Aug. 22 it failed, and this reverse appeared serious.

The reasons for it are complex. There were in this affair individual and collective failures, imprudences committed under the fire of the enemy, divisions ill-engaged, rash deployments, precipitate retreats, a premature waste of men, and, finally, the inadequacy of certain of our troops and their leaders, both as regards the use of infantry and artillery.

In consequence of these lapses the enemy, turning to account the difficult terrain, was able to secure the maximum of profit from the advantages which the superiority of his subaltern complements gave him.

#### OPERATIONS SOUTH OF SAMBRE.

In spite of this defeat our manoeuvre had still a chance of success, if our left and the British Army obtained a decisive result. This was unfortunately not the case. On Aug. 22, at the cost of great losses, the enemy succeeded in crossing the Sambre and our left army fell back on the 24th upon Beaumont-Givet, being perturbed by the belief that the enemy was threatening its right.

On the same day, (the 24th,) the British Army fell back after a German attack upon the Maubeuge-Valenciennes line. On the 25th and 26th its retreat became more hurried. After Landrecies and Le Cateau it fell back southward by forced marches. It could not from this time keep its hold until after crossing the Marne.

The rapid retreat of the English, coinciding with the defeat sustained in Belgian Luxembourg, allowed the enemy to cross the Meuse and to accelerate, by fortifying it, the action of his right.

The situation at this moment may be thus summed up: Either our frontier had to be defended on the spot under conditions which the British retreat rendered extremely perilous, or we had to execute a strategic retirement which, while delivering up to the enemy a part of the national soil, would permit us, on the other hand, to resume the offensive at our own time with a favorable disposition of troops, still intact, which we had at our command. The General in Chief determined on the second alternative.

#### PREPARATION OF THE OFFENSIVE.

Henceforward the French command devoted its efforts to preparing the offensive. To this end three conditions had to be fulfilled:

1. The retreat had to be carried out in order under a succession of counter-attacks which would keep the enemy busy.

2. The extreme point of this retreat must be fixed in such a way that the different armies should reach it simultaneously, ready at the moment of occupying it to resume the offensive all together.

3. Every circumstance permitting of a resumption of the offensive before this point should be reached must be utilized by the whole of our forces and the British forces.

#### THE FRENCH COUNTER-ATTACK.

The counter-attacks, executed during the retreat, were brilliant and often fruitful. On Aug. 20 we successfully attacked St. Quentin to disengage the British Army. Two other corps and a reserve division engaged the Prussian Guard and the Tenth German Army Corps, which was debouching from Guise. By the end of the day, after various fluctuations, the enemy was thrown back on the Oise and the British front was freed.

On Aug. 27 we had also succeeded in throwing back upon the Meuse the enemy, who was endeavoring to gain a foothold on the left bank. Our successes continued on the 28th in the woods of Marfée and of Jaulnay. Thanks to them we were able, in accordance with the orders of the General in Chief, to fall back on the Buzancy-Le Chesne-Bouvellemont line.

Further to the right another army took part in the same movement and carried out successful attacks on Aug. 25 on the Othain and in the region of Spincourt.

On the 26th these different units recrossed the Meuse without being disturbed and were able to join in the action of our centre. Our armies were, therefore, again intact and available for the offensive.

On Aug. 26 a new army composed of two army corps, five reserve divisions, and a Moorish brigade was constituted. This army was to assemble in the region of Amiens between Aug. 27 and Sept. 1 and take the offensive against the German right, uniting its action with that of the British Army, operating on the line of Ham-Bray-sur-Somme.

#### CONTINUATION OF THE RETREAT.

The hope of resuming the offensive was from this moment rendered vain by the rapidity of the march of the German right wing. This rapidity had two consequences, which we had to parry before thinking of advancing. On the one hand, our new army had not time to complete its detraining, and, on the other hand, the British Army, forced back further by the enemy, uncovered on Aug. 31 our left flank. Our line, thus modified, contained waves which had to be redressed before we could pass to the offensive.

To understand this it is sufficient to consider the situation created by the quick advance of the enemy on the evening of Sept. 2.

A corps of cavalry had crossed the Oise and advanced as far as Château Thierry. The First Army, (General von Kluck,) comprising four active army corps and a reserve corps, had passed Compiègne.

The Second Army, (General von Bülow,) with three active army corps and two reserve corps, was reaching the Laon region.

The Third Army, (General von Hausen,) with two active army corps and a reserve corps, had crossed the Aisne between the Château Porcien and Attigny.

More to the east the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Armies, namely, twelve army corps, four reserve corps, and numerous Ersatz formations, were in contact with our troops, the Fourth and Fifth Armies between Vouziers and Verdun and the others in the positions which have been indicated above, from Verdun to the Vosges.

It will, therefore, be seen that our left, if we accepted battle, might be in great peril through the British forces and the new French Army, operating more to the westward, having given way.

A defeat in these conditions would have cut off our armies from Paris and from the British forces and at the same time from the new army which had been constituted to the left of the English. We should thus be running the risk of losing by a single stroke the advantage of the assistance which Russia later on was to furnish.

General Joffre chose resolutely for the solution which disposed of these risks, that is to say, for postponing the offensive and the continuance of the retreat. In this way he remained on ground which he had chosen. He waited only until he could engage in better conditions.

In consequence, on Sept. 1, he fixed as an extreme limit for the movement of retreat, which was still going on, the line of Bray-sur-Seine, Nogent-sur-Seine, Arcis-sur-Aube, Vitry-le-François, and the region to the north of Bar-le-Duc. This line might be reached if the troops were compelled to go back so far. They would attack before reaching it, as soon as there was a possibility of bringing about an offensive disposition, permitting the co-operation of the whole of our forces.

#### THE EVE OF THE OFFENSIVE.

On Sept. 5 it appeared that this desired situation existed.

The First Germany Army, carrying audacity to temerity, had continued its endeavor to envelop our left, had crossed the Grand Morin, and reached the region of Chauffry, to the south of Rebaix and of Esternay. It aimed then at cutting our armies off from Paris, in order to begin the investment of the capital.

The Second Army had its head on the line Champaubert, Etoges, Bergeres, and Vertus.

The Third and Fourth Armies reached to Chalons-sur-Marne and Bussy-le-Repos. The Fifth Army was advancing on one side and the other from the Argonne as far as Triacourt-les-Islettes and Juivecourt. The Sixth and Seventh Armies were attacking more to the east.

But—and here is a capital difference between the situation of Sept. 5 and that of Sept. 2—the envelopment of our left was no longer possible.

In the first place, our left army had been able to occupy the line of Sézanne, Villers-St. Georges and Courchamps. Furthermore, the British forces, gathered between the Seine and the Marne, flanked on their left by the newly created army, were closely connected with the rest of our forces.

This was precisely the disposition which the General in Chief had wished to see achieved. On the 4th he decided to take advantage of it, and ordered all the armies to hold themselves ready. He had taken from his right two new army corps, two divisions of infantry, and two divisions of cavalry, which were distributed between his left and his centre.

On the evening of the 5th he addressed to all the commanders of armies a message ordering them to attack.

"The hour has come," he wrote, "to advance at all costs, and to die where you stand rather than give way."

(To be continued in the next issue.)

## By The North Sea.

By W.L. COURTNEY.

[From King Albert's Book.]

Death and Sorrow and Sleep:

Here where the slow waves creep,

This is the chant I hear,

The chant of the measureless deep.

What was sorrow to me

Then, when the young life free

Thirsted for joys of earth

Far from the desolate sea?

What was Sleep but a rest,

Giving to youth the best

Dreams from the ivory gate,

Visions of God manifest?

What was Death but a tale

Told to faces grown pale,

Worn and wasted with years—

A meaningless thing to the bale?

Death and Sorrow and Sleep:

Now their sad message I keep,

Tossed on the wet wind's breath,

The chant of the measureless deep.

## When Marthe Chenal Sang the "Marseillaise"

By Wythe Williams

[From THE NEW YORK TIMES, Feb. 14, 1915.]

I went to the Opéra Comique the other day to hear Marthe Chenal sing the "Marseillaise." For several weeks previous I had heard a story going the rounds of what is left of Paris life to the effect that if one wanted a regular old-fashioned thrill he really should go to the Opéra Comique on a day when Mlle. Chenal closed the performance by singing the French national hymn. I was told there would be difficulty in securing a seat.

I was rather skeptical. I also considered that I had had sufficient thrills since the beginning of the war, both old fashioned and new. I believed also that I had already heard the "Marseillaise" sung under the best possible circumstances to produce thrills. One of the first nights after mobilization 10,000 Frenchmen filled the street beneath the windows of THE NEW YORK TIMES office, where I was at work. They sang the "Marseillaise" for two hours, with a solemn hatred of their national enemy sounding in every note. The solemnity changed to a wild passion as the night wore on. Finally, cuirassiers of the guard rode through the street to disperse the mob. It was a terrific scene.

So I was willing to admit that the "Marseillaise" is probably the most thrilling and most martial national song ever written, but I was just not keen on the subject of thrills.

Then one day a sedate friend went to the Opéra Comique and came away in a raving condition. It was a week before his ardor subsided. He declared that this rendition of a song was something that will be referred to in future years. "Why," he said, "when the war is over the French will talk about it in the way Americans still talk concerning Jenny Lind at Castle Garden, or De Wolf Hopper reciting 'Casey at the Bat.'"

This induced me to go. I was convinced that whether I got a thrill or not the singing of the "Marseillaise" by Chenal had become a distinct feature of Paris life during the war.

I never want to go again. To go again might deepen my impression—might better register the thrill. But then it might not be just the same. I would be keyed to such expectancy that I might be disappointed. Persons in the seats behind me might whisper. And just as Chenal got to the "Amour sacré de la patrie" some one might cough. I am confident that something of the sort would surely happen. I want always to remember that ten minutes while Chenal was on the stage just as I remember it now. So I will not go again.

The first part of the performance was Donizetti's "Daughter of the Regiment," beautifully sung by members of the regular company. But somehow the spectacle of a fat soprano nearing forty in the role of the twelve-year-old vivandière, although impressive, was not sublime. A third of the audience were soldiers. In the front row of the top balcony were a number of wounded. Their bandaged heads rested against the rail. Several of them yawned.

After the operetta came a "Ballet of the Nations." The "nations," of course, represented the Allies. We had the delectable vision of the Russian ballerina dancing with arms entwined about several maids of Japan. The Scotch lassies wore violent blue jackets. The Belgian girls carried large pitchers and rather wept and watered their way about the stage. There were no thrills.

After the intermission there was not even available standing space. The majority of the women were in black—the prevailing color in these days. The only touches of brightness and light were in the uniforms of the officers liberally sprinkled through the orchestra and boxes.

Then came "Le Chant du Depart," the famous song of the revolution. The scene was a little country village. The principals were the officer, the soldier, the wife, the mother, the daughter, and the drummer boy. There was a magnificent soldier chorus and the fanfare of drums and trumpets. The audience then became honestly enthusiastic. I concluded that the best Chenal could do with the "Marseillaise," which was next on the programme, would be an anti-climax.

The orchestra played the opening bars of the martial music. With the first notes the vast audience rose. I looked up at the row of wounded leaning heavily against the rail, their eyes fixed and staring on the curtain. I noticed the officers in the boxes, their eyes glistening. I heard a convulsive catch in the throats of persons about me. Then the curtain lifted.

I do not remember what was the stage setting. I do not believe I saw it. All I remember was Chenal standing at the top of a short flight of steps, in the centre near the back drop. I indistinctly remember that the rest of the stage was filled with the soldier chorus and that near the footlights on either side were clusters of little children.

"Up, sons of France, the call of glory"——

Chenal swept down to the footlights. The words of the song swept over the audience like a bugle call. The singer wore a white silk gown draped in perfect Grecian folds. She wore the large black Alsatian head dress, in one corner of which was pinned a small tri-colored cockade. She has often been called the most beautiful woman in Paris. The description was too limited. With the next lines she threw her arms apart, drawing out the folds of the gown into the tricolor of France—heavy folds of red silk draped over one arm and blue over the other. Her head was thrown back. Her tall, slender figure simply vibrated with the feeling of the words that poured forth from her lips. She was noble. She was glorious. She was sublime. With the "March on, March on" of the chorus, her voice arose high and fine over the full orchestra, and even above her voice could be sensed the surging emotions of the audience that seemed to sweep over the house in waves.

I looked up at the row of wounded. One man held his bandaged head between his hands and was crying. An officer in a box, wearing the gorgeous uniform of the headquarters staff, held a handkerchief over his eyes.

Through the second verse the audience alternately cheered and stamped their feet and wept. Then came the wonderful "Amour sacré de la patrie"—sacred love of home and country—verse. The crashing of the orchestra ceased, dying away almost to a whisper. Chenal drew the folds of the tricolor cloak about her. Then she bent her head and, drawing the flag to her lips, kissed it reverently. The first words came like a sob from her soul. From then until the end of the verse, when her voice again rang out over the renewed efforts of the orchestra, one seemed to live through all the glorious history of France. At the very end, when Chenal drew a short jeweled sword from the folds of her gown and stood, silent and superb, with the folds of the flag draped about her, while the curtain rang slowly down, she seemed to typify both Empire and Republic throughout all time. All the best of the past seemed concentrated there as that glorious woman, with head raised high, looked into the future.

And as I came out of the theatre with the silent audience I said to myself that a nation with a song and a patriotism such as I had just witnessed could not vanish from the earth—nor again be vanquished.

## A War of Commerce to Follow

By Sir William Ramsay

That commerce in Germany is regarded as war, that the "powerful mass of the German State" is projected into methods meant to kill off the trade of other nations, and that after the war between the nations the German war with British trade will be resumed, is the burden of this address. Sir William Ramsay delivered it in Manchester on Jan. 22, 1915, before representatives of British associations of employers and of leading industrial concerns in many parts of the United Kingdom, making up the Employers' Parliamentary Association. Sir William is one of the world's great chemists.

I suppose that among my audience some are convinced free traders, while some believe that our commercial interests would be better served by a measure of protection. This is neither the time nor the place, nor have I the knowledge and ability for a discussion of this much-debated question. Nor will I reveal my own private views, except in so far as to say that I agree with the majority. But, as the question cannot be ignored, I should like to say that I hold firmly the conviction that all trade should be carried on for the mutual advantage of the parties engaged. The old fable of Æsop may be quoted, which relates to a quarrel between the different members of the body. Every one of us can be, and should be, helpful to every other, independent of nation, country, and creed. That is, I am sure, what lies on the conscience of each one of us, as an ultimate end to be struggled for, although perhaps by many considered unattainable.

For the same kind of reason, it appears to me that we all think that peace is a blessing, and war a curse. For under peace commerce and industry prosper; science and the arts flourish; friendships are made and adorn the amenities of life. Moreover, our religious traditions in all Christian countries, and in some non-Christian ones like China, influence us to believe that war is wrong, indefensible, and, in the present year of our Lord, an anachronism.

We imagined, perhaps not most, but many of us, that no important European nation thought differently. Your leading Liberal paper, The Manchester Guardian, on July 22, 1908, wrote, "Germany, though the most military of nations, is probably the least warlike"; and this doubtless represented the views of the majority of Englishmen. Some of us knew better. I have, or had, many German friends; we have lived for many years on a footing of mutual kindliness; but it was impossible to disregard the signs of the times. The reason of this war is at bottom, as we have now discovered, the existence of a wholly different ideal in the Germanic mind from that which lies at the base of the Latin, Anglo-Saxon, Dutch, or Scandinavian nations. Such a statement as this is sweeping; it can be illustrated by a trivial tale. In 1912 an international scientific congress met at Berlin; I was a member. Although the conventional language was German, in compliment to our hosts, it turned out that in the long run all discussions were conducted in French. After such a sitting, the members separated, the German committee remaining behind for business purposes. The question of language was raised, I think by a Dutchman, in the corridor. Of the representatives of the fourteen or fifteen nations present, all were agreed on this—that they were not going to be compelled to publish in German; some chose English; some French; Spanish was suggested as a simple and easily understood language; but there was no love lost between the "foreign" and the German representatives, and this not the least on personal, but purely on national grounds. Acknowledging to the full the existence of high-minded German gentlemen, it is a sad fact that the character of the individuals of the nation is not acceptable to individuals of other nations. Listen to a quotation from a letter I have received from a very distinguished Swiss: "Une chose me frappait aussi, dans les tendances allemandes, une incroyable inconscience. Accaparer le bien d'autrui leur paraissait si naturel qu'ils ne comprenaient même pas que l'on eût quelque desir de se défendre. Le monde entier était fait pour constituer le champ d'exploitation de l'Allemagne, et celui qui s'opposait á l'accomplissement de cette destinée était, pour tout allemand, l'objet d'une surprise." [Translation: "One thing has also struck me in German tendencies; that is an unbelievable want of conscience. To grab the belongings of others appeared to them so natural, that they did not understand that one had some wish to defend himself. The whole world was made for the field of German operations, and whoever placed himself in opposition to the accomplishment of this destiny was for every German the object of surprise."] The view is not new; the feeling of surprise at opposition was expressed wittily by a French poet in the words:

Cet animal est trés mechant;

Lorsqu'on l'attaque, il se defend.

This animal is full of spite;

If you attack him, he will bite.

Well, gentlemen, this war has opened the eyes of some of us, and has confirmed the fears of others. Not one of us wanted to fight. Our hand was forced, so that we could not have abstained without national and personal dishonor.

Now, I do not think it is even yet realized that Germany's methods in trade have been, and are, as far as possible identical, with her methods in war. Let me rub this in. As long ago as 1903, at a meeting of the Society of Chemical Industry, under the Presidency of your fellow-citizen, Mr. Levinstein, I pointed out that under the German State there was a trade council, the object of which was to secure and keep trade for Germany. This council had practical control of duties, bounties, and freights; its members were representative of the different commercial interests of the empire; and they acted, as a rule, without control from the Reichstag. You can read what I said for yourselves, if you think it worth while, in The Journal of the Society of Chemical Industry for 1903.

Let me give you a simple case of the operations of that trade council. Ex uno disce omnes. A certain firm had a fairly profitable monopoly in a chemical product which it had maintained for many years. It was not a patented article, but one for which the firm had discovered a good process of manufacture. About six years ago this firm found that its Liverpool custom was being transferred to German makers. On inquiry, it transpired that the freight on this particular article from Hamburg to Liverpool had been lowered. The firm considered its position, and by introducing economies it found that it could still compete at a profit. A year later German manufacturers lowered the price substantially, so that the English firm could not sell without making a dead loss. It transpired that the lowering of price was due to a heavy export bounty being paid to the German manufacturers by the German State.

It is the bringing of the heavy machinery of State to bear on the minutiæ of commerce which makes it impossible to compete with such methods. One article after another is attacked, as opportunity offers; British manufacture is killed; and Germany acquires a monopoly. No trade is safe; its turn may not have come.

Much has been said about British manufacture of dyestuffs, and much nonsense has been written about the lack of young British chemists to help in their manufacture. There is no lack of able inventive young British chemists. Owing to the unfairness of German competition by methods just exemplified, a manufacturer, as a rule, does not care to risk capital in the payment of a number of chemists for making "fine chemicals." He finds "heavy chemicals" simpler. I do not wonder at his decision, though I lament it. There are also other reasons. The duty on methyl alcohol (for which no rebate is given) makes it impossible to introduce economically methyl groups into dyes; the restrictions incident on the use of duty-free alcohol do not commend themselves to manufacturers; these constitute other obstacles in the way of the British color maker. Lastly, our patent regulations are even yet not what they might be, although an attempt has recently been made to improve them. The British manufacturer is thus trebly handicapped.

Besides, the English competitor is at a disadvantage owing to what may be termed systematic and fraudulent attacks, for which no redress has been obtainable. Thus the manufacturers of Sheffield still complain, I suppose justly, that German articles for foreign consumption bear the words "Sheffield steel" stamped upon them. I myself have been approached by a German swindler with the proposition that I should assist his firm in infringing patents; he was surprised and pained to learn that I did not consider his proposal an honorable one.

Nor are methods like these confined to business or manufacture; they have greatly affected British shipping. Our shipping companies, in good faith, have associated themselves with others in "conferences," apparently for the mutual advantage of all, forgetting that behind the German companies lay the powerful mass of the German State. Tramp steamers, and with them cheap freights to the East, have been eliminated. The Royal Commission on Shipping Rings, which met some years ago, referring to the system obtaining in Germany, and fostered by the German Government, on charging through rates on goods from towns in the interior to the port of destination, observed in its report: "Such rates constitute a direct subsidy to the export trade of German manufacturers, and an indirect subsidy to those German lines by whom alone they are available. And as they are only rendered possible by the action of the German Government, it appears to us that the British lines can in no way be held responsible for the preferences which these rates afford to German goods." Now, our Government pays large mail subsidies to many of our shipping companies. Could these not be so utilized that it would become impossible for Germans to capture our trade by indirect state bounties?

These are a few examples (and your greater knowledge will enable you to supplement them with many others) of the methods which have been employed against us by Germans with the co-operation—nay, the active support—of their State.

Of late a new factor has appeared. The German Imperial Chancellor made his noteworthy (or notorious) remark about a "scrap of paper." And Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, speaking in the Reichstag, acknowledged openly that the German Nation had been guilty of a "wrong" to Belgium. This breach of faith has the approval of the whole German people. Do they realize what it means? Are they not aware that no treaty, political or otherwise, with the German people is worth the paper it is written on? That the country and its inhabitants have forfeited all claims to trust? That no one, in future, should make a bargain with a German, knowing that he is a dishonorable and dishonored man?... Germany has made many blunders—an almost inconceivable number of blunders; but this blundering crime is surely the culminating point of blunder. Did any nation ever before deliberately throw away its political, commercial, financial, and social credit to no purpose? To gain what? England as an adversary, and the contempt of the whole civilized world. Her treatment of the poor Belgian civilians has added to contempt, loathing and scorn.

Now, gentlemen, you see our problem. At, the end of this war we shall have Germans again as trade rivals; if there is a German State our German rivals will be backed by their State. They will, as they have done before, steal our inventions, use trickery and fraud to oust us from world markets, and we know now that we need not expect any bargain to be binding. I am not a commercial man; science is supposed to be above such trickery. Yet I read a few days ago, not as a single example, but only as the last I happen to remember, an article by a distinguished American professor, protesting with great moderation that an important scientific generalization which he published in 1902 had been annexed, without acknowledgment, by a versatile and adroit professor in the University of Berlin—an acquaintance of my own—in the year 1906; and it was not until 1910 that the latter was made to confess his guilt, with much subterfuge and blustering.

Commerce, indeed, is in Germany regarded as war; we now know it, and we must meet war by war. How is that war to be waged?

I can see only two methods. One is recommended by a writer in The Observer of the 10th inst., who acknowledges himself to have been a lifelong free trader. His remedy is a 25 per cent. duty on all German goods, and on German goods only, imported (or rather offered for import) into Great Britain and her colonies, and also that German passenger liners and freight boats should not be allowed to call at any one of the ports of the empire. His reasons are fully stated in his letter; it is signed "A City Merchant."

The other method is perhaps less apt to offend free trade susceptibilities; it is to impose on what remains of our opponents at the conclusion of this war free trade for a term of years. It remains to be seen whether we shall be powerful enough to insist on this measure, or to persuade our allies that it is one likely to fulfill the proposed end. It is, so far as I see, the only other alternative.

Those who are thoroughly convinced of the benefits of free trade should welcome this suggestion, unless, indeed, they think that such a blessing is not deserved by Germany. On the other hand, they may comfort themselves with the certain knowledge that no possible punishment inflicted on the Germans could possibly be more galling and repulsive to them. Doubtless, too, it would suit the books of our allies very well, who could impose on German goods any duty they thought fit, and deposit their surplus and inferior goods in Germany at a price which would defy competition. But these are questions which I must leave to those more conversant with the merits and demerits of free trade and protection than I am.

Whatever view you take, you cannot but acknowledge that the situation calls for early and anxious deliberation, and well-thought-out and firm action; and it must be action taken as a nation—through our Government—whatever the political complexion of the Government may be at the close of the war. It is for you, as members of the Employers' Parliamentary Association, to make up your minds what you wish to do; above all, to agree, and to take steps to force the Government in power to carry out your wishes.

## Belgium.

By EDITH WHARTON.

[From King Albert's Book.]

La Belgique regrette rien.

Not with her ruined silver spires,

Not with her cities shamed and rent,

Perish the imperishable fires

That shape the homestead from the tent.

Wherever men are stanch and free,

There shall she keep her fearless state,

And, homeless, to great nations be

The home of all that makes them great.

## Desired Peace Terms for Europe

## Outlined by Proponents for the Allies and for Germany

The following forecast of the terms of peace which the Allies could enforce upon Germany and Austria is made for The New York Times Current History by a former Minister of France, one of the leading publicists of the French Republic:

The Allies will decline to treat with any member of the Hohenzollern or Hapsburg family or any delegates representing them and will insist on dealing with delegations representing the German and Austro-Hungarian people elected by their respective Parliaments or by direct vote of the people, if they so desire.

The Allies will facilitate in every possible way negotiations between Austria-Hungary and Italy with a view to the latter obtaining the southern part of the Tyrol, known as Trentino, and the Peninsula of Istria, known as Trieste.

The 200 miles "strait" channel (Dardanelles, Sea of Marmora, and Bosporus,) between Turkey in Europe and Turkey in Asia, is to be declared free to the ships of all nations, and under the direction of an international commission, which will also administer Turkey in Europe and form a permanent court of arbitration for all questions which may arise among Rumania, Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro, and Greece. In settling the status of Albania respect will be paid to the wishes of the inhabitants.

Alsace and Lorraine, after rectifications of the French boundary line in accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants, are to be annexed to Belgium, whose permanent neutrality will be guaranteed by the powers. Schleswig-Holstein is to be returned to Denmark and the Kiel Canal made an international waterway, under either an international commission or a company which will operate it as the Suez Canal is operated.

Poland is to be declared an autonomous State under the protection of Russia, and its boundaries are to be restored as they were in 1715.

The Allies will also entertain a proposition for the restoration of the independence of Hungary and the geographical integrity of the country as it was in 1715.

The delegates representing the German people must pledge themselves that military conscription shall be abolished among them for a period of twenty-five years.

The status of all German colonies and protectorates is to be settled by a joint commission appointed by the Governments of England, Japan, and France.

The ownership of Italy and Greece to the Aegean Islands, now in their respective possessions, is to be confirmed by the powers and guarantees shall be given that the said islands shall not be fortified.

The ownership of England to the Island of Cyprus is to be confirmed by the powers and her protectorate over Egypt acknowledged.

The Mediterranean Sea is to be declared a "maritime area" to be policed by England, France, and Italy.

Here is the declaration of peace terms by the Central Committee for National Patriotic Organization of England:

Great Britain can never willingly make peace with Germany until the power of Prussian militarism is completely destroyed and there is no possibility of our children or our children's children being forced again to fight for the national existence. As far as we are concerned, this is a fight to a definite finish. We must either win all along the line or we must be completely defeated and our empire destroyed. Our allies fully share the same conviction. The thousands of lives already lost, and, alas! still to be lost, will have been tragically wasted if the German menace remains to terrorize Europe and to stunt the progress of civilization. In order to convince public opinion that the only peace worth having is a peace absolutely on our own terms, a Central Committee for National Patriotic Organization has been formed from the members of all the four political parties. The committee will, in addition, take steps to lay a clear statement of the British case before neutral countries. Both the tasks it has undertaken are of the first importance, and it should have the support of every patriot.

### GERMANY'S PROGRAM.

Professor Ernst Haeckel, the militant German zoologist, supplies, in an interview in the Berliner Tagesblatt, the following summary:

Freedom from the tyranny of England to be secured as follows:

1. The invasion of the British piratical State by the German Army and Navy and the occupation of London.

2. The partition of Belgium, the western portion as far as Ostend and Antwerp to become a German Federal State; the northern portion to fall to Holland, and the southeastern portion to be added to Luxemburg, which also should become a German Federal State.

3. Germany to obtain the greater part of the British colonies and of the Congo State.

4. France to give up a portion of her northeastern provinces.

5. Russia to be reduced to impotency by the re-establishment of the Kingdom of Poland, which should be united with Austria-Hungary.

6. The Baltic Provinces of Russia to be restored to Germany.

7. Finland to become an independent kingdom and be united with Sweden.

An article by Georges Clemenceau, in L'Homme Enchaîné, reports the following view of the German terms accredited to Count Bernstorff, German Ambassador at Washington:

One of my friends in America informs me of a curious conversation between an influential banker and the German Ambassador, Count Bernstorff. The banker, who had just handed over a substantial check for the German Red Cross, asked Count Bernstorff what the Kaiser would take from France after the victory.

The Ambassador did not seem the least surprised at this somewhat premature question. He answered it quite calmly, ticking off the various points on his fingers as follows:

1. All the French colonies, including the whole of Morocco, Algeria, and Tunis.

2. All the country northeast of a straight line from Saint-Valéry to Lyons, that is to say, more than one quarter of French territory, including 15,000,000 inhabitants.

3. An indemnity of 10,000,000,000 francs, ($2,000,000,000.)

4. A tariff allowing all German goods to enter France free during twenty-five years, without reciprocity for French goods entering Germany. After this period the Treaty of Frankfurt will again be applied.

5. The suppression of recruiting in France during twenty-five years.

6. The destruction of all French fortresses.

7. France to hand over 3,000,000 rifles, 2,000 cannon, and 40,000 horses.

8. The protection of all German patents without reciprocity.

9. France must abandon Russia and Great Britain.

10. A treaty of alliance with Germany for twenty-five years.

Dr. Bernhard Dernburg, late German Colonial Secretary of State, has published an article in The Independent, in which this forecast appears:

1. Germany will not consider it wise to take any European territory, but will make minor corrections of frontiers for military purposes by occupying such frontier territory as has proved a weak spot in the German armor.

2. Belgium belongs geographically to the German Empire. She commands the mouth of the biggest German stream; Antwerp is essentially a German port. That Antwerp should not belong to Germany is as much an anomaly as if New Orleans and the Mississippi delta had been excluded from Louisiana, or as if New York had remained English after the War of Independence. Moreover, Belgium's present plight was her own fault. She had become the vassal of England and France. Therefore, while "probably" no attempt would be made to place Belgium within the German Empire alongside Bavaria, Württemberg, and Saxony, because of her non-German population, she will be incorporated in the German Customs Union after the Luxemburg pattern.

3. Belgian neutrality, having been proved an impossibility, must be abolished. Therefore the harbors of Belgium must be secured for all time against British or French invasion.

4. Great Britain having bottled up the North Sea, a mare liberum must be established. England's theory that the sea is her boundary, and all the sea her territory down to the three-mile limit of other powers, cannot be tolerated. Consequently the Channel coasts of England, Holland, Belgium, and France must be neutralized even in times of war, and the American and German doctrine that private property on the high seas should enjoy the same freedom of seizure as private property does on land must be guaranteed by all nations. This condition Herr Dernburg accompanies by an appeal to the United States duly to note, and Britain is making commercial war upon Germany.

5. All cables must be neutralized.

6. All Germany's colonies are to be returned. Germany, in view of her growing population, must get extra territory capable of population by whites. The Monroe Doctrine bars her from America, therefore she must take Morocco, "if it is really fit for the purpose."

7. A free hand must be given to Germany in the development of her commercial and industrial relations with Turkey "without interference." This would mean a recognized sphere of German influence from the Persian Gulf to the Dardanelles.

8. There must be no further development of Japanese influence in Manchuria.

9. All small nations, such as Finland, Poland, and the Boers in South Africa, if they support Germany, must have the right to frame their own destinies, while Egypt is to be returned, if she desires it, to Turkey.

These conditions, Herr Dernburg concludes, would "fulfill the peaceful aims which Germany has had for the last forty-four years." They show, in his opinion, that Germany has no wish for world dominion or for any predominance in Europe incommensurate with the rights of the 122,000,000 Germans and Austrians.

## The British Volunteers.

By KATHERINE DRAYTON MAYRANT SIMONS, JR.

We are coming, Mother, coming

O'er the seas—your Younger Sons!

From the mighty-mouthed Saint Lawrence

Or where sacred Ganges runs,

We are coming for your blessing

By a ritual of guns!

We are coming, Mother, coming

On the way our fathers came!

For their spirits rise to beckon

At the whisper of your name;

And we come that you may knight us

By your accolade of flame!

We are coming, Mother, coming!

For the death is less to feel

Than to hear you call unanswered?

'Tis the Saxon's old appeal,

And we come to prove us worthy

By its ordeal of steel!

## Chronology of the War

## Showing Progress of Campaigns on All Fronts and Collateral Events from Jan. 31, 1915, up to and Including Feb. 28, 1915.

Continued from the last Number.

### CAMPAIGN IN EASTERN EUROPE

Feb. 1—Russians retake Borjimow trenches and capture men of Landsturm; severe cold hampers operations in Galicia.

Feb. 2—Germans advance, with heavy losses, southward toward the Vistula and eastward between Bejoun and Orezelewo.

Feb. 3—Russians again pour into Hungary as Austrians yield important positions; German position north of the Vistula is insecure.

Feb. 4—Von Hindenburg hurls 50,000 men at Russian lines near Warsaw.

Feb. 5—Russians reported to have killed 30,000 Germans under Gen. Mackensen; Russians recapture Gumine.

Feb. 6—General German offensive is looked for; Russians shift troops in East Galicia and Bukowina.

Feb. 7—Germans rush reinforcements to East Prussia; second line of trenches pierced by Russians near Borjimow; Austrians resume attacks on Montenegrin positions on the Drina.

Feb. 8—Russian cavalry sweeps northward toward East Prussia; Russians move their right wing forward in the Carpathians but retire in Bukowina; Germans shift 600,000 troops from Poland to East Prussia, using motor cars; Italians say that 15,000 Germans died in attempting to take Warsaw.

Feb. 9—Austro-German forces attack Russians at three points in the Carpathians; Russians begin the evacuation of Bukowina, where Austrians have had successes; Russians make a wedge in East Prussia across Angorapp River.

Feb. 10—Fierce fighting in the Carpathian passes; Russians are retreating from Bukowina.

Feb. 11—Russians fall back in Mazurian Lake district; they still hold Czernowitz.

Feb. 12—Von Hindenburg, as a result of a several days' battle, wins a great victory over the Tenth Russian Army in the Mazurian Lake region, part of the operations taking place under the eyes of the Kaiser; more than 50,000 prisoners are taken, with fifty cannon and sixty machine guns; the Russians retreat in disorder across the frontier, their loss in killed and wounded being estimated at 30,000; a second line of defense is being strengthened by the Russians; Paris announces the complete failure of German offensive in Poland.

Feb. 14—Russians check Germans in Lyck region; battle raging in Bukowina; Albanians invade Servia and force Servians to retreat from the frontier.

Feb. 15—Russian lines hold in the north; Austrians state that Bukowina has been entirely evacuated by the Russians; Germans retake Czernowitz.

Feb. 16—Germans occupy Plock and Bielsk; Russians fall back in North Poland; Austrians win in Dukla Pass; Servians drive back Albanian invaders.

Feb. 17—Germans prepare for attack along whole Russian front; cholera and typhus gain headway in Poland.

Feb. 18—Belgrade bombarded; Germans try to cut off Warsaw.

Feb. 19—Germans abandon march to Niemen; they march toward Plonsk from two directions; they occupy Tauroggen.

Feb. 20—Germans repulsed at Ossowetz; Russians bombard Przemysl; Germans capture French Hospital Corps in East Prussia.

Feb. 21—Russians force fighting from East Prussia to Bukowina.

Feb. 22—Russians make progress in Galicia and the Carpathians; it is said that German and Austrian armies are being merged.

Feb. 23—Russians force Germans back along the Bobr; Germans assemble greater forces at Przanysz; Russians destroy two Austrian brigades between Stanislau and Wyzkow; Austrians repulsed near Krasne.

Feb. 24—Russians have successes in the Carpathians near Uzrok Pass.

Feb. 25—Germans besiege Ossowetz; Russians gain in the Carpathians and again invade Bukowina; Russian wedge splits Austrian Army in the Carpathians; fighting on Stanislau Heights.

Feb. 26—Fighting in progress on a 260-mile front; battle in north sways to East Prussian frontier; Germans retire in Przanysz region; Germans claim capture of eleven Russian Generals in Mazurian Lake battle; snow and intense cold hinder operations in Bukowina.

Feb. 27—Germans retire in the north; Russians recapture Przanysz; German battalion annihilated on the Bobr; Russians advance in Galicia and claim recapture of Stanislau and Kolomea; stubborn fighting north of Warsaw.

Feb. 28—Russians are attacking along whole front; Germans checked in North Poland and many taken prisoners; General Brusiloff's army is claimed by the Russians to have thus far captured 188,000 Austrians.

### CAMPAIGN IN WESTERN EUROPE.

Feb. 1—Germans evacuate Cernay and burn Alsatian towns as French advance.

Feb. 3—Germans try to retake Great Dune; Allies make gains in Belgium; fighting at Westende.

Feb. 5—Allies are making a strong offensive movement in Belgium.

Feb. 7—British take German trenches at Guinchy.

Feb. 9—Germans again bombard Rheims, Soissons, and other places; fighting on skis is occurring in Alsace.

Feb. 14—Germans are making preparations for an offensive movement in Alsace.

Feb. 16—French forces gain in Champagne and advance on a two-mile front; fighting in La Bassée.

Feb. 18—Allies make offensive movements; Germans give up Norroy.

Feb. 23—Germans use Austrian twelve-inch howitzers for bombardment of Rheims.

Feb. 26—French gain on the Meuse.

Feb. 28—Germans advance west of the Vosges, forcing French back four miles on a thirteen-mile front; French gain in Champagne, taking many trenches.

### CAMPAIGN IN AFRICA.

Feb. 3—Portugal is sending reinforcements to Angola, much of which is in German hands, although there has been no declaration of war between Portugal and Germany; some of the anti-British rebels in South Africa surrender.

Feb. 4—Germans have evacuated Angola; some South African rebel leaders, including "Prophet" Vankenbsburg, surrender.

Feb. 6—Germans are repulsed at Kakamas, a Cape Colony village.

Feb. 13—Germans have won a success against the British on the Orange River; German East Africa is reported now clear of the enemy; Germans have invaded Uganda and British East Africa.

Feb. 16—Trial of General De Wet and other South African rebel leaders is begun.

Feb. 21—German newspaper report charges that German missionaries are tortured by pro-British Africans.

Feb. 26—Botha heads British troops that plan invasion of German Southwest Africa.

### TURKISH AND EGYPTIAN CAMPAIGN.

Feb. 1—Turks withdraw forces from Adrianople to defend Tchatalja; Russian victories over Turks in the Caucasus and at Tabriz prove to be of a sweeping character; Turks have been massacring Persians.

Feb. 2—American Consul, Gordon Paddock, prevented much destruction by Turks at Tabriz.

Feb. 3—Turks, while trying to cross Suez Canal, are attacked by British, many of them being drowned; Turks are driven back at Kurna by British gunboats.

Feb. 4—Turks routed, with heavy loss, in two engagements on the Suez Canal, New Zealand forces being engaged; Turks are near Armageddon.

Feb. 5—British take more Turkish prisoners.

Feb. 7—British expect Turks again to attack Suez Canal, and make plans accordingly.

Feb. 8—Turks in Egypt are in full retreat; their losses in dead have been heavy.

Feb. 13—British wipe out Turkish force at Tor.

Feb. 17—Work of Consul Paddock in saving British property at Tabriz is praised in British House of Commons.

Feb. 22—Turks are massacring Armenians in Caucasus towns; Turks make general retirement on Damascus.

Feb. 28—Turks have evacuated the Sinai Peninsula.

### NAVAL RECORD—GENERAL.

Feb. 1—German submarine seen near Liverpool; there is a new theory that infernal machines in coal caused blowing up of the Formidable and the Bulwark.

Feb. 2—English shipping paper offers reward of $2,500 to first British merchant vessel that sinks a German submarine; German submarine tries to torpedo British hospital ship Asturias; men from a Swedish warship are killed by a mine.

Feb. 3—German auxiliary is sunk by British cruiser Australia off Patagonia; German destroyer reported sunk by Russians in the Baltic.

Feb. 4—British ships shell Germans at Westende.

Feb. 5—Germans deny that Russians sank a destroyer in the Baltic.

Feb. 7—Allied fleets menace the Dardanelles.

Feb. 9—Turkish cruiser bombards Yalta; Russians shell Trebizond.

Feb. 10—Germans are said to have sunk casks of petrol off the English coast for use by their submarines; French Government, in report to neutrals, denounces sinking of refugee ship Admiral Ganteaume.

Feb. 11—Cargo of American steamship Wilhelmina, bound for Hamburg, is seized by British at Falmouth, and a prize court will pass upon question whether food destined only for German civilians can go through in neutral bottoms; it is generally understood that the Wilhelmina shipment was made as a test case; German submarines, driven into Norwegian ports by storm, are forced to put to sea again.

Feb. 13—Two British steamers long overdue are believed to have been sunk by the Germans.

Feb. 14—Canada is guarding her ports more vigilantly; the Captain of British steamer Laertes is decorated for saving his ship from a German submarine by fast manoeuvring.

Feb. 15—British steamer Wavelet hits mine in English Channel and is badly damaged; British submarines are in the Baltic; Austrian fleet bombards Antivari.

Feb. 16—Captain of the German battle-cruiser Blücher dies from pneumonia contracted when his ship went down in the North Sea fight; British merchant collier Dulwich is torpedoed and sunk off French coast.

Feb. 17—French steamer Ville de Lille is sunk by German submarine.

Feb. 18—German auxiliary cruiser Kronprinz Wilhelm has sunk six British ships off the coast of Brazil.

Feb. 20—Allied fleets are pounding the Dardanelles forts with great effect; German steamer Holger interned at Buenos Aires.

Feb. 21—Berlin papers report that a British transport, loaded with troops, has been sunk.

Feb. 22—Two German submarines are missing; Germans are building submarines near Antwerp.

Feb. 23—Australian mail boat Maloja fired on by armed merchantman in English Channel; operations at the Dardanelles interrupted by unfavorable weather.

Feb. 24—British capture German steamer Gotha; British armed merchantman Clan Macnaughton reported missing.

Feb. 25—The four principal forts at the entrance of the Dardanelles are reduced by the allied British and French fleet; three German submarines are sent to Austria for use in the Adriatic and Mediterranean.

Feb. 26—Inner forts of Dardanelles are being shelled; mine sweeping begun; wreckage indicates disaster to German submarine U-9 off Norwegian coast; French destroyer Dague hits Austrian mine off Antivari; Allies blockade coast of German East Africa.

Feb. 27—Forty British and French warships penetrate the Dardanelles for fourteen miles; French cruiser seizes, in the English Channel, the American steamer Dacia, which was formerly under German registry and belonged to the Hamburg-American Line, and takes her to Brest; a French prize court will determine the validity of her transfer to American registry; British skipper reports that the German converted cruiser Prinz Eitel Friedrich sank a British ship and a French ship in December.

Feb. 28—Allied fleet prepares to engage the strongest and last of the Dardanelles defenses; land attack in conjunction with the fleet is being considered; English and French flags now fly over wrecked forts; London welcomes seizure of Dacia by French.

### NAVAL RECORD—WAR ZONE.

Feb. 4—Germany proclaims the waters around Great Britain and Ireland, except a passage north of Scotland, a war zone from and after Feb. 18, and states that neutral ships entering the zone will be in danger, in consequence of the misuse of neutral flags said to have been ordered by the British Government.

Feb. 6—Decree is discussed by President Wilson and the Cabinet; dangers of complications for the United States are foreseen; indignation is expressed in Italy, Holland, and Denmark; text of the decree is submitted to the United States State Department by Ambassador Gerard.

Feb. 9—Some European neutrals intend to have the names of their ships printed in huge letters on ships' sides and the national colors painted on.

Feb. 11—The State Department makes public the text of the American note, dated Feb. 10, sent to Ambassador Gerard for delivery to the German Government; the note is firm but friendly, and tells Germany that the United States will hold her "to a strict accountability" should commanders of German vessels of war "destroy on the high seas an American vessel or the lives of American citizens."

Feb. 12—Ambassador Gerard delivers the American note to the German Foreign Secretary and has a long conference with him.

Feb. 13—The German Legation at The Hague warns neutral vessels against entering the war zone; German Foreign Office comments on the friendly tone of the American note; Germany has requested the United States to advise ship owners to man vessels sailing to German ports with subjects of neutral States.

Feb. 15—Germany communicates to the United States through Ambassador von Bernstorff a preliminary answer to the American note; Germany would be willing to recede from her decree if England would permit foodstuffs to enter Germany for use by the civilian population; the preliminary answer is cabled to Ambassador Page for presentation to the British Foreign Office as a matter of information; Italy and Holland protest to Germany against war zone decree; Winston Churchill, in Parliament, hints at retaliation.

Feb. 18—Germany replies to American note; reply is friendly in tone, but its substance causes concern in Washington; Germany still disclaims responsibility for fate of neutral vessels in war zone; war zone decree now in effect; ships are moving in and out of British ports as usual; Norwegian steamer Nordcap is blown up by a mine.

Feb. 19—German submarines torpedo Norwegian tanker Belridge near Folkestone and French steamer Denorah off Dieppe; British Government suspends passenger travel between England and the Continent; Irish Channel services are continued, and it is said that the ships may fly the Irish flag.

Feb. 20—British steamer Cambank sunk by submarine in Irish Sea; Norwegian steamer Bjarka sunk by mine off Denmark; it is reported that hundreds of armed merchant ships are hunting for German submarines.

Feb. 21—American steamer Evelyn sunk by mine off coast of Holland, eight men being lost; German submarine U-12 sinks British steamer Downshire; Dutch vessels sail from Amsterdam painted with the national colors; traffic between England and Sweden is suspended.

Feb. 22—The United States, through Ambassadors Page and Gerard, presents notes to England and Germany proposing modifications of war zone decree by Germany and an arrangement by which England would allow food to enter Germany, for the use of civilians only; ships leave Savannah with the American flag painted on their sides.

Feb. 23—American steamer Carib sunk by a mine off German coast, three men being lost; Norwegian steamer Regin destroyed off Dover; British collier Brankshome Chine attacked in English Channel; Swedish steamer Specia sunk by mine in North Sea; British limit traffic in Irish Channel; twelve ships, of which two were American, have been sunk or damaged since the war zone decree went into effect; Germany includes Orkney and Shetland Islands in war zone.

Feb. 24—Germany, replying to Italian protest, promises to respect Italian flag; British steamer Harpalion torpedoed off Beachy Head; Minister van Dyke reports that the Carib was sunk outside route prescribed by the German instructions.

Feb. 25—British steamer Western Coast lost in English Channel; British steamer Deptford hits a mine off Scarborough; Scandinavian conference decides against convoying ships; sailings between Sweden and England resumed.

Feb. 26—It is reported from London that the Allies favor reprisals against Germany by which shipment of all commodities to and from Germany will be stopped; formal announcement from Premier Asquith expected in a few days; German submarines allow Dutch steamer to pass; Swedish steamship Svarton hits mine; passenger service between England and Flushing to be resumed.

### NAVAL RECORD—NEUTRAL FLAGS

Feb. 6—Lusitania, warned of submarines, flies American flag in Irish Sea on voyage to Liverpool.

Feb. 7—British Foreign Office issues statement upholding use of American flag by Lusitania and declares that the practice of thus protecting merchant ships is well established; passengers uphold Capt. Dow's act.

Feb. 8—British Government says that Capt. Dow was not ordered by Government officials to use neutral flag.

Feb. 11—The State Department makes public the text of the American note, dated Feb. 10, sent to Ambassador Page for delivery to the British Government; the note asks the British authorities to do all in their power to prevent the deceptive use of the American flag by British ships and suggests that responsibility might rest upon Great Britain in case of destruction of American ships by Germans; according to passengers arriving in New York, the Cunarder Orduna flew American flag as precaution against submarine attack before Lusitania did.

Feb. 15—Holland sends protest to England against use by British ships of neutral flags.

Feb. 19—England, replying to American note, says that the United States and other neutrals should not grudge the use of their flags to avoid danger, and that the use of neutral flags has hitherto been generally permitted.

### AERIAL RECORD.

Feb. 1—Germans drop bombs on Dunkirk; Russia threatens to treat air raiders of unfortified towns as pirates.

Feb. 2—French airmen burn castle in Alsace where German staff officers are housed.

Feb. 3—Swiss troops fire on German airmen; indications are that England will not uphold Russia's threat to treat hostile aviators as pirates.

Feb. 4—Body of German aviator engaged in Christmas Day raid found in the Thames.

Feb. 5—Allies' airmen force German General to abandon Altkirch headquarters; Germany protests against Russian threat against aviators.

Feb. 6—British aviator sinks German submarine.

Feb. 10—Allies' aviators damaged Düsseldorf arsenal in recent raid; bombs dropped in Adrianople; French bring down aviator who had dropped bombs on Paris.

Feb. 11—Bomb dropped by British airmen kills thirty-five Germans in Antwerp fort; Dunkirk repulses raid by German aviator.

Feb. 12—Thirty-four British airships raid Belgian coast seaports; Ostend station set on fire; Grahame-White narrowly escapes drowning; attack intended as a check for German blockade plans; French aviators raid German aerdome in Alsace.

Feb. 13—Germany states that the British raid of yesterday caused "regrettable damage to the civilian population"; two British airmen killed at Brussels.

Feb. 14—Excitement in Ottawa over report of German raid; French aeroplanes rout Zeppelin near Mülhausen.

Feb. 15—Austrian aviators fire on Montenegrin royal family at Rieka.

Feb. 16—British aviators make another raid in Belgium; French attack aerdome at Ghistelle and attack Eichwald in Alsace.

Feb. 17—Copenhagen reports explosion of a Zeppelin off the coast of Jutland; Allies' airmen attack network of Belgian canals, which may be used as submarine base.

Feb. 18—Another Zeppelin wrecked off the coast of Jutland.

Feb. 19—French aviator drops bombs on Ostend; Germany apologizes to Switzerland for aviator's flight over Swiss territory.

Feb. 20—Austrian aviator drops bombs on Cettinje; England distributes illustrated posters showing differences between English and German aircraft.

Feb. 21—German aeroplane drops bombs on Braintree, Colchester, and Marks Tey, little damage being done.

Feb. 22—Zeppelin bombards Calais, killing five; Buckingham Palace and other places in London are guarded against aeroplane attack.

Feb. 23—German aeroplane seen off the English coast.

Feb. 24—Three British aviators lost in raid on Belgium.

Feb. 27—French aviators bombard Metz; Germans drop bombs on Nieuport.

### AUSTRALIA.

Feb. 2—Second contingent of troops reaches Egypt; Minister of Defense says that Government has placed no limit on number of men to be sent.

### AUSTRIA.

Feb. 2—Government issues warning that Rumanian volunteers caught serving with Russians will be shot.

Feb. 6—Two Czech newspapers suspended for comments on the war unacceptable to the authorities; editors of papers in Styria threaten to stop publication unless censorship is relaxed.

Feb. 9—Commercial and political organizations protest against muzzling of the press.

Feb. 12—Czechs clamor for independence; Hungarian Deputies have been conferring with Rumanian Deputies to try to reach an agreement about Transylvania which would keep Rumania out of the war; the negotiations have now been abandoned, as Rumanians wanted complete autonomy for Transylvania.

Feb. 13—Entire Austro-Hungarian Landsturm is called out.

Feb. 15—Church bells may be melted to supply copper.

Feb. 21—Foreign Minister Burian and German Imperial Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg have three long conferences in Vienna.

Feb. 22—Austrian and German troops have been concentrating for several days along the Swiss-Italian border; miles of trenches have been dug.

Feb. 24—Germany is reported to be bringing strong pressure on Austria to induce the latter to cede to Italy her Italian province of Trent and a portion of the Istrian Peninsula for the purpose of keeping Italy neutral.

Feb. 28—Full text of Austro-Hungarian "Red Book" is published in THE NEW YORK TIMES; it is estimated that the total Austrian loss, killed, wounded and prisoners, is now 1,600,000.

### BELGIUM.

Feb. 5—Government protests against annulment by Germany of exequaturs of Consuls of neutral powers.

Feb. 8—Letter from Cardinal Mercier to the higher clergy of his diocese protests against violation of his rights as a Belgian and as a Cardinal; legation in Washington denounces tax imposed by Germans on refugees who fail to return to Belgium.

Feb. 18—Germany withdraws interdiction against correspondence by Cardinal Mercier with Belgian Bishops.

Feb. 24—Belgian women in Brussels are ordered by Germans to stop wearing hats made after style of Belgian soldiers' caps.

Feb. 27—Committee appointed by Germans to investigate condition of Belgian art treasures reports that the actual destruction has been insignificant, while objects which have been damaged can be repaired.

### BULGARIA.

Feb. 2—Forces have been sent to organize the naval defense of Dedeagatch.

Feb. 3—Premier Radoslavoff says that the Government is neutral, but that the Macedonian question causes apprehension.

Feb. 10—Government plans to remain neutral despite German loan.

### CANADA.

Feb. 3—Unusual measures taken to guard the Duke of Connaught, Governor General, at the opening of Parliament.

Feb. 8—The first working day of Parliament; party leaders declare there will be a political truce during the war; Government to have ample funds; Colonial Secretary sends dispatch reviewing military operations from British viewpoint and stating that no Canadian troops are yet on the firing line except the Princess Patricia Light Infantry.

Feb. 10—Sixty-five Canadians have died in the encampment at Salisbury Plain, England.

Feb. 14—Excitement in Ottawa over report of intended German air raid from American soil.

Feb. 15—Parliament buildings, Royal Mint, and Rideau Hall, the Governor General's residence, are darkened in fear of German air raid.

Feb. 16—Government asks United States to guard American end of international bridges; the whole of the first contingent is now in France.

Feb. 19—Guards at international bridges are doubled.

### ENGLAND.

Feb. 3—It is planned to devote the present session of Parliament entirely to war measures.

Feb. 5—Official estimates place the number of effective men in the army, exclusive of those serving in India, at 3,000,000.

Feb. 8—Premier Asquith tells Parliament that British losses to Feb. 4 are about 104,000 in killed, wounded, and missing.

Feb. 9—Admiral Lord Charles Beresford suggests public hanging of captured German sea and air raiders.

Feb. 10—At a cost of $100,000 the Government has converted Donington Hall, Leicestershire, one of the most beautiful old places in England, into a rest home for captured German officers.

Feb. 11—Government plans to publish biweekly communications from Field Marshal French.

Feb. 12—First exchanges of disabled prisoners between England and Germany are arranged through the Papal Nuncio at Berlin.

Feb. 13—Pamphlet issued to the public gives instructions as to how to act in case of German invasion.

Feb. 15—First troops of new armies are pouring into France; enemy subjects denied admittance at ports.

Feb. 17—Board of Trade plans to compensate all merchant seamen who may be injured during hostilities.

Feb. 18—Victoria Cross is conferred on twelve men, one of whom, Corporal Leary of the Irish Guards, killed eight Germans in hand-to-hand combat and took two Germans prisoners.

Feb. 23—Captain who was formerly in command of the super-dreadnought Audacious, generally stated to have been sunk by a mine on Oct. 27, is made a Rear Admiral; promotion revives rumors that the Audacious was saved and is being repaired; British merchant shipping loss thus far is $26,750,000, including both ships and cargoes, the Liverpool and London War risks Association citing figures as showing the efficacy of British Navy's protection.

Feb. 25—Sir Edward Grey, Foreign Secretary, announces in the House of Commons that Great Britain is in "entire accord with Russia's desire for access to the sea."

Feb. 27—Six newspaper correspondents, including one American, are to be permitted to go to the front under auspices of the War Office, according to present plans.

### GERMANY.

Feb. 1—Official order has been issued that all stocks of copper and other metals used for war purposes are to be reserved for the army.

Feb. 4—German refugees from Kiao-Chau reach New York.

Feb. 5—It is reported that a sham railroad station has been built outside of Cologne to deceive French aviators; the Second Secretary of the British Legation is arrested in Brussels.

Feb. 6—An Alsatian is condemned to death for fighting in French Army.

Feb. 7—French prisoner condemned to two years' imprisonment for defacing portrait of the Kaiser.

Feb. 8—Government orders neutrals expelled from Alsace; Archbishop of Cologne writes pastoral letter predicting victory.

Feb. 9—Cardinal von Hartman says that the motto of the day is "Trust in God and hold out"; there is a scene in Prussian Diet, when two Socialists protest against the war.

Feb. 10—Socialists indorse the war at a meeting in Mainz.

Feb. 11—Berlin communes suggest that all members of the Emden's crew be authorized to add the word Emden to their names.

Feb. 12—Government warns against offering insults to Americans.

Feb. 14—Many French civilians are freed; the Kaiser is said to be fifth in popularity among contemporary German heroes, von Hindenburg being first and the Crown Prince second.

Feb. 15—Substitute for petrol is stated to have been found.

Feb. 16—Spaniards are expelled from Baden; Iron Crosses given to Emden's men; German nurses and surgeons are acquitted by the French of charges of pillage at Peronne.

Feb. 19—Passport rules are made stricter; all men of last reserve are stated to have been called out.

Feb. 20—New submarines, airships, and two more dreadnoughts are under construction.

Feb. 21—Afternoon entertainments are suppressed in Berlin.

Feb. 22—Boys from seventeen to twenty are, it is reported, to be called out for Landsturm; charges of cruelty to British prisoners of war are denied.

Feb. 24—Frankfurter Zeitung estimates that prisoners of war now held in Germany and Austria are 1,035,000, 75 per cent. being held by the Germans.

Feb. 27—Admiral von Pohl, Chief of the Admiralty Staff, has been selected as successor to Admiral von Ingenohl, who has been removed from command of the battle fleet; manufacturing and agriculture enterprises in the occupied parts of France and Belgium are being kept alive under the management of Germans to contribute to support of the armies; high school teachers and pupils are in the army.

Feb. 28—It is reported that Ambassador von Bernstorff is to be recalled to Berlin and that Baron Treutler, a friend of the Kaiser, will be his successor; the total Prussian losses are now 1,102,212, in killed, wounded, and prisoners.

### GREECE.

Feb. 1—Nation at large is declared to be ready to join war on behalf of Serbia.

Feb. 9—The Government believes that Germany should respect Greek rights in the naval war zone.

Feb. 14—There is danger of Greece's becoming involved in hostilities because of the Albanian invasion of Serbia.

### ITALY.

Feb. 2—Reservists in England warned to be ready to respond to call.

Feb. 7—Russia plans to send to Italy many Austrian prisoners of Italian nationality.

Feb. 8—Soldiers of Second Category are to remain under colors until May; meeting in Padua is held in favor of joining the war and of dissolving the Triple Alliance.

Feb. 9—Federation of the Italian Press condemns pro-German propaganda; Garibaldi visits Joffre.

Feb. 10—Garibaldi, in London, says that popular feeling in Italy is against Germans and Austrians.

Feb. 20—One million men are under arms; Premier Salandra avoids war debate in Parliament; volunteers await arrival of Garibaldi to head expedition to aid Allies.

Feb. 23—It is planned to call more men to the colors.

Feb. 27—Premier Salandra, addressing Chamber of Deputies, says the nation does not desire war but is ready to make any sacrifice to realize her aspirations.

### RUMANIA.

Feb. 19—There is much uneasiness throughout the nation as Parliament reopens after a recess.

Feb. 20—Russian Minister to Rumania reports to the Russian Foreign Minister that, as far as he can gather, Rumania intends to continue her policy of armed neutrality and that Russia should not rely upon Rumanian co-operation.

Feb. 23—The nation is alarmed by the revival of the traditional Russian policy of obtaining command of Constantinople and the straits; Rumania stands for the internationalization of Constantinople, the Bosporus, and the Dardanelles, free passage of the Dardanelles being held vital for her existence.

### RUSSIA.

Feb. 2—Six German subjects and two Russians are sentenced to prison for collecting funds for German Navy; Government issues statement giving instances of alleged German cruelties to Russians in Germany after declaration of war.

Feb. 3—Girl who fought in nineteen battles is awarded the St. George's Cross.

Feb. 4—It is stated that regimental chaplains sometimes lead men in charges after the officers are killed or wounded.

Feb. 9—Lvov (Lemberg) to be recognized as Russian; Sir Edward Grey may send British commercial attaché there; Duma opens; Foreign Minister Sazonof assails Germany and declares that her intrigues caused the war.

Feb. 10—Resolution is unanimously adopted by the Duma declaring that the Russian Nation is determined to carry on the war until such conditions have been imposed on the enemy as will insure the peace of Europe; Prof. Paul N. Milukoff, speaking in the Duma in behalf of the Constitutional Democrats, says that the principal task is the acquisition of Constantinople and the straits.

Feb. 13—Duma adopts resolutions asking war relief for provinces suffering from the war and an inquiry by commission into enemies' alleged violations of international law; the session is suspended until not later than the middle of December.

Feb. 20—It is planned to put war prisoners to work.

Feb. 24—Russian Ambassador at Washington presents to United States Government a "mémoire" dealing with atrocities and violations of the laws and usages of war alleged to have been committed by German and Austro-Hungarian armies along the Polish and East Prussian frontiers; the communication is also delivered to other neutral Governments, and it is planned to bring it before all the Red Cross societies of the world.

Feb. 26—Consul in London says men living abroad will be held liable for military service.

### SERBIA.

Feb. 15—Prince Alexine Karageorgevitch of Serbia arrives in London with photographs in support of charges of atrocities alleged to have been committed against Serbian women and children by Austrians during the Austrian occupation.

### TURKEY.

Feb. 1—There is widespread suffering in Palestine and Syria.

Feb. 3—Abdul Hamid advises peace.

Feb. 6—Archives of the Porte are moved to Asia Minor; Field Marshal von der Goltz's rule is stated to be absolute; it is reported that able-bodied men are exempted from service on payment of money.

Feb. 13—The Russians hold a total of 49,000 Turkish prisoners of war, according to estimates from Petrograd; a strict mail censorship prevails in Syria.

Feb. 15—Officers who conspired to stop the war are court-martialed.

Feb. 16—French Vice Consul at Sana is freed from detention.

Feb. 20—Jerusalem authorities are ordered to guard non-Moslems as a result of intervention of United States Ambassador Morgenthau.

Feb. 21—More reserves are called out; bitterness toward Germans is being expressed in Syria.

Feb. 27—At a Cabinet Council in Constantinople it was decided to transfer the seat of Government to Broussa in Asia Minor.

### UNITED STATES.

Feb. 2—Werner Horn, a German, tries to blow up the Canadian Pacific Railroad bridge over the St. Croix River between Vanceboro, Me., and New Brunswick; attempt is a failure, bridge being only slightly damaged; he is arrested in Maine; Canada asks for his extradition.

Feb. 5—Horn sentenced to jail for thirty days on the technical charge of injuring property, several windows in Vanceboro having been broken by the explosion.

Feb. 24—R.P. Stegler, a German naval reservist, confesses to Federal authorities in New York, when arrested, details of alleged passport frauds by which German spies travel as American citizens, and charges that Capt. Boy-Ed, German Naval Attaché at Washington, is involved; Federal Grand Jury in Boston begins inquiry to determine whether Horn violated law regulating interstate transportation of explosives.

Feb. 25—Capt. Boy-Ed denies the truth of statements made by Stegler involving him; Stegler is held for alleged obtaining of a United States passport by fraud; two other men under arrest.

Feb. 28—German Embassy at Washington issues a statement characterizing Stegler's allegations about Capt. Boy-Ed as "false and fantastic," and "of a pathological character," and hinting at attempted blackmail.

### RELIEF WORK.

Feb. 2—It is planned to send a Belgian relief ship with supplies donated wholly by the people of New York State; France facilitates entry of tobacco sent by Americans as gift to French soldiers; organization is formed in New York called the War Relief Clearing House for France and Her Allies to systematize shipment of supplies.

Feb. 3—Russia permits supplies to be sent to captives, but Russian military authorities will do the distributing.

Feb. 4—Steamer Aymeric sails with cargo of food from twelve States for Belgium.

Feb. 5—Russia refuses to permit relief expeditions to minister to German and Austrian prisoners in Siberia; the United States asks that an American doctor be permitted to accompany Red Cross supplies to observe their distribution; American Commission for Relief in Belgium is sending food to some towns and villages of Northern France in hands of the Germans, where the commission's representatives have found distressing conditions.

Feb. 7—New York women plan to equip a lying-in hospital for destitute mothers of Belgium.

Feb. 10—Steamer Great City sails with supplies for the Belgians estimated to be worth $530,000, this being the most valuable cargo yet shipped; the shipment represents gifts from every State, 50,000 persons having contributed; Rockefeller Foundation is negotiating in Rumania for grain for people of Poland.

Feb. 12—American Girls' Aid Society sends apparel to France sufficient to clothe 20,000 persons.

Feb. 13—Otto H. Kahn lends his London residence for the use of soldiers and sailors who have been made blind during the war.

Feb. 14—Rockefeller Foundation reports that the situation in Belgium is without a parallel in history; Commission for Relief announces that it is possible to send money direct from United States to persons in Belgium.

Feb. 16—Queen Mary sends letter of thanks for gifts to the British-American War Relief Committee; American Red Cross sends a large consignment of supplies to Russia and Poland.

Feb. 19—London Times Fund for the sick and wounded passes the $5,000,000 mark, thought in London to be a record for a popular fund; steamer Batiscan sails with donations from thirty States; Red Cross ships seventeen automobile ambulances for various belligerents donated by students of Yale and Harvard.

Feb. 22—Sienkiewicz and Paderewski appeal through Paris newspapers for help for Poland.

Feb. 23—Rockefeller Foundation's report to Industrial Commission shows an expenditure of $1,009,000 on war relief up to Jan. 1; food, not clothes, is Belgium's need, so the Commission for Relief in Belgium announces from London office.

Feb. 24—Plans are made for American children to send a ship to be known as the "Easter Argosy—a Ship of Life and Love" with a cargo for the children of Belgium.

Feb. 25—Queen Alexandra thanks British-American War Relief Committee.

Feb. 26—The American Belgian Relief Fund is now $946,000.

Feb. 27—Doctors and nurses sail to open the French Hospital of New York in France.

## The Great Sea Fight.

By J. ROBERT FOSTER.

In my watch on deck at the turn of the night

I saw the spindrift rise,

And I saw by the thin moon's waning light

The shine of dead men's eyes.

They rose from the wave in armor bright,

The men who never knew fear;

They rose with their swords to their hips strapped tight,

And stripped to their fighting gear.

I hauled below, but to and fro

I saw the dead men glide,

With never a plank their bones to tow,

As the slippery seas they ride.

While the bale-star burned where the mists swayed low

They clasped each hand to hand,

And swore an oath by the winds that blow—

They swore by the sea and land.

They swore to fight till the Judgment Day,

Each night ere the cock should crow,

Where the thunders boom and the lightnings play

In the wrack of the battle-glow.

They swore by Drake and Plymouth Bay,

The men of the Good Hope's crew,

By the bones that lay in fierce Biscay,

And they swore by Cradock, too—

That every night, ere the dawn flamed red,

For each man there should be twain

Upon the ships that make their bed

Where England rules the Main.

They pledged—and the ghost of Nelson led—

When the last ship's gunner fell,

They would man the guns—these men long dead—

And ram the charges well.

So we'll choose the night for the Great Sea Fight

Nor ever give chase by day,

Our compeers rise in the white moonlight,

In the wash of the flying spray;

And if we fall in the battle-blight,

The shade of a man long dead

Fights on till dawn on the sea burns bright

And Victory, overhead!

## Notes

1.

  Apparent omission.

2.

  Die Deutsche Volksernährung und der Englische Aushungerungsplan. Eine Denkschrift von Friedrich Aereboe, Karl Ballod, Franz Beyschlag, Wilhelm Caspari, Paul Eltzbacher, Hedwig Heyl, Paul Krusch, Robert Kuczynski, Kurt Lehmann, Otto Lemmermann, Karl Oppenheimer, Max Rubner, Kurt von Rümker, Bruno Tacke, Hermann Warmbold, und Nathan Zuntz. Herausgegeben von Paul Eltzbacher. (Friedr. Vieweg and Sohn. Braunschweig. 1914.)

3.

  The amounts in this column are close approximates.

*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK NEW YORK TIMES CURRENT HISTORY: THE EUROPEAN WAR, VOL 2, NO. 1, APRIL, 1915 ***
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